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1. Introduction 
 
Each morning, same time, the director of the company walks through the corridor. 
And while he passes the room of a manager, each morning he asks: ‘Hi John, 
everything under control?’ Each morning the answer is: ‘Yes, sure.’ 
After two months, same time, same question and same answer, the director enters 
the room: ‘I am concerned about your answer. Let’s have a talk.’ 1 
 
 
1.1 Problem statement 
 
 
Box 1 ‘How do we get our employees in the right mode?’2 
 
In a large Amsterdam-based company, top management is not satisfied with the customer 
focus of the company. With support of a consultant, they start an improvement process in 
the entire organization. The approach follows a cascade structure: at each level of the 
organization, teams develop improvement plans that aim at the shared goal, customer 
focus. This way, responsibility for developing ideas and bringing them into practice is 
combined. The approach strongly appeals to employees’ ideas and insights and aims at 
stimulating ownership. In the short run the approach leads to creativity and practical 
improvement ideas that really seem to work. Top management is enthusiast about the first 
results. However, in the longer run the energy declines. Managers at all levels struggle 
with the same questions: ‘Why is it so difficult to keep this alive? Why do we persistently 
have to push and persuade? Why aren’t they intrinsically motivated? How do we get our 
employees in the right mode?’ 
 
 
Management have conducted several interventions, but are confronted with the 
same problems time after time. Despite several interventions, they still face 
problems with lack of energy and opponent forces (in management terms: 
resistance). Sometimes it seems that the harder they try, the worse the result or 
even the larger the problems. Management try to gain control and seem to lose 
control. Management try ‘to break through resistance’, though this seems to 
stimulate opposition. Obvious interventions produce non-obvious consequences. It 
is these kinds of situations this study deals with. 
 
Extensive literature on change management has been released over the past 
decades. Consultants and managers can select their own favourite approaches, 
models, checklists and scorecards. Still, numerous studies support the belief that 
there seems to be a collective incompetence to organize successful change 
processes (e.g. Kearny, 1997; Mourier and Smith, 2003; Boonstra, 2000; 
                                                
1 The quotes/narratives at the start of each chapter are illustrative of the contents of that chapter. 
2 Examples in the theoretical exploration have been put in boxes. They are not considered to be empirical 
evidence, but only illustrations to create a text that is accessible and understandable.  
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Pettigrew, 1997). Beer & Nohria (2000) have tried to find an unambiguous 
explanation (integrative conceptual framework) by bringing some leading 
management thinkers together to ‘break the code of change’. However, in their 
concluding chapter they state “let’s start by admitting that we have not broken the 
code of change” (p. 473).   
 
Do we need more models? Is the right scorecard still not available, or do we need 
better change plans? Day-to-day observations as a consultant and researcher do not 
support this view. The vast majority of managers and management teams have 
knowledge about how to plan and manage change processes, how to measure 
progress and how to behave during this process. And if they do not, they generally 
pick up new insights on these topics easily. Mostly, (top) managers are able to have 
a thorough discussion on how to lead a change process and to select a suitable 
approach. More knowledge and experience seem not to be the topic. Some 
preliminary observations as a consultant and researcher support another view. 
 
Regardless of their spoken change ambitions and their desired management 
behaviour, in action managers often show behaviour that is inconsistent with these 
ambitions and intentions. Illustrative are a number of post-academic courses on 
change management3. In almost thirty different study groups, participants (senior 
managers) were asked to collect the most important conditions for successful 
change. Without any exception, they were able to compose a list of important 
conditions within a couple of minutes, including creating commitment, listening to 
concerns and clear communication. In the next step they were participants in a 
game. The group was divided in subgroups with a position in a company. Only the 
context of the change project was described. Participants were totally free in the way 
they filled in their role. The assignment was to prepare a meeting on the change 
process, each party from its own position. The participants who represented top 
management tended to involve the conditions for successful change in their 
preparation. However, without any exception, as soon as they were confronted with 
different beliefs and opinions during the meeting, they showed behaviour that was 
entirely inconsistent with these conditions: top managers enlarged control by 
persuasion, neglected emotions and suppressed deviant opinions.  
These findings are in line with observations in management practice: although 
managers are very well able to describe what management behaviour would be 
desirable during a meeting with subordinates, as soon as they are confronted with 
critical questions and deviant opinions their actual behaviour tends to be inconsistent 
with their desired behaviour and focus on enlarging control (Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004). Preliminary observations lead to the perception that this inclination to enlarge 
control leads to unintended effects varying from employees who say yes, but act no, 
employees who just undergo the ‘change project’ and take no personal responsibility, 
and employees who come up with ideas but do not bring them into practice to 
                                                
3 Courses by Holland Consulting Group, Amsterdam, conducted in the period from 2003-2008. 
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feelings and divergent visions that are kept undebatable (Noonan, 2007). This way, 
managers might contribute to the problems they face. While many managers 
emphasize their desire to stimulate ownership, entrepreneurship and personal 
responsibility, they find their employees too reactive and dependent, even cynical. 
Employees, in turn, perceive the organization as unsafe and management as 
directive. Interventions contribute to short-lived improvements but lack a long-term 
effect (Ardon, 2006).  
 
These observations turn the attention from what managers say to what they really do 
in action and to the effects of their behaviour on the change process to which they 
aspire. After all, it is not the intentions but the actual management behaviour that 
elicits certain effects. If their behaviour in action is not or only partly governed by 
what they say, then what does govern their behaviour? And how does their actual 
behaviour relate to the change process? Might they, unintendedly, block change and 
–thus- contribute to the preservation of the current situation? 
 
In the vast majority of change situations management put an emphasis on the 
(planned) change approach and methods: what steps and interventions lead from the 
current to the desired situation (Werkman, 2006)? This emphasis is in line with the 
mainstream literature that pays much more attention to change methods (what we 
talk about) than daily interactions (what we actually do). In practice, however, 
blocked change processes often seem to have their roots in daily interactions 
(Argyris, 2004; Noonan, 2007; Schwartz, 2002). 
 
An additional perspective concerns the role of management consultants in these 
interactions between managers and their employees. After all, as soon as they enter 
an organization, they contribute directly to the interactions (McCaughan and Palmer, 
1994). Especially if their focus is on supporting management in their goals, strategies 
and approach (Argyris, 2000; Noonan, 2007; Drukker & Verhaaren, 2002; Strikwerda, 
2004), their role in stagnations in change processes cannot be neglected. For 
example, they might contribute to blocked change by developing and supporting 
strategies to break through resistance, by supporting persuasive management 
behaviour and by bypassing fundamental problems that are difficult to manage and 
control. 
 
The focus of this study is not on development of even more descriptions of change 
methods and desired management behaviour. Nor does it focus on what managers 
and consultants do right or wrong. This study doesn’t aspire to persuade that change 
is better than preservation of the current reality. This study aims at understanding the 
gap between what we say and write on the one hand and what we actually do on the 
other hand. The focus is not on change plans, but on how daily interactions 
contribute to (blocked) change processes.  
This study does not address routine and simple change processes. It focuses on 
problematic situations that are relatively difficult to change and have a repetitive 
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character. ‘Simple’ change processes are not necessarily easy to deal with. Simple 
rather means ‘instrumental’, concerning structure and systems rather than 
performance, people, culture, behaviour or attitude. In this study, change processes 
are considered to be ‘complex’ in case of dynamic complexity (Senge, 1990). Senge 
describes two types of complexity: detail complexity and dynamic complexity. Detail 
complexity refers to a kind of complexity in which there are many variables. 
Examples are working out the timetable of a large school (McCaughan et al., 1994, p. 
27), following a complex set of instructions to assemble a machine, or designing a 
financial planning and control cycle for a large enterprise. Detailed complexity can be 
dealt with by proper procedures.  
Dynamic complexity is of a different order. “When the same action has dramatically 
different effects in the short run and the long, there is dynamic complexity. When an 
action had one set of consequences locally and a very different set of consequences 
in another part of the system, there is dynamic complexity. When obvious 
interventions produce nonobvious consequences, there is dynamic complexity” 
(Senge, 1990, p. 71). Typical examples are laborious attempts to develop 
entrepreneurship and ownership, recurrent patterns of resistance, and problematic 
relations between management and employees. 
 
The problem statement of this study is: 
 
 
How do leaders and their consultants contribute to (de-)blocking dynamically 
complex change processes? 
 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical positioning 
 
This study builds on the scientific tradition of organizational learning and systems 
thinking and particularly on Argyris’ contributions about the effects of unilateral 
control on changing and learning. Argyris (e.g. 1990, 2000, 2004) has conducted 
extensive research upon the inconsistency between what managers say and what 
they do. Besides, he found that managers have a strong inclination to unilaterally 
control difficult situations and subordinates, especially if they experience threat 
and/or embarrassment. Typical expressions of this unilateral control are persuasion, 
neglect of emotions and suppression of deviant opinions. The consequence of – what 
he calls – a unilateral control model is limited learning, escalating error and in the end 
blocked changing. 
 
The unilateral control concept has its roots in two scientific schools that seem to 
approach this concept relatively separately. The first school is the organizational 
learning school, as represented by Argyris. The second school is the (organizational) 
culture school. Interestingly, both schools differ strongly in some preconceptions. 
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The (organizational) culture school assumes that dominant control thinking is 
characteristic of modern Western culture since the Enlightenment (Kamsteeg & Koot, 
2002). In this view people tend to think they can produce and control their social and 
natural environment. In this view we tend to focus on rational coordination in our 
actions (goal – means rationality). This conception of reality also influences our 
perception of organizations and organizational culture. Just as management can 
produce and control organization structure and systems, this perspective assumes 
one can implement culture (Kunda, 1992; Hosking, 2004). However, this is 
problematic, as the desire to control can easily lead to no control. The effects of this 
control view continuously activate their own anti-forces (Kamsteeg & Koot, 2002). As 
a consequence, (top) management often face complex situations. Kamsteeg and 
Koot argue that Dutch top managers often don’t control their business processes 
(any more), however, they do try to convince employees, shareholders and other 
stakeholders that they are in control (p. 156). In their perception, (top) managers’ 
assumptions that they can control their environment are so strong that regardless of 
their negative effects in the management of organizations they tend to hold them 
firmly. 
In another publication, Koot & Sabelis (2000) describe dominant values in 
organizations as the desire to score, schedule, program, judge, define goals, show 
decisiveness, run and look forward. They argue that these values, which are visible 
in day-to-day practice, are not consistent with the more socially desirable views one 
tends to talk about. Here, this school agrees with the organizational learning school. 
 
Characteristic of the (organizational) culture school is the assumption that dominant 
control thinking is region and time-related: the modernistic Western world since the 
Enlightenment. This assumption is in strong contrast to the organizational learning 
school, represented by Argyris. According to Argyris, young or old, female or male, 
minority or majority, wealthy or poor, well-educated or poorly educated – all people 
use action theories that instruct them how to be in control (Argyris & Schön, 1974; 
Argyris 1990, 1999): to be in unilateral control, to win, and not to upset people. These 
action strategies are primarily selling and persuading and, when necessary, save 
one’s own and others’ faces. According to Argyris this action theory (that he calls 
Model I) is neither region nor time-related. In a verbal comment (The Hague, 29th 
June 2007) he stated that this action theory is held by almost everyone all over the 
world. Furthermore, he referred to his research that shows the same action theory 
was held by human beings in Ancient times and even by apes. In numerous 
publications Argyris describes how a unilateral control model leads to defensiveness 
and blocks organizational learning. In the end, this leads to self-fulfilling prophecies 
and error-escalating processes.  
It is these self-fulfilling prophecies and error-escalating processes where Argyris’ 
insights relate to circular patterns and feedback loops in systems thinking. According 
to Senge (1990), nothing is only a cause or only an effect. In systems thinking 
everything is both cause and effect (p. 75). This leads to recurrent patterns that tend 
to be persistent. Senge (1990), McCaughan & Palmer (1994) and Campbell et al. 
 18 
(1994) describe how circular patterns lead to short-term solutions and bypass more 
fundamental problems. 
When management is confronted with the same problems time after time, when they 
try to gain control yet seem to lose control, try to break through resistance yet 
stimulate resistance, when obvious interventions produce non-obvious 
consequences, their behaviour is probably cause and effect and they are probably 
stuck in circular patterns. However, a unilateral control model keeps them from 
learning about their role and instructs them to seal their ineffectiveness. Argyris has 
described how one can facilitate mutual learning and thus de-block changing. He 
introduced Model II, that aims at (i) valid, direct observable data instead of personal 
and hidden interpretations, (ii) internal commitment instead of saying ‘yes’ and 
thinking ‘no’ and (iii) free choice instead of persuasion and manipulation. A recurrent 
question in discussions on Argyris’ work is to what extent managers and 
professionals are able to learn and apply Model II values (Drukker, 1999; 
Edmondson, 1996; Kegan, 1994; Van de Vliert, 1977).  
 
Boonstra (2004), Putnam (1999) and Campbell et al. (1994) have described the 
dominance of a unilateral control model and its effect on organizational change and 
learning. Recently, Argyris’ insights count on a new revival. Several authors have 
made his concepts more accessible through practical and easy-to-read publications 
(e.g. Noonan, 2007; Schwarz, 2002). Argyris has described many examples of 
meetings with managers and professionals in order to share directly observable data. 
This way, he illustrates what individuals say, how unilateral control leads to 
communication problems and how mutual learning contributes to solutions.  
 
By building on the scientific tradition of organizational learning as represented by 
Argyris, this study is rooted in American pragmatism (Sauquet, 2004). This school of 
thought assumes that changing and learning evolve in action. When individuals are 
confronted with unexpected situations, they can reduce the confusion by translating 
the situation into a problem. The resulting problem frame serves as a starting point 
for further inquiry that – in turn- can lead to corrective actions. As a consequence, 
change and learning evolve in action. This school of thought can be distinguished 
from other schools, like behaviourism, the cognitive school, and situated learning 
(Sauquet, 2004). Argyris' insights on organizational learning have been influenced by 
the work of Bateson (2000), who has strongly contributed to theory on the 
psychology of communication.   
 
The empirical study is a combination of longitudinal case studies (Yin, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Van der Zwaan, 1990) and action research (Eden & Huxham, 
1996). The study aims at developing evidence-based knowledge on the effects of 
unilateral control on changing, organizing and learning, and what interventions 
(interactions) help to de-block changing in the longer run. This way, this study tries to 
respond to Argyris’ call for directly observable data during entire change projects and 
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valid information (Argyris, 1973, 1990, 1995, 2004) and Rousseau’s call for evidence-
based management (2006). 
By collecting directly observable data (daily interactions) in three longitudinal case 
studies, one can observe what managers, employees and their consultants say and 
do, whether and how these interactions are governed by unilateral control, how they 
contribute to (de-)blocking of changing, organizing and learning, and how 
interventions affect interactions in the longer run. The process of ongoing interactions 
is ‘slowed down’ in order to understand patterns, recognize important moments and 
their meaning to effective changing: moving moments. 
 
 
1.3 Objectives 
 
The problem statement of this study can be translated into six specific objectives. 
 
1. Collect data and evidence of a dominant unilateral control model by managers 
and their consultants. 
2. Develop insight into the expressions of a dominant unilateral control model. 
3. Create insight into the relation between a dominant unilateral control model and 
blocked changing. 
4. Create insight into the practical attainability of employing alternative behaviour in 
interpersonal interactions. 
5. Create insight into the interventionist’s role in (de-)blocking of changing. 
6. Develop an intervention perspective that supports de-blocking of changing. 
 
 
1.4 Contributions 
 
As discussed before, several studies support the belief that there seems to be a 
collective incompetence to organize successful change processes (e.g. Kearny, 
1997; Mourier and Smith, 2003; Boonstra, 2000; 2001; Pettigrew, 1997; Maurer, 
1997; Schneier et al., 1992). All studies mention different success rates. However, 
regardless of the exact percentages, there is a strong belief that the return on 
investment (in terms of manpower, money, time and energy) of change initiatives 
tends to be disappointing. This study wants to contribute to an explanation of 
recurrent change difficulties. Not by studying what leaders know or say, but how they 
act in interaction with people in their environment. Not by studying what change 
methods are selected, but what people really do in practice. This study builds on the 
work of researchers like Argyris and Senge. Its contribution to scientific as well as 
practical knowledge can be summarized in five points. 
 
First, this study integrates perspectives in order to give a broad overview of 
expressions of a unilateral control model. It not only refers to Argyris’ insights, but 
also to other sources in the field of systems thinking and organizational change. This 
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leads to a diagnostic model that supports recognition of blocked changing and 
learning. Second, by describing three longitudinal case studies this study endeavours 
to gain knowledge about how dynamically complex change situations develop during 
a longer period and in an organizational context that goes further than the description 
of isolated meetings and conversations. Third, by combining longitudinal case studies 
and action research, the long-term effects of interventions by the consultant 
(interventionist) can be visualized. This leads to practical knowledge in order to 
develop an intervention perspective on de-blocking of dynamically complex change 
situations. Fourth, this study contributes to a translation of knowledge on 
organizational learning into practical and concrete insights that support 
understanding of blocked changing and to actionable interventions that contribute to 
de-block changing. This way, this study aims at developing evidence-based insights 
that are applicable to the practice of managers and consultants and that might be 
helpful in effective changing and learning. Fifth, unlike the emphasis of the 
mainstream literature, this study does not focus on ‘how one should organize 
change’, but on ‘how one –unintendedly and apparently- contributes to the 
preservation of the current reality’.  
 
 
1.5 Research outline 
 
This study consists of three parts: the theoretical exploration (chapters 1-4), the 
empirical study (chapters 5-10) and conclusions (chapters 11-12). 
 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the expressions of a unilateral control model. This 
chapter concludes with a diagnostic model that aims at recognising and 
understanding expressions of a unilateral control model in practice and how they 
might contribute to blocked changing and learning. Chapter 3 reviews alternative 
guiding principles and provides a basis for ways to de-block changing and learning. 
Chapter 4 reviews literature on the role of the interventionist (consultant) and 
intervention perspectives. 
 
Chapter 5 summarizes the central concepts and presents the research questions, as 
derived from the theoretical exploration. Chapter 6 outlines the research 
methodology of the empirical study. Chapters 7-9 describe three case studies. Each 
chapter concludes with a within-case analysis. Chapter 10 compares the outcomes of 
the within-case analyses in a cross-case analysis and addresses similarities and 
differences. 
Chapter 11 describes the conclusions, as based on the cross-case analysis. The 
conclusions concern the research questions, additional findings, as well as the 
research methodology. Furthermore, limitations of the present study as well as 
recommendations for future research are described. This study finishes with a 
personal reflection on the research process and a description of the individual 
learning process of the researcher (chapter 12). 
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PART I THEORETICAL EXPLORATION
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2. Expressions of unilateral control  
 
Manager: HR did an employee satisfaction survey; employees say they don’t feel 
safe. 
Director: What do they mean by that?  
Manager: I have asked some of them. But I get only little information. Most of them 
say it is not really a problem. 
Director. Well, then there is little we can do. We have to change the culture. People 
don’t take initiative. We miss entrepreneurship and pro-activeness.  
Manager: But how do we realize that? 
Director: What about workshops? 
Manager: We already organized workshops last year, didn’t we? All the managers 
and team leaders had to participate. 
Director: And? 
Manager: All of them did participate. In the first instance I saw some initiatives. But I 
am afraid nothing has changed really. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The website of an Amsterdam-based clinic on mesology4 displays the message: ‘In 
our clinic we treat people with chronic complaints. For acute and life-threatening 
symptoms we refer you to your family doctor’.  
 
This study does not focus on acute and life-threatening situations in organizations. 
Instead, this study aims at chronic problems, e.g. how can one explain that the same 
problems recur time after time, regardless of several interventions?  
 
This chapter aims at exploring the expressions of unilateral control by leaders5, and 
the consequences for change processes. First, the phenomenon of unilateral control 
is described. The subsequent sections describe the expressions of a unilateral 
control model: the way leaders (and their consultants) perceive organization 
problems, how they act, how they intervene and how they design and change 
organizations. These insights lead to a diagnostic model that helps to recognize 
ineffective patterns and make them debatable. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Mesology is a medical science that particularly focuses on understanding and influencing underlying causes of 
chronic disorders, instead of applying symptomatic solutions. 
5 The terms ‘leaders’ and ‘managers’ refer to persons with a supervisory relationship to others. In this 
understanding, these terms are used alternately in this text. Here, the terms do not refer to leadership and 
management, which are often considered to be different concepts (see, for example, Zaleznik, 2004). 
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2.2 Unilateral control as a dominant model? 
 
The introductory chapter describes observations regarding inconsistency between 
what managers say and do and the inclination to control difficult situations 
unilaterally. These observations are in line with results of studies by Argyris (e.g. 
1990, 1995, 1999, 2004). In his opinion, human beings have implicit programs that 
tell them how to be in control, “especially when they face embarrassment or threat, 
two conditions that could lead them to get out of control” (p. 13). He distinguishes two 
types of programs. Firstly, people hold a set of beliefs, values and attitudes regarding 
how to manage their lives. He calls these sets of beliefs their espoused theories. 
Secondly, theories-in-use are used to design and implement their actions. In other 
words, people use these theories when they actually act. 
 
In practice, the espoused theories are what we speak about. They refer to what we 
think we do or –at least- what we want to do. In general, these ideas have a rational 
focus and they are vulnerable to socially desirable opinions. Discussions in the 
boardroom between managers and/or professionals about how to lead a change 
program are led by these espoused theories. However, their actions (e.g. during the 
meeting with middle management) are led by theories-in-use. These theories are 
often not in line with the espoused theories. As a consequence, people might show 
behaviour that is inconsistent with the beliefs they talk about.  
 
According to Argyris (1990) theories-in-use do not vary widely. By and large, people 
tend to use the same theory-in-use, although the actual behaviours that are produced 
by these theories can differ widely (p. 13). In his opinion, individuals tend to think 
from a universal set of principles, so-called Model I principles: ‘Theories-in-use are 
the master programs that individuals hold in order to be in control. Model I theory-in-
use instructs individuals to seek to be in unilateral control, to win, and not to upset 
people. It recommends action strategies that are primarily selling and persuading 
and, when necessary, strategies that save their own and others’ face.’ (p. 13). 
Argyris (1983) reports that 99% of nearly 2,000 managers and professionals hold 
only a Model I theory-in-use. Individuals, including leaders, tend to be skilful in 
behaviour that is designed by Model I. This behaviour, however, leads both to a 
dilemma and a paradox (Argyris, 1990). The dilemma arises because is it not 
possible to save someone’s face and be open about this intention. As a 
consequence, this requires “designed lying, called white lies, as well as a cover-up of 
the white lies” (Argyris, 1990, p. 13). The paradox stems from the fact that in a 
relation only one person can effectively use Model I behaviour. The other person 
must be submissive, passive and dependent. As a consequence, if Model I is an 
effective model, it only works if other people are able and willing to be ineffective.  
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Drukker & Verhaaren (2004) summarize Model I behaviour as unilateral control, the 
desire to win, suppress feelings, to avoid testing one’s own assumptions, to judge 
others and to be rational. 
A practical consequence of this behaviour is illustrated by patterns that are visible in 
day-to-day (business) communication. In communication one often tends to play and 
accept ‘a cheating game’. When individuals want to be in control, they tend not to be 
open about what they really think and feel. That’s why they cover up what they really 
think and feel. And then they cover up what they cover up. The other person, 
however, sees the non-verbal behaviour that probably reflects the (real) feelings and 
thoughts. And he knows that these are not consistent with what he hears. But, in 
turn, he covers up this thought and these feelings and says something else. Often 
what we see is inconsistent with what we hear. In general, one accepts this 
inconsistency. In turn, what we feel/think is inconsistent with what we say. This is an 
ongoing circle of ineffectiveness, as depicted in figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The accepted cheating game 
 
According to Argyris we are so skilful in these behaviours that we are unaware of 
using them. He calls this “skilled incompetence”. 
Argyris (1990) describes the consequences of this skilled incompetence: 
“- The errors would not exist and persist if someone was not producing them. 
- Because human behaviour is activated by our own theories-in-use, there must be 
programs of rules in our heads that tell us how to behave. 
If this is true, then we must have rules in our heads that tell us to: 
1. Produce consequences that you do not intend when dealing with difficult people. 
2. Hold other people or the system responsible for errors in problem solving and 
decision making, and do not examine your own responsibility” (p. 22-23). 
 
In the cases he describes, Argyris often focuses on the role managers and leaders 
play, although his research illustrates professionals tend to show the same 
behaviour. In short, they tend to be very skilful in Model I behaviour. This behaviour 
is based on controlling, winning and not upsetting others, but they are unaware of 
these ‘values’. As a consequence, they can produce unintended effects: 
misunderstandings, self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes and escalating 
error. Figure 2.2 depicts a Model I theory-in-use. 
 
 
SEE HEAR 
SAY FEEL/THINK 
incongruence 
incongruence 
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Figure 2.2 Model I theory-in-use (source: Argyris, 2004, p. 391) 
 
Recent publications by Noonan (2007) and Schwarz (2002, 2003), who try to further 
enlarge the accessibility of Argyris’ insights, tend to replace ‘Model I’ by ‘unilateral 
control model’. Here, the latter term will be used.  
Several authors on organizational learning and change confirm this unilateral control 
model (e.g. Senge, 1990; Boonstra, 2004; Campbell et al., 1994; McCaughan & 
Palmer, 1994; Putnam, 1999; Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Drukker & Verhaaren, 
2004; De Man, 2003; Robinson, 2001; Friedman, 2001). 
 
The concept of control in psychology 
In psychology extensive research has been conducted upon the concept of control. 
Skinner (1996) analyzed more than 100 terms that researchers in these disciplines 
use when they refer to control. She concludes that this variety has led to a broad 
heterogeneity among the constructs. As a consequence, there is a theoretical 
confusion about the concept of control. Furthermore, the variety complicates a 
rigorous accumulation of research findings. Most research outcomes have in 
common that “a sense of control is a robust predictor of physical and mental well-
being” (Skinner, 1996, p. 549). This finding is in line with Higgins (1997), who argues 
that people tend to evaluate high control as positive. Although the heterogeneity 
among the constructs complicates a clear positioning of Argyris’ unilateral control, 
below this construct is related to some dominant others. 
 
In order to organize the heterogeneous constructs related to control, Skinner (1996) 
distinguishes objective control, subjective control and experiences of control. 
Objective control refers to control conditions in the context and the individual. 
Subjective control refers to individuals’ beliefs about how much control is available. 
Dominant constructs related to subjective control are perceived behavioural control 
and self-efficacy. Both constructs refer to people’s perceived ability to perform certain 
behaviour, not to their ability to control the outcomes (Ajzen, 2002; Bandura, 1991). 
The experience of control is defined as “a person’s feelings as he or she is 
interacting with the environment while attempting to produce a desired or prevent an 
undesired outcome” (Skinner, 1996, p. 551). Argyris’ theory on people’s inclination to 
be in control does not involve the question of how much control is available 
(objectively or subjectively). However, his theory does correspond to the notion of 
Control the purpose of the 
meeting or encounter 
 
Try to win 
 
Suppress negative feelings 
 
Behave rationally 
Advocate your position 
in order to be in control 
and win 
 
Unilaterally save face –  
your own and others 
Misunderstandings 
 
Self-fulfilling prophecies 
 
Self-sealing processes 
 
Escalating error 
Governing variables  Action strategies                    Consequences 
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experience of control. Argyris developed a goal-oriented theory: people try to realize 
their goals through (control-oriented) actions like trying to win, suppressing negative 
feelings, judging others and behaving rationally.  
Argyris’ claim regarding people’s inclination to control is in line with Heckhausen & 
Schulz (1995, 1999), who describe the desire of individuals to control their 
environment. They distinguish primary control and secondary control. While primary 
control refers to the inclination of individuals to control their environment in order to fit 
their needs and desires, secondary control targets internal processes and serves to 
minimize losses and maintain and expand levels of primary control. In his prospect 
theory Kahneman describes the concept of loss aversion, which refers to people’s 
tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains (Kahneman, 2003). In situations 
where people have to decide between alternatives that involve risk, they tend to 
select the alternative that minimizes loss. In the light of this theory, the risk of losing 
control seems to be less attractive for managers than the potential gain. Through his 
research upon individuals’ behaviour regarding financial decisions, Kahneman has 
connected psychology with economy (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
 
Argyris’ unilateral control can also be related to the construct ‘locus of control’ (e.g. 
Karasec et al., 1981; Ajzen, 2002; Ng et al., 2006; Armitage & Conner, 1999; 
Skinner, 1996, Judge & Bono, 2001). This construct contrasts internal or agent-
related causes with external or non-agent-related causes (Skinner, 1996). An 
individual is considered to be in control if causes (e.g. behaviours, efforts, abilities of 
personality) of certain outcomes are related to the person. Control, in this 
perspective, refers to “the range of decision-making freedom” (Karasec et al., 1981, 
p. 695). This relates to the paradox as described by Argyris (1990): if one person 
unilaterally controls another person, the former reduces the decision-making freedom 
of the other person. According to Argyris, the latter will consequently be submissive, 
passive and dependent. Or, in other words, they will experience an external locus of 
control. Researchers illustrated a relationship between locus of control and job 
satisfaction and job performance (Judge & Bono, 2001), learned helplessness 
(Seligman, 1975), physical health (Henry, 2005) and psychological health (Stipek, 
1988). These findings justify the conclusion that restricting the control of someone 
else can lead to negative consequences in the longer run.   
This conclusion corresponds with Argyris’ argument that people’s tendency to 
unilaterally control situations can lead to consequences like misunderstandings and 
escalating error. If related to the notion of experience of control, this way people 
produce a desired outcome in the short run (e.g. painful issues are being kept 
undiscussable or employees are being made to obey), however, they contribute to 
ineffectiveness and loss of control in the longer run. Or, in other words, their locus of 
control moves from internal to external. As for people’s response in case of loss of 
control, there are some researchers who describe similar conclusions as Argyris. 
Skinner argues that in case of threat or loss of control, the experienced distress 
stimulates people to reassert control or escape from the situation (p. 557). One way 
of escaping from the situation is to minimize the perception of loss of control by 
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diverting attention away from the situation (Miller et al,, 1989). Another way is to 
blame others. As such, blaming is related to the concept of control (Brickman et al., 
1982; Skinner, 1996). In this light, escaping can be considered as a way to reassert 
control as well and is comparable with Argyris’ construct of defensiveness (1990, 
2000, 2004). 
 
Unlike the researchers who are mentioned, Argyris elaborates on the anti-learning 
effects of defensiveness. In order to find out how effective their actions are, 
individuals need to inquire into the effects of these actions. Argyris (1990, 2000, 
2004) argues that people find it hard to inquire into these effects and learn, 
particularly if this could lead to painful or embarrassing situations. In this way, they 
keep control in the short run, but lose control in the longer run (see section 2.5). In 
spite of the similarities, there is also an important difference between Argyris’ 
unilateral control and the locus of control construct. The latter implies that people with 
a high internal control have a broad range of decision-making freedom. Argyris’ 
unilateral control construct describes a highly automatic program; it is precisely the 
lack of free choice that is considered to be problematic (Argyris, 1990; Drukker, 
1999). For this reason Argyris introduces a mutual learning model that involves free 
and informed choice (see section 3.2). 
 
Altogether, research in psychology confirms people’s tendency to control their 
environment and people’s positive evaluation of being in control. In addition, the 
locus of control construct supports Argryis’ insights regarding the potentially negative 
consequences of unilateral control in the longer run. Additionally, there is scientific 
evidence that in case of threat or loss of control, people try to reassert control as a 
consequence of experienced distress. Unlike the researchers who are mentioned, 
Argyris elaborates on the anti-learning effects of defensiveness. 
 
 
2.3 Expressions of unilateral control  
 
The main value of a unilateral control model seems to be obvious: keeping things 
under control. A deeper study demonstrates that the expressions go much further 
than only keeping the reins short and forcing obedience. Unilateral control by 
managers becomes manifest in their 
 
1. perception of (organization) problems 
2. behaviours in interaction with people in the environment 
3. interventions in change processes 
4. design of organization 
5. change of organization 
In all these areas managers may block change, contrary to their spoken desires. By 
and large, the way changing is blocked is by subtle and sophisticated patterns that 
are mostly recognized only with a delay (if they are recognized at all), as these 
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patterns seem logical and obvious. The expressions as mentioned are described in 
the next paragraphs.  
 
 
2.4 Perception of (organization) problems (expression 1) 
 
Organizational change normally starts with diagnosing ‘what is going on’. Thus, the 
way one perceives the current reality is relevant. Typical of unilateral control is to 
isolate problems in such a way that we can think of a solution. That is how we keep 
things under control.  
 
An example illustrates how this can ‘paralyse’ individuals and keep them from 
creating a real solution. 
 
 
Box 2 How to teach employees the new culture? 
 
Top management of a Dutch service organization has implemented a new organizational 
design. The management team members concluded, however, that things were not going 
well: employees did not behave in line with a performance culture. Structure was 
implemented, but the culture had not been changed, they agreed. The next step was an 
assessment of the culture. Management consultants were invited to conduct interviews with 
staff members in order to draw a picture of the current culture. One week later the 
consultants had finished their report. Main conclusion: in most staff members’ perception top 
management was not clear about their business goals and expectations. Besides, they failed 
to provide proper coaching. The consultants did not feel comfortable with these outcomes, 
however ‘their professional standard’ required them to be open. In a meeting the 
management team members and consultants agreed that the outcomes confirmed what top 
management already had thought: ‘employees were not able and/or willing to reflect on their 
own role; they only pointed at top management’. What was needed to change this culture? 
During the same meeting they agreed on an approach of workshops aiming at teaching 
employees the desired behaviour. 
 
 
Interestingly, the managers (and their consultants) put the problem outside 
themselves: they distance themselves and observe, analyse and solve. According to 
Campbell et al. (1994), we tend to see the world as if we stand outside this world. 
This way, we stay at a (safe) distance and we don’t have to be afraid we lose control. 
Campbell et al. (1994) put it this way: “Typically, each of us sees the organization 
around us from our own perspective, as though it exists ‘out there’, separate from our 
own influence upon it. So, for example, it is easier to see a communication problem 
in terms of other people not responding to memos or speaking openly at meetings, 
but it is difficult to see what we ourselves do that contributes to that process” (p. 20). 
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As a consequence, rather than being actors who react to each other and who are 
engaged in mutual influence, we tend to isolate problems that should be solved. Ask 
someone in an organization what the problem is, and the answer will refer to others, 
environment or abstractions. Individuals seldom seek ‘the problem’ in the interactions 
they are personally involved in. Argyris calls this phenomenon ‘distancing’. Or in 
other words, one tends to make a picture of the situation that does not include 
oneself (De Man, 2003). Senge (1990) uses different words for the same pattern: 
“We tend to blame outside circumstances for our problems [….]; (however) you and 
the cause of your problems are part of a single system” (p. 67).  
 
These findings correspond to the psychological concept of self-serving bias, as 
introduced by Miller & Ross (1975) and elaborated by other authors (e.g. Babcock & 
Loewenstein, 1997; Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). This concept refers to people’s 
tendency to attribute their success to internal or personal characteristics, while they 
attribute their failures to contextual factors beyond their control, such as other 
persons and circumstances. Wagner & Gooding (1997) specifically describe 
managers’ inclination to show a self-serving bias. Illustrative quotes are: 
 ‘They are not committed’,  
‘They tend to speak in ‘we-they’ terms’ and 
‘They are not pro-active’.  
This way of thinking keeps leaders from reflecting on their own influence on the 
observed behaviour of others. If one is not aware of one’s own behaviour, one will 
not be aware of the effects one produces oneself. According to Argyris (1990), our 
inclination to neglect our own role leads to unintended effects. These unintended 
effects are also described by authors on systems thinking. McCaughan et al. (1994): 
“We look no further than the presenting problem, and so propose quick-fix, 
symptomatic solutions that leave unaddressed the larger dysfunctional processes 
that are giving rise to the problem we are worried about” (p. 22). And: “We attribute 
all the difficulties to a blameworthy individual (or group), whose behaviour has to be 
changed” (p. 23).  
 
Managers in the example in box 2 respond relatively instrumentally to the signal. 
They reduce the ‘culture problem’ to an isolated problem (employees’ attitude) and 
find a concrete solution (workshops that aim at teaching the desired attitude). The 
process of reducing complex problems to simple and manageable categories of 
incidents and small problems is referred to as ‘reductionism’ (Van Dongen et al., 
1996, p. 65). This phenomenon is directly linked to ‘distancing’. 
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These observations are in line with the so-called ‘Subject-Object’ construction of 
relations. A Subject-Object (or S-O) relation is between an active agent (subject) and 
an acted upon (passive) object. Often, Subject and Object are perceived as being 
sharply separated entities. In this view, organizational leaders are assumed to be the 
ones who inquire, develop knowledge and design and implement necessary changes 
based on this knowledge (Hosking, 2004; Homan, 2005). If the leader (Subject) 
considers his actions to be effective, the ultimate effectiveness is perceived as 
dependent on the loyalty and competence of the employees (Objects). Common 
quotes in this light are ‘how can we make them follow us?’, ‘how do we get them in 
the right mode?’, and ‘how can we commit them to our strategy?’ A Subject-Object 
perception of reality can be considered as quite dominant in management thinking. 
Kotter (2002), for example, recommends an eight-step plan to successfully realize 
change, e.g. increase urgency, create a vision and communicate for buy-in. This 
structure, that is quite common in management literature, is based on the assumption 
that the top develops a vision that subsequently has to be imposed upon employees 
and thus is in line with a Subject-Object construction of relations. This line of 
reasoning is also confirmed by the well-known formula on change management E = 
Q x A, the effect of the change process is the product of the quality of the change 
plan and the acceptance by employees.  
The effectiveness of a Subject-Object perspective cannot be separated from the 
specific character of an era. During times when it was normal and usual that 
employees did what their boss instructed them (nothing more or less), Subject-Object 
thinking was highly functional: espoused theory and theory-in-use were consistent. 
However, problems occur when managers tend to speak about stimulation of 
(internal) entrepreneurship, personal responsibility, pro-activity, empowerment and 
ownership. As long as managers’ perception and action are still governed by Subject-
Object thinking, espoused theory and theory-in-use will be inconsistent: managers 
say that they desire ownership and entrepreneurship, but their actions stimulate 
dependency and reactivity. Even if managers see this inconsistency, it is not easy to 
behave consistently. Typical expressions of this struggle are double bind 
assignments like ‘I don’t want you to do it for me, but I want you to do it for yourself’.  
 
People tend to see separate parties (see Hosking, 2004), rather than mutually 
interlinked processes. As long as top management and staff see the cause of the 
problems outside their own influence, the recommended solutions will always focus 
on only a part of the system. In the best case, these solutions will be implemented 
reactively, because one party ‘obeys’ the other party. This behaviour is in line with a 
unilateral control model. 
Empirical evidence can be derived from Mastenbroek et al. (2004), who conducted 
the Dutch national study on stimulating and blocking factors in change processes. 
The outcomes are based upon 1970 respondents to a questionnaire on the Internet. 
Two factors appear to be most obvious: 
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1. Top management have no clear and challenging perspective on what should be 
improved. They lack a vision on innovation and do not communicate transparently. 
2. The vast majority of staff members show resistance to change. 
Further examination of the research outcomes leads to the observation that the first 
factor is mainly brought in by employees and middle managers, and the second one 
by top management. In their recommendations, the researchers focus on 
improvements that can be linked directly to creating a clear vision and commitment. It 
would be rewarding to find out the extent to which these are symptoms of an 
underlying pattern that reflects blaming, distancing and a reactive attitude. 
 
These insights seem to justify a number of conclusions regarding how leaders tend to 
perceive organization problems and select solutions.  
• Individuals tend to underestimate their own influence on (social, process) 
problems they face. 
• Individuals tend to isolate problems outside themselves rather than seeing a 
(circular) pattern that produces the problems. 
• Individuals tend to be reactive in the sense that solutions are expected to start 
outside themselves. This does not mean that they are not willing to take initiative 
to support a solution.  
• Individuals tend to see ‘the other party’ and themselves as separated parties, who 
act autonomously, rather than seeing a bigger pattern/system that they produce 
together. They tend to ‘cure’ only a part of the system instead of the underlying 
patterns and interactions that produce the recurrent problems.  
 
Figure 2.3 summarizes the way unilateral control influences our perception of 
organization problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Expressions of unilateral control: perception 
UNILATERAL 
CONTROL 
PERCEPTION 
• Reductionism: reducing (dynamically) complex patterns to simple problems that can be solved instrumentally 
• Distancing: putting oneself outside the problem and observing the problem from a distance 
• Blaming: considering one or more parties as being ‘the cause’ of the problem 
• Linear patterns: considering only one-way causal relations between cause and effect 
• S-O relations: considering leader/consultant as an active Subject that imposes reality on employees, being passive Objects  
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2.5 Behaviours in interaction with people in the environment (expression 2) 
 
 
Box 3 How managers stifle employees’ entrepreneurship 
 
A knowledge-based company is confronted with problems with their market position. 
Management decide that more entrepreneurship is needed. However, they feel discouraged 
by employees who do not take any initiatives. Some quotes of MT members: ‘I tend to have 
sleeping problems when my employees do not finish their assignment in time.’ ‘In case of 
problems I am the one who is responsible for making decisions’, ‘Clear instructions are the 
fastest way to keep things going’. Another person: ‘I think it is important to stimulate a sense 
of responsibility.’ ‘What do you do to realize this?’ ‘I divide clear tasks so that people know 
what they have to do. After that, I always ask them if they understand what they have to do.’ 
‘And what is – in general – their answer?’ ‘Yes, they do.’ Another manager finds it important 
to ask his employees for input. ‘Can you describe a case in which you asked your 
employees?’ ‘Well, mostly there is not enough time for that.’  
In the end, the conversation leads to the insight that managers keep a pattern alive that 
stifles the sense of responsibility and entrepreneurship. This pattern is illustrated in figure 
2.4. Although most managers are aware of the need to stimulate a sense of responsibility, 
their behaviour plays a pivotal role in realizing opposite effects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Manager stifles employees’ entrepreneurship in a vicious circle 
 
 
The example in box 3 illustrates the insight that management actions and strategies 
are governed by principles that strive for unilateral control, especially if managers 
experience pressure, threat or embarrassment. Managers tend to be unaware of 
these principles, the actions and strategies that are produced as a consequence, and 
the unintended effects of these actions. Argyris (1990) describes unintended effects 
like self-fulfilling prophecies and escalating errors.  But if the same problems recur, 
there must be repetitive behaviours and patterns that contribute to the preservation of 
the current reality. And there must be limited learning. How can this be explained? 
 
 
 
Manager experience 
pressure 
Employees feel 
insecure/low sense 
of responsibility 
Problems are 
brought to manager 
 
Manager delivers 
‘solution’/instruction 
TIME/PERFORMANCE PRESSURE 
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Repetitive behaviours and patterns 
Unilateral control tends to stimulate linear thinking, which preconceives a one-way 
causality between two actions (considering circumstances and others to be the cause 
of one’s own actions). An example is the manager who says ‘they are quite passive, 
so I must be firm now!’ In his perception of the situation his own firmness is an 
obvious consequence of the passiveness of staff members. However, employees 
judge the same situation from another perspective and consider their passiveness to 
be a logical consequence of their boss’ firmness. From a distance, both parties seem 
to be right. However, nothing will change as long as both ‘parties’ consider the 
situation as linear. De-blocking the recurrent pattern requires the parties to recognize 
the circular pattern. The difference is visible in figure 2.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Linear and circular perspectives 
 
Circular patterns lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and recurrent problems. His belief 
that staff is passive makes the manager firmer and as a consequence staff becomes 
passive. That, in turn, confirms the manager’s belief.  
Senge (1990), McCaughan and Palmer (1994), and Campbell et al. (1994) refer to 
this circular perspective by calling it a ‘system’ (Senge,1990, McCaughan and 
Palmer, 1994, Campbell et al., 1994). According to Senge, “the essence of the 
discipline of systems thinking lies in a shift of mind: 
Seeing interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chains, and 
seeing processes of change rather than snapshots” (p. 73). 
 
Unilateral control is only effective in situations that are ‘controllable’. As soon as a 
manager has to deal with other people, especially if they have deviant ideas, 
interests or beliefs, a unilateral control model seems to be no longer effective and will 
probably have unintended effects. And as long as managers distance themselves 
and blame, they do not involve their contribution to the recurrent problems, which 
reinforces the recurrent character. This leads to ongoing circular processes: the 
manager tries to tighten control, this leads to unintended effects (escalating error, 
Passive employees Firm manager 
Firm manager Passive employees 
Firm manager 
Passive employees 
From a linear perspective 
From a circular perspective 
Manager’s perception: 
Employees’ perception: 
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self-fulfilling prophecies), the manager perceives a loss of control and tries even 
harder to get control, etcetera (see figure 2.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Enlarging control leads to losing control 
 
How is one to know whether a problem should be approached from a linear or a 
circular perspective? One major sign that shows one is facing a system (circular 
perspective), is if “doing the obvious thing does not produce the obvious, desired 
outcome” (Senge, 1990, p. 71). For example, the manager who decides to be firm 
because staff members are passive might discover that they will be even more 
passive after his firm intervention. His next step, from a linear perspective of the 
situation, is wondering how to break through their passiveness. By ‘distancing’ he 
neglects his own role and tends to be reactive, as ‘their passiveness’ is the problem 
and should be solved. This situation can be explained by the way leaders tend to 
perceive organization problems (section 2.4). Or, as Senge puts it, “true pro-
activeness comes from seeing how we contribute to our own problems” (p. 17). 
 
McCaughan and Palmer (1994) define a system as follows: “A system is a pattern of 
interaction, between persons or groups, which can be represented by one or more 
feedback loops – that is, by closed loops or sequences of interaction that link and 
integrate all the components of the system” (p. 12). 
Their definition of systems thinking: “Systems thinking is a way of describing and 
explaining the patterns of behaviour that we encounter in the life of organizations: the 
regularities of individual behaviour, which we describe as a role, the characteristic 
ways of doing things in organizations which we refer to as their culture, the repeating 
patterns of sterile conflict or mistakes or absenteeism or failure to delegate, which we 
define as problems and try to solve” (p. 12). 
 
Recently, Moeskops (2004) and Werkman (2006) contributed to the literature on 
systemic thinking. Both authors have identified characteristic circular patterns. 
Moeskops distinguishes three typical patterns.  
• Decisiveness: leader is decisive, goal-oriented, well structured and transparent. 
In a negative cycle this style leads to a distance between leader and employees 
that, in turn, leads to lack of commitment and passiveness. The leader, in turn, 
enlarges distance. 
• Support: leader mobilizes positive support inside and outside the organization. 
In a negative cycle negative forces are neglected. As a consequence, they go 
underground and resistance grows. The leader, who wants to score, neglects 
resistance and influence of negative forces. 
Losing control 
Trying to get control Unintended effects 
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• Interactive: leader involves employees actively and offers much space to bring in 
ideas. In a negative cycle the leader is not able to manage all these ideas and 
slows down. As a consequence, employees call for decisiveness. The leader, in 
turn, overcompensates with too much control. 
It is interesting to see that although these patterns start differently, somewhere in the 
pattern the leader activates a unilateral control model, which leads to negative 
circularity. Even if one starts by creating participation, managers end up enlarging 
their control (e.g. because they experience different views as threatening). 
Apparently, regardless of the primary intention, perceived threat activates a unilateral 
control model. The same conclusion is applicable to the circular patterns that have 
been identified by Werkman (2005). She describes 10 patterns. 
1. Persevere: top-down direction from a negative perspective of employees’ ability 
and willingness that, in turn, works out as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
2. Create interdependence: reactivity leads to more direction leads to reactivity. 
3. Avoid criticism: leaders avoid interaction because they are afraid of employees’ 
criticism. This, in turn, stimulates employees’ criticism. 
4. Fight uncertainty by informing and persuading: informing and persuading, which 
should lead to a reduction of uncertainty, create that very uncertainty. 
5. Frustrate problem solving by centralisation: solutions are checked by top 
management; as a consequence employees feel less responsible to solve 
problems themselves and even more problems are forwarded to top 
management. 
6. Create pressure by defending and isolating changes: isolated project groups work 
out change plans in order to communicate well-designed plans. Employees do not 
feel committed and project teams respond by committing top management who 
respond with persuasion. This, in turn leads to even less commitment. 
7. Formalize: direction by new job descriptions, structures and procedures makes 
things unclear to employees; problems regarding cooperation and quality lead to 
even more direction by descriptions, structures and procedures. 
8. Balance between directing and letting go: an interactive approach leads to 
employees who are in doubt; their lack of involvement leads to a directive 
approach that confirms their scepticism. 
9. Realize self direction by direction: management stifles their own desire to 
organize self-direction by discussing employees’ abilities time after time. 
Subsequently, they show a top-down approach. Employees, in turn, lose 
confidence in management and confirm assumptions about their abilities. 
10. Avoid interaction: management ask feedback. However, they feel intimidated by 
feedback and increase direction. Employees, in turn, become reactive. 
 
Again, regardless of whether leaders start with a directive or open approach, as soon 
as they experience threat, embarrassment, or loss of control they activate a unilateral 
control model and, as a consequence, a negative circular pattern. 
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Limited learning 
Recurrent problems, despite positive intentions, can be explained by circular 
patterns. How can one explain that managers (and employees) carry on contributing 
to the problems they face and, thus, maintain the current reality? The next example is 
illustrative.  
 
 
Box 4 Participative words, directive actions 
 
The Board has called a meeting in order to create clarity about a change initiative. At the 
opening of the meeting, they say: ‘We know that in the past changes have been implemented 
top-down. This time we want you to participate.’ Apparently, they know the risks of top-down 
implementation (espoused theory). However, the more they are confronted with deviant 
opinions and signals of resistance, the more they act top-down (governed by their theory-in-
use). One of the employees asks some questions (with a disapproving tone of voice). The 
CEO blocks this interruption and gives the word to another party (Head of the HR 
department). While the latter presents his point of view, some employees send strong 
nonverbal signals that reflect dissatisfaction. When one of the employees tries to express his 
feelings, the CEO stops this intervention: ‘The Board is in charge, now.’ One of the attendees 
gives feedback to the board members: ‘You say that you do not want to do the 
implementation top-down, however, your behaviour is not consistent with these words.’ The 
CEO, who probably feels this reaction as threatening, rejects these words: ‘You are wrong, 
we do want you to participate in the implementation. But we cannot accept this behaviour.’ 
In an evaluation the members of the Board are asked how they have experienced the 
situation. ‘They show a lot of resistance’, is their answer, ‘it is very hard to come any further.’ 
Subsequently, board members are asked to review their own approach. ‘We knew this was 
not going to be effective in the end, but still we did not try another strategy.’ ‘Why did you 
stick to your strategy, knowing it was not going to be effective?’ ‘We did not want a mess by 
losing control.’ ‘And what was the consequence of your strategy?’ ‘A huge mess...’.  
 
 
Some observations can be derived from this case. 
• Board members (and other participants) were fully aware of the disadvantages of 
implementing changes top-down. Although the board members did not want to 
implement top-down, they acted top-down. 
• Board members and other participants create a circular process that makes 
themselves and the other parties ineffective. 
• Regardless of their insight that the strategy is not going to be effective, they 
continue the strategy. 
• Direct feedback on the board’s strategy from one of the attendees does not help 
to change it. On the contrary, the feedback is rejected with the same unilateral 
control model. 
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This case illustrates the assumption that a consistent application of a unilateral 
control model can easily lead to a reduction of control and – from a system 
perspective – can start a continuous process of losing control, escalating error and 
conflicts. Compare Kamsteeg & Koot (2002), who state that the desire to control 
often leads to no control (p. 138).  
These observations are in line with findings described by Drukker (1999). He is 
interested in the puzzle that if we see we produce unintended effects with our 
behaviour, we tend to activate the same actions. The problem is that we are not 
aware of the program that produces our actions and we are not aware of the fact that 
we are not aware. As a consequence, it is not us who control the program, but the 
program that controls us.  
 
But if managers contribute to recurrent problems and escalating error, then why don’t 
they change their behaviour? Why don’t they seem to learn? According to Argyris 
(1990, 1999, 2004) unilateral control leads to defensiveness: “[…] whenever human 
beings are faced with any issue that contains significant embarrassment or threat, 
they act in ways that bypass, as best they can, the embarrassment or threat. In order 
for the bypass to work, it must be covered up.” (1990, p. 25). After all, it wouldn’t 
work if one said: ‘This is a sensitive subject it’s better we leave unaddressed, as it 
could be painful for you (or me)’, or ‘You ask my opinion; I could tell you the truth, but 
I’d better reassure you’. 
As most individuals use these defensive actions, they become common and part of 
normal life within organizations. As a consequence, one develops so-called 
defensive routines. Argyris (1990): “Organizational defensive routines are actions or 
policies that prevent individuals or segments of the organizations from experiencing 
embarrassment or threat. Simultaneously, they prevent people from identifying and 
getting rid of the causes of the potential embarrassment or threat. Organizational 
defensive routines are antilearning, overprotective, and self-sealing” (p. 25).  
 
Or, in other words, defensive routines are a consequence of unilateral control 
governing values and can be seen as actions, behaviour or policies that aim at 
bypassing situations that one cannot control, which undermines one’s position (and 
keeps one from winning) and which could lead to negative feelings about oneself 
and/or others. In order to be effective, these bypasses, in turn, are covered up. 
 
Some examples: 
 
If then 
You have made a mistake cover up your mistake and if needed, blame  
 circumstances or someone else. 
You see someone covering his mistake up leave this unaddressed. 
 
Your boss expects you to commit to his  say that you do and hope that nothing will change 
new change project  really. 
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You see some employees only act as if they leave this unaddressed and say that you succeeded 
are committed to get your employees’ commitment. 
 
Your employees don’t bring their tasks don’t ask if they are really committed (the answer  
regarding the change process into practice would probably be ‘yes’ – whether true or not), but
 suggest putting a plate on the wall with the text ‘an  
 appointment is an appointment’. 
 
Your boss suggests putting a plate on the wall confirm this is a good idea that will help you to 
with the text ‘an appointment is an  remember. 
appointment’  
 
Generally, we tend to be skilful in these actions. We think they help us to keep things 
under control. Argyris calls this ‘skilled incompetence’. As they tend to be so 
common, these actions often come across as rational, obvious and logical. If we are 
part of the ‘system’, we often do not see how these actions contribute to recurrent 
problems. While our espoused theories tell us to be open and transparent and to 
reflect on our contribution to problems, our theories-in-use instruct us to keep things 
under control and avoid threat and embarrassment. This way, despite our spoken 
and written policies, we can contribute to recurrent problems without learning and 
open dialogue. Johnson (1987) calls this inclination to defend our way of thinking and 
acting in case of threat a political defence reaction.  
 
What if one does see the defensive patterns and how oneself and others contribute 
to them? Then one has a difficult choice: not making them debatable leaves them to 
deteriorate the situation and makes one co-responsible, as one cannot say one did 
not know. Making them debatable is not without risk: it is not without reason that 
human beings contribute to these patterns and one will probably find out how tough 
these are. If one decides not to confront, one has to live with that situation. Argyris 
(1990) describes two possible coping strategies: either take some distance, accept 
that many persons are responsible and go on with your life, or (if you are too 
committed to take some distance), try to redefine the situation such that it is 
acceptable again. Here, there is a relation with Festinger’s (1957) cognitive 
dissonance theory. Contributing to problems by covering up sensitive issues is not 
consistent with a self-picture that is characterized by being open and candid. This 
leads to cognitive dissonance, which is an unpleasant experience. In order to release 
the inconvenience, one strategy is to redefine the situation, e.g. by saying that 
confronting the situation will probably make things worse, someone else is actually 
more responsible, or changing circumstances will probably solve the problem. In 
Argyris’ terms, these ‘solutions’ are only other and even more sophisticated forms of 
bypassing and covering up. He calls this fancy footwork (1990, p. 46), which helps 
individuals to deny inconsistencies and place responsibility on circumstances and 
other people. In effect, this keeps them from learning and reflection and supports 
maintaining the current situation. 
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Successful changing will be hard under these conditions; lack of (mutual) learning 
keeps the recurrent patterns alive and contributes to escalating error, self-fulfilling 
prophecies, frustration and cynicism. In the end, and unlike one’s spoken desires, 
this way one effectively preserves the current reality. 
 
A dominant unilateral control model seems to have a major impact on the way 
leaders tend to behave in interaction with other people. Some observations seem to 
be justified. 
• Individuals tend to get control over (change) situations; if they are confronted with 
unintended effects they tend to repeat and reinforce their unilateral control 
strategy. 
• Individuals (leaders and employees) tend to enforce (ineffective) circular 
processes, which cannot easily be stopped because of their perception of one-
way causality between two actions. 
• As individuals often seem not to be aware of their unilateral control model and this 
model is so strong, even direct feedback on the effects is often responded to by 
behaviour that is being produced by the same model.  
• Even if leaders stress the importance of bottom-up involvement and 
empowerment (espoused theory), they tend to behave in a top-down way as soon 
as they are confronted with unexpected and threatening behaviour (theory-in-
use). 
• In case of threat or stress (e.g. feedback on ‘control behaviour’) one tends to 
tighten the strings.  
• Learning is limited as a consequence of defensive routines that aim at reduction 
of embarrassment and threat. 
 41 
 
Figure 2.7 summarizes the expressions of a unilateral control model regarding 
perception and behaviour. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Expressions of unilateral control: perception and behaviour 
 
Reflection on systems perspective  
Further research on the definition of system thinking uncovers different approaches. 
Senge focuses on the system that keeps patterns alive. Nothing is only a cause or 
only an effect. In systems thinking everything is both cause and effect. “Nothing is 
ever influenced in one direction” (p. 75). Therefore, “see interrelationships rather than 
linear cause-effect chains and see change processes rather than snapshots” (p. 73). 
In his view individuals play a role in keeping a system alive by reacting to behaviour 
of others in the system. Senge: “In other words, the structure causes the behaviour” 
(p. 77). In the way he describes these systems and he draws pictures, he puts 
emphasis on ‘something that exists as a structural pattern’. Basically, this approach 
is reflected in figure 2.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8 The system causes the behaviour 
 
Senge acknowledges that problems are created by the way managers (and other 
actors) think: “This [seeing the systemic pattern – AA] can lead to solving a problem, 
but it will not change the thinking that produced the problem in the first place” (p. 95). 
Still, the way he describes systemic processes does not reflect a continuous process 
of meaning creation. In other words, he approaches systemic processes as relatively 
structural phenomena. As a consequence, his approach is vulnerable to reification, 
which means that an abstract phenomenon that can be approached from different 
Firm manager 
Passive staff 
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perspectives and is ever changing is defined as a concrete thing or object that does 
not change (see Van Dongen et al., 1996, p. 60-67). Or, in other words, reification 
refers to people’s inclination to attribute characteristics of a concrete object or 
organism to abstract concepts. For example, Senge is vulnerable to reification when 
he writes: “to change the behaviour of the system, you must identify and change the 
limiting factor” (p. 101). In this example he suggests ‘the system’ can behave, as if it 
were a person. Again, this can be related to people’s inclination to distance 
themselves from their environment. For example, ‘the organization should create 
some conditions, before we can contribute to this change process’, or ‘we just don’t 
have the right culture’. From this perspective, there is always the risk of an 
unreflective acceptance of a certain definition (see Van Dijk, 1989). 
 
Senge pays little attention to what happens before an actor (the manager or staff 
members) takes an action. At this point he differs from the approach of system 
thinkers like McCaughan et al. (1994) and Campbell et al. (1994). The latter pay 
much attention to the role of meaning creation. An action does not have meaning in 
itself, but acquires meaning by the person who observes the action in a certain 
context. “The central assumption of systemic thinking is that human systems operate 
on the basis of the meaning that members ascribe to the activities around them” (p. 
16). Figure 2.9 gains meaning this way. 
 
 
Figure 2.9 The interpretation causes the behaviour 
 
In this view, meaning leads to action leads to further meaning, etcetera. ‘The system’ 
cannot exist in this approach. Unlike Senge, whose ‘pictures’ suggest they are a 
reflection of ‘reality’, Campbell argues that ‘reality’ does not exist and is an ongoing 
process of negotiation and creation. McCaughan et al. (1994) refer to Senge with 
respect and a warning: “[…] he treats problems and solutions as though they were 
real, rather than being constructed by persons out of circumstances and their own 
desires” (p. 111). In this study reality is considered to be related to the actors and 
observers, who create this reality with their actions and interpretations. This does 
apply to the interventionist as well. For this reason, as will be discussed in section 
6.4, the research design rests heavily upon action research that includes the role of 
the interventionist (and researcher). 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
2.6 Interventions in change processes (expression 3) 
 
Senge (1990) argues that whenever a problem seems to be hard to solve despite 
numerous attempts and whenever the same patterns recur time after time, it seems 
to be likely that underlying balancing processes keep the organization from real 
change. Balancing processes are considered to be a source of stability and 
resistance. Corrective actions lead to the reduction of problems in the short run and 
lead to the reinforcement of problems in the longer run, just as the use of alcohol 
reduces stress in the short run, but keeps the person from paying attention to the 
fundamental problem and therefore leads to deterioration of the problem in the longer 
run. Visible problems, in this vision, are (only) symptoms of a more fundamental 
problem. Unless these fundamental problems are changed themselves, they will 
keep producing problems. However, from a unilateral control perspective it is neither 
easy nor attractive to work on these fundamental problems. Leaders seem to prefer 
selecting and implementing symptomatic solutions.  
 
From a systemic view this process can be described as ‘shifting the burden’ (Senge, 
1990), which might also have been called ‘the symptomatic solution’ (McCaughan et 
al., 1994). Figure 2.10 visualizes the ‘shifting the burden’ systemic pattern. 
 
Figure 2.10 Shifting the burden (Senge, 1990, p. 380) 
 
The ‘shifting the burden’ pattern should be read like the number ‘eight’: start in the 
centre and follow the arrow upwards, cross the centre again and follow the arrows 
downwards. “A short-term ‘solution’ is used to correct a problem, with seemingly 
positive immediate results. As this correction is used more and more, more 
fundamental long-term corrective measures are used less and less. Over time, the 
capabilities for the fundamental solution may atrophy or become disabled, leading to 
even greater reliance on the symptomatic solution” (p. 381). The fundamental 
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solution takes more time than the symptomatic solutions and is characterized by 
delay. In addition, there is a direct side effect: the symptomatic solution stifles a 
fundamental solution. The next example is illustrative.  
 
Box 5 Consultant is hired to speed things up 
 
Top management of a department in an international enterprise struggles with the customer 
orientation of their organization. The problem has already existed for years, despite several 
improvement projects. Major customers no longer accept the bad service and put pressure 
on the department: quick improvement is needed. An external consultant is hired in order to 
assess the processes and bring in recommendations. As commitment of staff members is 
considered to be important, they are actively involved in interviews and workshops. 
Improvements are implemented and customer reviews are more positive than they were ever 
before. However, after some months the scores tend to drop back to the old level.  
The quick fix is done. But the problem existed for a longer period. What produced the 
problem? Why didn’t staff members solve these problems? (To what extent) do they feel 
responsible for implementing improvements? And if not, why not? What is the effect of this 
approach to their sense of responsibility? What would be the long-term revenues if staff 
members solved the problems themselves? 
 
From a systemic approach, the situation in box 5 could be presented as in figure 
2.11. 
 
Figure 2.11 Illustration of ‘shifting the burden’ system 
 
Process adjustments make the problems regarding customer processes less severe. 
The underlying problem seems to be that staff members do not solve process deficits 
themselves. Because symptoms are less severe after the consultant’s interventions, 
there is less urgency to deal with this ‘real problem’. As a consequence, after a while, 
this underlying problem produces the same symptoms regarding customer 
orientation and probably other subjects. This example illustrates a situation in which 
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one ‘shifts the burden’ to a solution that reduces the problems in the short run, but 
deteriorates the symptoms in the long run because the ‘underlying problem’ is 
covered up by management. Moreover, in this example the consultants facilitate this 
cover-up. 
Why did top management choose this strategy? This question was asked during a 
meeting with the general director. ‘I was fed up with them. We have tried to involve 
them several times without any success. We cannot make customers wait any 
longer.’ ‘What exactly did you try before?’ ‘We organized several meetings and asked 
for input. Subsequently, we collected their ideas in an overview and reported these 
back to them. I stressed the importance of a personal sense of ownership. However, 
this only led to marginal improvements. They had their chance, but now I am going to 
speed things up.’  
 
This example leads to a number of observations. 
• The sense of responsibility of staff members is difficult to deal with from a 
unilateral control perspective. Top management do not make things debatable. 
On the contrary, they stress the importance of a sense of ownership and try to 
force staff members to take their responsibility. 
• Top management do not involve their role in the problem and use a linear 
perspective. From a circular perspective they probably keep the problem alive by 
their own approach: the more persuasion, the less sense of personal 
responsibility. 
• Because workshops were not successful, top management decided to speed 
things up by inviting an external expert in order to implement an instrumental 
solution. As a direct consequence of the intervention, the fundamental problem 
deteriorated, as staff members even felt less responsible after the consultant ‘took 
responsibility’ for their problems. 
• Top management seem to be stimulated in their behaviour by the pressure they 
experience; customers are not satisfied. Short-term solutions seem to be the best 
option management can choose in order to avoid customers going to another 
supplier. 
 
The last observations introduce the factor of ‘time’. Working on the fundamental 
problem generally implicates a delay. In this example, development of a sense of 
responsibility leading to solutions by staff members will probably take more time than 
the process adjustments by the consultant. Besides, the fundamental solution is less 
controllable. This is not attractive from a unilateral control perspective. Especially if 
there is pressure (e.g. by clients, shareholders or higher management) it is much 
more attractive to choose a quick (symptomatic) solution. Generally, a manager will 
not serve his career with words like ‘we are working on underlying fundamental 
processes in order to realize long-term improvement’. He is probably more 
successful with quotes like ‘firm interventions’, ‘assessing performance with 
scorecards’ and ‘quick scans by consultants aiming at process improvements within 
a month’.  
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Management behaviour in this case could also be explained by defensive routines. In 
the example as presented, inquiring what keeps staff members from solving the 
problems could lead to awkward situations in terms of loss of control and negative 
feelings towards management. In order to keep control and prevent these feelings, 
one covers up (or bypasses) the fundamental problem by implementing process 
adjustments. This short-term strategy can be seen as a defensive routine of which 
management is probably not unaware. Figure 2.12 summarizes these insights. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12 Symptomatic solution as cover-up of fundamental problem 
 
The upper and lower cycle of Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure correspond with 
the distinction between single-loop learning and double-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön, 1974; Argyris, 1990). Argyris (1990): “Single-loop learning solves the 
presenting problems. It does not solve the more basic problem of why these 
problems existed in the first place” (p. 92). If a mismatch or error arises, single-loop 
learning leads to a corrective action (the upper cycle in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’). 
Recall the example in box 6: the process adjustments by the consultant are not 
suitable to correct the underlying problem that staff members don’t take initiative to 
solve the problems. Working on this fundamental solution requires a change in the 
thinking or governing values behind the actions. In other words, this means one has 
to learn a new theory-in-use. This is double-loop learning.  
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Figure 2.13 depicts single-loop learning and double-loop learning. These concepts of 
single-and double-loop learning make clear that a unilateral control model does not 
help to work on fundamental solutions, as this requires a different theory-in-use. 
 
 
Figure 2.13 Single-loop learning and double-loop learning (Argyris, 1990) 
 
Figure 2.14 incorporates the concepts of single-loop and double loop learning in 
Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure.  
 
 
Figure 2.14 ‘Shifting the burden’ incorporates single-loop learning and double-loop 
learning  
 
As a consequence of defensive routines, one tends to detect and isolate problems 
that are controllable and ‘solve’ these problems by implementing impersonal 
instruments, changes in structures and systems. Management concepts like the 
Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan, 1996), Human Resource Scorecard (Walker & 
MacDonald, 2001), Value Based Management (Haspeslagh et al., 2001) and 
Business Process Reengineering (Hammer and Champy, 1993) are illustrative. The 
popularity of all kinds of scorecards and Key Performance Indicators (KPI’s) shows 
the attractiveness of instruments. This, in itself, can contribute to organization 
effectiveness, as one needs management information. However, these instruments 
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can also be used to bypass more fundamental problems. Then, they become short-
term symptomatic solutions (the ‘upper cycle’ in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ model) 
that might create blindness to more complex patterns that influence performance in 
the longer run (the ‘lower cycle’). This finding is in line with Weick (1996), who argues 
that people tend to stick to their tools, partly as these give an impression of control.  
 
Nowadays, when business leaders experience a pressure on results, sources and 
time, a growing interest is visible in so-called ‘quick scans’. A typical design of such a 
process consists of two elements. First, one conducts a quick assessment of the 
current situation and selects ‘the problems’, followed by recommended ‘solutions’ for 
these problems. Second, these solutions are implemented (top-down). Illustrative is 
the emphasis on ‘quick’ and ‘scan’. This approach might be effective in the case of 
simple, routine and instrumental problems. However, underlying patterns that 
produce the problems will not be found this way. As a consequence, this method 
seems to be highly vulnerable to reductionism. An example of a dubious application 
is a quick scan of culture. Several models and instruments have been developed to 
assess organizational culture. For example, Quinn & Cameron (1999) present a 
clarifying classification of organizational culture. However, their suggested change 
approach has characteristics of a quick scan: participants are asked to evaluate 
items in the current situation and in the desired situation. Gaps between scores help 
to find areas of attention. Underlying problems that produce the symptoms will be 
difficult to find this way. The last phase in their approach is an implementation plan. 
The authors suggest to be prepared for resistance and recommend strategies for 
breaking through resistance. The survey and the recommended implementation plan 
fit in a unilateral control model: assess the situation, detect the problem, implement 
the solution; and if one does not want the solution, implement another solution for 
that (resistance) problem. Argyris (1990) questions the value of organization 
diagnoses through surveys: This diagnosis “bypasses the organizational defensive 
patterns and thereby drives them underground in the short run and reinforces them in 
the long run” (p. 84). Or, from a system perspective, the focus is on the upper circle 
of Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ pattern (quick fix, short-term, symptomatic) and 
draws the attention away from the lower circle (fundamental problem that produces 
the symptoms time after time). This could explain the implementation problems. 
 
A dominant unilateral control model seems to have a major impact on leaders’ 
intervention preferences. Some observations seem to be justified. 
• Facing a problem, leaders tend to prefer quick and instrumental solutions to 
examining underlying problems that produce the symptoms. In the short run this 
leads to a reduction of problem symptoms. In the longer run this approach 
reinforces the underlying problem that produces the symptoms. 
• From a unilateral control perspective, interventions regarding the underlying 
problem are less attractive, as these are less easy to plan and forecast, and there 
tends to be a delay between intervention and effect. 
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• As long as the underlying problem and one’s own contribution to the dynamics 
are not being faced, this underlying problem keeps producing symptoms that 
stimulate leaders to implement quick symptomatic and instrumental solutions. 
 
The main manifestations of a unilateral control model regarding perception, 
behaviour and preferred interventions are summarized in figure 2.15. 
 
Figure 2.15 Expressions of unilateral control: perception, behaviour and interventions 
 
 
2.7 Design of organization (expression 4) 
 
One might expect that a unilateral control model stimulates leaders to organize in 
order to control their environment. This assumption is supported by Wierdsma 
(2004), who introduces the term ‘positional organization’: “traditional doctrine on 
organization and change places great reliance on rationality and external control by 
managers” (p. 228). The term ‘positional organization’ refers to the focus on ranking 
people in positions. In order to reduce variety as much as possible, organizations are 
designed as a hierarchical ranking of people based on the degree to which they have 
an overview of and insight into the organization. From this perspective “the viability of 
systems depends on 
• Staff departments which generate sufficient knowledge of regularity to be able to 
achieve standardisation; 
• Managers who are able to convert this regularity into concrete measures on the 
basis of their overview and insight; 
• Employees who implement these measures in a loyal and disciplined way” 
(Wierdsma, 2004, p. 228).  
 
According to Wierdsma, the underlying assumptions of the positional organization 
perspective are an “ends and means rationale, linear causality and the ability to 
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control behaviour externally” (p. 229). Swieringa and Jansen (2005) describe how the 
positional organization leads to the assumptions that change has to be initiated by 
the highest in rank and employees have to be motivated by the highest in rank, which 
leads to reactive employees and limits energy. These assumptions are in line with 
observations regarding the way leaders perceive organization problems (section 2.4). 
 
The positional organization perspective is related to the ‘machine metaphor’ as 
described by Morgan (1986) and the machine bureaucracy as described by 
Mintzberg (1983). Typically, in this perspective the organization is perceived as a 
closed system, with sharp boundaries between the organization and its environment. 
Hosking (2004) puts it this way: “Much of Organization Theory has focused on 
organizations as the seemingly separate context for individual activities, groups, and 
inter-group relations [….], as entities that exist ‘in their own right’” (p. 260). This 
perspective is in line with the risk of reification (Van Dongen et al., 1996), which was 
referred to before, and typically fits in a unilateral control perspective. Just by putting 
boundaries between inside and outside and between layers and by creating 
regularity and stability ‘the’ organization seems to be manageable (controllable).  
 
The sharp separation of things and people refers directly to the Subject-Object 
construction of relations. A dominant Subject-Object view has three implications 
(Hosking, 2004, p. 260): 
First, it “constructs relationships as necessarily being between an active agent and 
an acted upon (passive) object”. For example, good leadership means that the leader 
knows what ‘the’ organization needs and is able to implement the necessary 
changes. 
Second, it “explains actions, relationships, and outcomes through reference to the 
assumed characteristics of entities.”6 For example, a good leader is expected to have 
a clear vision and effective organizations can be characterized as being flexible to 
adapt to changes in the environment. 
Third, “the entity that is explicitly positioned […] as the Subject is presumed to make 
social realities and relationships: the Subject is the one who acts to know and to 
influence ‘other’ as a knowable and formable Object.” For example, the leader knows 
the organization and its environment and is able to correct unbalance by proper 
changes. And he is the one who must design strategies to break through the 
resistance from the (unwilling) object.  
The Subject-Object construction relates to a unilateral control perspective: the 
Subject is or must be able to act upon the Object (entities such as organization, 
employees, activities, culture and environment) in order to organize for stability. This 
way of perception is a source for blocking change processes in itself, as the Subject  
can only be effective if the Object is willing to be passive. At the same time passivity 
 
___________________________  
6 The second implication is exactly the reason why this study does not focus on leadership traits, as if the leader 
were an isolated entity. Instead, this study tries to contribute to a better understanding of the leader in interaction 
with others. 
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is often perceived as unwillingness and resistance and as the very reason to use 
(top-down) strategies. The consequence is a circular pattern that frustrates change 
processes, as depicted in figure 2.16. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16 Subject-Object construction or relations leads to self-fulfilling prophecies 
 
Focus on stability has direct consequences for the perceived relation between 
organization and change. An organization is considered to be a relatively stable 
entity, unless it is being changed for a period. In other words, organization and 
change are, in this perspective, two different and sharply separated entities. 
Organization focuses on stability, change focuses on the transformation from old 
stability to a new stability. As a consequence, from this perspective change is always 
episodic. Weick and Quinn (1999) use the term episodic change for changes that 
“tend to occur in distinct periods during which shifts are precipitated by external 
events such as technology change or internal events such as change in key 
personnel” (p. 363). This perception of organization depicts organizations as entities 
that converge and tighten during periods of relative stability, often at the expense of 
continued adaptation to changes in the environment. As soon as the tension between 
environment and organization is too high, this is the signal one should organize for a 
new episodic change period. 
 
The sharp separation between organization and episodic change seems to contain a 
paradox that contributes to blocked change processes. Consider the next pattern. 
The manager perceives tension between environment and organization and starts an 
episodic change process (‘we have to show innovation power’). As an effect of the 
change process, the manager perceives instability (employees come up with new 
ideas and take initiatives independently). If the manager, stimulated by a unilateral 
control model, tends to organize for stability and regularity, he might perceive (a 
period of) change as a distortion of this stability that will, in turn, create threat. This 
experience stimulates the manager to activate a unilateral control model that strives 
for organizing for more control and stability (‘I wish you to consult me before you put 
your ideas into practice’, ‘plans should be submitted according to a default format’). 
The manager tends to tighten control and contributes to stagnation of the change 
process (employees do not feel stimulated, they lose ‘fun’). In the longer run, this 
leads to perceived tension between environment and organization again. This 
circular pattern seems to block effective changing, as change leads to stability. As a 
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consequence, sharp separation of organization and change seems to be conflicting 
with effective changing. Figure 2.17 illustrates this pattern. 
 
 
Figure 2.17 Change leads to stability 
 
These insights seem to justify a number of assumptions regarding design of 
organization from a unilateral control perspective.  
• Leaders tend to perceive and design their organizations as formal structures with 
a clear division of positions, in order to get an overview, reduce variety and create 
stability. In turn, they experience that they are in control.  
• In order to be in control, one is vulnerable to a Subject-Object perspective, which 
means that the active Subject perceives the passive Object (like the organization, 
the structure and staff) as a separate entity that can be changed. This perspective 
will only work if the Object is indeed passive, which can easily be conceived as an 
expression of unwillingness or resistance. This, in turn, reinforces top-down 
control. 
• From a unilateral control perspective, organization is being sharply separated 
from change: organization depicts stability while change is an unstable period that 
transforms the old stability to a new stability. Since a unilateral control perspective 
stimulates leaders to organize for stability, they might perceive change as a 
threatening distortion. Precisely this perception might reinforce unilateral control 
that organizes for stability. As a consequence, unilateral control creates a 
leadership paradox: change stimulates stability. 
 
The main manifestations of a unilateral control perspective regarding perception, 
behaviour, interventions and design of organization are summarized in figure 2.18. 
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Figure 2.18 Expressions of unilateral control: perception, behaviour, interventions and  
  design of organization 
 
 
2.8 Change of organization (expression 5) 
 
Several studies have presented classifications of change methods (e.g. De Caluwé & 
Vermaak, 2003; Ardon, 2002; Cummings & Worley, 2004). Generally, a contingency 
approach is suggested: the best change method reflects the specific characteristics 
of the situation.  
Boonstra (2004) contrasts two approaches: planned change and Organization 
Development. These approaches highly resemble Beer and Nohria’s (2000) Theory 
E and Theory O. Planned change projects have clear objectives, derived from market 
demands and economical considerations, and have well-elaborated plans that should 
lead to these objectives in a linear process. Focus is put on economic measures of 
performance. This approach has a strong top-down character. Change is planned as 
well as programmatic. Organization Development aims at enabling organizations to 
improve effectiveness (in relation to environment) and working life. The change 
process is based on collaboration of managers and employees and has an iterative 
character. Change is described as emergent, less planned and less programmatic. 
 
Boonstra argues that “planned change seems suitable when the problem is known, 
not too complex, and a solution is within reach. [….] Organization Development 
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appears to be more suitable in the case of complex issues for which no evident 
solution is at hand” (p. 450). This is also a contingency approach.  
What is the influence of a unilateral control model on the way leaders select their 
change approach? Earlier, it was argued that leaders seem to look at situations by 
distancing themselves from their environment, decomposing complex processes into 
simple problems and trying to find a right solution that can be implemented. In other 
words, a unilateral control model instructs managers to perceive situations such that 
a planned change approach often seems to be appropriate, regardless of whether 
issues are complex and solutions are within reach. One would expect this to lead to a 
bias in favour of the planned change approach. This assumption is supported by 
Werkman (2005), who found that managers act strongly according to planned 
change principles. This observation might lead to a circular pattern: the manager 
perceives the situation from a unilateral control perspective and finds a justification to 
apply a planned change method. In Argyris’ (1990, 2000, 2004) words this is a self-
protective reasoning. If this method does not lead to the desired outcomes, this can 
be threatening or embarrassing for the manager. According to Argyris it is exactly 
these conditions that reinforce unilateral control. 
A preference for planned change, regardless of the current reality, can easily 
contribute to blocked changing. It is not only structures or systems that one tends to 
implement top-down, but also behaviour and culture. By reducing these concepts to 
separate entities (see Hosking, 1994), such as competences and cultural values, one 
lays the foundation for top-down implementation. The next example is illustrative.  
 
 
Box 6 Top management stifle entrepreneurship by top-down communication 
 
Top management of an engineering company has developed a new strategy. The key word 
is ‘entrepreneurship’. In order to be successful, all professionals should show pro-activeness, 
personal responsibility and ownership. In order to realize this, top management and the HR 
department decide to design a workshop, aiming at developing entrepreneurial skills. The 
general director: “Every manager has to participate; this is of strategic importance for the 
company”. Top management calls in a consultancy firm to design and facilitate the 
workshops. The process starts with a kick-off meeting; all managers are invited. The general 
director presents the strategy and emphasizes the importance of a new entrepreneurial 
culture. All managers listen. Subsequently, the consultants describe the development 
process. All managers listen. Afterwards, top management and consultants agree that the 
atmosphere during the session had been constructive but passive and that there is a long 
way to go. No one confronts the top- down implementation approach and how this might 
contribute to managers’ passive and dependent conduct. No one suggests that the approach 
is completely in line with the current and undesired culture instead of a new and 
entrepreneurial culture. 
 
 
Especially if the desired culture is characterized by terms like empowerment, 
entrepreneurship, ownership and accountability, a planned change approach can 
easily lead to inconsistency. Managers ask their consultants if they can do the 
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implementation process. Consultants, in turn, tend to confirm by emphasizing their 
experience with and responsibility for implementation, as if they can implement new 
insights, skills, approaches and values from the outside in. The word ‘implementation’ 
breathes associations like ‘it is new’, ‘staff is incompetent and unknowing’, ‘it is driven 
in from the outside’ and ‘performance has not had the attention of staff members until 
now’. It is not surprising, from a systemic point of view, that staff might indeed 
behave this way as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Wierdsma (2004) uses the metaphor of 
a ‘package tour’: ‘the tour management – the diagnosis team- encourages the 
travelling party to follow the planned activities so that the journey will be successful. 
Discussion about the desirability of chosen routes and excursions is interpreted as 
resistance” (p. 235). This approach to implementation is characteristic of a planned 
change approach and seems to be inextricably bound up with resistance and 
recurrent patterns if it is used for complex issues for which no evident solution is at 
hand.  
This finding is in line with Wierdsma (2004), who argues that planned change is 
marked by two paradoxes. First, this approach creates resistance, which in turn is 
perceived as legitimating the approach. Second, strategy, structure and systems are 
stabilising factors. It is exactly these factors that are the starting point of numerous 
change projects. As a consequence, changing them creates uncertainty. Both 
paradoxes seem to activate circular patterns that block change.  
 
The preceding discussion on the preference for planned change methods is 
confirmed by results of the Dutch national study on change management by 
Mastenbroek et al. (2004), which is also discussed in section 2.4. Respondents’ 
change situations were divided over six categories, varying from mergers and take-
overs, to introductions of new technology and changes aimed at behaviour, attitude 
and culture. The categories reflect a wide variety of subjects. Still, in almost every 
category the three most frequently mentioned ‘blocking factors’ in change processes 
are ‘top management is unclear’, ‘employees show resistance’ and ‘management do 
not facilitate a learning process between organizational units’. Neither the subject of 
change nor the change method seems to relate to the factors that are perceived as 
blocking. This might support the vision that daily interactions (theory-in-use) take 
place regardless of the change method that is selected in the boardroom (espoused 
theory). The Dutch national study on change management focuses on blocking 
factors (or entities; see Hosking, 1994) rather than processes. Respondents select 
the factors they perceive as being the strongest in change processes within their own 
organization. By focusing on factors, there is a risk of reductionism, distancing and 
neglect of one’s own role.  
 
After all, regardless of the differences, planned change and Organization 
Development (OD) have some similarities. “Both approaches see organizations as 
entity, and more or less as a combination of people and resources to be optimized in 
a structure which is used to take decisions to achieve defined purposes” (Boonstra, 
2004, p. 450). With this description it becomes clear that OD, although less than the 
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planned change approach, is a planned change process as well. Several authors 
consider OD as a more or less planned approach. Cummings (2004) writes 
“Organization Development is a system-wide process of applying behavioral-science 
knowledge to the planned change and development of the strategies, design 
components, and processes that enable organizations to be effective” (p. 25). And 
Schein (1988) argues “OD is typically defined as a planned organizationwide kind of 
program” (p. 3). Moreover, planned change and organization development have an 
episodic character and separate change from stability (although OD is less episodic 
than planned change).  
 
These insights seem to justify a number of assumptions regarding the effect of a 
unilateral control model on the preferred change approach. 
• In order to be in control, leaders prefer a planned change method, which can be 
characterized as a goal-oriented, step-by-step, rational and episodic approach 
with a strong focus on economical measures of performance. 
• A planned change method is especially appropriate if the problem is known, 
relatively simple and a solution is within reach. However, this method is not 
appropriate for situations that are more complex, e.g. when the problem is in 
(social) patterns rather than isolated issues. These patterns cannot be controlled 
like isolated issues. 
• From a unilateral control theory-in-use leaders tend to perceive most problems as 
relatively simple as they are vulnerable to reductionism, distancing, blaming and 
linear thinking. As a consequence, they might overlook the more complex 
patterns and select a planned change method mistakenly.  
• The ‘selection’ of a change method can be considered as being espoused theory. 
Regardless of the selected change method, the leaders’ perception and 
behaviour in interaction with other people is probably governed by a unilateral 
control model. This could be an explanation for the fact that, regardless of the 
change issue and change method, people tend to perceive the same blocking 
factors for successful change. 
• Despite the differences, planned change and OD can be characterized as more or 
less episodic and planned. Stable organization and change are being separated. 
Changing is blocked and de-blocked by daily interactions that seem to be 
emergent and independent of the selected change approach. 
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Figure 2.19 summarizes the consequences of unilateral control for perception, 
interaction, intervention, design and change of organization. 
 
 
Figure 2.19 Expressions of unilateral control: perception, behaviour, interventions,  
  design of organization and change of organization 
 
 
2.9 Expressions of unilateral control: a diagnostic model  
 
Although managers tend to hold espoused theories that reflect values like internal 
commitment, ownership, entrepreneurship and personal responsibility, their 
perception, behaviour, interventions, design and change of organization tend to be 
governed by a unilateral control theory-in-use. This model refers to control, the desire 
to win, suppress feelings, to avoid testing one’s own assumptions, to judge others 
and to be rational. This model is effective if the problem is known and relatively 
simple and a proper solution is within reach. However, these skills make managers 
incompetent to deal with complex situations. For that reason, Argyris talks about 
‘skilled incompetence’ (1990, p. 12-24).  
  
‘Simple’ change processes are not necessarily easy to deal with. Simple means 
‘instrumental’, concerning structure and systems rather than performance, people, 
culture, behaviour or attitude. In this study, change processes are considered to be 
‘complex’ in case of dynamic complexity, as opposed to detail complexity (Senge, 
1990). The distinction between (dynamically) simple and complex situations seems to 
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relate to Edmondson and Smith’s (2006) so-called ‘cool topics’ and ‘hot topics’. Cool 
topics refer to task conflicts and “can be addressed by debating the facts, with little 
risk of giving rise to heated disagreement” (p. 7). Hot topics concern relationship 
conflicts and are characterized by differing values or interests, available facts cannot 
help to reduce uncertainties surrounding the topic and stakes are high. Although the 
authors limit their focus to management team conflicts, there is a strong resemblance 
to dynamically simple and complex situations. 
 
A unilateral control model is not suitable for dynamically complex situations as a 
consequence of the restricting effects on the way managers perceive, behave, 
intervene, design and change organization. Figure 2.20 summarizes the expressions 
of unilateral control and the consequences for changing and is considered to be a 
diagnostic model. The five expressions lead to recurrent patterns and blocked 
changing and organizing. This leads to threat and/or embarrassment that, in turn, 
reinforce a unilateral control model.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.20 Diagnostic model: circular relation between expressions of unilateral  
  control, blocked changing and organizing and threat 
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The problem is that the effects of unilateral control are normally not only undesired, 
but also unintended. One is often not aware of the effects of one’s own behaviour. 
And as soon as one is confronted with these effects, for example by feedback, one 
usually perceives this as a threat. As a consequence, the unilateral control model is 
reinforced. Even if one perceives this as not effective, it appears not to be easy to 
replace this model by an alternative. This way, regardless of their spoken and written 
change ambitions, leaders unintendedly contribute to the preservation of the current 
reality, as opposed to change. 
 
Effects of pressure 
Particularly if managers perceive pressure or a sense of urgency, they are stimulated 
to activate a unilateral control model that can lead to unintended effects and 
ineffective change processes (see Argyris, 1990, 2000, 2004). 
This is an important insight, as the current economy represents numerous sources of 
pressure, such as shareholders, clients, customers and boards. Especially in a 
situation of an economic downturn, managers will experience extra pressure on their 
performance and their time. Under these conditions, it is hard for managers to come 
up with a message other than ‘everything is under control’ and ‘we’ll solve the 
problems as soon as possible’. Under these circumstances it is not likely that 
managers will say that they ‘assume a recurrent pattern undermines successful 
changing in the longer run’ and that they ‘will take time to investigate these patterns 
and find alternatives’. As described before, interventions in interactive patterns are 
characterized by delay before they lead to visible results (Senge, 1990). This delay 
makes these interventions less attractive for managers who adhere to a unilateral 
control model.  
This reasoning leads to the assumption that managers who are under pressure will 
tend to focus on problems that are dynamically simple and have a routine character. 
Under these circumstances, it seems to be hard if not impossible to organize for 
dynamically complex changing. 
 
In case of dynamically simple (routine) situations, urgency justifies immediate 
pragmatic solutions. In case of dynamically complex situations, it depends: if the 
urgency is really high, a quick fix might be essential to ‘save the situation’. 
Simultaneously, one might investigate the underlying problem and work on a 
fundamental solution. If the urgency is relatively low, it is the best moment to 
investigate the underlying problem. 
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3. Alternative guiding principles: de-blocking changing,   
    organizing and learning 
 
Manager: I would like you to contribute to this policy. 
Employee: Would you like me to be intrinsically motivated or is this just something I 
have to do? 
Manager: It is just something you have to do.  
Employee: O.k., I will do it. But don’t expect me to do it because I feel like it.  
Manager: I understand and I am aware of that.  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
According to Argyris (1980), approximately three-quarters of all problems that 
emerge in organizations can be solved with a unilateral control model and have a 
relatively linear character: clear problems can be solved with obvious solutions. 
These situations have a relatively low dynamic complexity (Senge, 1990). Other 
situations require an alternative approach. This chapter contributes to a clearer 
distinction between situations that can be managed with a unilateral control model 
and situations that require alternative guiding principles. In the next section Argyris’ 
Model II (mutual learning) is introduced, which he describes as the alternative for 
Model I (unilateral control). The subsequent section presents the concept of 
(continuous) changing, organizing and learning, which exist alongside episodic 
change. This chapter concludes with a critical reflection on Argyris’ Model II. 
 
 
3.2 Introduction of mutual learning model 
 
If three-quarters of all organization problems can be solved with a unilateral control 
model, how can one know when to look for an alternative? Argyris argues that “Model 
I may be relevant for the more routine single-loop issues that do not threaten 
individuals, groups, intergroups, or organizations” (1983, p. 120). Situations that do 
not fit these conditions require an alternative. 
 
As an alternative for Model I (unilateral control) Argyris introduces Model II, also 
referred to as the ‘mutual learning model’ (e.g. Schwartz, 2002; Noonan, 2007). 
While a unilateral control model aims at controlling situations by (re)defining actions 
in order to solve problems, the governing values of a mutual learning theory-in-use 
are valid information, informed and free choice and (personal) responsibility and 
commitment to effective implementation. Schwartz (2002) added a fourth governing 
value: compassion. These four governing values need some additional clarification. 
Valid information means that one shares all relevant information: concrete data 
(instead of abstractions), one’s assumptions and feelings about an issue and one’s 
reasoning that leads to one’s conclusions. Besides, one tries to find out if one is 
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missing relevant information that others might have about the situation and about the 
way one contributes to the situation. 
Free and informed choice refers to a choice that is based on valid information. One 
does not make a choice because one is manipulated by another person or one is 
defensive, but because one truly thinks this is the best option. 
Internal commitment means that one feels personally responsible for the 
implementation of the choice. This means that one feels ownership and does not put 
things into practice because of unilateral control by another person (which would 
make one’s actions dependent on the control of this person). 
Compassion means that one has empathy for other persons and for oneself and still 
holds oneself and other persons accountable for action rather than unilaterally 
protecting others or oneself (Schwartz, 2002). Box 7 further illustrates these 
governing values of mutual learning. 
 
 
Box 7 Stimulating entrepreneurship with mutual learning 
 
The general director of a middle-sized company has a conversation with his middle 
managers about the level of entrepreneurship. He has introduced this issue earlier by 
arguing that entrepreneurship must be enlarged. Since then, the general director has put the 
issue on the agenda time after time and introduced several improvement suggestions, but 
nothing has really changed. During a conversation with a coach, he becomes aware of the 
inconsistency between what he says and what he does: by his unilateral control (talking in 
abstractions, holding his conclusions as being true, persuading, instructing), he stifles his 
managers’ entrepreneurship. Now he tries again:  
 
“Managers or employees seldom surprise me with new initiatives, e.g. a new method or a 
new product (concrete data). Therefore I think they are not taking initiatives at all and only 
consolidate the current situation (reasoning and assumptions). That is what I call ‘lack of 
entrepreneurship’ and what worries me (conclusion and feelings). Am I missing something 
(checking for additional information)? 
I raised this issue several times. Still I don’t hear you about more initiatives with your 
employees (concrete data). Therefore I think I am the only one who is worried about the 
situation (reasoning and assumptions). Might I be right (checking for additional information)? 
What do I do that might contribute to this situation (information about how he might contribute 
himself)? What are your observations?  
To what extent do you share my findings? Do you believe we could learn and improve this 
situation? Please, do not keep me uninformed if you think we can’t. I really want you to be 
honest with me (inviting to share valid information). 
What would you suggest? How could you contribute? What could I do to help you? (free and 
informed choice).” 
 
Valid information lays the foundation for free and informed choice and, subsequently, for 
internal commitment for the implementation. Managers can take this approach as ‘soft’ and 
‘lack of leadership’. This approach is especially effective, if commitment and ownership are 
needed in order to realize effective change.  
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Saying that one desires commitment and ownership (espoused theory) while acting in line 
with a unilateral control model (theory-in-use) leads to inconsistent and unreliable leadership. 
In order to be consistent, one could either say that one does not try to realize (full) 
commitment and show unilateral control, or say that one desires commitment and act in line 
with a mutual learning model. It is a free choice. 
 
 
A unilateral control model (Model I) is based upon the assumption that other persons 
are not capable of dealing with the truth and are, thus, weak and vulnerable. For that 
reason one tends to save face by not sharing valid information (see ‘the cheating 
game’, figure 2.1). However, by acting this way one keeps oneself and other persons 
from learning.   
Mutual learning (Model II) supports learning by advocating one’s position and 
encouraging inquiry into it, and minimizing face saving. The assumption is that other 
persons have their own responsibility to deal with valid information and that one 
should give oneself and other persons the opportunity to learn. This can typically be 
considered as espoused theory.  
Unlike Model I, Model II (figure 3.1) represents free choice for individuals instead of 
control or even intimidation. To make a good and free choice, one needs valid 
information, which includes information that may cause embarrassment or may be 
difficult to deal with. In order to get valid information, one should also be able and 
willing to test one’s assumptions.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Model II theory-in-use (source: Argyris, 2004, p. 393) 
 
Argyris emphasizes that Model II (mutual learning) governing values are not the 
opposite of Model I (unilateral control). Mutual learning does not mean that one 
focuses entirely on someone else’s opinions, desires and interest. That wouldn’t be 
mutual either. Mutual learning means a combination of advocacy of one’s own 
position and inquiry into one’s own position and someone else’s position. This 
requires mutually sharing valid information that has led to one’s position instead of 
keeping positions in order to win (Argyris, 1990, 2000, 2004; Noonan, 2007; 
Schwartz, 2004). Or, in other words, being right or wrong is less interesting. The 
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emphasis is on sharing valid information in order to find the most effective solutions 
and strategies. That is how one might break through the ongoing  
‘cheating game’ (see figure 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Mutual learning: breaking through the ‘cheating game’ 
 
Argyris characterizes the differences between Model I and II by five social virtues 
(2004). 
 
 Model I Social Virtues Model II Social Virtues 
Help and Support 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respect for others 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strength 
 
 
 
 
 
Give approval and praise to others. 
Tell others what you believe will 
make them feel good about 
themselves. Reduce their feelings of 
hurt by telling them how much you 
care, and, if possible, agree with 
them that the others acted 
improperly. 
 
Defer to other people and do not 
confront their reasoning or actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advocate your position in order to 
win. Hold your own position in the 
face of advocacy. Feeling vulnerable 
is a sign of weakness. 
 
 
Increase the others’ capacity to 
confront their own ideas, to 
create a window into their own 
mind, and to face their 
unsurfaced assumptions, biases, 
and fears by acting in these 
ways toward other people. 
 
 
Attribute to other people a high 
capacity for self-reflection and 
self-examination without 
becoming so upset that they 
lose their effectiveness and their 
sense of self-responsibility and 
choice. Keep testing this 
attribution openly. 
 
Advocate your position and 
combine it with inquiry and self-
reflection. Feeling vulnerable 
while encouraging inquiry is a 
sign of strength.  
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Honesty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integrity 
Tell other people no lies or tell others 
all you think and feel. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stick to your principles, values and 
beliefs. 
Encourage yourself and other 
people to say what they know 
yet fear to say. Minimize what 
would otherwise be subject to 
distortion and cover-up of the 
distortion. 
 
Advocate your principles, values 
and beliefs in a way that invites 
inquiry into them and 
encourages other people to do 
the same. 
Table 3.1 Social virtues of Model I and Model II (Argyris, 2004, p. 398) 
  
 
Direct observable data  
Middle manager: I am afraid I already know how they will react to this new policy. 
They will probably say ‘Here we go again’. 
Director: The problem is that it is very difficult to change in this organization. People 
just want to do their work. However, we cannot afford failure of this policy. Things 
really have to change. You have to act smartly. 
Middle manager: Of course I have to. But I am dependent on the employees, right? 
Director: Of course you are. 
 
This conversation, derived directly from practice, strongly illustrates unilateral control. 
Some observations (see sections 2.2 and 2.4): 
• Distancing: manager and director approach the situation as if they are not part of 
it. 
• Blaming: employees are perceived to be the problem. 
• Subject-Object thinking: management’s policy is o.k., performance depends on 
employees’ competence and loyalty. 
• Face-saving of other: director does not confront middle manager’s effectiveness 
and confirms that his success depends on employees; manager does not inquire 
into quotes like ‘things have to change’. 
• Face-saving of oneself: manager does not say he actually does not know how to 
deal with this situation smartly and covers his problem up. 
 
All these observations help these individuals to keep things under control and keep 
them from learning and changing. While they talk about the change problems within 
the organization, they illustrate how they probably contribute to these problems. 
There is another characteristic of this conversation: director and manager talk on an 
abstract level. Their claims cannot be tested, which again keeps them from learning. 
How does the manager know that ‘they’ will say ‘Here we go again’? Did he have 
such experiences before? What exactly was said, then? And how did he respond? 
And what was the effect of that response? (How) might he have contributed to their 
response? And how does the director know that ‘People just want to do their work’? 
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From what data (observations, quotes) does he derive this conclusion? And what is 
the effect of this conclusion (or belief) on his actions? Claims like ‘things really have 
to change’ and ‘you have to act smart’ are just as abstract. Advice or expectations 
like these are of little value, as they sound obvious but are not actionable (Argyris, 
1990).  
 
The example is not unique. Generally, discussions in boardrooms tend to have an 
abstract character. A mutual learning model is based on directly observable data, 
minimizes defensiveness and requires advocacy to be supported by illustration, 
testing and inquiry into others’ views (Argyris, 1982, Fig. 3). This means that a mutual 
learning model does not accept abstractions, but tries to find the directly observable 
data, or valid information, that these abstractions are based upon. Such learning is 
facilitated (see the questions related to the example) by advocacy and public testing 
and inquiry. In order to visualize the way one tends to infer interpretations and 
conclusions from (relatively) directly observable data and how one can move the 
other way round, Argyris introduced the ‘ladder of inference’ (e.g. 1983, 1990, 2000). 
Recently, Wouterson and Bouwman (2005) made this more accessible by using 
different terms.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Ladder of inference (based upon Argyris, 2000) 
 
The mutual learning model requires valid information and thus instructs one to make 
discussions less abstract by descending the ladder of inference. Argyris puts this into 
practice by regularly asking ‘How do you know that you are right?’, ‘Can you share an 
example that illustrates your point?’. Furthermore, he tends to use the very ‘here-
and-now’ of the conversation to inquire how one contributes to one’s own recurrent 
problems.  
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3.3 Changing, organizing and learning  
 
A unilateral control model stimulates individuals to think in terms of episodic change, 
which is a period of (planned) instability between the current stable (positional) 
organization and the desired stable organization. As discussed before (section 2.8), 
regardless of the selected change approach, our perception, behaviours and 
interventions can still be governed by a unilateral control model. This, in turn, can 
lead to recurrent problems and blocked changing. There seem to be two – different – 
worlds:  
1. the world of organization (strategy and structure) and change (method); this is 
what we tend to talk about; 
2. the world of (continuous) changing and organizing, the daily interactions that can 
contribute to positive developments or recurrent problems. 
Or, in other words, continuous changing and organizing is what happens (what we 
are doing) while we are talking about change (method) and organization (strategy 
and structure). In this light, culture might be best described as the way we are 
engaged in changing and organizing. Or, culture is what happens (what we are 
doing) while we are talking about culture diagnosis and cultural values. 
 
These findings are in line with other authors (e.g. Van Dongen, 1996; Hosking, 2004; 
Weick & Quinn, 1999; Wierdsma, 2004), who suggest moving from structure to 
process, from organization to organizing and from change to changing. Wierdsma 
(2004) introduces an alternative for positional organization: transactional 
organization. While the positional organization perspective focuses on positions, the 
transactional organization perspective focuses on transactions in the chain of value 
addition. “In order to be viable, the organization must be capable of responding to the 
differing demands and requirements of customers and other stakeholders with regard 
to products, services, and information” (p. 230). The variety in demands and 
requirements cannot be answered by an organization perspective that strives for 
stability. Beer (1979), cited by Wierdsma (2004) puts it this way: “only variety beats 
variety” (p. 230).  
 
Transactional organization differs from positional organization in several 
characteristics. Transactional organization functions “as a dynamic network of people 
connected by a network of mutually dependent activities and shared meanings” (p. 
231). In their interactions people ‘create’ the organization, which can be seen as the 
sum of these interactions. The transactional organization perspective assumes that 
the world ‘becomes’ instead of ‘is’. As these activities and interactions go crosswise 
through all kind of boundaries (e.g. between individuals, functions, teams, 
departments, layers and environment), transactional organization replaces 
boundaries by interfaces. This concept corresponds with the boundaryless 
organization, as described by Ashkenas et al. (1998): “Specifically, behaviour 
patterns that are highly conditioned by boundaries between levels, functions, and 
other constructs will be replaced by patterns of free movement across those same 
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boundaries. No longer will organizations use boundaries to separate people, tasks, 
processes and places” (p. 2). The authors argue for free movement of ideas, 
information, talent rewards and actions where they are most needed. 
Subject-Object relations do not fit in transactional organization. The Subject does not 
look at the organization as a separate entity. In this perspective it is the Subject who 
has to create organization just by interacting with others. As a consequence, 
relations are much more equal. This perspective can better be characterized by 
Subject-Subject relations. 
 
The assumptions underlying both perspectives are summarized in table 3.2.  
Positional organization Transactional organization 
World which ‘is’ 
Subject-Object 
Stability 
Positions 
Boundaries 
Focus on constituent parts 
Reduction of variety 
World which ‘becomes’ 
Subject-subject 
Dynamism 
Transactions 
Interfaces 
Balance between parts and whole 
Maintenance of variety 
Table 3.2 Underlying assumptions of positional and transactional organization  
(derived from Wierdsma, 2004, p. 239). 
 
While positional organization focuses on structure, transactional organization focuses 
on processes. Organization can be sharply separated from change; organizing 
cannot be separated from changing. Episodic change does not fit in this perspective. 
Weick & Quinn (1999) introduce ‘continuous change’, which is used “to group 
together organizational changes that tend to be ongoing, evolving and cumulative. A 
common presumption is that change is emergent, meaning that is ‘the realization of a 
new pattern of organizing in the absence of explicit a priori intentions’” (p. 373, partly 
quoted from Orlikowski, 1996, p. 65).  
 
Continuous changing7 becomes an alternative for both (positional) organization and 
episodic change, as there is no sharp separation between organizing and changing 
from this perspective. Besides, continuous changing cannot be separated from 
learning (Boonstra, 2004). As discussed before (section 2.5), a unilateral control 
model stifles learning and reinforces circular patterns. De-blocking changing and 
organizing preconceives learning. 
Weick & Quinn (1999) argue that the concepts of episodic change and continuous 
changing reflect differences in the perspective of the observer. From a distance (the 
macro level of analysis), observers see repetitive action, routines and inertia that are 
occasionally interrupted by episodic changes. If observers view from closer in (the 
micro level of analysis), they see ongoing adaptation and adjustments. This 
distinction of episodic and macro level versus continuous and micro level seems to  
___________________________  
7 In order to emphasise the ongoing process and to distinguish from episodic change, ‘continuous changing’ 
seems to be more consistent than ‘continuous change’. 
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correspond to the ‘different worlds’ that are referred to at the start of this section. The 
world of organization (strategy and structure) and change (method) seems to relate 
to the macro level of analysis, while the world of (continuous) changing and  
organizing and daily interactions relates to the micro level of analysis. 
 
The focus of this study is on the micro level of analysis that relates to continuous 
changing, organizing and learning. More specifically, the focus is on daily interactions 
between leaders, employees and their consultants and the way these interactions 
block or de-block ongoing changing, organizing and learning. These interactions (and 
interactive patterns) may emerge, regardless of specific change goals and selected 
change method. This focus corresponds with Weick and Quinn (1999), who argue 
that “change is not an on-off phenomenon nor is its effectiveness contingent on the 
degree to which it is planned. Furthermore, the trajectory of change is more often 
spiral or open-ended than linear. All of these insights are more likely to be kept in 
play if researchers focus on ‘changing’ rather than ‘change’” (p. 381).  
 
Managers who adhere to a unilateral control model might contribute to blocked 
changing, organizing and learning. While episodic change is driven by tensions 
between a changing environment and the organization structure, continuous 
changing is driven by organizational instability and alert reactions to daily 
contingencies (Boonstra, 2004). A condition for continuous changing is thus a 
personal sense of responsibility by organization members to take initiative for (small) 
improvements and leaders’ trust in and appreciation of this sense of responsibility. 
These conditions, again, seem to relate in a circular way. 
 
 
3.4 Reflection on Argyris’ mutual learning model 
 
In spite of Argyris’ impact on management thinking, some critical notes can be 
mentioned. Argyris’ description of Model II (mutual learning) is radical; in effect, it is 
difficult to comply with this model. As a consequence, even his own ideas do not 
always pass the test. Van de Vliert (1977) has summarized five inconsistencies with 
respect to the governing values of Model II. First, Argyris argues that change is not a 
primary task of the interventionist. However, a shift from Model I to Model II is always 
a change process in itself. Second, free choice is difficult if one presents the situation 
as a choice between learning and not learning. Third, free choice for everyone is 
difficult to realize, because free choice for one individual in an organization often 
implicitly means absence of free choice for another individual. Fourth, Argyris 
assumes that free choices based on valid information lead to effective organizations. 
However, free choices do not need to be good choices. Fifth, although Argyris argues 
that an interventionist must carry out the primary tasks throughout the whole 
organization, Argyris seems to have a management bias “which is manifested in his 
preoccupation with ‘top executives’” (p. 562).  
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Argyris pays special attention to double bind risks in Model I management behaviour, 
which refers to impossible messages that keep persons captured because they 
represent two incompatible assignments. Argyris’ theory, however, is vulnerable to 
double bind in itself, by saying that one should always have free choices and one 
should create learning situations and behave autonomously. This seems to be a risk 
of radicalisation on a theoretical level. 
On a practical level the governing values of Model II could be accused of being too 
optimistic. According to Argyris, managers (and individuals in general) are highly 
skilled in Model I and they are not aware of their skills. He even argues that Model I 
is neither region nor time-related. Drukker (1999) stresses the difficulties with training 
managers in Model II. Model I is considered to be deeply ingrained. Besides, working 
according to Model II in an environment where Model I is dominant requires courage. 
For that reason, Drukker calls Model II the model of courage. Argyris is not consistent 
about how easily managers learn Model II. In one publication he reports difficulties: 
“[…] people who want to learn theories-in-use that facilitate double-loop learning are 
unable to do so during the early phases of learning, even if economically 
autonomous and powerful, even if in an environment that is designed to bring about 
such learning” (1983, p. 119). Later, he claims that in his experience the majority of 
executives have had the capacity to learn Model II without too much difficulty. “It will 
take as much time to learn Model II as it takes to play a middling game of tennis” 
(1990, p. 95). Still later, Robert Kegan describes that “Argyris, however, has been 
candid in reporting that even highly advantaged, graduate-educated, organizationally 
high-ranking adults have a great deal of difficulty mastering – or simply cannot 
master - what it is he is teaching (source: personal communication)” (Kegan, 1994, p. 
321). These findings seem to support the assumption that a model shift is difficult to 
realize. The fact that one tends to act the easy (Model I) way might be an explanation 
of disappointing effectiveness of change processes. This is in line with Senge (1990), 
who argues that “systemic insights never find their way into operating policies” (p. 
174). His explanation is the persistence of our mental models: “deeply held internal 
images of how the world works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and 
acting” (p. 174).   
A last remark that can be made concerns the individual psychological and more 
specifically, the cognitive bias of Argyris’ approach (De Man, 2003, p. 13). According 
to De Man, Argyris pays relatively little attention to emotions and reflexive behaviour. 
De Man argues that behaviour is mainly automatic and is not directed by a theory. 
However, this remark seems to be applicable only to Model II. Argyris stresses the 
fact that management behaviour is normally and automatically guided by Model I. 
One tends to be aware of neither the guiding principles, nor the way these lead 
automatically to certain behaviour, and the way this behaviour leads to unintended 
results. Unlike Model I, Model II assumes a conscious process. The governing values 
of Model II assume that the ‘design’ of individual behaviour is based upon valid 
information and informed choice.  
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4. Role of the interventionist 
 
Consultant: Before the meeting started, you told me you wanted all managers to be 
intrinsically committed. How do you evaluate the management meeting? 
Director: Positive. All managers said they are committed to the change project. That 
is important to me. 
Consultant: In the first instance, John said he did not believe this was going to work. 
Director: But I succeeded to convince him, didn’t I? 
Consultant: Do you think he is intrinsically committed? 
Director: Well, he said he is committed, didn’t he? 
Consultant: Help me to understand you. Does that mean that you don’t want your 
managers to be intrinsically committed, but you want them to say that they are 
committed? 
Director: Well, eh, well, actually I think it is important that they are intrinsically 
committed. I need them for an effective implementation, right? 
Consultant: Then how do you know that you can evaluate the management meeting 
positively? 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The role of consultants has been mentioned several times. There is quite some 
evidence that a majority of consultants tends to hold the same unilateral control 
model as their clients (Argyris, 2000). Taking a role of ‘partner-in-business’, 
consultants can support their clients in creating processes that reinforce circular 
processes and stifle learning.  
This chapter describes the role of consultants. The next section illustrates how 
different approaches relate to unilateral control. Subsequently, a classification of 
interventions is presented, followed by the scope of interventions in this study. The 
following section describes interventions that contribute to de-block changing, 
organizing and learning. Here, interventions (the ‘what’) are distinguished from the 
process of intervening (‘the how’). 
 
 
4.2 Unilateral control by consultants 
 
Drukker and Verhaaren (2002) see two possible approaches by consultants in 
interactions with clients.  
1. Management Serving. This approach refers to an acceptance of the problem 
definition and change method. The consultant’s role is ‘only’ to serve management by 
conducting the activities that have been outsourced by the principal. This approach is 
effective if the problem is known and relatively simple and a proper solution is within 
reach and is especially suited to outsourcing situations for capacity reasons. This role 
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is considered to be identical to a ‘partner-in-business’ model: the consultant stands 
next to the manager and supports him to bring his strategies into practice. 
2. Professional Independent Consulting. This approach is suitable if the problem is 
complex and/or the approach is new. The client’s assumptions and perspectives 
cannot be accepted as being ‘the truth’ and might even contribute to the perceived 
problems. When ‘the problem’ is presented, there is a risk of reification (Van Dongen, 
1996). This means that the client considers an abstract phenomenon that can be 
approached from different perspectives always to be a concrete thing or object that 
does not change. Under these circumstances the consultant has to challenge the 
problem definition and assumptions. 
 
Several authors argue that most consultants have a strong bias to a Management 
Serving model (Argyris, 2000; Noonan, 2007, Drukker & Verhaaren, 2002; 
Verhaaren, 2004; Strikwerda, 2004). Consultants seem to be as vulnerable as 
managers to a unilateral control model. Drukker & Verhaaren describe how client and 
consultant tend to reinforce each other in using this model. A client who invites a 
consultant for a reason other than for capacity reasons will often experience the 
situation as more or less uncomfortable. This experience stimulates the client to 
activate a unilateral control model; he will tend to control the situation, suppress 
emotions, act rationally and show dominant behaviour. This behaviour stimulates the 
consultant to show the same model: ‘I will show that I am fully equipped to handle 
this situation effectively’.  
 
Besides this reinforcement by the client, the consultant might experience other 
factors that activate a unilateral control model. Just like the client, the consultant 
might very well experience the urge 
• for quick visible success (quick wins are more probably noticed as being a 
success by the consultant than delayed effects); 
• to present himself as someone who is able to manage the situation; 
• of commercial pressure (if a potential principal asks for a practical solution for a 
defined problem, critical questions about assumptions or deviant views might be 
experienced as being undesirable).   
These factors stimulate consultants to present themselves as ‘partners-in-business’ 
and able to ‘solve the problems as being presented by the client’. This perspective 
seems to be vulnerable to single-loop solutions and to cover-up of underlying 
problems that produce the symptoms. In non-routine and dynamically complex 
situations, the consultant might contribute to maintaining the current situation. The 
difference between cover-up of the underlying problem and inquiring into the 
underlying problem can be subtle, as illustrated in box 8. 
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Box 8 Why do you want me to give my opinion? 
 
A consultant was invited to facilitate a two-day session on changing for the general director 
and management team of a knowledge institute. In one session the participants discussed 
the effectiveness of their team. The consultant listened and had no active role in the 
discussion. In his perception the discussion had an abstract, rational and safe character and 
seemed to be free of any obligations. Personal contribution of individual team members was 
not the subject of discussion, although body language and tone of voice showed some 
disapproval between individuals. He intervened: ‘You appear to be very skilled in discussing 
at an abstract level with much freedom of obligations.’ The most active participant reacted: 
‘Apparently you have an opinion about our communication and team culture. I am very 
interested in your analysis.’ In a first reaction the consultant tended to present his analysis. 
Such an action would justify his position and be a great opportunity to show his added value. 
However, by presenting his analysis he would probably have reinforced the ineffective 
pattern: one would have reviewed the ‘interesting’ analysis and discussed to what extent it 
reflected the real situation. Still, it would have been the message of an outsider and as a 
consequence no one would have felt personally responsible for that vision. As an alternative, 
the consultant reacted with a question: 
’Why do you want me to give my opinion?’ 
The participant: ‘Because you are an outsider and you might see things we are not aware of.’ 
Consultant: ‘What kind of things do you mean?’ 
Participant (a bit irritated): ‘Well, for example the way we deal with each other’s beliefs.’ 
Consultant: ‘Why do you want me to give my opinion?’ 
The participant turned to his colleagues again and said (still irritated): ‘Well apparently he 
does not want to share his opinion, so I will do it. I really don’t like the way we discuss things. 
I do not feel that you take me seriously. My point of view is ignored time after time. Besides, 
we talk about every kind of subject except for personal ones. I am not willing to go on like 
this.’ 
 
 
For the consultant this conversation meant resisting the pressure that was put on him 
by the participants. They were highly skilled in their abstract discussions. With these 
defensive routines they succeeded to avoid personal responsibility and blocked 
changing. The participant even tried to involve the consultant in these routines and 
was probably not aware of this strategy. They were, as Argyris calls it, skilled 
incompetent. At the same time the consultant felt the pressure that he created 
himself: he was able to present an analysis and was willing to show how skilled he 
was to handle the situation. But still, he was convinced that not presenting his 
analysis would help the team break through the pattern he observed. Although the 
consultant succeeded not to please the client and undermine learning, he did not 
share his reasoning openly. This way, his intervention had still a unilateral character.  
 
This finding is in line with Campbell et al. (1994, p. 87), who argue that it can be easy 
for a consultant to offer an opinion, however the real answer often comes from 
members of the organization. After all, consultants seem to reinforce managers in 
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activating a unilateral control model easily. They are vulnerable to the same 
behaviour and tend to activate the same patterns. 
 
In order to focus on his role and in line with Argyris and others, from here ‘the 
consultant’ will be called the ‘interventionist’. 
 
4.3 Interventions in continuous changing 
 
This study focuses on continuous changing as opposed to episodic change. 
Continuous changing becomes visible at a micro level of analysis. Weick and Quinn 
(1999) describe the consequences of this focus for the development of an 
intervention theory and the role of the change agent and explore the contrasts 
between episodic change and continuous changing (table 4.1). 
 
This study on daily interactions between leader, employees and interventionist 
relates to continuous changing. The study is characterized by a micro level 
perspective as well as a long-term emphasis.  
 
Weick and Quinn (1999) refer to Inkpen and Crossan (1995) when they argue that 
continuous change can be triggered by a dissonance between beliefs and actions. 
They could have referred to Argyris here as well. While a central idea of episodic 
change is to detect inertia and replace or substitute the cause, continuous change 
aims rather at understanding how ongoing changing and learning is being blocked 
and how one could unblock changing and learning. Typical characteristics of 
continuous changing that relate directly to the contents of this study are recurrent 
interactions, response repertoires, emergent patterns, and learning.  
 
From the perspective of continuous changing, an intervention theory relates to the 
order ‘freeze, rebalance, unfreeze’. Weick and Quinn elaborate on the meaning of 
these terms. To freeze continuous changing is to make sequences visible and to 
show patterns in what is happening. It is not surprising that they refer to Argyris 
(1990). Rebalancing is explained as reinterpreting, relabelling and resequencing the 
patterns so that they unfold with fewer blockages. Unfreezing means resuming 
improvisation, translation and learning in ways that are now more mindful in their 
patterns, more resilient to anomalies and more flexible in their execution. 
Improvisation refers to ongoing variations which take place at a micro level: changing 
emerges because people do new things, in new ways, in interactions with new 
people, without a top-down initiative that urges them to do so. Translation refers to 
the free movement of ideas that bypass the apparatus of planned change and which 
may be turned into new actions at new places. Learning is considered here to be ‘a 
change in an organization’s response repertoire’ (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Sitkin et 
al., 1998). This study aims particularly at developing insight into how to unblock 
learning, rather than improvisation and translation. 
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 Episodic change Continuous changing 
Analytic framework Perspective: macro, distant, global 
 
Emphasis: short-run adaptation 
 
Key concepts: inertia, deep structure 
of interrelated parts, triggering, 
replacement and substitution, 
discontinuity, revolution 
Perspective: micro, close, local 
 
Emphasis: long-term adaptability 
 
Key concepts: recurrent interactions, 
shifting task authority, response 
repertoires, emergent patterns, 
improvisation, translation, learning 
 
Intervention theory The necessary change is created by 
intention. Change is Lewinian: 
inertial, linear, progressive, goal-
seeking, motivated by disequilibrium, 
and requires outsider intervention 
 
1. Unfreeze: disconfirmation of 
expectations, learning anxiety, 
provision of psychological safety 
2. Transition: cognitive 
restructuring, semantic 
redefinition, conceptual 
enlargement, new standards of 
judgement 
3. Refreeze: create supportive 
social norms, make change 
congruent with personality 
The change is a redirection of what is 
already under way. Change is 
Confucian: cyclical, professional, 
without an end state, equilibrium-
seeking, eternal 
 
1. Freeze: make sequences visible 
and show patterns through maps, 
schemas and stories 
2. Rebalance: reinterpret, relabel, 
resequence the patterns to reduce 
blocks, use logic of attraction 
3. Unfreeze: resume improvisation, 
translation and learning in ways 
that are more mindful 
 
Role of change agent Role: prime mover who creates 
change 
 
Process: focuses on inertia and 
seeks points of central leverage 
 
Changes meaning systems: speaks 
differently, communicates alternative 
schema, reinterprets revolutionary 
triggers, influences punctuation, 
builds coordination and commitment 
Role: sense maker who redirects 
change 
 
Process: recognizes, makes salient, 
and reframes current patterns 
 
Shows how intentional change can 
be made on the margins. Alters 
meaning by new language, enriched 
dialogue, and new identity. Unblocks 
improvisation, translation, and 
learning. 
 
Table 4.1 Comparison of episodic change and continuous changing (based on Weick  
  and Quinn, 1999, p. 366) 
 
 
According to Weick and Quinn (1999) contributing to de-blocking changing, 
organizing and learning means being sensitive to discourse. They refer to Barrett et 
al. (1995) and Dixon (1997), who claim that the most powerful change interventions 
occur at the level of everyday conversation. These claims are in line with this study 
that focuses at daily interactions, mainly expressed in conversations. 
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4.4 Interventions that contribute to de-block changing, organizing and learning  
 
Interventions and the process of intervening  
In order to develop an intervention perspective, a distinction can be made between 
interventions and the process of intervening. Interventions refer to approaches and 
methods that help to analyse and share circularity, organizational patterns and 
behaviour. The process of intervening refers to how to interact with the client system 
in such a way that the interventionist actually helps de-block changing, organizing 
and learning. The contrast between interventions and the process of intervening is 
compatible with the contrast between change methods and the way leaders perceive, 
behave and intervene in action. Regardless of the selected intervention methods, the 
interventionist can behave defensively and be ineffective in the end. While selected 
interventions can be espoused theory, the process of intervening is governed by 
one’s theory-in-use. Both perspectives are elaborated below. 
 
Interventions8 
Cummings and Worley (2004) define an intervention as “a set of sequenced planned 
actions or events intended to help an organization increase its effectiveness. 
Interventions purposely disrupt the status quo; they are deliberate attempts to 
change an organization or subunit toward a different and more effective state” (p. 
143). This definition discloses a direct relation with episodic change and the order 
‘unfreeze-transition-refreeze’. Argyris’ (1973) definition has a more neutral character: 
“To intervene is to enter into an ongoing system of relationship, to come between or 
among persons, groups or objects for the purpose of helping them” (p. 15). In this 
definition just entering in itself can already be an intervention. 
According to McCaughan & Palmer (1994), an intervention perspective has two 
overarching purposes: “to enable the consultant (and the manager seeking advice) to 
arrive at hypotheses about why the situation is the way it is and to lead the manager 
(and the consultant) to see the problem situation from new perspectives, and reframe 
the goings-on they regard as problematical” (p. 32-33).  
 
Several authors describe interventions aiming at de-blocking changing as a 
consequence of circularity and defensiveness. 
 
Argyris (1990, p. 95) describes four phases that support the capacity to learn in case 
of blocked changing: 
1. Map out how the organization presently deals with problems that are 
embarrassing and threatening. 
2. Help individual players diagnose to what extent each contributes to creating and 
maintaining the map. 
 
___________________________  
8 The word ‘interventions’ reflects a Subject-Object relation in itself. A consistent alternative would be 
‘interactions’. In this study ‘interventions’ refer to interactions by an interventionist. 
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3. Re-educate the players to take model II from an espoused theory to a theory-in-
use (start with the top). 
4. Repeat the learning experience to solve new problems as they arise. 
Argyris (1984, 1990) argues that one should start with the top. This is confirmed by 
Weick & Quinn (2004), who argue that “most top managers assume that change is 
something that someone with authority does to someone who does not have 
authority”. However, to engage the logic of attraction (instead of power), leaders must 
first make deep changes in themselves. “When deep personal change occurs, 
leaders then behave differently toward their direct reports, and the new behaviours 
from followers” (p. 190). 
 
Moeskops (2004), who bases her work on system dynamics, describes three 
intervention stages that aim at making systemic patterns transparent and debatable. 
1. Constructing systemic hypotheses 
As systemic patterns are generally hardly recognisable for participants, a third party 
supports them by analysing and sharing systemic hypotheses. 
2. Getting acceptance of systemic hypotheses 
Acceptance of systemic hypotheses by participants helps them to create new 
meaning and often leads to de-blocking changing. 
3. Offering concrete recommendations to break through systemic patterns  
If insight into systemic hypotheses does not lead to new energy and behaviour, a 
third party could help by offering concrete recommendations. 
 
McCaughan and Palmer (1994, p. 36-47) focus on asking the right questions and 
introduce systemic questioning. They suggest approaching systemic patterns with 
questions from different directions and describe five strategies: 
• Establishing circuitry, in order to raise awareness of feedback processes and 
circular patterns; 
• Establishing patterns, in order to find out how people relate to each other in terms 
of power and relationships; 
• Exploring meaning, in order to open up beliefs and meanings that people 
subscribe to actions and situations; 
• Exploring covert rules, in order to get insight into ‘unwritten’ rules; 
• Exploring time dimension, in order to explore how the meaning that one ascribes 
to a situation relates to past or imagined future contexts.  
 
Senge (1990) argues that in most ‘shifting the burden’ structures, there are two 
possible areas of leverage:  
1. Weaken the symptomatic structure and  
2. Strengthen the fundamental solution. 
He suggests doing this by diminishing the emotional threat that prompts the 
defensive response in the first place and learning how to deal with defensive routines 
when they arise. Senge: “to retain their power, defensive routines must remain 
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undiscussable. Teams stay stuck in their defensive routines only when they pretend 
that they don’t have any defensive routines, that everything is all right, and that they 
can say ‘anything’” (p. 255). 
 
A common thread in the contribution of these authors is their focus on the 
perspective of a third party. It is not surprising, since it is difficult to get insight into 
one’s own contribution to blocked changing. Unilateral control normally leads to 
interactions that seem to be obvious in the first place, even for a third party.  
 
Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory might be of great use in helping 
individuals changing their behavioural patterns that block change processes. To use 
the power of this theory, feedback should disclose dissonance between cognitions 
that are relevant to the individual (or team). Two types of dissonance could be visible 
in blocked change processes. 
1. Dissonance between espoused theory and theory-in-use. For example, a leader 
says that he expects employees to come up with ideas. However, as soon as he is 
confronted with deviant ideas or criticism, he tends to reject these signals. What he 
says (and wants to do) on the one hand, and what he really does in action on the 
other hand are dissonant. 
2. Dissonance between assumed effects and observed effects. For example, a 
leader assumes that he creates a safer climate in the team by avoiding personal 
feedback. However, one tends to feel unsafe because one thinks that the boss is not 
satisfied and this is not debatable.  
According to the cognitive dissonance theory, individuals don’t feel comfortable with 
dissonance and will try to reduce or eliminate dissonance. By sharing dissonance 
with a person, he might choose one of two options in order to reduce or eliminate 
dissonance: either he changes his assumptions or he changes his attitude and/or 
behaviour. In the first example (regarding the leader who rejects ideas), he could 
either be open about his desire to control and tell why and when he tends to tighten 
the rules, or try to inquire into employees’ concerns. In the second example 
(regarding the leader who wishes a safer climate), the leader could either accept that 
he does not create a safer climate or try to be open and take time for discussing 
performance and mutual inquiry. 
 
The preceding interrelated insights can be summarized in an approach, which is 
described below. 
1. Map out how the organization presently keeps itself from changing; develop 
hypotheses. 
2. Help the leader diagnose to what extent he contributes to creating and 
maintaining the patterns and give insight into the effect of his actions by 
- diminishing the emotional threat by creating an open climate 
- asking questions to help the leader to get insight into his own role 
- sharing insight into dissonance between beliefs (I want to contribute to change) 
and actions (I contribute to blocked changing) 
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- sharing feedback on the consequences of the leader’s actions/behaviour  
- sharing insight into defensiveness  
- sharing insight into circular processes/producing patterns (concerning leader, 
employees and consultant) 
- sharing insight into underlying problems that produce the symptoms. 
3. Help the leader to make defensiveness debatable without producing more 
defensiveness, by self-disclosure and by inquiring into the causes of one’s own 
defensiveness (mutual learning model). 
4. Help the leader and other persons to make defensive routines and circularity 
debatable and develop strategies to pro-actively contribute to changing by mutual 
inquiry and dialogue. 
 
These ‘phases’ suggest a planned and linear approach. However, it is rather an 
overview of activities to be explored. Although there seems to be a ‘logical order’, it is 
quite probable that this order cannot always be followed ‘in action’. 
 
The process of intervening 
The interventions as described above aim at gaining insight and helping leaders to 
become aware of their governing values, their behaviours and effects. However, what 
about the behaviour of the interventionist? There seems to be a similarity with 
leaders who either contribute to or block changing with daily interactions, regardless 
of the selected change method. Here, regardless of the selected intervention 
methods and techniques, the interventionist contributes to (de)blocking changing, 
organizing and learning in daily interactions. After all, he might be as vulnerable to a 
unilateral control model as his client, is a part of the system from the moment he 
enters the door and might show behaviour that bypasses or even activates defensive 
routines. As a consequence, he might contribute to the problems that the client 
experiences. This can only be observed in action. Action leads to observable data 
from which the theories-in-use can be inferred (see Argyris, 1983, 1990, and see 
further, chapter 6 ‘Research Methodology’).  
 
The interventions as described before regularly refer to feedback, inquiry and 
dialogue. What exactly do these words mean for the interventionist who wants to 
contribute to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning? As a starting point, the 
interventionist’s interactions (intervening) should meet the conditions of a mutual 
learning theory-in-use. Subsequently, consequences for feedback, inquiry and 
dialogue are relevant to be covered. Since a unilateral control model is an 
automatically operating program and the alternative is so hard to realize, slowing 
down the process will be the last issue that will be addressed. 
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Mutual learning model  
If interventionists are willing to help others to understand how one contributes to the 
problems one faces, and help others to learn alternatives in line with a mutual 
learning model, they should be able to approach the conditions of a mutual learning 
theory-in-use themselves.  
There is no reason to believe that all the insights that have been described before 
regarding a unilateral control model and its consequences for changing and 
organizing cannot be translated to interventionists. In other words, the most important 
interventions are the interactions with the client system. These interactions should be 
in line with the governing values of a mutual learning theory-in-use: organize for valid 
information, leave room for informed and free choice and stimulate personal 
responsibility and commitment to effective implementation. 
 
Organize for valid information. In order to see and understand how he might 
contribute to recurrent patterns and blocked changing, the interventionist needs to 
advocate his position and combine it with inquiry and self-reflection. In addition, he 
has to encourage himself and clients to say what they know yet fear to say. By doing 
so, he can help others to increase their capacity to confront their own ideas and their 
role in recurrent patterns. The interventionist trusts his clients have a high capacity 
for self-reflection and self-examination without becoming so upset or defensive that 
they lose their effectiveness and their sense of self-responsibility and choice (derived 
from social virtues as described by Argyris, 1990, 2004). 
 
Leave room for informed and free choice. Free choice implies voluntary rather than 
automatic, and proactive as opposed to reactive (Argyris, 1973). Clients might wish 
to turn over their free choice to the interventionist. By accepting, the latter would 
accept the client would lose his free choice and act dependently. Argyris (1973) 
argues that the interventionist has to resist this pressure, as otherwise the client as 
well as the interventionist will lose free choice9. After all, the latter would be controlled 
by the client’s anxieties. Free choice is essential to be able to feel internally 
committed. And thus free choice is especially important for those helping activities 
where the process of help is as important as the actual help. Argyris makes the 
comparison with a doctor-patient relationship. If the doctor has to surgically treat a 
bullet wound, free choice for the patient about the method is not needed. However, if 
the patient has an alcohol problem or high blood pressure, it is important that the 
patient is fully involved to make an informed (based on valid information) and free 
choice about the desired course of action (Argyris, 1973). Otherwise, he will not feel 
internally committed and will probably not succeed in realizing his goals. 
 
____________________  
9 Sharing valid information seems to require the interventionist to be open about this belief, as this will 
contribute to learning. After all, not accepting to take over the free choice from the client without explaining still 
has characteristics of unilateral control (´I won´t take the free choice from you and will not give you binding 
advice, as I think that is not good for your internal commitment. But I will not say that to you.´) and will 
probably lead to the client being frustrated. Argyris does not make mention of this. 
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Stimulate personal responsibility and commitment to effective implementation. 
Putting a chosen course of action into practice requires the client to feel internally 
committed. In addition, this way the client will not feel dependent on the 
interventionist. Actually, the foundation for personal responsibility, ownership and 
commitment is laid by valid information and free choice. 
 
Feedback 
If the interventionist perceives patterns, behaviours or defensive routines that 
contribute to problems, (how) can he give feedback to the actors? Some authors call 
for caution, because giving feedback about these routines would easily activate them 
and make people defensive.  
Moeskops emphasizes the risk of resistance when feeding back systemic 
hypotheses, especially if the pattern includes the role of specific persons. Therefore, 
third parties should be cautious and consider not sharing systemic hypotheses 
(immediately). McCaughan and Palmer (1994, p. 71 - 77) describe three ways of 
dealing with systemic hypotheses: 
1. Addressing the client system 
2. Addressing the client 
3. Addressing oneself 
Addressing the client system seems to have the highest impact, however, might 
easily lead to resistance and lack of understanding. Sitting side by side with the client 
is less stressful. If the client takes time out to analyse his own situation, one might 
even decide to address hypotheses only to oneself. 
 
However, the call for caution might be an expression of unilateral control: do not 
confront persons’ reasoning or actions, since they are not able to manage. This is a 
way of bypassing their defensiveness. This critical note is in line with Argyris, when 
he says: "But if the source of the defensive feelings were that they would have to 
examine their automatic dependency/distancing activities, then perhaps the 
defensive feelings should not be bypassed" (1990, p.127). According to Senge, the 
challenge is to confront defensiveness without producing more defensiveness, by 
self-disclosure and by inquiring into the causes of one’s own defensiveness (1990, p. 
255). 
 
Inquiry and dialogue 
William Isaacs (1999) published an interesting book, called ‘Dialogue – and the art of 
thinking together’. This work contributes to the debate on how to overcome 
organizational defensiveness.  
 
The way Isaacs describes the art of Dialogue highly resembles the characteristics of 
a mutual learning model. Dialogue, as he defines it, “is a conversation with a center, 
not sides (p. 19). An analysis of the word ‘dialogue’ leads to two meanings. First, 
dialogue is a flow of meaning. ‘Logos’ can be translated as ‘relationship’ as well. This 
makes dialogue “a conversation in which people think together in relationship” (p. 
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19). “Thinking together implies that you no longer take your own position as final. You 
relax your grip on certainty and listen to the possibilities that result simply from being 
in a relationship with others – possibilities that might not otherwise have occurred” (p. 
19).  
 
Isaacs presents a number of insights that can be helpful in finding out what 
interactions help to de-block changing, organizing and learning. He describes 
behaviours that relate to unilateral control or mutual learning and links these 
behaviours to discussion versus dialogue.  
In line with the contents of this study, Isaacs describes how people tend to defend 
their views and sustain their positions. Besides, he states that we often do things we 
do not intend and do not always see the forces that are operational below the surface 
of our conversations. “As individuals, this leads people to misread both what others 
are doing and the impact that they themselves are likely to have on others. In groups 
and organizations, it leads people continuously to find that efforts to make change 
are neutralized by other, well-intentioned individuals who have very different goals 
and ways of seeing the world” (p. 30). People are not aware, because they are 
focused on their vision and defending their position. The danger is that we construct 
assumptions about others and situations and finally translate them into beliefs that 
we adopt. “These beliefs tend to remain relatively stable and hard to change. We can 
easily become locked into a way of thinking that is hard to change” (p. 97). As we 
found earlier, this situation leads to circular patterns. 
 
In addition¸ Isaacs describes how people act in ways that are problematic. With a 
case study he illustrates how people judge and do not admit to it, how they cover up 
and act like they are not; how they push for their point of view but resist others to do 
the same; and how they attribute to others that they would not be interested or open 
to tackling the ‘real’ difficulties and so do not raise them (p. 32). These insights are in 
line with and a further confirmation of a unilateral control model. 
 
The challenge is to find out how to break through one’s fixed beliefs and 
communicative patterns that are meant to defend these beliefs. In Isaacs’ words, this 
means to develop from discussion, which is defensive, to dialogue. Unlike 
discussion, dialogue seeks to open possibilities and see new options. Discussion 
seeks closure and completion. “Dialogue is about evoking insight, which is a way of 
reordering our knowledge – particularly the taken-for-granted assumptions that 
people bring to the table” (p. 45). While discussion aims at solving a problem, 
dialogue is seen as dissolving a problem by being open to new insights and 
definitions. This line of thinking is compatible with Van Dijk (1989). Fixed beliefs that 
reconfirm themselves and lead to circularity fit his notion of reification. In his view, 
overcoming reifications requires variety (other beliefs and insights). The duality of 
solving and dissolving, as described by Isaacs, also fits the distinction between 
single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris, 1990), as discussed in section 2.6. 
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According to Isaacs, individuals have two fundamental choice points: the first one is 
between defend and suspend. And if one chooses to be defensive, one can 
subsequently choose one of two options: create either productive defensiveness or 
unproductive defensiveness. Figure 4.1 shows these choices.  
 
 
Fig 4.1  Fundamental choices (Isaacs, 1999) 
 
Isaacs presupposes the opportunity to make conscious choices. As we have learned 
earlier, by and large, individuals tend to hold a unilateral control theory-in-use, and 
are not aware of it. Making conscious choices is already in conflict with a unilateral 
control model and is a first step to overcoming defensiveness. This finding is in line 
with Schein (1993), who argues that dialogue does not primarily focus our attention 
to listening to the other, but on getting in touch with (particularly our own) underlying 
assumptions that automatically determine when we choose to speak and what we 
choose to say.  
Interventions by a third party may help to make people aware of their thinking and 
behaviour. According to Isaacs (who refers to Galwey, 1997), “[…] awareness is 
curative. As people become more conscious of the ways in which they unintentionally 
undermine themselves, they begin to make changes to reduce these difficulties” (p. 
188).  
 
By describing the alternative, dialogue, interestingly enough Isaacs refers to Argyris: 
“At the core of producing a set of actions that can truly bring about change is what 
Argyris calls ‘balancing advocacy and inquiry’” (p. 188). Advocacy refers to speaking 
openly what one thinks, speaking for a point of view. Inquiry means looking into what 
one does not yet know, what one does not yet understand or seeking to discover 
what other people see and understand that may be in conflict with one's point of 
view. Inquiry refers to asking questions that “seek to understand the rules that govern 
why people do what they do as much as to challenge what they do” (p. 188). 
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Balancing advocacy and inquiry requires learning how to make explicit the thinking 
that leads one to say what one says and ask the questions that help others to do the 
same (compare overcoming the ‘cheating game’, as described in section 3.2). Some 
additional characteristics of inquiry and reflective dialogue can be derived from 
Isaacs. First, people stop talking for others, or for the group. They speak for 
themselves (advocacy). Second, by reflective dialogue people are willing to explore 
their assumptions. As a consequence, they can be surprised that they are forced to 
slow down and think. Third, new meaning may unfold from different directions at 
once. 
 
Intervening by the interventionist means helping others to become aware of their own 
fixed beliefs and unconscious behaviours, to advocate their own insights and inquire 
in order to find alternatives. In order to be consistent and to avoid a Subject-Object 
relationship, one has to be able to balance advocacy and inquiry (reflective dialogue) 
oneself. 
 
Slowing down 
A unilateral control model is a highly automatic and deeply embedded theory-in-use. 
Because the vast majority of people is so competent in the skills that are required in 
this model, people are able to communicate and behave ‘without thinking’. This is 
helpful in relatively simple situations. However, in case of situations that are 
dynamically complex, embarrassing or threatening, this model is no longer 
appropriate. This means that people cannot depend on their automatic programs 
anymore. Especially in non-routine change situations and if change processes fail 
time after time, there is a need to ‘slow down’ ‘automatic’ behaviour and strategies 
that are based on unilateral control and investigate alternatives that are in line with 
mutual learning. 
 
Slowing down might be difficult in everyday practice. Reflective dialogue is not a 
usual strategy when people have to run a business. It might be in conflict with the 
decisive leaders one often calls for and with the partner-in-business the 
interventionist is expected to be.  
 
These findings argue for an intervention perspective that not only involves a 
description of interventions, but also a vision on the process of intervening.  
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5. Research questions 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is the start of the empirical study. In the next section the central 
concepts in the theoretical exploration are summarized, since they play an important 
role in the research questions. The subsequent section introduces the research 
questions of the empirical study. The questions are related to the diagnostic model 
that was introduced in section 2.9 (figure 2.20). 
 
 
5.2 Central concepts  
 
In this section the central concepts in this study are summarized.  
 
In change projects most attention is paid to the approach and method: what steps 
and interventions lead from the current to the desired situation (see Werkman, 2005). 
In practice, blocked change processes often have their roots in daily interactions that 
emerge regardless of the selected change approach (Argyris, 1990, 2000, 2004; 
Weick and Quin, 1999). The focus of this study is on daily interactions between 
leaders, employees and consultants and how these interactions relate to the 
(de)blocking of change processes. This study particularly addresses change 
processes that are tough, when problems recur time after time, when obvious 
interventions produce nonobvious consequences. Senge (1990) calls these 
situations dynamically complex. Therefore, the concept dynamically complex change 
processes has been introduced. This study builds on the scientific traditions of 
organizational learning and systems thinking. In these traditions, the concept of 
unilateral control plays an important role in the explanation of how daily interactions 
contribute to blocked change. According to some authors (e.g. Argyris, 1990, 2004; 
Senge, 1990; Boonstra, 2004; Campbell et al.,1994; McCaughan & Palmer, 1994; 
Putnam, 1999; Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Noonan, 2007; Schwarz, 2002), leaders 
have a strong inclination to activate a unilateral control model, particularly under 
circumstances that create pressure, threat and/or embarrassment. This model 
instructs them to impose their beliefs, opinions and change ambitions unilaterally 
upon others. As the theoretical exploration illustrates, expressions of unilateral 
control relate to leaders’ perception of organization problems, behaviours, 
interventions, and design and change of organization.  
 
When leaders and their consultants talk about change approaches and methods, 
they tend to focus on episodic change: change is separated from organization and 
considered to be a timely period of change in between two stable organizations. 
Weick & Quinn (1999) introduce ‘continuous change’, which is used “to group 
together organizational changes that tend to be ongoing, evolving and cumulative.  
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A common presumption is that change is emergent, meaning that is ‘the realization of 
a new pattern of organizing in the absence of explicit a priori intentions’” (p. 373). In 
order to relate to the ongoing process in daily interactions, this study uses the 
(active) term continuous changing. Unlike (episodic) change and organization, 
changing cannot be separated from organizing and learning (Boonstra, 2004). By 
studying daily interactions, this study focuses on the continuous process of changing, 
organizing and learning.  
Interactions becoming tough, problems recurring time after time, and obvious 
interventions that produce nonobvious consequences are expressions of a blocked 
process of changing, organizing and learning. The assumption is that under these 
circumstances circular patterns evolve: certain behaviour of one party leads to 
specific behaviour of another party that, in turn, reinforces the behaviour of the first 
party. Nothing is only a cause or only an effect. In systems thinking everything is both 
cause and effect (Senge, 1990). As long as one does not consider one’s own 
contribution, circular patterns lead to ongoing recurrent problems. Considering one’s 
own role preconceives the ability and willingness to learn and to be open about error. 
Unilateral control, however, leads to defensive routines that aim at covering error up. 
Defensive routines are considered to be actions that prevent individuals or segments 
of the organizations from experiencing embarrassment or threat. This makes 
defensive routines anti-learning (Argyris, 1990). Defensive routines thus contribute to 
ongoing ineffective patterns and growing error. 
 
As unilateral control seems to lead to blocked changing, organizing and learning, 
Argyris has introduced an alternative model: mutual learning. While unilateral control 
instructs leaders to persuade or even intimidate others to comply and – thus – stifles 
internal commitment, the governing values of a mutual learning theory-in-use aim at 
real commitment, because one makes free choices based upon valid information 
(Argyris, 1990, 2000, 2004; Schwartz, 2002; Noonan, 2007). An assumption is that 
interventions can contribute to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning. 
Interventions can be both (designed) methods and interactions by a third party (an 
interventionist). The focus in this study is on the interactions, or the ‘process of 
intervening’. 
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5.3 Research questions 
 
The theoretical exploration leads to three research questions that will be studied 
empirically. The research questions are depicted in figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Research questions related to theory 
 
Research question 1:  
To what extent are the expressions of unilateral control visible in interactions?  
The aim is to develop and validate a diagnostic model that helps to recognize and 
understand expressions of a unilateral control model in daily interactions of leaders.  
 
In order to be able to observe the phenomena as described, theoretical notions 
should be formulated unambiguously, regardless of whether the research is 
quantitative or qualitative (Van der Zwaan, 1990). In table 5.1 the expressions of a 
unilateral control model are translated in tentative operational descriptions.  
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Alternatives in order to de-block changing, organizing and learning are summarized 
as well. The descriptions are based upon the theoretical exploration. The most 
important sources are mentioned in the table. The descriptions will be further 
explored in the empirical study. In table 5.1 the operational translations as well as the 
alternatives have been encoded. These codes will be used in the empirical study. 
 
Consequences of 
unilateral control that 
tend to block change 
processes 
Operational translation   Alternatives in order to de-block 
change processes (D) 
PERCEPTION (P) 
 
• Reductionism 
(Van Dongen et al., 
1996) 
 
 
• Distancing 
(Argyris, 1990; De 
Man, 2003) 
 
 
• Blaming 
(Argyris, 1990; 
Senge, 1990) 
 
• Linear patterns 
(Campbell et al., 
1994; McCaughan 
and Palmer, 1994; 
Senge, 1990) 
 
• Subject-Object 
Hosking, 2004 
 
 
Reducing complex patterns to 
simple and manageable 
categories of incidents and 
problems – P reduction 
 
Putting oneself outside ‘the 
problem’ and observing ‘the 
problem’ from a distance –  
P distancing 
 
Considering one or more parties 
as being ‘the cause’ of the 
problem – P blaming 
 
Considering only one-way 
causal relationships between 
cause and effect – P linear 
 
 
 
Considering leader as an active 
Subject that imposes reality on 
employees, being passive 
Objects –  
P Subject-Object 
 
 
 
Trying to understand the 
dynamically complex patterns - P 
dynamic (D) 
 
 
Involving one’s own contribution to 
recurrent problems and patterns– 
P own (D) 
 
 
Considering mutual influences 
between parties – P mutual (D) 
 
 
Considering circular patterns: each 
party or element is both cause and 
effect – P circular (D) 
 
 
 
Considering leader and employees 
as well-thinking individuals who 
can make well-informed choices 
and take responsibility –  
P Subject-Subject (D) 
 
BEHAVIOUR (B) 
 
• Controlling 
circumstances 
(Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004; Schwarz, 
2002; Noonan, 2007) 
 
 
 
• Repeated behaviour 
regardless of  
 ineffectiveness 
(Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
  
 
Showing the desire to win, 
suppress feelings, to avoid 
testing one’s own assumptions, 
to judge others, to be rational 
and to avoid situations that are 
considered to be difficult to 
control or have uncertain 
outcomes – B control 
 
Showing the same behaviour 
time after time, regardless of 
whether it is effective – B repeat 
 
 
Aiming at valid information (which 
includes information that may 
cause embarrassment or may be 
difficult to deal with), informed and 
free choice, and personal 
responsibility and commitment to 
effective implementation –  
B valid (D) 
 
Reflecting on one’s own 
effectiveness and exploring 
alternatives – B reflection (D) 
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2004; Drukker, 1999) 
 
• Stronger control in 
case of threat 
(Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004; Drukker, 1999) 
 
 
 
• Reactive behaviour 
(Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004; Senge, 1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
Showing even more controlling 
behaviour if one experiences 
threat from the environment (e.g. 
feedback, time pressure, 
pressure on results, pressure 
from shareholders or clients) –  
B control↑ 
 
Expecting solutions to start 
outside oneself (by others) -  
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
Testing one’s assumptions; 
learning by advocating one’s own 
position and encouraging inquiry 
into it, and minimizing face saving 
-  
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
Taking initiative to open inquiry 
and change one’s behaviour pro-
actively – B proactive (D) 
 
INTERVENTIONS (I) 
 
• Focus on symptoms 
(reductionism) 
(Senge, 1990; Van 
Dongen et al., 1996; 
Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004) 
 
• Cover up underlying 
patterns 
(Senge, 1990; 
Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004) 
 
 
• Short-term 
solutions, quick wins 
(Senge, 1990; 
Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004) 
 
• Focus on 
impersonal 
instruments 
(Senge, 1990; 
Argyris, 1990, 2000, 
2004; Isaacs, 1999; 
Schein 1993) 
  
 
Focusing on the visible problems 
that should be solved – I 
symptoms 
 
 
 
 
Avoiding inquiry into more 
fundamental problems/patterns 
that ‘produce’ the recurrent 
symptomatic problems –  
I cover-up 
 
 
Focusing on quick and practical 
symptomatic solutions 
(pragmatic short-term 
perspective) – I short-term 
 
 
Preferring instrumental ways of 
‘solving or controlling the 
problem’, e.g. instruments, 
techniques, tips ‘n tricks, 
scorecards, and procedures –  
I instruments 
 
 
 
Distinguishing problem symptoms 
from underlying fundamental 
problems/patterns that ‘produce’ 
symptoms – I patterns (D) 
 
 
 
Inquiring into underlying 
problems/patterns and defensive 
routines that aim at covering up 
these patterns, including one’s 
own defensive routines –  
I inquiry (D) 
 
Focusing on approaches to de-
block change processes in the 
longer run (fundamental long-term 
perspective) – I long-term (D) 
 
 
Focusing on learning by reflection, 
inquiry and dialogue –  
I reflection (D) 
DESIGN OF 
ORGANIZATION (O) 
 
• Positional 
organization 
(Wierdsma, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
Considering organization as a 
hierarchical division of people 
based on the degree to which 
they have an overview of and 
 
 
 
Considering organizing as a 
process of ongoing transactions, 
relationships and meaning 
creation; focus on processes and 
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• Variety reduction 
(Wierdsma, 2004) 
 
 
• Subject-Object 
relations 
(Hosking, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
• Organization and 
change separated 
entities 
(Hosking, 2004; 
Weick and Quinn, 
1999) 
insight into the organization; 
focusing on structure and 
boundaries – O positional 
 
Using procedures and structures 
to reduce deviations as much as 
possible – O variety reduction 
 
Considering active leader and 
reactive employees as sharply 
separated entities – O Subject-
Object 
 
 
 
Considering organization as a 
stable condition and change as 
an episodic period in between 
an old stability and a new and 
desired stability – O episodic 
  
interfaces (transitional) –  
O transitional (D) 
 
 
Accepting several perspectives 
and meanings – O variety (D) 
 
 
Considering Subject-Subject 
relations, based on equality: each 
party is part of the ‘system’ and 
plays his role in the process of 
changing, organizing and learning 
– O subject-subject (D) 
 
Considering organizing and 
changing as interlocked processes 
that cannot be sharply separated – 
O continuous (D) 
CHANGE OF 
ORGANIZATION (C) 
  
• Goal-oriented and 
planned process 
(Boonstra, 2004; 
Werkman, 2006) 
 
• Step-by-step 
(Boonstra, 2004; 
Werkman, 2006) 
 
 
• Episodic and top-
down 
(Weick and Quinn, 
1999; Boonstra, 
2004) 
 
• Rational 
•(Weick and Quinn, 
1999; Boonstra, 
2004) 
 
 
 
Developing elaborative plans 
that describe the steps that lead 
to clear goals along a linear path 
- C planned 
 
Focusing on stages and steps; 
the output of each stage is 
logically input for the next stage 
– C step-by-step 
 
Considering change as a logical 
result of (top-down) initiatives, 
that will not evolve otherwise – 
C top-down 
 
 
Emphasizing rational analyses 
and considerations – C rational 
 
 
 
 
Process-oriented, focusing on 
value and effects of daily 
interactions – C process (D) 
 
 
Focusing on daily interactions 
between leader, employees (and 
consultants) – C interactions (D) 
 
 
Considering human beings as 
being able to change continually 
and improve autonomously, 
without any force by others – 
C autonomous (D) 
 
Emphasising emergent processes 
of changing, organizing and 
learning – C interactions (D) 
Table 5.1 Operational definitions  
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Research question 2:  
How does unilateral control relate to (de-)blocking of changing, organizing and 
learning? 
The conceptual model presumes a relation between the expressions of unilateral 
control and blocked changing, organizing and learning. This relation, however, is 
considered to be a black box, as there is little evidence-based information available 
about this relation10. 
The aim is to get evidence-based insight into the consequences of unilateral control 
on changing, organizing and learning. 
 
Based on the theoretical exploration, this research question can be translated into 
four specific questions: 
• How do expressions of unilateral control contribute to recurrent problems? 
• What circular patterns are visible? 
• What defensive routines are visible? 
• How do leaders de-block changing, organizing and learning? 
 
Research question 3:  
How do interventions contribute to (de-)blocking changing, organizing and learning?  
The aim of this research question is to develop an intervention perspective that 
contributes to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning. This intervention 
perspective has to offer practitioners insights they can actually apply in their practice 
(see also chapter 6 ‘Research methodology’). 
 
This research question not only addresses interventions (the ‘what’), but also the 
process of intervening (the ‘how’), as discussed in section 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________  
10 Compare Latour (1987), who introduced the concept of ‘black box’, which is a metaphor borrowed from 
cybernetics denoting a piece of machinery that ‘runs by itself’. This means, when a series of instructions are too 
complicated to be repeated time after time, a black box is drawn around it, meaning it to function only by giving 
it ‘input’ and ‘output’ data. 
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6. Research methodology  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Denise Rousseau (2006) published an article titled ‘Is there such a thing as 
‘evidence-based management’?’ In this article she calls for a better translation of 
research evidence into practices that solve organizational problems. In her opinion, 
the gap between research and practice is large. She feels managers rely largely on 
personal experience and bad advice from business books or consultants based on 
weak evidence.  
The challenge of this study is contributing to bridge this gap. The next section 
addresses the scope of this study and describes how the research method aims at 
the development of a practice theory. The subsequent section describes 
methodological considerations and addresses in particular the conditions that have to 
be met in order to be consistent with the contents of this study. The last section 
presents the research design, combining longitudinal case studies and action 
research. 
 
 
6.2 Scope of this study 
 
Rousseau’s observation about the gap between research and practice is applicable 
to the subject of this study. Numerous insights have been developed on a unilateral 
control model, blocked changing and organizing, defensive routines and recurrent 
patterns. Nevertheless, few of these insights are a foundation for management 
decision-making and management behaviour. It is not the lack of concepts that 
seems to be the problem. Rather, it seems to be the lack of clear and specific 
illustrations of how these concepts work out exactly in action. Added value is not in 
developing new concepts. Instead, it is in the way these (abstract) concepts are 
being consumed and translated (Latour, 1987).  
 
This study aims at contributing to reduce the gap between research and practice 
through explicit and specific illustrations of how changing, organizing and learning 
are being blocked by a unilateral control model and how de-blocking can be realized. 
This methodology is in line with Argyris, who suggested already in 1983 that “we 
must go beyond beliefs, values and attitudes (that is, beyond espoused theories) to 
collect relatively directly observable data from which to infer the theories-in-use” (p. 
119). This study also fits Latour’s (1987) methodological dictum that science and 
technology must be studied ‘in action’ or ‘in the making’. 
 
In the end, this study leads to a diagnosis and intervention theory that can be 
indicated as a practice theory. This is considered to be a system of logically 
interrelated and not conflicting opinions and concepts regarding a professional area, 
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which are formulated in such a way that they offer insights for one or more 
professional groups which they can actually apply in their practice (Marx, 1975; 
Mastenbroek, 1991). 
 
 
6.3 Methodological considerations 
 
Conducting research can be perceived as an intervention in itself and contributes to 
change processes (Bouwen, 1994). As a consequence, the contents and 
assumptions in this study have direct effects on the research design. In order to be 
consistent, in the empirical study two major issues have to be addressed. 
1. Focus on processes of changing, organizing and learning rather than separate 
instances or elements. As described in the theoretical exploration, a part of the 
problems to be studied is an inclination to reduce complex processes to controllable 
problems that can be solved in a linear way. In order to be consistent, this should be 
avoided in this study. The research approach should give insight into interactions 
rather than instances and dynamically complex situations rather than simple or 
routine situations. As a consequence, the research design has to support data 
collection during a longer period. Besides, a proper design contributes to insight into 
dynamically complex patterns. 
2. Inconsistency between espoused theory and theory-in-use. The theoretical 
exploration refers to the risk of inconsistency between what leaders think or say and 
what they really do in action. It is exactly this inconsistency that is part of the 
problems to be studied. Valuable insights into processes require a research design 
that reveals theories-in-use. In an interview or questionnaire participants might easily 
show their espoused theories. This is confirmed by Werkman (2005), who has used 
these methods in order to describe circular patterns. The challenge is to design a 
research process that helps to get insight into what one really does in action. It is 
important to put an emphasis on the “spontaneous, tacit theories-in-use … especially 
whenever feelings of embarrassment or threat come into play” (Argyris & Schön, 
1991, p. 86). Eden (1994) even argues that when subjects do not have to commit to 
real actions, any data that are gained are considered to be unreliable. All information 
might be espoused and inconsistent with real behaviour. 
 
These conditions lead to some methodological considerations. In order to maximize 
external validity, referring to the extent to which findings can be generalized (Yin, 
1994), a quantitative research approach would be preferable. Surveys, for example, 
can demonstrate the link between data and outcomes transparently (Eden & 
Huxham, 1996). Although research in a positivistic tradition has clear advantages, 
there seems to be some relation with a unilateral control model that would challenge 
consistency of this study. Typical characteristics that seem to be applicable to this 
kind of research are: 
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• Distancing (Argyris, 1990). The researcher considers him- or herself as being 
outside the area that is being studied. This way, the possible influence of the 
researcher on the observed phenomena is neglected. 
• Subject-Object construct of relations (Hoskings, 2004). The researcher is 
conceived to be the active and knowing Subject, who conducts a research to 
understand the passive and unknowing Object in order to determine what should 
be done upon the Object to be effective. 
• Entities and instances (Hoskings, 2004). Focus is on separated entities (factors 
and features) that are relatively stable rather than on interlocked systems and on 
instances (moments) rather than on processes. 
• Linear relations (Senge, 1990; McCaughan and Palmer, 1994). Often, the 
attention is paid to linear relations between entities rather than to ongoing circular 
patterns. 
• Reductionism (Van Dongen et al., 1996). If complex patterns are reduced to 
entities and instances, the outcomes will not offer insight into the (dynamically 
complex) processes.  
 
Taking these characteristics into consideration, positivistic research seems to be less 
suitable for understanding areas with a dynamic complexity, as opposed to situations 
with a high detail complexity (Senge, 1990). Positivistic research seems to be highly 
suitable for ‘what’ questions, while the challenge of this study is to address ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions (see Yin, 1989). 
 
Table 6.1 summarizes the characteristics of a positivistic research design with the 
challenges of research in dynamically complex situations. 
 
Positivistic research 
 
Dynamically simple, detailed complex 
Unilateral control  
Distancing 
Subject-Object 
Isolated/separated entities (factors, problems) 
Linear 
Single-loop 
Structure 
Research in dynamically complex situations 
 
Dynamically complex 
Mutual learning 
Involving one’s own role in research processes 
Subject-Subject 
Underlying patterns that produce problems 
Circular 
Double-loop 
Process 
Table 6.1 Positivistic research in relation to research in dynamically complex situations 
 
This discussion relates to the comparison of reductionism and holism (Eikelenboom, 
2005). The reductionist approach is based on a positivist epistemology: reality can be 
reduced to parts (factors, problems). Studying and understanding these parts give 
insight into the whole (Harkema, 2004). This approach stands opposed to the holistic 
approach. Holism is based on a post-positivist epistemology. Some characteristics of 
this approach (based on Eikelenboom, 2005): 
• Subject-Object relations as problematic 
• Based on complexity science 
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• Relations are considered to be non-linear 
• Simulations and qualitative research methods as alternative for positivist-
quantitative methods. 
 
All in all, in this study the conditions in the right column of table 6.1 are perceived as 
challenges. In sections 11.6 and 11.7 the empirical study is methodologically 
evaluated. 
 
 
6.4 Research design 
 
The preceding discussion leads to a qualitative research design that should support 
data collection during a longer period, insight into dynamically complex patterns, 
insight into what managers really do in action (research questions 1 and 2) and what 
interventionists do in interaction with managers (research question 3).  
 
Neither experiments nor simulations meet all these conditions, since they do not 
support insight into daily interactions during a longer period. A multiple longitudinal 
case study design (Van der Zwaan, 1990) can meet these conditions. Several 
authors have stated that case studies, if conducted appropriately, lead to sound 
scientific research (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Van der Zwaan, 1990). A major 
advantage of case studies is the opportunity for thorough and in-depth analysis that 
is especially of value in complex situations. When the phenomena that are being 
studied cannot be isolated and the behaviour cannot be controlled in a direct, precise 
and systematic way, a case study is more appropriate than an experiment (Yin, 
1994). In longitudinal case studies processes are studied during a longer period (Van 
der Zwaan, 1990). 
 
Within case studies, several research methods are available to collect data. A 
common approach to study interactions is non-participative or participative 
observation (Moug, 2007). These methods do not meet the conditions of this study, 
since they do not particularly involve the active role of the interventionist in the 
patterns that evolve. A more suitable approach for studying the interactions of 
managers and interventionist is action research (Eden & Huxham, 1996). Action 
research supports the study of theories-in-use. Unlike participative observation, in 
action research the role of the active observer is being observed as well. “Action 
research involves the researcher in working with members of an organization over a 
matter which is of genuine concern to them and in which there is an intent by the 
organization members to take action based on the intervention” (Eden & Huxham, 
1996, p. 527). 
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A specific action research approach is Appreciative Inquiry (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 
1987; Zandee & Cooperrider, 2007; Ludema & Fry, 2007). According to the authors 
who introduced this approach (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987), Appreciative Inquiry 
(AI) is based upon four principles: research into the social (innovation) potential of 
organizational life should begin with appreciation, should be applicable, should be 
provocative (in the sense that it should contribute to improvement), and should be 
collaborative. The authors argue that “a unilateral approach to the study of social 
innovation (bringing something new into the social world) is a direct negation of the 
phenomenon itself” (p. 154). This argument matches the contents of this study 
precisely. Recent contributions about AI illustrate some additional characteristics that 
are highly relevant to this study. First, AI is not about implementing a change, but it is 
about the process of changing (Ludema & Fry, 2007; Bushe & Coetzer, 1995). 
Second, AI replaces intervention by inquiry: learning, discovering and sharing 
information (Ludema & Fry, 2007). Third, AI is considered to leverage the generative 
capacity of dialogue (Gergen et al., 2004). Fourth, AI reflects a strong commitment to 
learning as a way to change or develop (Ludema & Fry, 2007; Bushe & Khamisa, 
2005). If one considers these characteristics of AI, this form of action research seems 
to be consistent with the contents of this study and, therefore, appropriate as a 
research method. However, one major characteristic of AI does not fit the research 
questions of this study. AI focuses on the ‘positive core’ of organizations: “its greatest 
strengths, assets, capacities, capabilities, values, traditions, practices, 
accomplishments, and so on” (Ludema & Fry, 2007, p. 293). The focus of this study, 
however, is not the positive core of organizations. Instead, this study aims first of all 
at understanding how leaders unintendedly contribute to blocked changing, 
organising and learning. Insight into their contribution to recurrent problems should, 
subsequently, contribute to develop alternative behaviour. This focus is in line with 
Fineman (2006), who argues that ‘in exclusively favoring positive narratives, 
appreciative inquiry fails to value the opportunities for positive change that are 
possible from negative experiences, such as embarrassing events, periods of anger, 
anxiety, fear, or shame’ (p. 275, quoted by Zandee & Cooperrider, 2007). Although 
some characteristics of AI are highly relevant to this study and in line with general 
characteristics of action research (Eden & Huxham, 1996), this ‘appreciative’ aspect 
of AI makes this specific approach not suitable for this study.  
Still, action research in general meets the conditions of this study. Action research 
acknowledges that the researcher is visible and is expected to have an impact on the 
experiment (Eden & Huxham, 1996). Just by working with the participants the 
researcher is able to get insight into their behaviours in action, from which their 
theories-in-use can be inferred (Argyris, 1990). With this approach it is possible to 
observe processes over a period. This is especially interesting because of the delay 
that characterises fundamental change processes (Senge, 1990). In order to come 
close to a Subject-Subject relation, it is important to work together and reduce the 
distance as much as possible. In this study learning by reflection has played a pivotal 
role. At this point, the study meets a major characteristic of action science, as 
described by Argyris. “Action scientists assume that learning is the first and 
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overarching objective for the researcher, the clients and the system in which they are 
embedded” (Argyris, 1983, p. 16). This makes this study a learning study for the 
researcher as well, as the approach incorporates the (effectiveness of the) 
interventionist’s role. 
 
As to research question 3, design-based research should be considered as well (Van 
Aken, 2004b). Van Aken, (2004a) describes this method as a specific way of 
conducting action research. Design-based research aims at solving the rigor-
relevance dilemma (Andriessen, 2004): “Management theory is either scientifically 
proven, but then too reductionistic and hence too broad or too trivial to be of much 
practical relevance, or relevant to practice, but then lacking sufficient rigorous 
justification” (Van Aken, 2004b, p. 221). Design-based research combines solving 
field problems with developing general knowledge regarding the relation between an 
intervention and a desired outcome (Van Aken, 2004b, p. 221). This means that the 
research process supports the development of scientific knowledge through solving 
problems in practice (Stam, 2007). This characteristic, which also applies to action 
research in general, is highly relevant to this study. The problem-solving process 
consists of four phases (Stam, 2007; Van Strien, 1997): defining the problem, 
planning the intervention, applying the intervention and evaluating the intervention. 
This planned and relatively linear process does not support a proper study of 
research question 3. This study not only addresses interventions, but also the 
process of intervening that involves expressions of unilateral control and defensive 
patterns. These patterns cannot be planned, but evolve in action. This study does not 
emphasize planned interventions, which can easily be espoused theory, but focuses 
on interventionists’ real interactions, which are based on their theories-in-use. As a 
consequence, design-based research seems to be less appropriate to this study.  
 
Altogether, this study follows a research design that combines multiple longitudinal 
case studies (Van der Zwaan, 1990) and action research (Eden & Huxham, 1996). 
 
Methodological conditions 
The methodology in this study combines multiple (longitudinal) case studies and 
action research. A methodologically robust design thus meets the conditions of case 
study research as well as action research. 
 
Yin (1994) mentions four criteria that have to be met in order to produce sound case 
study research.  
1. Construct validity, referring to correct operational measures for the theoretical 
concept being studied. 
2. Internal validity, referring to the robustness of assumed causal relationships, 
whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished 
from spurious relationships.  
3. External validity, referring to the extent to which findings can be generalized. 
 101 
4. Reliability, referring to the condition that the study can be repeated with the same 
outcomes. 
 
Construct validity, according to Yin, can be realized by three techniques, which have 
guided this study. First, different sources have been used to develop concepts in the 
theoretical exploration. Subsequently these concepts have been translated to 
operational definitions. Second, much attention has been paid to a logical ‘chain of 
evidence’. All outcomes of each case refer in a transparent way to observations. 
Furthermore, each case description contains a number of reflections that describe 
temporary conclusions. Third, during the course of each case temporary findings 
have been shared with actors. This technique is inextricably bound up with action 
research. 
In order to enlarge internal validity Yin, again, describes three techniques. With 
‘pattern matching’ empirical findings are compared with the assumptions that were 
based on the theoretical exploration. The use of multiple cases means outcomes can 
be both similar and conflicting. ‘Explanation building’ is applied by checking the 
findings of case 1, as well as case 2, in subsequent cases. The technique of ‘time-
series’ is applied by following specific observations during a longer period. This 
technique, again, characterizes action research. 
External validity, in this study, concerns analytical generalisation (as opposed to 
statistical generalisation). Multiple case studies offer the opportunity of literal 
replication, in which several case studies lead to the same conclusions. In this study, 
three separate cases with different contexts and histories have been studied. 
The outcomes of each case have been compared with the other cases and with the 
theory. Multiple case studies are also appropriate for theoretical replication (different 
outcomes that can be explained by the theoretical model).  
As analysis in the case studies is based on observations, conversations and 
interventions in a certain context, atmosphere and process, repeatability is relatively 
low. This might have consequences for reliability. However, through a thorough 
description of the course of the study, one could replicate a similar study in a different 
environment.  
 
This study needs to meet conditions for proper action research as well. A major 
concern of action research is the external validity, which refers to representativeness 
or generalisability (Kerlinger & Lee, 1999). Eden & Huxham (1996) have some 
remarks on this assumed constraint. First, action research gives insight into the 
theories-in-use of participants, which enlarges reliability of results. Second, to 
enlarge external validity, one should pay attention to the role and context of the case 
that is being studied. Third, one should triangulate. “Triangulation of research data 
refers to the method of checking their validity by approaching the research question 
from as many different angles as possible and employing redundancy in data 
collection” (Denzin, 1989, quoted by Eden & Huxham (1996), p. 536). According to 
Denzin, this is an argument for using several approaches where each approach acts 
as a cross-check on others.  
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Regarding the reliability of action research, Eden & Huxham (1996) argue that when 
subjects do not have to commit to real action that has an impact on their own future, 
any data gained from them will probably be unreliable. 
 
Eden & Huxham (1996) describe fifteen characteristics of action research (see table 
6.2). They consider the characteristics one to ten as reflecting internal validity and 12 
to 15 as reflecting external validity. 
 
These characteristics have been input for the design of the study and offer the 
opportunity for afterward checks and criticism of this research. Although this research 
method highly qualifies the aims of this study, Eden & Huxham (1996) argue that the 
standards as described in table 6.2 are hard to achieve. In addition, they argue that 
“what is important is having a sense of the standards that make for good action 
research and evaluating the research in relation to them” (p. 538-539). 
 
Data collection: moving moments 
In the empirical study, data have been collected in three cases. The case studies 
incorporate different research methods, aiming at triangulation (Eden & Huxham, 
1996): 
- observations of managers and their staff members in meetings 
- interventions and observations of consequences 
- narratives analysis based on individual sessions and group meetings 
- diagramming of circular patterns 
- analysis of communication documents (emails, minutes of meetings and memos). 
The emphasis has been on narratives and interactions, as these are considered to 
be most reliable to infer theories-in-use from. Communication documents could 
represent espoused theories.  
In this study, the concept of moving moments is introduced. This concept refers to 
important and distinctive moments that illustrate how changing is being blocked or 
supported. In order to recognize these moments, the process of ongoing interactions 
has to be slowed down (compare a movie that is a series of successive moments) 
until the slowly moving moments are perceived.  
 
Literal transcripts have been the basis of data analysis. The transcripts have been 
made without a tape-recorder. The assumption is that this may inhibit discussion. 
Schein subscribes to this assumption, while Argyris is a regular user of tape-
recordings (see Edmondson, 1996). Group meetings have been literally noted by the 
interventionist and/or an assistant. Individual meetings have been partly literally 
noted by an assistant, combined with personal notes by the interventionist. For about 
a half of the individual meetings the transcripts were made by the interventionist 
immediately after the sessions and based on his elaborative personal notes. In order 
to reduce the risk of a bias as much as possible, the clients have read the transcripts. 
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The fifteen characteristics of action research 
 
1.  Action research demands an integral involvement by the researcher in an intent to change the 
organization. This intent may not succeed - no change may take place as a result of the 
intervention - and the change may not be as intended. 
2.   Action research must have some implications beyond those required for action or generation of 
knowledge in the domain of the project. It must be possible to envisage talking about the 
theories developed in relation to other situations. Thus it must be clear that the results could 
inform other contexts, at least in the sense of suggesting areas for consideration.  
3.  As well as being usable in everyday life, action research demands valuing theory, with theory 
elaboration and development as an explicit concern of the research process. 
4.   If the generality drawn out of the action research is to be expressed through the design of tools, 
techniques, models and method then this, alone, is not enough. The basis for their design must 
be explicit and shown to be related to the theories which inform the design and which, in turn, 
are supported or developed through action research.  
5.   Action research will be concerned with a system of emergent theory, in which the theory 
develops from a synthesis of that which emerges from the data and that which emerges from 
the use in practice of the body of theory, which informed the intervention and research intent. 
6.  Theory building, as a result of action research, will be incremental, moving through a cycle of 
developing theory to action to reflection to developing theory, from the particular to the general 
in small steps.  
7.  What is important for action research is not a (false) dichotomy between prescription and 
description, but a recognition that description will be prescription, even if implicitly so. Thus 
presenters of action research should be clear about what they expect the consumer to take from 
it and present it with a form and style appropriate to this aim. 
8.  For high quality action research a high degree of systematic method and orderliness is required 
in reflecting about, and holding on to, the research data and the emergent theoretical outcomes 
of each episode or cycle of involvement in the organization.  
9.  For action research, the processes of exploration of the data - rather than collection of the data - 
in the detecting of emergent theories and development of existing theories must either be 
replicable or, at least, capable of being explained to others. 
10. The full process of action research involves a series of interconnected cycles, where writing 
about research outcomes at the latter stages of an action research project is an important 
aspect of theory exploration and development, combining the processes of explicating pre-
understanding and methodical reflection to explore and develop theory formally. 
11. Adhering to characteristics 1 to 10 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the validity of 
action research. 
12. It is difficult to justify the use of action research when the same aims can be satisfied using 
approaches (such as controlled experimentation or surveys) that can demonstrate the link 
between data and outcomes more transparently. Thus in action research, the reflection and 
data collection process - and hence the emergent theories - are most valuably focused on the 
aspects that cannot be captured by other approaches. 
13. In action research, the opportunities for triangulation that do not offer themselves with other 
methods should be exploited fully and reported. They should be used as a dialectical device 
which powerfully facilitates the incremental development of theory. 
14. The history and context for the intervention must be taken as critical to the interpretation of the 
likely range of validity and applicability of the results of action research. 
15. Action research requires that the theory development which is of general value is disseminated 
in such a way as to be of interest to an audience wider than those integrally involved with the 
action and/or with the research.  
 
Table 6.2 Characteristics of action research (Eden & Huxham, 1996) 
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Data analysis  
In order to structure the data analyses, a ‘three-column method’ has been used (not 
to be confused with Argyris’ two-column method). In the left column, illustrative 
narratives have been noted (compare Argyris´ ´directly observable data´). The middle 
column contains codes that are related to the diagnostic model (see table 5.1): 
perception, behaviour, interventions, design and change of organization that (de-
)block changing, organizing and learning. The right column depicts interpretations 
and reflections. This column also includes reflections upon the interventionist’s role 
(italic). The three-column method is illustrated below. 
 
Meeting: director (Dir), interventionist (Int) 
Subject: preparing MT meeting and change initiatives 
 
 
Dir: When I started in my job, the Supervisory 
Board gave me an assignment: ‘try to make the 
institute more businesslike and result-oriented’. 
Well, in the meantime I know the consequences of 
that. 
 
Int: What do you mean by that? 
 
Dir: Well, the last director has changed the 
structure. However, the reorganization is not 
ready.  
 
Employees complain, the organization consists of 
many islands, the grapevine is active, employees 
have a ‘we-they’ attitude towards management. 
 
[…] 
 
We have formulated a clear mission for the 
organization. 
 
Int: So what is missing? 
 
Dir: Well, this organization behaves like a family. 
Although there are differences, many employees 
act dependent on and –at the same time - aversive 
to management. They say: ‘you give too little 
room’. Well, we are quite willing to take some 
distance, as long as they take their responsibility. 
 
Int: Sounds to me that you are waiting for each 
other. Might it be possible that you stifle their 
personal sense of responsibility just by giving little 
room? 
 
Dir: This might be possible. Still, we also tried the 
opposite just by letting go. However, they did not 
take their responsibility either. They seem to have 
an anti-management attitude. 
 
 
P Subject-Object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O episodic 
O positional 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
 
 
The assignment, as formulated here, reflects 
the assumption that the director can ‘make’ or 
‘produce’ another organization and act upon a 
passive and reactive system of persons. 
 
 
 
 
Director considers the reorganization as an 
episodic period that is ‘not ready’. 
 
 
Director focuses on the role employees play 
and seems to overlook the fact that their 
behaviour might be a consequence of an S-O 
relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intervention: feedback of circular pattern.  
 
Reflection: it is not clear how they tried the 
opposite.  
Assumption: one cannot break through a 
circular pattern by one action, as ‘the other 
party’ is used to the pattern they don’t like. 
Some delay should be taken into account. And 
be open about the new strategy. Otherwise, 
one would still work from a Subject-Object 
perspective. 
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Interpretations and analyses in the right column are a combination of  
• Narrative analysis (Boje, 2001) 
• Consequences in terms of circular patterns and defensive routines 
• Interventionist’s interventions (interactions) and consequences 
• Additional observations, reflections and questions.  
 
The researcher applied the encoding (middle column) afterwards. This means that 
the diagnosis model (figure 2.20) has not been tested in action, but afterwards in a 
subjective-interpretative process. The coding has not been shared with the parties, 
as it is considered to have limited relevance to them. Although the analyses (right 
column) do also have a subjective-interpretative character, mostly they have been 
shared in order to contribute to learning. 
 
In order to structure the large amount of observations, the conceptual framework and 
research questions that have been developed in the theoretical exploration play a 
guiding role. This is in line with Miles and Huberman (1994): “that’s why we think 
conceptual frameworks and research questions are the best defence against 
overload. [….] Data collection is inescapably a selective process, that you cannot and 
do not ‘get it all’ even though you might think you can and are” (p. 55-56). Another 
way to bring order is the use of coding. The (blocking) expressions of unilateral 
control, as well as de-blocking alternatives have been encoded (see chapter 5, table 
5.1). Miles and Huberman (1994) distinguish three types of codes: descriptive codes 
simply describe observations, interpretive codes incorporate interpretations, while 
pattern codes are even more inferential and explanatory. The emphasis of this study 
is on interpretive coding of the role of leaders and managers, which subsequently 
leads to (de-)blocking changing, organizing and learning.  
 
The process from observations to conclusions has been structured in order to 
enlarge the chain of evidence (Yin, 1994) and follows Argyris’ ladder of inference 
(1990). Each step from directly observable data to conclusions is publicly testable 
and/or the testability is testable (e.g. if the reasoning by the researcher is not open, 
this cannot be covered up). 
• Directly observable data are openly shared (left column). 
• Interpretations and analyses of data are based on literal quotes and, thus, are 
testable (middle column, right column). 
• In the course of each case study, these interpretations and analyses are 
summarized in reflections. In these reflections, the interventionist’s reasoning is 
open to inquiry.  
• At the end of each case study, these reflections are related to the research 
questions in a within-case analysis. 
• The findings of the individual cases are subjected to a cross-case analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
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In order to enhance reliability of the outcomes, the outcomes of each case have been 
shared with the clients, who got the opportunity to give their opinion11. Furthermore, 
reflections and observations have been shared with a team of colleagues, in order to 
create recognition and common interpretation. Finally, the outcomes of each case 
have been shared with an informed expert in order to check if he draws the same 
conclusions as the researcher. The informed expert is familiar with the theory, the 
application of the theory and action research. Since he is not involved in the cases, 
he can judge without interest. 
 
Cases (moving moments) 
In this study, action research is conducted through three separate cases that are 
combined consultancy and research projects (moving moments 1, 2 and 3). The 
consultancy context offers the opportunity to meet a major condition of action 
research: “Action research involves the researcher in working with members of an 
organization over a matter which is of genuine concern to them and in which there is 
an intent by the organization members to take action based on the intervention” 
(Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 527). However, it is important to distinguish between 
consultancy and scientific research, as the latter has specific characteristics to be 
met (Eden & Huxham (1996). The role of the interventionist has been a part of the 
study and is regularly reflected on. 
 
Because consultancy projects are characterized by a certain goal and a certain 
period, they have a character of episodic change. This study, however, does not 
focus on the episodic change. Instead, it focuses on daily interactions that contribute 
to or block changing, organizing and learning (in the course of the episodic change 
period). For that reason, the case descriptions do not follow stages or steps. Rather, 
the researchers follow the process during approximately one year.  
 
The three cases have different contexts and histories: profit and non-profit, business-
to-business and business-to-consumer, 75 – 800 employees. This variety contributes 
to the external validity of the outcomes, if the results of the three cases are consistent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Regarding the number of cases, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that 
one can stop adding cases as soon as theoretical saturation has been reached. The 
point has been reached when additional learning is minimal because the researchers 
observe the same phenomena as before. In this study, theoretical saturation is 
considered to be reached with three cases. 
 
Structure of case-descriptions 
The cases have been divided into two parts. The cases in chapters 7, 8 and 9 
describe a selection of illustrative narratives as well as (theoretical) reflections. Each 
case finishes with a within-case analysis that is related to the research questions. A 
                                                
11 One manager requested to adjust one of his quotes slightly, which has been done without consequences for the 
intention. 
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broader selection of narratives is described in appendices 1 and 2.12 These 
narratives have numbers (for example, the narratives of case 1 have numbers from 
1.1 to 1.17). The reflections in the next chapters refer to these numbers. This is 
clearly visualized. For example: 
 
 
Reflection 3 
(narratives 1.2 – 1.7) 
 
 
This way, one can read the case descriptions in the next chapters and, if desired, 
read the corresponding narratives in the appendices for deeper understanding. In 
order to study the most elaborative set of data and analysis, one reads the narratives 
in the appendices and the corresponding reflections in the next chapters. The 
references to these reflections are visualized in the appendices, for example: 
 
 
 
Reflection 1 
 
 
                                                
12 The appendix of case 3 is not public for reasons of privacy.  
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7. Moving moments 1 
 
 
 
7.1 Type of organization 
 
This organization focuses on development, implementation and maintenance of 
information technology systems. Staff consists of approximately 150 professionals. It 
is under pressure as a consequence of several developments. First, the company is 
developing a completely new information system that has to support the primary 
processes of a major client. This is a large project in which a majority of the 
employees are involved. Deadlines are ambitious and hard. The client applies a great 
deal of pressure on quality and deadlines. Second, the company has to prove that it 
can deliver on a competitive level. Some clients tend to hire other suppliers. This puts 
pressure on quality and costs. This case study describes a change process focusing 
on the internal communication and management style in this company. The case 
study starts when an employee satisfaction survey leads to the insight that 
employees do not feel safe within the organization. 
 
 
7.2 Context of the change process 
 
In 2003 an employee satisfaction survey was conducted. The outcomes of this 
survey led to the conclusion that many employees were not satisfied about internal 
communication. As a response, top management asked the internal communication 
department to initiate some actions. Contents and quality of the (information on) 
intranet were evaluated, which led to some improvements regarding contents and 
quality of the (information on) intranet and written information. 
 
In addition, the internal communication department was asked to organize a number 
of group interviews in order to find out what problems they perceived. The outcomes 
partly referred to communication methods (communication plans, written 
communication, intranet and meetings) and led to a number of improvement issues, 
focusing on means like intranet, information sessions and (lunch) meetings. The main 
problems as experienced by employees, however, focused on communication 
between management and employees. The conclusions, as formulated by the 
internal communication department, are presented below. 
 
Conclusions regarding communication between management and employees 
 
Vertical communication 
• Exchange of information is inadequate, as a consequence of 
- little information from second line management 
- not keeping appointments 
- information from first and second line management does not correspond to 
employees’ experiences 
- lack of openness 
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• Management do not communicate a common vision  
• Difficulties in approaching managers 
 
Fear 
• Employees are afraid to criticize 
• Employees feel anxious about approaching managers 
• Employees feel managers have little loyalty towards them  
• Employees sometimes feel they are ignored 
 
 
The director wished to work with a consultant, who was able to introduce an 
approach that was less instrumental.  
 
 
7.3 Moving moments 
 
Period 1:  start of the study 
 
First session between director and consultant (interventionist) 
In the first session the director describes the current situation: the signals about 
dissatisfactory communication recur time after time and seem to increase despite 
several initiatives like more information by intranet, by paper and in (large) 
information sessions. Generally, the outcomes of the survey have not been 
discussed with employees yet. The director wants the interventionist to mingle with 
employees and talk with them. He has positive experience with this approach. The 
director behaves firmly and self-consciously and leaves little room for the 
interventionist to bring in ideas. Director and interventionist agree upon a second 
meeting. The latter will prepare an approach. After the second meeting the director 
will decide upon a ‘go’ or ‘no go’. 
 
 
Reflection 1 
 
The information that is being shared in the first meeting leads to the observation that 
communication problems seem to recur time after time, despite several (instrumental) 
initiatives.  
 
Based on the available information, some expressions of a unilateral control model 
seem to be visible. 
• Distancing: director expects the interventionist to mingle with employees and 
communicate with them; employees are being interviewed by an adviser of the 
internal communication department; management have not yet discussed the 
outcomes of the survey (such as fear) with employees in personal 
communication, nor have they inquired how they might contribute to the 
communication problems. 
• Reductionism: director seems to focus on the employees’ role. 
• Blaming: director seems to focus on the employees’ role. 
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• Reactive behaviour: solutions are expected to start from the employees. 
• Focus on symptoms (reductionism) and impersonal instruments: employees bring 
in their dissatisfaction about the communication; management, in return, decide to 
deliver more information by intranet, paper and information meetings. 
• Cover up underlying patterns: managers have not personally inquired into why 
their employees do not feel secure. 
 
The recurrence of the problems in the longer run, despite several initiatives, seems to 
disclose a dynamically complex situation. “When obvious interventions produce 
nonobvious consequences, there is dynamic complexity” (Senge, 1990, p. 71). 
Apparently, the initiatives do not improve the communication in the longer run. They 
might even contribute to the deterioration of the situation by tempering the attention 
to the problems and stifling personal responsibility of management and employees. 
Based on the first information, the pattern seems to be as depicted in figure 7.1, 
which represents Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure: one ‘deals’ with 
communication problems between management and employees through instruments 
and interventions by third parties (upper loop). These interventions can be perceived 
as symptomatic solutions that can reduce the problem symptoms in the short run. As 
long as the underlying problem (e.g. employees experience ‘fear’ in interaction with 
managers) is covered up and a fundamental solution is not developed, the problem 
symptoms will recur in the longer run. 
 
Figure 7.1 Unilateral control in relation to the ‘shifting the burden’ structure 
 
 
The first impressions lead to an approach that is shared with the director (for a more 
elaborative description that includes considerations, see box 1.1 in appendix 1): 
• Start with top management: discuss approach and consequences for their own 
role (compare Argyris (1984, 1990, 2000), who argues that one should start with 
the top). 
• Follow the ‘cascade’: director and management team, management team 
members with their teams, etcetera. This approach enables direct communication 
between managers and their employees and gives the opportunity to organize 
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reflection and learning about the way one contributes to the communication 
problems. 
• Each department gets a team coach, who supports reflection and learning. 
• Each manager develops a suitable approach for his/her department in 
consultation with the team coach, in order to feel responsible for the change 
process in his/her own department. 
• Before and after each session the manager has a feedback session with the team 
coach about the communication patterns and his contribution. The underlying 
belief is that the team coach can ask questions and give feedback in order to 
enable reflection and learning. 
• Regular progress meetings with director, individual managers and management 
teams contribute to keeping things result-oriented. 
• Evaluation after a few months. 
 
Presentation to the management team 
In a second session with the director the interventionist shares his ideas regarding 
the approach. The director has a firm reaction: he believes in this approach. He 
invites the interventionist to present this approach to the management team. 
In this meeting the interventionist emphasizes that communication improvement 
requires managers to involve their own role and to take responsibility for their own 
department. Immediately, the director stresses his support for this approach and his 
eagerness to improve communication this way. Subsequently, the HR manager 
emphasizes that in his vision this is the right approach. All managers say they find 
this change approach attractive and commit to it. The director concludes that they will 
start the process.  
 
 
Reflection 2 
 
The director seems to leave little room for his managers to question the approach. 
His vision (and decision) is clear. In this situation, the unilateral control behaviour of 
the leader seems to be very effective to avoid testing his assumptions and to avoid 
situations that might be difficult to control or lead to uncertain assumptions. However, 
how valid is these managers’ commitment? To what extent do managers feel 
freedom to question ideas in order to have an open discussion? And to what extent is 
this situation representative of the fear that employees experience? A temporary 
assumption is that managers say that they comply with the approach, regardless of 
whether they really do. 
 
 
Period 2: further investigation of director and management team 
 
Meeting with director and HR manager 
In a meeting, director, HR manager and interventionist elaborate on the process, 
partly as a preparation of a special two-hour meeting with the management team. 
Below, a characteristic phrase is quoted. 
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Dir: I want no planned communication and no 
instruments. That is exactly what we have done in 
the past. I perceive this process as an adventure. At 
certain moments you and your colleagues will be 
suddenly there during meetings and say that you are 
only there to listen a while. People may be confused. 
That’s okay. Let us see what happens. 
 
HR: But shan’t we bring in more structure? 
 
Dir: Let’s watch out for another instrumental 
approach. Let’s just start an open process. 
 
[.....] 
 
 
C process (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C planned 
C step-by-step 
 
C process (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
Director does not want a planned and 
instrumental process. Is this espoused theory 
or theory-in-use? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir behaves inconsistent: he says he wants an 
open approach, while he imposes his opinion 
upon the HR manager. 
 
  
 
Session with management team 
In a session with the management team, each manager is expected to tell what 
he/she wishes to realize regarding communication in his/her department. Although 
some say they are positive about the process, the discussion does not really uncover 
sense of urgency. Subsequently, they discuss the atmosphere in the management 
team. 
 
 
P: Some people are afraid to approach W 
(director). 
 
Dir (joking): Well, I don’t know what they are afraid 
of... Besides, I wonder if it’s that bad. ... (all laugh, 
subsequently the subject is changed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[......] 
 
  
 
H: And we have to let them know that we are open 
to all subjects they wish to share with us. By the 
way, we have to be open to each other within the 
management team as well. 
 
M (laughing): Fortunately this is the case in this 
team.  
 
Dir: By the way, we should not give employees the 
impression that – after all – we agree with their 
complaints about us. During this process you have 
to be aware of that. Who is next? 
 
[......] 
 
 
Int: The last team to address is this management 
team; I suggest I will personally keep in touch with 
the director and will regularly join management 
team sessions.  
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
I cover-up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
 
 
B control 
I cover-up 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
B control 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although director desired an open 
process/adventure, he activates a unilateral 
control model as soon he is confronted with an 
embarrassing situation. Director keeps situation 
controllable by making embarrassing situation 
undebatable. Two defensive routines (or 
strategies) are visible: 
- Joke strategy: in case of embarrassment, 
make a joke and change subject. 
- Reduction strategy: in case of 
embarrassment, reduce the problem until it is 
controllable again (‘it isn’t that bad’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threat is blocked by joke strategy -> sensitive 
issues is being made undebatable. 
 
Strong unilateral control perspective. 
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Dir: Is that necessary? Let’s check. Who thinks this 
team is not safe? 
 
Silence ..... 
 
 
 
 
 
H: I feel quite safe here. I can say anything I want.  
(some managers confirm nonverbally) 
 
Silence .... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The director gives a mixed message (Argyris): 
precisely if one did not feel safe, one would 
probably not be open about it. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to gather valid 
information (mutual learning model) with this 
question. One might easily activate a defensive 
routine (denial strategy) and – in line with 
Argyris– will not be open about it.  
 
“To retain their power, defensive routines must 
remain undiscussable. Teams stay stuck in 
their defensive routines only when they pretend 
that they don’t have any defensive routines, 
that everything is all right, and that they can say 
‘anything’” (Senge, p. 255). 
 
Progress meeting with director and HR manager; first feedback on patterns 
In a meeting, director, HR manager and two interventionists discuss progress 
regarding the process in the departments. In this meeting the interventionists 
confront the director for the first time with hypotheses regarding his role in interaction 
with his management team. A main challenge is to make defensiveness debatable 
without producing more defensiveness. 
 
 
Int: We doubt how open people can be. We see 
some patterns that keep team members from 
being open. It appeared to us that you can say 
fairly hard things to each other. However, each 
time this happens someone makes a joke, 
releases tension and changes the subject. Difficult 
or personal issues remain undebatable this way 
and -contrary to the desired effect- an unsafe 
climate is created. Let’s call this a joke strategy. 
Another strategy with the same effect is the 
reduction strategy: you tend to make problems 
smaller if the situation might become difficult or 
embarrassing.  
 
HR to dir (joking): Then you must not make any 
jokes about my roots anymore (both laugh). 
 
 
Int: This is what we mean .... 
 
Dir: Now you are exaggerating. It is not that bad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑  
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sharing observations regarding defensiveness 
activates exactly the same defensiveness: joke 
and reduction strategy. 
 
The interventionist decides to reflect on this 
inclination the first time, however does not the 
second time. His assumption is that this would 
put too much pressure on the director and lead 
to stronger defensiveness. The desire to get 
(immediate) compliance by the director would 
reflect a unilateral control model. 
 
 
Session with management team 
In a session with the management team, one of the subjects concerns ‘progress of 
communication improvement’. The first subject on the agenda concerns procurement 
of photocopiers (low dynamical complexity). This part of the meeting is effective. 
Subsequently, each manager is asked to present the situation in his/her department. 
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Some managers present positive stories. Others, especially the director, ask some 
questions. Then it is V’s turn, the manager who had let an interventionist know that 
he does not like the approach. The director tries to persuade him to comply with the 
approach. 
 
 
V: I have had a meeting with P (one of the 
interventionists) and the approach in my 
department will differ from the other departments. I 
want my employees to be trained in 
communicative skills. 
 
Dir: How are you going to learn yourself; by 
feedback? 
 
V: No, I do not want to involve feedback in our 
approach. 
 
Dir: Why not? 
 
V: Well, next Monday I will discuss the approach 
with my employees. 
 
Dir: P (interventionist) will join the session and he 
will observe. You can’t deny observations, can 
you? If he is there, he will have some 
observations. And the agreement is that these will 
be fed back. 
 
V (quietly): Whose agreement .... 
 
Dir: Just let it happen ... 
 
V: But what if my employees are not open to it? 
 
Dir: Well, there you have a strong observation, 
haven’t you? 
 
E (other manager): Why are you pushing so hard? 
 
Dir: These guys are professionals. You can only 
learn from them, can’t you? 
 
V: Okay, I am with you ... 
 
[......] 
 
Another manager’s turn. 
 
K: Tomorrow I will have a meeting with A (another 
interventionist). I don’t think these communication 
problems play a role in our department. We’re a 
small team and the atmosphere is okay.  
 
H (another manager): Well K, I want to be open 
with you. This week two employees of yours 
visited me. They said they do not feel comfortable 
with you at all. Thus, there is more than you know. 
 
Silence ..... 
 
H: You seem to say things in a way that they feel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V informs that he does not comply with ‘the 
method’ (a deviant opinion). 
 
 
 
Growing control by director 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While manager V informs that he has another 
opinion, the director’s control grows stronger 
and stronger. He goes on until V complies.  
 
 
 
Direct feedback to director (apparently she 
feels safe enough to act this way). 
 
 
 
The unilateral control model leads to a short-
term solution: the manager saying that he 
complies (compliance strategy). However, this 
does not seem to be valid information and will 
probably not help in the longer run. 
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insecure. 
 
Silence ... 
 
Dir: Well, don’t we all sometimes say thing that 
appear to be ineffective afterwards? Let’s go on....  
 
[…] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
Face saving by a reduction strategy. 
Result: no opportunity to inquire into personal 
feedback, which results in an insecure situation 
for K and others. 
 
 
Session with director 
In a meeting, the interventionist reflects on the director’s role by self-disclosure.  
 
 
Int: you make difficult situations undebatable by 
joking and putting things into perspective (e.g. 
situation with K.). 
 
Dir: I shouldn’t have done that. I have visited H. 
and K. and have let them know I should have dealt 
with the situation either by leaving room for 
discussion or by asking questions. 
 
Int: It looked like saving K., however you created 
an unsafe situation for him. The feedback could be 
given, but could not be discussed. 
 
Dir: Yes, you are completely right. 
 
Int: Another example refers to you, asking ‘how 
anyone could be afraid of this man?’ during a 
meeting. This way you make a possible threat for 
team members undebatable by making a joke. 
 
Dir nods. 
 
[….] 
 
Int: I think you can be quite threatening for people. 
Even for me, while I am an outsider, this is the first 
conversation with you in which I feel comfortable. 
So how safe are you for persons that report to 
you? 
 
Silence 
 
Dir: But why? 
 
Int: it is a combination of the way you make 
important issues undebatable and the firmness 
you show when presenting your opinion. Besides, 
you are easily bored if things take too much time. 
Still, you say that you want to improve 
communication and safety. However, this takes 
some time for inquiry. What you say and what you 
do are inconsistent. 
 
Dir (thinking): I understand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director reflects on own role; as opposed to last 
meeting, he shows no defensive behaviour. 
What makes him more open? 
- effect of feedback in management team? 
- effect of him being alone? 
- delayed effect of earlier feedback? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int decides to be open about the effect of dir’s 
behaviour on him. He assumes that self-
disclosure will enable dir’s learning -> this 
intervention leads to inquiry indeed (as 
opposed to the first time, when director became 
defensive). 
 
Intervention: giving insight into dissonance 
between beliefs (‘we want to change’) and 
actions (‘we keep ourselves from changing’). 
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Reflection 3 
(narratives 1.2 – 1.7) 
 
Unilateral control in simple and complex situations 
In most meetings in this case, two types of situations can be distinguished.  
 
1. Simple situations (low dynamic complexity: focus on content, relatively routine, 
neutral)  
In these situations a unilateral control model seems to be effective. The problem is 
clear, as well as the required solution. The problem is instrumental/technical and 
refers to content. These situations can have a high detail complexity. However, they 
have a low dynamic complexity (Senge, 1990). Obvious solutions lead to obvious 
effects. This situation is depicted in figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 Dynamically simple situation 
 
2. Complex situations (high dynamic complexity: threatening, conflicting opinions, 
personal issues) 
In these situations unilateral control is no longer effective. In Senge’s ‘shifting the 
burden’ structure, a unilateral control model consistently activates the upper circle 
(symptomatic and short-term solutions) and defensive routines, and blocks inquiry 
into the lower circle (fundamental and long-term solutions), as depicted in figure 7.3. 
 
Figure 7.3 Dynamically complex situation: unilateral control in relation to ‘shifting  
the burden’ structure 
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Defensive strategies block changing and learning 
The lower circle (inquiry into underlying patterns) is not only blocked because of 
delay (Senge), but also because of defensive routines by leader and managers 
aiming at making sensitive issues undiscussable. Here, we call these routines 
defensive strategies, referring to specific and recognisable expressions of 
defensiveness. The following defensive strategies can be identified in this case: 
• Joke strategy: in case of embarrassment, make a joke and change subject. 
• Reduction strategy: in case of embarrassment, reduce the problem until it is 
controllable again. 
• Denial strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, deny the problem. 
• Compliance strategy: in case of threat, say that you comply (regardless of 
whether you really do). 
• Ignorance strategy: act as if it is interesting, but ignore the information that is 
difficult to deal with. 
• Distance strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, change the subject to 
other parties or general observations (employees, middle management, ‘the 
organization’). 
• Blame strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, blame others. 
• ‘We’ strategy: in case of threat, talk about ‘our responsibility’ and ‘we should pay 
attention to the problems’ (as a consequence, nobody has to feel personally 
responsible). 
• Assume strategy: hold strong assumptions about others and situations without 
testing them. 
 
Consequences for change process: effective in maintaining the current situation 
The control model seems to have a number of consequences for the effectiveness of 
the change process. 
• The defensive strategies by managers (especially compliance strategy and denial 
strategy) might lead to invalid information regarding their opinions, feelings and 
commitment. This will easily lead to problems in the process. A ‘yes’ to the 
question of whether managers are committed is only of value if one could say ‘no’ 
as well. 
• Difficult issues that block effective change remain undebatable. Although these 
managers might want to change, they block the change process effectively and 
maintain the current situation (skilled incompetence, Argyris). 
• A focus on the upper circle leads to reactive behaviour by managers. This pattern 
is repeated deeper in the organization: the more one pushes, the fewer initiatives 
from organization members. This, in turn, activates a unilateral control model. 
 
In the meantime the director seems to be taking some first steps to reflect on his role 
in the process. This might lead to positive consequences in the longer run. 
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Session with director – preparation of management team meeting 
The director and an interventionist prepare the next management team meeting. 
During this session the director talks about his new insights and behavioural 
consequences.  
 
 
Int: What did you do with the feedback? 
 
Dir: The feedback gave me deep insight into my 
role. Since then I am learning by experimentation. 
Last week someone approached me to talk about 
some problems in project Y. Normally I would have 
tried to persuade him, but this time I have said 
almost nothing. I have only listened to his 
concerns. I have made no promises either. And 
still he left my room quite satisfied. Actually I 
haven’t done anything (laughing ….). 
Tomorrow I have a meeting with all members of 
department Z. Without a doubt, they expect I will 
increase the pressure. However, I won’t do that. I 
will sit down and listen to them. I will try to 
empathize with them. And ask questions like ‘how 
do you experience the situation?’, ‘what 
consequences do you perceive?’ and ‘what is the 
relation with our approach?’ 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
P mutual (D)  
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director is able to ask questions (single loop 
learning); it sounds quite natural, as if he has 
activated another program (double loop 
learning). 
 
Surprisingly, he seems to perceive these 
situations as relatively simple and he behaves 
relaxed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subsequently, the director shares with the interventionist that he will announce the 
dismissal of one of his managers during the forthcoming management team session. 
Director and interventionist agree that this might have a direct influence on perceived 
communication and safety. They decide they will ask managers whether they are in 
the mood to discuss these themes during that session. 
 
Session with management team 
The interventionists enter the meeting during a short break, just after the 
announcement that manager X will (have to) leave the organization. 
 
 
When the interventionists enter, the climate seems 
to be very good: jokes, laughter and a lot of 
talking.  
 
Dir starts the next subject: Communication and 
safety is a sensitive subject, as we have just 
announced that manager X will have to leave. 
Lately other managers left this team as well. Do 
you think this is the right moment to discuss this 
subject now? 
 
V: I am flabbergasted. I have never felt unsafe in 
this team. What do you mean? 
 
Dir repeats his message. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This might be very well an expression of the 
joke strategy: as long as we laugh, there is no 
problem. 
 
Director tries to activate and inquire into the 
lower circle, but is being ‘pushed back’. 
Managers are very good at these routines: 
even if the director tries to leave the unilateral 
control model, managers immediately fall back 
on their routines. This response stifles the 
director’s attempts and pushes him back in his 
‘well known’ role. As a consequence, it is hard 
for the director to change the patterns (he may 
succeed with a delay). 
 
Managers activate several defensive strategies: 
- denial strategy: we have no problems with 
P = Perception  B = Behaviour  I = Intervention O = Design of organization  C = Change of organization 
 120 
 
 
E: Why do you want to discuss safety? Don’t you 
feel safe? 
 
Director looks at interventionist and asks for help 
nonverbally.  
 
Int repeats the same message. 
 
 
 
H: I don’t feel unsafe at all. However, I recognize a 
feeling of fear amongst employees. For example, 
an employee who said: ‘Well, this remark may be 
not good for my career, but I would like to say ….’. 
But I have never had this feeling.  
 
During this discussion nobody looks at manager X, 
who is still present at the meeting.  
 
 
A manager describes what makes good 
communication (in general) and another manager 
describes a meeting deeper in the organization. A 
third manager argues that second line 
management and employees should be trained to 
deal effectively with change processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist goes on with the same strategy 
that apparently activates defensiveness. An 
alternative: making the process debatable.  
 
- denial strategy: “To retain their power, 
defensive routines must remain undiscussable.  
 
 
 
 
- ignorance strategy: we act as if she and her 
problem are not there just by ignoring her. And 
we keep saying that this team is very safe. 
 
- distance strategy: we talk about other parties 
and general observations 
 
 
 
 
 
Session with management team 
In the period that follows, the interventionists have several moments of hesitation: will 
the director and managers succeed to de-block the process? Their routines seem to 
be deeply ingrained and difficult to change. The next session illustrates some 
initiatives by managers to make defensive strategies and circularity debatable.  
  
 
A: In my perception employees have less fear to 
bring things in. Besides, they really appreciate that 
W. (the director) behaves more vulnerable. 
Some second line managers find it a bit soft and 
would still prefer some concrete instruments to 
improve communication. That is really a problem 
for me. 
 
H makes a joke: Isn’t that a great experience for 
you; employees who find you soft? 
 
A: Gentlemen, we’re changing the subject by 
making jokes.  
 
H: You are right. (other managers confirm 
nonverbally) 
 
[….] 
 
A: I think a problem is second line management. 
They must be the bridge to the rest of the 
organization and we have quite a problem there. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I inquiry (D) 
I long term (D) 
I reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joke strategy. 
 
 
Joke strategy being addressed. 
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Dir: Let’s not focus on other parties. Let’s start with 
our own role. 
 
[ …..]  
 
During the meeting there is a discussion about the 
next staff information session. Normally, during 
these sessions the director and/or management 
team members talk about recent developments, 
while employees listen. One is aware of the 
disadvantage: ‘the more we direct, the more 
reactive they will be’. A small committee is being 
formed in order to develop ways to break through 
this cycle. 
 
End of the session: interventionists feed back their 
observations of this session. 
 
I inquiry (D) 
I long term (D) 
I reflection (D) 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
P own role (D) 
P mutual (D 
Blame/distance strategy is addressed. 
 
 
 
 
This discussion shows that one’s awareness of 
circularity and their own roles is growing. 
 
In the current situation, employees show an 
‘undergo- strategy’: in case of threat, just 
undergo the intervention (passively) and do not 
make the producing patterns debatable. 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection 4 
(narratives 1.8 – 1.10) 
 
Positive developments 
Some improvements are visible in the process. Some observations, as derived from 
the last management team meeting: 
• Some defensive strategies are being addressed by managers (‘Gentlemen, we’re 
changing the subject by making jokes’). 
• Attention to management team’s role (‘Let’s not focus on other parties. Let’s start 
with our own role’). 
• Awareness of circularity: what we see in our employees is a consequence of what 
we do (‘The more we direct, the more reactive they will be’). 
• Direct feedback to director (‘W, you are just too impatient’). 
 
Self-disclosure and feedback by the interventionist 
The interventions until now focus on feedback to the management team as a group 
and on the director personally. Some temporary conclusions regarding interventions: 
• The main change in the director’s attitude and behaviour followed after the 
interventionist shared his own personal experience: ‘I do not feel comfortable 
during our conversations’. From that moment the director tends to reflect on his 
own role more and more. Self-disclosure by the interventionist seems to 
contribute to self-disclosure by the director. This change seems to have a positive 
effect on the team.  
• A major question regarding interventions has been how to feed back defensive 
routines without activating them. Now, after a period, people seem to be aware of 
the patterns that keep them from change and people even put the insights into 
practice at a certain level. This brings up the question to what extent it is 
necessary to avoid activating defensive routines. This might be a typical ‘upper 
circle’ view: it has to be effective immediately. The lower circle, on the contrary, is 
characterized by delay. The interventions are typically focused on activating the 
lower cycle. In short, activation of defensive routines may not be a problem, as 
long as the interventions contribute to improvement in the longer run.  
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• Perhaps one even has to ‘break through’ the defensive routines and one should 
not try to bypass them.  
 
Unilateral control restricts interventionists’ effectiveness 
In situations they perceive as threatening (situations in which their role and added 
value is at stake), the interventionists tend to activate a unilateral control theory-in-
use. Some illustrative expressions of unilateral control: 
• Proving one has ‘everything under control’ and showing one’s added value by 
(immediate) answers, analysis and solutions. The underlying reasoning is that the 
client hires someone who is professional and is able to present a thorough 
analysis every moment the client asks. From a mutual learning perspective this is 
reasoning is highly discussable. 
• Confirming managers who say that ‘we are improving’ and suppressing 
hesitations about their real intentions or asking questions about their intentions, 
without being open about one’s own hesitations. This behaviour stems from the 
assumption that the interventionist has to be sure about managers’ intentions, 
before he could confront these. However, from a mutual learning perspective this 
is not relevant: the interventionist shares his observations, his interpretations and 
conclusions openly and tests for different views (see Argyris, 1990; Schwarz, 
2002).  
• Confronting defensiveness in terms of ‘wrong’ and persuading one has to show 
different behaviour. By doing so, the interventionist establishes a Subject-Object 
definition of relations. As a consequence, just like the relation between manager 
and employees, they stimulate managers to act dependently on the 
interventionist.  
 
By doing this, the interventionists make defensiveness undebatable, create 
dependency and keep themselves and others from learning, changing and 
organizing. 
 
 
Period 3: observations deeper in the organization 
 
Sessions with second line management 
The interventionists join several sessions deeper in the organization. The vast 
majority of these sessions is characterized by exactly the same patterns as observed 
in the management team. In a session with a second line management team, 
managers share negative perceptions of their employees, such as 
‘They are reactive and seldom bring in ideas.’ 
‘They often complain about lots of things. I expect them to suggest solutions.’ 
‘They are frustrated. They have the feeling they are overruled by the management 
team’ (= first line management team). 
 
Managers, however, seem to reinforce this behaviour in a circular way: 
‘If they don’t come up with ideas themselves, I tell them what to do.’ 
‘They often come with small issues to my desk. Sometimes it is unbelievable. Mostly 
I give them a solution.’ 
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‘Sometimes I ask them to bring in ideas themselves, but they seldom come up with 
ideas.’ 
 
Sessions with employees 
The interventionists join some sessions with employees about the conclusions of the 
group interviews regarding communication between management and employees. 
Some findings: 
• The attitude of the employees does not fit in a normal curve. Many employees are 
quite negative and some are neutral. 
• Their dissatisfaction focuses on first line management, including the director. Most 
employees are fairly neutral regarding their own (second line) manager.  
• Main concerns:  
- top-down communication about major projects that they participate in; their 
opinion is not asked for; 
- management act at a distance: they don’t visit us to hear the problems and don’t 
pay attention to employees’ ideas. 
• If confronted with hypotheses on circularity, most of them are prepared to see 
their own responsibility. However, ‘management should start changing’.  
• Several employees are anxious to be visible. ‘First see changes in management 
behaviour, then be more positive and take initiatives ourselves.’ 
• Employees focus on what managers do (theory-in-use), not what they say 
(espoused theory). 
 
After repetitive feedback and discussion of the circular patterns, some positive 
developments are visible, for example when a first line manager has a discussion 
with a large group of employees at the end of a project session. He has observed the 
process and he tries to break through the routines. After a brief presentation one 
employee (the one who always does) wants to ask a question. The first line manager:  
“P, I see you want to ask a question. That is what I expected, because that is the 
pattern we always follow: I tell you my vision and you ask a critical question. Often 
you have an opinion about the subject yourself. In turn, I pretend that I know the 
answer and share another story with you. Then, after the session, you will evaluate 
my answer. You may disagree, but won’t share your disagreement with me. I often 
don’t know the answer, but I won’t share that with you. That is a strange game, isn’t 
it? Let’s play a different game. If you have a question and I don’t know the answer, I 
will return the question and ask your opinion. All right?” 
The employee is confused and inquires if he is still allowed to ask a question. The 
first line manager ‘allows’ him to ask his question and, in turn, asks the employee to 
share his opinion. The employee presents his (fairly critical) opinion. The manager 
does not respond or defend, but he asks other employees for their opinion. Some 
employees (more than ever before) share their opinions and actively join the 
conversation.   
 
This manager’s approach contributes to insight into circularity and blocking patterns. 
As a consequence, employees are involved more actively. Still, it is uncertain to what 
extent they have a free choice. The manager imposes his analysis and does not 
check whether employees recognize this analysis.  
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Staff information meeting 
During a management team meeting, the program of the next quarterly staff 
information meeting is being discussed. The program has been prepared by HR and 
consists of seven speakers on different subjects. In this program, all speakers are 
first-line managers. In the last part of the program, employees have the opportunity to 
ask questions, but no time has been scheduled for that part. When the interventionist 
asks why no time for questions has been scheduled, the answer is that ‘normally they 
don’t ask any questions’. During this session the awareness grows that this program 
confirms existing patterns: managers talkand are active, while employees listen and 
are passive. A small group is formed to prepare a program that de-blocks existing 
patterns.  
 
The director opens the session with a presentation on the communication 
improvement process. He shares a personal story about his concerns, what happens 
in the management team and what he has already learned about himself. He also 
shares his insights into circularity: ‘We keep a tight grip on each other, e.g. 
- management direct, employees listen (‘watch this meeting’) 
- management instruct, employees keep their ideas to themselves 
- ‘this meeting is illustrative: first line management prepare and have foreknowledge; 
second line management and employees wait and see. That is what we stimulate.’ 
He also shares personal expectations, recent positive examples and a suggestion for 
the future: let employees and managers prepare these sessions together. 
 
During the session the director succeeds in creating a good atmosphere. Employees 
seem to be surprised by the personal and vulnerable story of the director and 
respond positively. Many stay for a drink.  
 
 
Reflection 5 
(narratives 1.11 – 1.14) 
 
Managers are pushed back into ‘old’ behaviour by the environment they have created 
The observations show that expressions of unilateral control and circular patterns are 
repeated/copied deeper in the organization.  
 
Management try to break through ingrained patterns with several initiatives. This 
changing, however, is easily blocked:  
• They have difficulty to be consistent; managers easily fall back into a unilateral 
control model. 
• It appears to be difficult to show a mutual learning model; even meta-
communication about ‘the way we communicate’ tends to be control-driven. By 
imposing ideas about the communication patterns, managers create a threat and 
activate defensive routines. 
• If managers try to break through circular patterns, they are pushed back by the 
environment they have created with unilateral control. For example, the manager 
decides to stop ‘giving the right answer’ as this creates dependent and reactive 
employee behaviour.  
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When he asks the employee for his opinion, the latter is ‘saved’ by a colleague 
 who asks the manager for his opinion. The latter, subsequently, shares his  
opinion. 
 
Managers show best de-blocking interventions if the pressure is low. The lower the 
pressure, the easier change processes can be de-blocked.  
 
Interventionists are fixed in circular patterns 
Regardless of some positive observations, interventionists are not sure about the 
change process. The director in particular seems to be working on his behaviour and 
approach. However, interventionists still suspect that some managers play the game 
and act as if they want to work on it.  
 
Interventionists seem to contribute to a blocked change process by some circular 
patterns as well: 
• Interventionist active (takes initiative), participants passive. 
• Interventionist shares feedback, participants wait and see (‘that is an interesting 
analysis!!’). 
• Interventionist participates, manager directs difficult issues to interventionist. 
• Interventionist talks with employees about their role, manager feels less 
responsible. 
• Interventionist observes and shares feedback, participants keep their feedback for 
themselves. 
 
Furthermore, the interventionists are confronted with some dilemmas. 
 
Asking questions versus feeding back 
If managers are invited to tell about their experiences, they tend to be skilled in 
covering up their defensiveness and tend to share espoused theories. Through 
feedback the same defensive strategies tend to be activated.  
 
Active versus passive 
Interventions (questions or feedback) contribute to reflection. However, each 
intervention is a sign of activity and can lead to passive/dependent participants.  
 
Close versus distance 
In order to de-block changing, self-disclosure by the interventionist appears to be 
effective. Self-disclosure supposes a close relationship with participants. However, 
neutral observation of the process requires a distance: the closer the relationship, the 
more difficult it is to see circularity and defensive strategies (as one tends to be highly 
skilled in covering up these patterns). 
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Overall feedback by interventionist 
The interventionist is invited to present an overall analysis to the management team 
(appendix 1 includes the slides that the interventionist presents). A part of the 
dialogue that follows is described below. 
 
 
Interventionist finishes his presentation with the 
question ‘Do you personally really want to invest 
any further in this process?’ and sits down.  
 
Silence 
 
M: Yes, I agree with your analysis. 
 
H: Yes, I hear your analysis. However, I don’t 
know what I must do with this safety in the 
management team. I don’t know what to do 
differently (looks at interventionist).  
 
Int: H, I don’t say you have to do anything. The 
question is: do you accept the situation as it is? I 
could imagine if you said ‘yes’. As a consequence, 
you might just have to accept people might not feel 
safe. But that’s quite common in many 
organizations.  
 
 
H: But this safety in the management team; what 
do you expect me to do? I am one of the 
managers who tends to say that we can say 
anything here and that I feel safe. Partly because I 
don’t feel like saying that it is unsafe. Should I, 
time after time, say ‘I don’t feel safe’? Then we do 
not make any progress, do we? (exaggerates in 
order to make it funny – some laugh). 
 
Int: You respond as if you think this is not realistic. 
At the same time you expect managers and 
employees deeper in the organization to have an 
open dialogue about these subjects. That does not 
sound consistent. Based on your experience in the 
management team, you might decide to stop 
expecting others to discuss this theme.  
Please do not do this because you have to. W, you 
would really help the process if managers have 
some room to say they do not want to do this. I 
know this might be difficult for you, as you find this 
very important (director seems to be slightly 
uncomfortable with the situation). 
 
H: That is not what I want. I am really trying to find 
out what I should do differently in order to make a 
difference. Could you advise me what I should do? 
 
Int: Not immediately. If it were so simple, you 
would already have done so. You’re very smart. 
However, I am quite willing to assist you in 
discovering ways to improve. 
 
Dir: I have learned quite a lot since we started this 
process. I really try to do things differently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist confronts inconsistency in 
current situation (valid information), invites 
them to make a free choice (each option is fine, 
as long as it is consistent) and to take 
responsibility. He releases pressure by saying 
that accepting unsafety and fear is fine. By 
doing so, he stimulates managers to adhere to 
a mutual learning model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joke strategy 
 
 
Again, interventionist confronts inconsistency in 
current situation (valid information), invites 
them to make a free choice (each option is fine, 
as long as it is consistent) and to take 
responsibility. He releases pressure by creating 
room to say ‘no’. By this intervention he 
stimulates managers to adhere to a mutual 
learning model. 
 
 
(from this moment the pressure is reduced; 
persons are more open about their hesitations) 
 
 
He seems to make a conscious decision. 
Subsequently, he asks the interventionist for an 
instant answer. 
 
For the interventionist it is very attractive to give 
a piece of advice and show added value (in the 
short run). By doing so, he would have 
established an S-O relationship that leads to 
dependency. Here, the int aims at establishing 
an S-S relationship that supports exploring and 
mutual learning. 
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Int: I recognize and appreciate the way you are 
developing. 
There are already interesting experiments (int. 
describes situation when H succeeded to 
contribute to mutual learning in his team). H, this is 
part of an answer to your question what to do. (H. 
looks satisfied.) 
 
[…]  
 
M: Well, I see that changing the atmosphere in this 
organization really requires us to change. The 
question is, do we really want to change and are 
we able to change. After all, we are a certain type 
of managers: result-driven, slightly dominant, more 
attention to contents than people. We should take 
more time for our people. Do we want that? 
 
Int: That is the question. But please do not try to 
answer that question under pressure. Pressure 
does not help you now. The benefit of this 
discussion is that we have never had a dialogue 
this way. Personally, and about the role you want 
to play.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P dynamical (D)  
P own role (D)  
B valid (D) 
B proactive (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist keeps them from answering M’s 
question immediately. His assumption is that 
pressure might activate defensiveness again 
(e.g. a ‘compliance strategy’). Afterwards, the 
question would have deserved an answer. 
 
 
 
Reflection 6 
(narrative 1.15) 
 
Preparation supports interventions that enable mutual learning  
This session with the management team (including the slides in appendix 1) was well 
prepared. Good preparation makes it easier to choose consciously, avoid automatic 
unilateral control behaviour and adhere to a mutual learning model theory-in-use. 
The session illustrates some clear mutual learning interventions that seem to stifle 
defensiveness and de-block changing and learning. 
 
The interventionist’s underlying intentions were to share valid information, check for 
different views, invite the managers to make a free choice and help them to feel 
intrinsically responsible. 
 
• Confront inconsistency neutrally (‘What you say and what you do is inconsistent’), 
present possible consistent choices equally (‘You might decide you are satisfied 
with the results until now and accept some people do not feel safe; if you do not 
accept this, you will need to inquire into defensive strategies; each option is fine’) 
and invite to make conscious and free choices so that one can feel responsible. 
This way, managers are helped to be consistent and to reduce defensiveness.  
• Invite openly to share valid information and leave room for free choice, e.g. by 
asking the highest in rank whether one is allowed to say ‘no’ to a proposal (a ‘yes’ 
might only be valid information if a ‘no’ is allowed as well).  
• Relieve pressure that might activate defensiveness by creating room for free 
choice, reduce time pressure and quick-fixes. 
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• Accept defensiveness as a natural response to something that makes one 
defensive. Confront defensiveness neutrally and stimulate inquiry. The 
interventionist might even ‘forecast’ defensiveness (‘You will probably feel 
defensive strategies being activated while I talk about them. That is a part of 
these strategies, so don’t worry. Try to listen and understand what I say and what 
you feel’). 
 
 
 
Period 4: later developments  
 
Some months later there were some visible developments that pointed at a delayed 
effect of de-blocked changing, organizing and learning. The examples as described 
below are illustrative. 
 
Meeting first and second line management  
In October 2005, a meeting is organized on future developments in strategy and 
organization design. In the past, the director usually had a brief discussion with the 
management team on these subjects. Typical quotes were ‘I think this is all clear, 
isn’t it?’, without much room for a reaction. As a consequence, he got no valid 
information. 
 
Some observations during this session: 
• The director asks questions, line managers answer. The latter grow more and 
more active, while the director really listens. 
• The director is open (self-disclosure): ‘I thought it was all logical and clear. Now I 
see your opinions differ from mine. Apparently, it was my logic and clearness.’ 
• A first line manager (to the director): ‘The opinions of my second line managers 
appeared to differ from yours. I considered stopping them, but I didn’t. After all, 
we try to share valid information.’ The director agrees.  
• The director finishes by asking how managers have experienced the session and 
if they would like to work this way in the future. Their reaction is positive and they 
bring in ideas for the future. 
 
Session with first line manager and his second line managers 
In a session with one of the first line managers and his management team the 
effectiveness of the team and each team manager is discussed through mutual 
feedback. Team members are invited to select three elements that strongly 
characterize the team. One of the elements is ‘harmony’ that may lead to ‘caution’. 
The interventionist describes possible consequences of this characteristic for the 
improvement process by sharing his personal experience during a progress meeting 
with this team one week before. 
  
 
Int: We discussed progress during that meeting. All 
said the process is valuable. Still, the dialogue 
consistently related to general themes like ‘the 
management team’, ‘the organization’ and 
information processes. It seemed to be very hard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This example is in line with Argyris (1990), who 
argues that one tends to cover up defensive 
routines (‘the process is valuable’) and cover up 
the cover-up (‘this was a valuable discussion 
about a valuable process’). 
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to discuss the effectiveness of team members, 
regardless of several attempts by me. At the end 
of this meeting the first line manager asked each 
of you to evaluate the meeting. All managers said 
that they really found the discussion valuable. The 
interventionist was thanked for his valuable 
contribution and the meeting was finished. 
However, I left the meeting with an odd feeling: 
what you had said contradicted strongly to what I 
had felt. My feeling said that you liked neither the 
process nor the discussion during that meeting. 
And my assumption was that you experienced the 
whole process as a top-down initiative and that the 
safest way to behave was acting as if you found it 
valuable and keep the discussion on the surface. 
After my departure I was confused by the 
situation.” 
 
Silence … 
 
B: To be honest, your assumption is right. I felt a 
strong top-down pressure that forced me to 
comply.  
 
Other managers agree. 
 
H (first line mgr): I am glad you are so candid. I 
had the same feeling as the interventionist. 
However I did not know how to deal with the 
situation. 
 
Int: Great you can be so open. The problem is that 
you have been inconsistent. You said you wanted 
to contribute to an improvement process, but you 
blocked effective changing and organizing by 
sharing invalid information. Unlike before, now you 
are sharing valid information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
B valid (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D)  
B valid (D) 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist advocates his assumptions 
by sharing them openly. He confronts 
inconsistency not in terms of ‘right or wrong’. 
Instead, he brings in his assumptions and 
feelings neutrally and leaves room for inquiry. 
As a consequence, people respond very openly 
about their defensiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist confronts inconsistency and 
emphasizes the effectiveness of sharing valid 
information. 
 
 
 
All seem to feel uncomfortable with the situation and agree that this is not the way to 
be effective as a team. They agree that they will be more open about feelings and 
thoughts in the future. Some later signals point at genuine changes. During the same 
session people are open by giving mutual feedback regarding personal contributions 
to the team, the department and the improvement process. In addition, they start 
informal meetings with employees to share ideas concerning current themes in the 
department. Managers share some circular patterns with employees and invite 
employees to be open.  
 
Why stop here? 
The end of this case is chosen relatively randomly, as the case description does not 
focus on an episodic change but on the ongoing daily interactions that contribute to 
blocked or de-blocked changing, organizing and learning. The moment of stopping 
this case corresponds to the period the interventionist is involved in the organization 
and the results that are being accomplished. 
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7.4 Analysis of moving moments 1 
 
In this section the findings of case 1 are summarized and interpreted. The analysis 
follows the structure of the research questions. 
 
 
Point of departure and results 
 
The case starts with communication problems between management and 
employees, leading to employees’ fear and negative working climate. Management 
have already taken several initiatives, however without improvement of the situation. 
The recurrence of the problems in the longer run seem to disclose a dynamically 
complex situation. This situation directly relates to the subject of this study. 
 
At the end of this case director and (some) managers illustrate that they can bring 
some insights into practice, e.g. by confronting circularity and defensiveness and 
develop approaches that break through circularity. This way they directly contribute to 
the quality of changing and organizing. The employee satisfaction survey 
demonstrates higher scores on the quality of communication after the period that is 
described. 
 
 
Research question 1:  
To what extent are the expressions of unilateral control visible in interactions?  
 
In this case numerous observations have been made regarding Perceiving 
(reductionism, distancing, blaming, linear perception and S-O relations), Behaving 
(controlling circumstances, repeated behaviour, stronger control in case of threat and 
reactive behaviour) and Intervening (focus on symptoms, cover-up underlying 
patterns, quick wins and focus on impersonal instruments)13. The ‘diagnostic model’ 
helps to recognize situations that are influenced by unilateral control. 
 
There are no observations regarding Design of organization (positional organization, 
variety reduction, S-O relations and organization/change as separated entities). 
Regarding Change of organization (goal-oriented and planned process, step-by-step, 
episodic and top-down, rational), there are few observations of de-blocking 
expressions (D) in the start of the case, when the director talks about his desired 
open process without instrumental methods and the HR managers pleads for a clear 
structure and well-defined steps. Design and change of organization (as defined 
here) seem to be of a different order than the other expressions, as the former are 
vulnerable to espoused theory. In talking and on paper one can easily describe a 
certain way of design and change of organization, however in action one actually 
blocks or de-blocks changing by the way one perceives, behaves and intervenes: the 
director in this case says that he desires an open process/adventure (espoused 
                                                
13 For numbers of observations, see appendix 4 ‘Cross-case analysis’. 
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theory). However, he activates a unilateral control model as soon as he is confronted 
with deviant opinions in action (theory-in-use).  
 
Research question 2 
How does unilateral control relate to (de-)blocking of changing, organizing and 
learning? 
 
This research question aims at gaining insight into the ‘black box’ between unilateral 
control and changing and organizing. Research question 2 has been specified into 
four questions. The findings are summarized under these specific questions. 
 
How do expressions of unilateral control contribute to recurrent problems? 
This case starts with the analysis that the same communication problems recur time 
after time and the situation even seems to deteriorate, despite a number of initiatives. 
These initiatives appear to have a relatively instrumental and linear character: 
communication plans, intranet and written information. The underlying assumption is: 
as long as we give them more information, they will experience an improvement of 
communication. However, the situation does not improve, which seems to disclose a 
dynamically complex situation. “When obvious interventions produces nonobvious 
consequences, there is dynamic complexity” (Senge, 1990, p. 71). The initiatives 
might even contribute to the deterioration of the situation by tempering the attention 
to the problems and stifling personal responsibility of management and employees. 
Further research uncovers that employees have fear to criticize, feel anxious to 
approach managers, feel little loyalty of managers and feel they are ignored. 
Although they are familiar with this information, no manager have made this 
discussable with employees. 
 
A relatively large part of this case focuses on the management team and the role of 
managers towards the second level. The directly observable data during 
management team meetings, conversations with the director and meetings between 
managers and their employees give insight into the patterns that block changing and 
learning. 
 
Typical in this case is the strong unilateral control by the director during the first 
sessions. Although his spoken desire to organize an open process (espoused 
theory), he consistently persuades his managers to comply with the change 
approach (theory-in-use). Taking Senge’s ‘shifting the burden system’ as a starting 
point, this unilateral control consistently activates actions and initiatives in the upper 
circle: quick problem solving, persuasion and instrumental solutions. These actions 
seem to be copied by managers towards their employees. Although these actions are 
effective in (dynamically) simple situations, they are not in dynamically complex 
situations and lead to circular patterns (see next section). 
Besides, unilateral control activates defensive strategies that block the lower circle 
(Senge, ‘shifting the burden’, 1990). Difficult issues that block effective change 
remain undebatable by defensive strategies. With these defensive strategies 
managers succeed to avoid discussion of the way they contribute to communication 
problems in their departments and in the management team. This way, the lower 
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circle (inquiry into underlying patterns) is not only blocked because of delay, but also 
because of defensive strategies by leader and subordinates. As a consequence, 
there is little learning and the same communication problems recur time after time. 
 
The more unilateral control, the more the upper circle is activated and the lower circle 
is blocked, the more the fundamental problem grows, the more threatening the 
situation, the more control, etcetera. This leads to inconsistency: we say we want to 
change and we keep ourselves from changing. Figure 7.4 illustrates this situation. 
 
Figure 7.4 Unilateral control stimulates symptomatic solutions and blocks fundamental 
  solutions 
 
What circular patterns are visible? 
A focus on the upper circle leads to repetitive behaviour, as there is no learning and 
reflection. One tends to take a distance from the problems and expects others to 
change behaviour. This repetitive behaviour leads to circular patterns, e.g. the more 
one pushes, the less organization members take initiative. In this case one tends to 
copy these patterns deeper in the organization. 
 
Typical circular patterns that are illustrated in this case are described below. Although 
these patterns are described as if they start with the manager, by and large it is not 
clear where the circle starts. However, it is clear that the circles are self-propelling 
(behaviours stimulate each other) and self-protective (if managers start changing 
their behaviour, they tend to be pushed back by employees).  
 
Manager initiates change process, employees (act as if they) follow 
The more managers consider themselves as being capable of and responsible for 
imposing changes upon employees, the more they push employees into a following 
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(dependent, reactive) position, the more managers are confirmed in their belief they 
should impose changes, etcetera. 
 
Manager talks; employees (act as if they) listen 
The more managers talk (about ‘the change approach’, their opinion, the need for 
change) the more employees (act as if they) listen, the more managers direct, 
etcetera.  
 
Manager active; employees reactive 
The more initiative managers take (executing change actions, organizing meetings, 
chairing meetings, stressing the need for change), the more reactive and dependent 
employees behave (‘apparently he feels responsible …’, ‘let’s wait and see …), 
etcetera. 
 
Manager solves problems; employees bring problems in 
The more managers solve problems that employees bring in, the more employees 
bring in their problems (instead of solving them themselves), the more managers 
solve their problems, etcetera.  
 
Manager instructs; employees wait for next instruction 
The more managers instruct, the more employees wait for the next instruction, the 
more managers instruct, etcetera.  
 
Manager acts as if he knows answers; employees act as if they don’t 
The more managers act as if they know the answers (even if they don’t – yet), the 
more employees act as if they don’t, the more managers act as if they know the 
answers, etcetera.  
 
Manager feels uncomfortable and takes distance; employees feel uncomfortable and take 
distance 
The more uncomfortable managers feel, the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable employees feel and the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable managers feel, etcetera. 
 
All circular patterns are based upon the same Subject-Object perspective. By 
perceiving this way, management and employees maintain a recurrent circular 
pattern: active management and acted upon dependent employees. As long as 
manager and employees do not openly reflect on these circular patterns and how 
they contribute to them personally, little (mutual) learning takes place and changing is 
blocked. 
 
What defensive routines are visible? 
Learning in this case is being blocked by ‘defensive strategies’. In this study, 
defensive strategies are considered to be specific actions that block the lower circle 
of Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ and thus block fundamental solutions. Defensive 
strategies aim at making sensitive issues undebatable and, as a consequence, block 
learning and changing (as they protect the current reality). Or, in Argyris terms, 
defensive strategies cover sensitive issues up. For example, the director in this case 
firmly introduces the approach and asks for commitment. Everyone says ‘yes’. 
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However, since ‘no’ seems not to be an option, this ‘yes’ might easily be invalid 
information. If one says ‘yes’ and thinks ‘no’, one has to cover up in order to save 
face. A first defensive strategy is activated, the compliance strategy. 
This case illustrates several defensive strategies. The titles of these strategies have 
not been based upon existing literature; they have been developed and introduced in 
this study. 
• Joke strategy: in case of embarrassment, make a joke and change subject. 
• Reduction strategy: in case of embarrassment, reduce the problem until it is 
controllable again. 
• Denial strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, deny the problem. 
• Compliance strategy: in case of threat, say that you comply (regardless of 
whether you really do). 
• Ignorance strategy: act as if it is interesting, but ignore the information that is 
difficult to deal with. 
• Distance strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, change the subject to 
other parties or general observations (employees, middle management, ‘the 
organization’). 
• Blame strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, blame others. 
• ‘We’ strategy: in case of threat, talk about ‘our responsibility’ and say things such 
as ‘we should pay attention to the problems’ (as a consequence, nobody has to 
feel personally responsible). 
• Assume strategy: keep sensitive assumptions about others private. 
• Withdraw strategy: in case of difficulties in the communication between manager 
and employee, withdraw and discuss the difficulties with peers. 
• Shirk strategy: shift the responsibility to an ‘outsider’ and avoid sharing your own 
opinion about the process or colleagues. 
• Non-intervention strategy: in case of embarrassment, do not confront others’ 
dysfunctional behaviour (e.g. not keeping an appointment), so that others will not 
confront yours. 
• Undergo strategy: in case of threat, just undergo the intervention (passively) and 
do not make the producing patterns debatable.  
 
How do leaders de-block changing, organizing and learning? 
At the start of this process the director says he does not want a planned and 
instrumental approach. Instead, he prefers an open approach and wants to find out 
how a better climate can be developed. In action, however, he blocks changing by 
unilateral control: he leaves no room for valid information on managers’ commitment, 
increases pressure in case of deviant visions (just until one ‘complies’) and stimulates 
defensive strategies. If confronted with his behaviour and effects, he tends to 
respond with exactly the behaviour that is being shared. 
 
After repetitive feedback and self-disclosure by the interventionist, he starts reflecting 
on the way he blocks changing. From this moment he starts developing alternative 
behaviour and contributes to de-blocked changing. 
 
• Reflection and experimentation: ‘The feedback gave me deep insight into my role. 
Since then I have been learning by experimentation. Last week someone 
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approached me to talk about some problems in project Y. Normally I would have 
tried to persuade him, but this time I said almost nothing. I just listened to his 
concerns.’ 
• Self-disclosure and public reflection upon the way one contributes to lack of 
learning: ‘I visited H. and K. and let them know I should have dealt with the 
situation either by leaving room for discussion or by asking questions (instead of 
making the issue undiscussable).’ 
• Being proactive: ‘When the management team prepares the sessions, we push 
employees into a dependent role. I don’t think that is effective. What would you 
think about preparing the next session together?’  
• Making sensitive issues debatable by addressing them: ‘Communication and 
safety is a sensitive subject, as we have just announced that X will have to leave.’ 
• Confronting defensive strategies within the management team: ‘Let’s not focus on 
other parties. Let’s start with our own role.’ 
• Making circularity visible: ‘The more we direct, the more passive they will be’. And 
in a meeting with all employees: ‘We keep a tight grip on each other, e.g. 
management direct, employees listen (‘watch this meeting’), management 
instruct, employees keep their ideas to themselves, first line management prepare 
this session and have foreknowledge; second line management and employees 
wait and see. That is what we stimulate.’ 
• Sharing valid information: ‘Well, I see that changing the atmosphere in this 
organization really requires us to change. The question is, do we really want to 
change and are we able to change. We should take more time for our people. Do 
we want that?’ 
 
The director’s personal changing positively influences some managers who copy his 
behaviour within the management team and towards their own employees. Some 
months later, in a session with all managers and team leaders, the director invites the 
interventionist as ‘he would like feedback about his style’. During this session the 
director still shows several de-blocking behaviours as describes above, which seems 
to uncover a lasting effect. 
 
One difficulty is that when managers try to break through circular patterns, initially 
they tend to be pushed back by the environment they have created through their 
unilateral control. Curiously, the case illustrates several moments when a manager 
changes his behaviour (e.g. instead of instruction, helping employees to bring in their 
own ideas), and employees push him back into the behaviour they are used to 
although they do not like it (‘but what is your opinion?’). Some temporary conclusions 
can be drawn.  
Firstly, if a system is interrupted by changed behaviour by one party, the system 
tends to protect itself. As a consequence, it is difficult to induce immediate effects 
and one has to take into account a delay. Secondly, for this reason changing requires 
managers to be courageous and patient. If a manager falls back into ‘old’ behaviour 
after the first disappointing results, the system will probably persist and produce 
recurrent problems. Thirdly, if a manager changes behaviour in order to break 
through a system without being open about this change to employees, he still 
behaves from a unilateral control model including a Subject-Object perspective. In 
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order to stimulate mutual learning, it is important to share his observations about the 
circular pattern, his reasoning and what he intends to realize with changed 
behaviour. Subsequently, employees can respond, add missing information and feel 
responsible for learning and changing. 
 
Research question 3 
How do interventions contribute to (de-)blocking changing, organizing and learning? 
 
The aim of this research question is to develop an intervention perspective that 
contributes to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning. 
 
It is important to notice that interventionists cannot be separated from the 
organization. Their interactions are part of the system and contribute to blocking or 
de-blocking changing and organizing. This insight is in line with McCaughan and 
Palmer (1994): “We talk about a consultant being ‘outside’ the problem situation, but 
there are no insides and outsides in this kind of systems thinking. Feedback loops 
are no respecters of conventional boundaries” (p. 75). 
 
How interventionists contribute to blocked changing and organizing 
This case study delivers some illustrations of situations in which interventionists 
contribute to blocked changing by their behaviour. The interventionists tend to 
activate a unilateral control theory-in-use in situations they perceive as threatening or 
embarrassing: situations in which their role (and added value) is at stake. Typical 
expressions of a unilateral control model under these circumstances, as illustrated in 
this case, are:  
• proving one has ‘everything under control’ 
• confirming managers who say that ‘we are improving’ and suppress hesitations 
about their real intentions (Argyris calls this ‘self-censoring’) 
• persuading one has to show different behaviour (and showing a strong S-O 
definition of relations) 
• confronting defensiveness in terms of ‘wrong’ 
• showing one’s added value through (immediate) answers, analysis and solutions  
This way, the interventionists make defensiveness undebatable, create dependency 
and keep themselves and others from inquiry and learning. As a consequence, they 
contribute to blocked changing and organizing. 
 
Being part of the system, the interventionists regularly contribute to circular patterns 
as well: 
• Interventionist is active (takes initiative), participants are passive.  
• Interventionist feeds back, participants wait and see (‘that is an interesting 
analysis!!’). 
• Interventionist participates, manager directs difficult issues to interventionist. 
• Interventionist talks with employees about their role, manager feels less 
responsible. 
• Interventionist observes and feeds back, participants keep their feedback private. 
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In essence, it is the interventionist’s very presence that might be an expression of 
management’s distancing: 
• Interventionist is present, participants feel less responsible (take distance). 
Breaking through this circularity places the interventionist in some dilemmas:  
 
Asking questions versus feeding back 
If managers are asked to share their experiences, they tend to be skilled in covering 
up their defensiveness and tend to share espoused theories. By giving feedback, 
these very defensive strategies tend to be activated.  
 
Active versus passive 
Interventions (questions or feedback) contribute to reflection. However, each 
intervention is a sign of activity and can lead to passive participants.  
 
Close versus distance 
In order to de-block changing, self-disclosure by the interventionist appears to be 
effective. Self-disclosure supposes a close relationship with participants. However, 
neutral observation of the process requires a distance: the closer the relationship, the 
more difficult it is to see circularity and defensive strategies (as one tends to be highly 
skilled in covering these patterns up). 
 
Involved versus neutral 
Clients often expect active involvement of their consultants: working actively with us 
and being a partner in business. However, it is exactly this role that stimulates the 
consultant to activate a control model of proving his added value, to define problems 
and solve them as quickly as possible. A more neutral role is needed for confronting 
and inquiring into defensiveness. This role seems thus to contradict clients’ 
expectations and consultant’s tendencies. 
 
In line with a mutual learning model, the best way to deal with these dilemmas is to 
share them openly with clients. That way, one can choose consciously. 
 
Interventions that contribute to de-blocking of changing  
While attending sessions in the organization, the interventionist tries to support 
changing and learning. The basis of his interventions is directly observable data in 
the sessions. This case illustrates elements of an intervention perspective that seems 
to support changing and learning. 
 
Openly sharing what one fears to share regarding the effect of the leader’s actions  
This case illustrates that the director’s behavioural shift was influenced to a great 
extent by the interventionist’s self-disclosure: ‘I think you can be quite threatening for 
people. Even for me, while I am an outsider, this is the first conversation with you that 
I feel comfortable. So how safe are you for persons that report to you?’ This 
intervention, including the effect of the director’s behaviour on the interventionist, 
appears to contribute strongly to the director’s learning process. He changes his 
behaviour, that is copied by his managers and contributes to positive feedback by 
employees about the atmosphere and communication. 
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Inviting to share valid information 
Invite openly to share valid information (‘What do you really think about this change 
approach?’) and leave room for free choice, e.g. by asking the highest in rank 
whether one is allowed to say ‘no’ to a proposal (a ‘yes’ might only be valid 
information if a ‘no’ is allowed as well). Don’t hesitate to confront invalid information 
(‘What you say seems to differ from what you really think and feel …; am I right?’) 
 
Confronting inconsistency neutrally 
Confront inconsistency neutrally (‘What you say and what you do are inconsistent’), 
present possible consistent choices equally (‘Either you say you want to change and 
show consistent behaviour, or you accept the current reality – each option is fine’) 
and invite to make conscious and free choices so that one can feel responsible. This 
way, managers are helped to be consistent, reduce defensiveness and hold a mutual 
learning theory-in-use.  
 
Sharing circularity and help managers/employees to reflect upon their contribution to the 
problem 
Confront circular patterns and one’s contribution to the problems that one faces: 
‘Could there possibly be a circular pattern: the more active managers are, the more 
reactive and dependent employees are and vice versa?’ The underlying assumption 
is that by stimulating awareness of how one contributes to the recurrent patterns, it 
will be difficult to repeat these actions on purpose. 
 
Making defensive strategies debatable time after time (make the undiscussable discussable)  
De-blocking changing and organizing requires changing the defensive strategies that 
block changing and organizing. These defensive strategies, however, are built to 
defend themselves and can be characterized as ingrained routines. Feedback of 
defensiveness leads to activation of this defensiveness in the short run. However, the 
effect is visible in the longer run. This seems to be an argument for confronting 
defensiveness openly and repetitively. This conclusion is not in line with McCaughan 
and Palmer (1994) and Moeskops (2004), who emphasize caution and suggest 
addressing systemic hypotheses only to the client or oneself. However, the 
conclusion is in line with Argyris (1990), who argues that if the source of the 
defensive feelings is to avoid learning, defensive feelings should not be bypassed. 
 
The next quote is illustrative of initiating activation of strategies when confronting 
them. 
Interventionist: We doubt how open people can be. We see some patterns that keep 
team members from being open. It appeared to us that you can say fairly hard things 
to each other. Each time this happens some one makes a joke, releases tension and 
changes the subject. Difficult or personal issues remain undebatable this way and -
contrary to the desired effect- an unsafe climate is created. Let’s call this a joking 
strategy. Another strategy with the same effect is the reduction strategy: you tend to 
make problems smaller if the situation might become difficult or embarrassing.  
HR manager (joking): Then you must not make any jokes about my roots anymore 
(both laugh). 
Interventionist: This is what we mean .... 
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Director: Now you are exaggerating. It is not that bad. 
 
After a week the director addresses this issue in a conversation with the 
interventionist and wishes to know more about these defensive strategies, which 
uncovers a delayed effect.  
 
Consider the use of humour 
Using some humour can help to make defensive strategies debatable, e.g. ‘You are 
very good at keeping the situation as it is.’ Compare Argyris’ concept of ‘skilled 
incompetence’: ‘You are very skilled in being incompetent …’ 
 
Confront defensive strategies just before they will be activated 
Confronting defensive strategies even before they are activated, helps persons to 
inquire into their defensiveness ‘in action’: ‘I will mention some defensive strategies 
that keep you from effective change processes; you will probably feel them being 
activated while I talk about them. That is how they work; so don’t worry. Try to listen 
and understand what I say and what you feel.’ 
 
This does also help to accept defensiveness as a natural response to something that 
makes defensive, to confront defensiveness neutrally and stimulate inquiry: ‘do you 
feel you are stimulated to defend now? What exactly gives you that feeling?’ 
 
Reduce (time) pressure  
A practical but helpful insight is to reduce pressure that might activate defensiveness 
by creating room for free choice, reducing time pressure and quick-fixes. 
 
De-blocking organizing and changing 
The experiences after some months in particular lead to some additional notes 
regarding de-blocking organizing and changing. 
• De-blocking changing and organizing is characterized by delay; it takes time for 
‘the social system’ to translate insights into behaviour. This observation 
resembles Senge’s (1990) insights: changing the ‘lower circle’ is characterized by 
delay. 
• Change methods (e.g. the way information sessions are organized) are easier to 
change than perception, behaviour and interventions: the structure of certain 
meetings fits in ‘a new approach’, while concrete behaviours during these 
meetings still fit in the ‘the old approach’. There seem to be two explanations: 
firstly, change methods can be designed with time and attention. As a 
consequence, there is no direct pressure. Secondly, a method is discussed and 
put on paper. As such, this can easily be espoused theory.  
• Start with the top (see Argyris, 1990). Before they expect employees to change, 
they have to show visible changes themselves. Espoused theories that are 
inconsistent with theories-in-use stifle management’s credibility as employees 
focus on what managers do, not on what they say. Inconsistency confirms 
employees’ negative assumptions about managers and activates circular 
patterns. 
 140 
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8. Moving moments 2 
 
 
 
8.1 Type of organization 
 
This organization is a division of a large company in the business-to-consumer 
market. Approximately 600 persons work within this division. The vast majority of 
employees have direct contact with customers by phone, e-mail and post. The 
market of this division is generally considered to be highly competitive. As a 
consequence, attracting and retaining customers is a major concern of the company.  
 
 
8.2 Context of the change process 
 
In 2004, top management developed a new strategy for the company. The main 
subject of this strategy was a shift ‘from a product seller to a service supplier’. ‘Selling 
products’ was no longer the main aim, but ‘solving customers’ problems’.  
 
Top management concluded that this new strategy had major consequences for the 
company in four areas:  
• Structure: development of customer-focused work processes 
• Marketing: development of a new market approach 
• ICT: development of information that supports prompt and customer-oriented 
decision-making 
• Human resources and culture: development of an entrepreneurial and customer-
oriented culture and working methods. 
 
This case focuses on the fourth area: human resources and culture. 
 
For the overall coordination a program team was established. One of the first actions 
of this program team was collecting improvement issues in the organization, which 
led to more than 1500 ideas. A selection of these ideas was translated into projects. 
In order to focus, the remaining ideas were kept ‘in stock’ by the project team.  
 
Based on the input from the organization, the program team developed attractive 
leaflets and brochures that described the ambitions, success factors, and concrete 
actions that could be put into action by employees. Regarding human resources and 
culture, one described the ambition: 
- ‘our employees are proactive and entrepreneurial’ 
- ‘autonomy and a personal sense of responsibility are our employees’ core 
characteristics’ 
- ‘in our company we stimulate employees to contribute ideas on how to improve our 
 service’. 
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Management and program team decided to organize professional support from 
outside the organization in order to ‘implement’ a new culture and new working 
methods. At this point the interventionists enter the case. 
 
8.3 Moving moments 
 
Period 1: preparation 
 
The first meetings between (program) management and interventionists focus on 
information sharing and feedback. The interventionists’ feedback mainly concerns the 
risk of inconsistency between ambitions, as quoted above, and the process. Some 
issues are shared:  
• In practice, collection of improvement issues by the program team seems not to 
be in line with the ambition. Employees probably wait and see what ‘one’ is going 
to do with their ideas. In effect, they do not feel responsible for the issues 
anymore. Later, this assumption is confirmed. 
• A strong focus is being put on the ‘implementation’ of changes (C planned, C top-
down, C rational, C step-by-step). ICT and a market approach can probably be 
developed and implemented. However, a culture cannot. The more the focus is 
on implementation, the more employees will wait and see what ‘one’ is going to 
implement. In effect, this approach stimulates employees to be reactive instead of 
proactive.  
• When the interventionists share some ideas, the program manager shows his 
enthusiasm by saying that he likes this way of ‘boosting the new culture into the 
organization’ (P subject-object, O subject-object). Communicating this way 
probably stifles employees’ pro-activity, as management establish a relation of 
active management that impose their ambitions upon employees (which 
preconceives reactive and dependent employees). 
 
The challenge is to develop an approach that at least does not stifle employees to be 
pro-active and feel responsible. The approach, as described below, is shared with 
and subscribed to by top management (for a more elaborative description that 
includes considerations, see box 2.1 in appendix 2): 
• Start with top management: discuss approach and consequences for their own 
role (compare Argyris (1984, 1990), who argues that one should start with the 
top). 
• Follow the ‘cascade’: director and management team, management team 
members with their teams, etcetera. This way, employees can be invited to bring 
in ideas within their own circle of influence that can be implemented by 
themselves. This approach enables direct communication between managers and 
their employees and gives the opportunity to organize reflection and learning 
about the way one works on improvement processes. 
• Each department gets a team coach, who should support reflection and learning. 
• Before and after each session the manager has a feedback session with the team 
coach about the communication patterns and his contribution. The underlying 
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belief is that the team coach can ask question and give feedback in order to 
enable reflection and learning. 
• Regular progress meetings with director, individual managers and management 
teams contribute to keeps things result-oriented. 
• Evaluation after a couple of months. 
 
Reflection 1 
(narratives 2.1) 
 
A Subject-Object perspective leads to inconsistency 
Afterwards, by reflection, the start of this case reflects a strong Subject-Object  
perspective, considering the leader and interventionists as active agents and 
employees as passive Objects. This tends to work out as a self-fulfilling prophecy.   
It starts with the way management perceive the situation. Apparently, management 
believe they can ‘make’ employees more proactive and entrepreneurial. It is 
management who want employees to do something proactively, which in essence is 
a double bind message (Argyris, 1990). The vision on changing reflects a Subject-
Object perspective as well: words like ‘implementation’ of culture suggest that 
management (Subjects) can impose a new organizational culture on employees 
(Objects).  
 
The Subject-Object perspective easily leads to some pitfalls: 
• If the leader (Subject) assumes his/her own actions to be effective, the ultimate 
effectiveness is perceived as dependent on the loyalty, commitment and 
competence of the employees (Objects) (Hosking, 2004). 
• It is exactly this commitment and loyalty that is being stifled by a Subject-Object 
perspective, as the leader takes responsibility, tends to impose changes on 
employees, who – in turn – tend to react reactively and dependently.  
 
A Subject-Object perspective basically leads to circular patterns that block the 
desired change: 
 
Figure 8.1 Circular patterns  
 
The approach, as suggested by the interventionists, does not take away the risks as 
described above. Initiative is still in hands of top management (and interventionists), 
who expect employees to contribute by coming up with improvement ideas within 
their own circle of influence and putting them into practice. This way, coming up with 
ideas is still a reaction. In essence, it is paradoxical that management initiate a 
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change process that aims at the development of entrepreneurship and initiative.  
 
Period 2: start-up 
 
Workshop with all managers and team leaders 
In a one-day workshop with all 28 managers the change process is ‘kicked off’. 
 
 
Opening by director. Director has a very inspiring 
presentation. He starts with personal experiences 
as a customer and describes positive experiences. 
Subsequently, he clarifies the vision and (SMART) 
goals of this development process. Director talks 
with ‘Begeisterung’. Many managers and team 
leaders seem to be moved, however not all of 
them.  
 
Presentation by interventionist. Int shares 
dilemmas: 
- starting a change process with a kick-off session 
gives the impression that you are not working on 
customer satisfaction now. However, without a 
doubt you are. So this is not a change project with 
a beginning and an end, but rather a period of 
conscious learning.  
- by organizing a workshop for you, you are 
stimulated to be reactive (wait and see) 
- by asking to do sessions with your employees, 
others lead and you are led 
- by standing here and presenting you these 
insights, I am active and you are expected to be 
passive 
- by planning meetings in your schedule, we take 
initiative and you are expected to follow (while you 
don’t even exactly know what you are going to do 
during these meetings), 
- still, you are expected to feel responsible.  
Please, let’s help each other to find ways that help 
us feel responsible. And be open when you cannot 
feel responsible because of the way we organize 
things. 
 
After a presentation on the change approach 
(cascade model), all participants work on some 
questions, e.g. ‘what are possible blocking 
factors?’ and present the outcomes. ‘Political 
correctness’ is presented twice as a possible 
blocking factor. 
 
Nobody asks a question. 
 
Int: what do you mean by ‘political correctness’? 
 
Mgr: that we say ‘yes’ and think ‘no’. 
 
Int: you are quite open about this issue, which is 
not usual. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist aims at giving insight into some 
basic dilemmas related to initiating a change 
process: we say that we expect ownership and 
entrepreneurship and we act in a way that 
stifles these things just by giving the impression 
of an episodic change and by taking initiatives 
from a Subject-Object perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager is open about defensive strategy: we 
tend to say ‘yes’ and think ‘no’ (compliance 
strategy). 
The problem is that valid information is not 
always pleasant to hear and is easily labelled 
as ‘difficult behaviour’ and ‘resistance’. Saying 
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Silence …. 
 
 
Dir: I don’t understand why people think they 
cannot be open. As if anyone has experienced 
some terrible punishment (dir laughs …as well as 
some others). You can say anything to me. Please 
come to me if there is anything to share.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
‘yes’ and thinking ‘no’ is less threatening and 
more common. 
 
Inconsistent: what dir says is ‘you can say 
anything to me’, however what he does – 
instead of inquiring- is saying this perception of 
things makes no sense. The joking strategy 
helps making things undebatable. Thus, he 
exactly confirms the pattern.  
 
 
Immediately afterwards the director and interventionists evaluate the workshop. The 
director’s main feedback: the morning program was good, however the workshops in 
the afternoon have not contributed to participants’ enthusiasm for this change 
process. He would have expected the interventionist to create this enthusiasm.  
 
Conversation with director 
Director and interventionists briefly evaluate the workshop and prepare a meeting 
with the management team. In this meeting the director repeats his findings 
regarding the workshop and emphasizes the need for professionalism (a word that 
he uses often). He says he does not miss it, but ‘only wishes to stress the interest of 
success’. This message, in combination with the difficulty to create a relation, puts 
pressure on the interventionists. In effect, again, they reinforce unilateral control and 
wish to prove their professionalism (translated into being a good ‘partner-in-
business’). 
 
Subsequently, they prepare the agenda of the management team meeting 
intensively. The interventionists feel highly responsible for the success of this 
meeting. As a consequence, they tend to persuade the director of the desired 
approach. The director, in turn, complies with their suggestions and says ‘he hopes 
this is going to work’.  
 
Meeting management team 
Director and managers start the cascade in a meeting that focuses on their role in the 
improvement process. The director leads the session, while the interventionists focus 
on the process. The latter strongly wish a positive experience for their client and wish 
to prove their professionalism. As a consequence, they are relatively tense. 
 
 
[…]   
 
Dir shares his disappointment about relatively 
passive role that managers have played during the 
kick-off meeting. 
 
Managers do not respond to this. 
 
Director invites managers to share their vision on 
what they want to realize with this process within 
their own departments. 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blaming 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actually, in this session the same pattern takes 
place as they are discussing. The director is 
relatively active and initiates the discussion, 
while managers are relatively reactive. These 
behaviours seem to relate circularly.  
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Director gives turns to managers, takes time to ask 
questions and gives them room to share their 
ideas. Managers wait their turn and do not ask 
each other questions.  
 
Until it is K’s turn. 
 
K: Am I allowed to divert a bit? 
 
Dir: Yes, but keep it brief please. 
 
K: Well, I have been working on my health more 
consciously lately. I even drink two litres of water, 
which I never did before. In short, I made a real 
behavioural change myself because I am 
intrinsically motivated. It is my ambition not to say 
my team leaders and their employees must 
change. I want them to do it because they 
intrinsically want to. 
 
Silence. 
 
Dir: Well, but you have also a responsibility to 
manage the change and make things really 
happen. It is not free of obligations. 
 
K: I know, it isn’t. But in my opinion it would be 
better for me to coach them to find out their own 
way than tell them what they should do. 
 
Dir: As we have learned in our training program, 
you have three roles: leader, coach and manager. 
You easily forget the management role.  
 
H (another manager): How would you monitor 
progress? We have to make progress, don’t we? 
 
K: Yes, of course we have to. But I don’t believe 
people will really change if I push them. 
 
M (another manager): People won’t change if you 
don’t push them, will they? 
 
 
 
K: O.k., the message is clear. I will involve the 
management role as well. 
 
 
 
 
Int: What is happening? You put quite some 
pressure on K, don’t you?  
 
All (including K): yes. 
 
Int: K, what is the effect of this? 
 
K: It does not feel pleasant; I feel I have to defend 
myself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K’s question confirms the circular pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This sounds like a double bind message: ‘I 
want you to want it yourself.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is exactly the difference in beliefs between 
K and his colleagues. K does not want to push 
his team leaders (he knows the effect from 
experience, illustrated in this meeting). 
 
The unilateral control model (pushing) leads to 
a short term solution: the manager says he 
complies (compliance strategy). However, this 
does not seem to be valid information and will 
probably not help in the longer run. 
 
Interventionist intends to make the effect of this 
behaviour debatable. After all, forcing each 
other to act and think the same as the majority 
seems to be not consistent with the desire to 
stimulate entrepreneurship and ownership. 
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Int: But it works, right? After all, you say that you 
comply. Does it feel this way? 
 
K: Well, actually I believe my way also works. But I 
see I need to change my belief. 
 
Int (to all): Is that what you want? 
 
H: No, I think you are right. We should not try to 
convince him, but I think we have to take time to 
find out how we wish to contribute to the change 
process. 
 
All agree. 
 
Dir: We shall cover this later; we had already put 
the subject on the agenda. 
 
There appears to be not enough time. According to 
the agenda, director tries to initiate a brainstorm. 
However, the later it gets, the more he pushes and 
the less response by the managers. 
 
[…]  
 
Director seems to be very dissatisfied about the 
outcomes of this session and leaves the room with 
strong body language and without greeting.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int invites to share valid information. 
 
 
 
 
 
Int invites to make a free choice based on valid 
information and take responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pressure stimulates the director to activate 
a unilateral control model. As a consequence, 
the circular process of an active director and 
reactive (even passive) managers is activated.  
 
 
 
In the end the interventionists do not feel 
comfortable with the situation: there is still no 
relation and they are held responsible for the 
disappointment, as they ‘should have known 
more time was needed for this session’. In this 
situation they find it difficult to step into an 
independent position and give feedback about 
the process. As a consequence, they indeed 
add too little value, which leads to new 
disappointments. A circular process, that has to 
be stopped …. 
 
 
 
Afterwards there is only little time available for evaluation with the director. Director 
and interventionists agree to take time to evaluate by phone within two days. 
 
Conversation between director and interventionist 
Two days later director and interventionist have a conversation. In the meantime the 
interventionist does not feel comfortable in the process and has reflected upon 
possible explanations: 
- he experiences director’s behaviour as unpredictable, 
- he misses a relationship and feels he and his colleagues are being perceived as 
‘suppliers’ and 
- the effect of this lack of comfort stimulates the need to stay in control by proving his 
professionalism and added value; as a consequence, he loses his independence and 
finds it hard to take a position from which he can reflect on the process and share 
valid information (in other words, pressure activates a unilateral control model). 
The interventionist wishes to break through this situation in this conversation. 
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[…] 
 
Director and interventionist talk about the 
managers’ reactive attitude. 
 
Int: Still, I think you might contribute to this attitude 
yourself.  
 
Dir (open, curious): How? 
 
Int: What I see is that they mostly wait until you 
personally turn to them; there is practically no 
interaction between the managers during the 
meeting. You strongly direct the meeting and use 
words like ‘I’ll come back to you later’, which 
sounds like ‘wait until your next turn’. In that way 
you stimulate a reactive and dependent attitude. 
While you wish to stimulate entrepreneurship and 
pro-activity.  
 
Dir: I see … but I have to take initiative, right? 
Exactly because they act this way. 
 
Int: You perceive their behaviour as the cause and 
your behaviour as effect. But your behaviour and 
theirs might be cause and effect at the same time. 
Like a vicious circle: you take initiative, they 
behave reactively, this is a reason for you to take 
more initiative and, in turn they will even be more 
reactive. 
 
Dir: I see. You are right. 
 
Int: And there is something else. Would you be 
interested in an additional point? 
 
Dir: Yes, please … 
 
Int: Let me present this from my personal 
perspective. In my experience you can be very 
unpredictable: from one moment to another you 
can be very dissatisfied about things, which you 
communicate verbally or nonverbally (int gives 
some examples). Sometimes I think we have built 
a relationship, but the next moment it seems not to 
be there at all. As a consequence, I am on the 
alert and act very cautiously. I don’t think I give 
you what you deserve, then. 
 
Int: Do you recognize what I say? 
 
Dir (positively aroused): Yes, I can follow you. Go 
on. 
 
Int: After all it is my own responsibility to be able to 
deal with you and my feelings. However, it 
becomes important if you have the same effect on 
your managers. Might they be cautious because 
they cannot predict your reaction? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P linear 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist gives feedback about the circular 
patterns and addresses director’s role. The 
point is, the director is not satisfied about 
managers’ reactive attitude and stimulates this 
attitude with his own behaviour (self-fulfilling 
prophecy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist clarifies circularity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-disclosure by interventionist. Int describes 
the effects of director’s behaviour neutrally 
(without judging) and the way he tends to 
respond. Thus he shares valid information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int checks if he misses information.  
 
 
 
 
Int helps the director to reflect: might your 
behaviour produce the same effects in your 
management team? 
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Dir: Yes, they might be … 
 
Int: and as a consequence of their caution you 
increase pressure … 
 
Dir: Yes, I see I may contribute to their behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director recognizes circularity. 
 
 
 
Second management team meeting 
In a second meeting of the management team, the HR manager presents a well-
prepared Powerpoint presentation about the themes that took a great deal of time to 
explore in the first session. The director has already approved the contents of the 
presentation. All managers listen carefully. After the presentation, the managers keep 
silent. The director inquires how they think about the contents. When one manager 
asks a critical question regarding the contents of the presentation, the director 
responds firmly: ‘We have to make our decisions. If we wait for others, nothing will 
happen.’ All managers agree that it is a good piece of work and there is little to add. 
In the second half of the meeting the team members discuss some routine subjects. 
This part is much more effective: the director inquires and leaves room to the 
managers and managers, in turn, participate actively. 
 
Meeting with director 
Later, director and interventionist evaluate the current reality and progress, including 
the second management team meeting. 
 
 
[…] 
 
Int gives the director feedback upon the way the 
director seems to contribute to managers’ 
behaviour and the limited progress. 
 
Int: An illustrative example is the presentation by 
the HR manager. This was a great presentation. 
No doubt about that. And the contents were a 
major boost for the progress. However, a major 
reason for this presentation was you not being 
satisfied with the management team’s working 
pace and your team leaders’ initiative, right? 
 
Dir: Right.  
 
Int: Your solution helped in the short run. However, 
with this solution you stifled team leaders’ initiative 
in the longer run. Now they know that, in the end, 
you will come up with a solution. 
 
Dir: I understand what you say. But we don’t have 
plenty of time. I cannot wait all the time. 
 
Int: What are your considerations that make you 
decide to speed things up? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int shares the short-term and long-term effect of 
the HR manager’s presentation. In the short run 
it helps. However, the underlying circular 
problem remains not discussed. 
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Dir: Well, the process is too slow. We started 
already two years ago, long before we invited you 
to support us. It is my role to put pressure on the 
process. 
 
Int: Is this the reason why you communicated to 
the organization that all team sessions should be 
sped up? 
 
Dir: Yes, that is my role. Employees look at us with 
disdain: will they succeed? 
 
Int: Can I go one step further? 
 
Dir: Yes. 
 
Int: It sounds like a difficult process. Your response 
is putting pressure on it. If you are still not satisfied 
about the progress, this might be not the best 
solution. Applying pressure reduces freedom of 
obligations. That is okay. I think it would help if you 
would inquire into the process as well, starting with 
your management team. Try to have a discussion 
on how you, your managers and the HR manager 
contribute to the recurrent patterns. Sometimes 
logical actions do not lead to logical effects. Then it 
is time to explore alternatives. 
 
P subject-object 
I symptoms 
I cover-up 
I short-term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
I symptoms 
I cover-up 
I short-term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This belief (‘employees look at us with disdain’) 
apparently has a strong effect on director’s 
actions. Int could have explored what the effect 
exactly is. 
 
 
 
Afterwards, by reflection, the interventionist 
confronts a unilateral control model by using a 
unilateral control model: he increases pressure, 
repeats the message and tries to persuade the 
director. The latter mainly explains and defends 
his actions. 
Alternative (if interventionist is aware of this 
pattern in action) is inquiry into the pattern: ‘I 
feel I tend to persuade you; what is the effect of 
that?’ 
 
 
 
Reflection 2 
(narratives 2.2 – 2.7) 
 
Unilateral control in simple and complex situations 
The aim of the change process is to develop entrepreneurship; director and 
managers find it important that people take initiative (espoused theory). However, 
some recurrent patterns are visible that stifle proactive behaviour and 
entrepreneurship (theory-in-use). The recurrence of the problems in the longer run 
seems to disclose a dynamically complex situation. “When obvious interventions 
produce nonobvious consequences, there is dynamic complexity” (Senge, 1990, p. 
71). 
 
Two types of situations can be distinguished: Simple and dynamically complex 
situations (Senge, 1990). 
 
1. Simple situations (situations with a low dynamic complexity)  
In simple situations (no tensions, no sensitive subjects) the management team 
operates very effectively: director leaves room, is enthusiastic and creates a pleasant 
atmosphere. Managers participate actively and interact with each other.  
 
2. Complex situations (with a high dynamic complexity) 
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In case of threat, conflicting opinions and personal issues, unilateral control is not 
effective anymore.  
 
If related to Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure, the unilateral control model 
consistently activates the upper circle and defensive strategies, and blocks inquiry 
into the lower circle, as depicted in figure 8.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Unilateral control in relation to the ‘shifting the burden’ structure 
 
The more pressure, the more activation of a unilateral control model: 
• The director’s perception of the employees who look at the management 
disdainfully activates a unilateral control model: increasing pressure, persuasion, 
neglecting underlying patterns. 
• In complex situations the director tends to enlarge control and reduce room; 
initiative and participation reduce and managers wait for their turn; director’s 
unilateral control and managers’ dependency are linked circularly. 
• The presentation by HR is strong; however, the reason for her presentation was 
the team not being fast enough; this way this problem is bypassed and even 
reinforced; it is a short-term solution that is accompanied neither by testing of 
one’s beliefs (why did the director and HR manager choose this approach), nor 
inquiring into the underlying process (what makes managers act reactively and 
dependently). It is not the presentation as such, as much as the lack of 
(additional) inquiry that reinforces recurrent patterns and blocks learning and 
changing. Thus entrepreneurship and pro-activity are stifled. 
• Some defensive strategies by director and managers are visible: 
- Compliance strategy: in case of threat, say that you comply (regardless of 
whether you really do). 
- Ignorance strategy: act as if it is interesting, but ignore the information that is 
difficult to deal with. 
- Assume strategy: hold strong assumptions about others and situations without 
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testing them. 
- Shirk strategy: shift the responsibility to someone else and avoid sharing your 
own opinion about the process or colleagues. 
• Changing the pattern is difficult and has a delay. The director does his utmost to 
leave room and stimulate managers to be proactive. However, managers do not 
immediately respond. In turn, the director tends to fall back to increasing 
pressure. Changing current patterns takes time and is characterized by delay, as 
the system is maintained by a number of routines that tend to defend themselves. 
Changing the system of interactive patterns by the leader, therefore, is preferably 
accompanied by openness about one’s underlying beliefs: ‘I ask you to share 
your opinion and I’ll keep my mouth shut for a moment, because I am afraid I stifle 
your commitment and involvement otherwise. Shall we try how things work this 
way?’ This way, responsibility is being shared and mutual learning stimulated.  
 
Consequences of unilateral control for change process 
A unilateral control model seems to have a number of consequences for the 
effectiveness of the change process. 
• The aim of the process is to stimulate entrepreneurship and ownership. However, 
unilateral control activates the upper circle (see figure 8.2) and sooner stimulates 
reactive and dependent behaviour.  
• The defensive strategies by managers (especially compliance strategy) easily 
lead to invalid information regarding their opinions, feelings and commitment and, 
subsequently, to problems in the process. A ‘yes’ to the question if managers are 
committed is only of value if one could say ‘no’ as well. 
• Difficult issues that block effective change remain undebatable. Even if one says 
and believes one wants to change (espoused theory), one blocks the change 
process effectively (skilled incompetence, Argyris). 
 
Unilateral control by the interventionist  
Under circumstances of pressure and possible embarrassment the interventionists 
activate a unilateral control model. As a consequence, they tend to prove their 
professionalism and added value, being ‘partners in business’. In effect, they are as 
vulnerable as their client to the expressions of a unilateral control model and lose 
their added value. Expressions:  
• The interventionist tends to translate ‘adding value’ into ‘helping to keep things 
under control’, e.g. by managing meetings in such a way that no difficulties 
appear. This way, he adheres to the same unilateral control model as his client 
and does not add value. 
• Interventionist’s sensitivity to ineffective patterns diminishes; as he is so strongly 
involved, he does not see the unproductive patterns in actions. Only afterwards, 
in reflection, is he aware of what has happened. 
• Interventionist tends to confront unilateral control in a unilateral control way, when 
things don’t speed up: he persuades the director, who says he complies (but does 
not really feel personally responsible for the method). This pattern is identical with 
the circular pattern between director and managers. 
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In the end, the interventionist finds his way back by self-disclosure: he is open about 
the effect of the director’s behaviour on him. However, the interventionist is not really 
open about ‘him not being effective this way’. This way, he distances and considers 
the situation to be linear (the director has an effect on the interventionist; however, 
what is the effect of the interventionist’s approach on the director?). 
 
Alternative interventions from a mutual learning model 
As an alternative for unilateral control, the interventionist had some alternatives in 
order to de-block processes (mutual learning). 
• Making inconsistency visible and leaving room for the director to make his own 
choices: ‘what you wish (proactive behaviour, entrepreneurship) is not consistent 
with what you do (stimulating reactive behaviour). You could either leave your 
actions as they are and accept your managers’ behaviour or change your actions 
and contribute to their proactive attitude (valid information). Both options are 
consistent; it is up to you (free choice). This alternative is relatively easy, as the 
interventionist can still distance himself (act as if he is not a part of the system). 
The next alternative is more difficult. 
• Being open about interventionist’s own limited added value in this situation and 
exploring how this could be enlarged. This would require exploring the (circular) 
pattern between director and interventionist: how does the director perceive the 
interventionist’s role and how does this perception affect him? The difficulty is that 
such inquiry requires the interventionist (and director) to feel comfortable. Here 
lies an important explanation of persistent and recurrent ineffective patterns: 
pressure and discomfort activate a unilateral control model, leading to circular 
patterns and defensive strategies. De-blocking these patterns requires a feeling of 
comfort. This case helps the interventionists to experience how difficult the 
assignment is that they give to their clients. 
 
 
Period 3: sessions deeper in organization 
 
When director and managers have established a clear vision and main goals, the 
managers plan sessions with their teams (team leaders) in order to discuss the 
implications for their department. In addition, they prepare the sessions that team 
leaders will have with their teams. After a period, managers have follow-up sessions 
with their team leaders. During these sessions they discuss progress in the teams 
and share experiences on ‘supporting change’. Managers lead these sessions and 
interventionists support them. Support means a pre-session, assistance during the 
session (feedback to manager and team and co-responsibility for a productive 
session) and a feedback session with the manager. The interactions in one 
department are described as illustrations. 
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Start meeting with manager and team leaders 
Before the first session by the manager and his team leaders the interventionists 
have heard some rumours about this team. It is known as a ‘difficult’ team. Some 
illustrative parts of the session are described below. 
 
 
Meeting starts with strong body language. 
Atmosphere is tense. 
 
 
 
Introduction by manager: some slides describe 
goals of session. Atmosphere is still tense, nobody 
responds. 
 
Mgr: Who would like to respond? 
 
TL1: I miss the connection. 
 
Mgr: What do you mean? 
 
TL1: I miss the connection between what the MT 
has developed and what we are doing in our day-
to-day business. There should be 
acknowledgement of what our employees and we 
are already delivering.  
 
 
Mgr: Of course we do acknowledge your effort. But 
we are never good enough, are we. There is 
always room for improvement. 
 
[…] 
 
TL4: The problem is, that we have brought in 
plenty ideas in the past. But the project team has 
done nothing with them. 
 
Mgr: You are right. We have a lot of improvement 
issues. Let us take our responsibility and bring 
them into practice ourselves. 
 
[…] 
 
TL3: I understand that everything has already 
been decided. 
 
Mgr: No, it is just an outline. Just want to share this 
as input for your own thoughts.  
 
Other team leaders confirm TL3. 
 
Int: I don’t understand. You seem to have two 
faces: when you work out things yourself, you act 
constructively and positively. However, as soon as 
mgr presents some outlines and gives some 
direction, you seem to be offended by it. How 
come? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first impression confirms the rumours. In 
effect, the interventionist feels he has to 
support the manager to ‘deal with this difficult 
team’ and activates a unilateral control model.  
 
Introduction is relatively long. It seems that the 
more tense the atmosphere, the more the 
manager talks, etcetera (circular pattern). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This message seems to be a reaction to 
episodic change, initiated by management. 
Episodic changes, combined with a subject-
object perspective, give the impression that 
‘change should be imposed on the organization 
because otherwise nothing will happen’.  
 
Manager, nor interventionist, inquires what TL1 
means. In this way they keep things under 
control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All parties try to persuade the other party of 
one’s position. No mutual inquiry into positions. 
 
 
Interventionist supports manager and takes a 
position against team leaders (partner-in-
business with manager). Although his intention 
is to give feedback and help the process, in 
effect he blames and generalizes. 
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TL5 (a bit offensive): What is your point? 
 
[…]  
 
Int: This has been a difficult session. For all of us. I 
am afraid we are not connected with each other. I 
think you are all quite committed, but some of you 
are also disappointed. I think it is good that you 
share critical notes. This is much better than 
saying ‘yes’ and thinking ‘no’. Before, some of you 
referred to this as ‘political correctness’. However, 
at some moments I feel a firmness that makes it 
difficult to have an open conversation. This 
discouraged me to say what I think and stimulated 
me to be cautious. And it encourages me to stand 
beside the manager and against you. I am not sure 
if that is what you want. At the same time, we all 
have to reflect on the way we have contributed to 
this situation. This applies to the manager and us 
(interventionists) as well. We have to find out what 
the effect is of our approach and our behaviour.  
 
Mgr: Tomorrow we’re meeting again. Let’s 
evaluate then. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This defensive reaction is no surprise. 
 
 
 
Interventionist tries to share valid information 
about the effect of team leaders’ behaviour and 
he addresses circularity. He also says that he 
appreciates them being open and sharing valid 
information (not saying ‘yes’ if one thinks ‘no’). 
However, these words are not consistent with 
the interventionist’s perception and behaviour 
during the session, as he experienced valid 
information as ‘difficult behaviour’ and 
‘resistance’ and activated a unilateral control 
model that – as a self-fulfilling prophecy – 
stimulated ‘difficult behaviour’ and ‘resistance’. 
 
 
 
Feedback session 
After this meeting interventionist and manager have a feedback session. 
 
 
[…] 
 
Int: How did you feel during the session? 
 
Mgr: I felt not happy, more and more tense, 
disappointed about team leaders’ ownership, I was 
let down, I missed contact. Actually I was angry. 
 
Int: What kept you from saying these things? 
 
Mgr: I don’t know; it didn’t occur to me. 
 
Int : There was a distance between you and your 
team: the more tension, the more distance and the 
more focus on procedures. It seems there was a 
circular process: the more distance you took, the 
more critical some became, the more distance you 
took, etcetera.  
We saw a manager, but didn’t see you with your 
feelings and expectations. Do you see what I 
mean?  
 
[…]  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actually, the interventionist had not been able 
to share these kinds of feelings either. Both 
have been stuck in a unilateral control model, 
that instructs them to keep things under control, 
to win, to suppress feelings, to avoid testing 
one’s own assumptions and to judge others. 
Manager and interventionist showed all these 
behaviours during the session. The 
interventionist was a good ‘partner-in-business’. 
 
By giving this feedback, the interventionist 
distances himself from the situation, as if he 
were no part of the process. 
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Communication between manager and team leaders 
The next day the manager has a regular meeting with team leaders. In this session 
the manager is open about what he had felt during the session and why he was 
disappointed. In addition, he clarifies what he expects from his team leaders and he 
inquires what he did that stimulated the team leaders’ behaviour. They agree a 
further session is needed; the manager and a team leader will prepare this session 
together and team leaders are invited to bring in ideas. 
 
The next day the manager sends an email to the team leaders. He is open about his 
expectations and his own contribution to the stagnation. A quote: ‘I’m letting you 
know that I have higher expectations regarding our leadership in this change 
process. Of course I will be very glad to involve my own role. I wonder, for example, if 
you think I take you seriously and if I take enough time to involve you. I look forward 
to your personal and constructive feedback.’ 
 
Second session with manager and team leaders 
In a second session the manager wishes to create more active participation by team 
leaders, more connection and stronger commitment. After all, the improvement 
process aims at stronger entrepreneurship. This requires a feeling of ownership and 
responsibility. Therefore he has invited team leaders to bring in subjects for this 
session. By and large, the team leaders have given their ideas and wishes. They 
emphasize ‘being concrete’, ‘how to involve employees’ and ‘action!’. In a pre-
session with the interventionist the manager summarizes some points of attention 
regarding his role:  
 
 
Mgr:  
- keep contact, stay in touch 
- share valid information  
- beware of circularity: if I feel unpleasant, I have to 
beware of directing more and more. I had better sit 
down and share what I see and feel. 
Will you help me? 
 
Int: I will help you. However, this will not always 
mean that I confirm you. We have seen what 
happened last time. 
 
 
P circular (D) 
P own role (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager is aware of the circular relation 
between his actions and his team leaders’ 
actions. Besides, he is willing to share valid 
information. However, this all could be 
espoused theory. During the meeting, in action, 
he has to put this into practice. 
 
 
Int steps out of his ‘partner-in-business’ role, so 
that he feels free to act independently from the 
manager. He feels more relaxed in this role. 
 
Below, some parts of the second session of manager and team leaders are 
described. 
 
 
Mgr (with a friendly, warm tone of voice): Welcome 
to this session. A second-chance session. In our 
first session we were not in touch. We were 
opposing instead of working together. In the 
meantime several important things have 
happened. We had a good evaluation the next 
day. And many of you have given input for this 
session.  
In the meantime I have learned. I have had 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager is open about his own role and gives 
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intensive contact with A (interventionist) about my 
style. I have learned that I tend to take a distance 
in difficult situations. As a consequence, I lose 
contact, which stimulates you to be offended. I 
really want to keep in touch. 
 
TL1: It is not the change itself. I think most of us do 
want to change. It is the process and the tone of 
voice that bothered me: the management team 
has formulated exactly what we should do  …. 
 
Mgr: .. but these were only outlines … 
 
Int: I know you wish to listen carefully. …. 
 
TL1: We want to be taken seriously. 
 
Mgr: What do you feel needs to be taken 
seriously? 
 
TL1: The way we talk now. In an open discussion.  
 
Mgr: Does anyone else wish to share any issues 
about the past? 
 
TL2: We don’t like to be ‘the difficult team’. That is 
what we hear in this organization.  
 
TL3: What is the idea? Does one want yes-men in 
this organization? That doesn’t feel good. 
 
Mgr: I don’t want yes-men. Let’s be honest, it 
would be easy if you just followed. However, I 
appreciate you being honest about your thoughts 
and feelings. Still, it is not always easy to deal 
with. I expect you to take responsibility as well. 
Can you imagine? 
 
TL3: Yes, I can. 
 
[…] 
 
Manager finishes the session with a brief 
evaluation by asking each individual team leader 
for his/her feeling. All are positive and agree this 
was ‘much better’.  
 
Mgt invites int to share his observations. 
 
Int: I have learned from you. To be honest, in the 
first session I tended to perceive you as a ‘difficult 
team’. I really appreciate if one is open, however 
one can easily label real openness as ‘resistance’. 
I did. In turn, I started helping J (manager) to 
persuade you and took distance. This way I 
stimulated you precisely in your behaviour, didn’t 
I? After all, I did not help J this way. On the 
contrary. Today you have shown how engaged 
you are.  
 
TL: Could you spread this message in the 
P own role (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B proactive (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
B inquiry (D) 
I reflection (D) 
I long-term (D) 
I inquiry (D) 
 
 
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
insight into the circular process. 
 
 
 
 
 
TL1 tells he finds it hard to feel responsible for 
things that are being imposed on him. The 
words he chooses make the manager 
defensive; he tries to control the situation (to 
win?). 
 
 
Interventionist leaves his role of ‘partner-in-
business’ and takes an independent role. The 
manager immediately brings the feedback into 
practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager shares valid information. He is open 
about not wanting yes-men and about yes-men 
being easier to deal with. He is also open about 
his expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist reduces distance by self-
reflection and involving his own role. He also 
shares valid information and addresses circular 
patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TL does not involve their own role, as if ‘the 
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organization? To be honest, we don’t like to be 
labelled as ‘the difficult team’ time after time.  
 
Int: What is the effect of being labelled this way? 
 
TL: We feel unhappy with it. Actually I get angry. It 
de-motivates me when the organization talks this 
way, just because we are not yes-men. 
 
Int: I will talk positively about you. However, if you 
are labelled this way time after time, you should 
think together why one would do that. You might 
be in a vicious circle: you get angry, which leads to 
more negative labels, which make you even 
angrier, etcetera. Try to find out together how you 
could stop this recurrent pattern. 
 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
organization’ perceives them as difficult without 
any reason. 
 
Interventionist tries to make circularity visible 
and stimulates reflection on one’s own 
contribution to the situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection 3 
(narratives 2.8– 2.13) 
 
The sessions with manager and team leaders illustrate the development from a 
unilateral control model that leads to strong tensions towards a mutual learning 
model that leads to learning and dialogue. 
 
How unchecked beliefs lead to self-fulfilling prophecies 
Before the first session the interventionists heard several rumours about this team 
(difficult, critical). Furthermore, the manager is quite tense because he expects some 
resistance. However, what is the effect of this belief? Afterwards, through reflection, 
the effect was ‘we have to manage this process carefully. Otherwise things could 
escalate. In other words: ‘we have to keep things under control’. This way, the 
unchecked ‘negative beliefs’ create a threat, which in turn activates a unilateral 
control model by managers and interventionists: they persuade, distance, blame, 
oppose and make the source of the tension undebatable. As a consequence, team 
leaders distance and oppose as well and tend to respond more and more negatively 
to the manager. This, in turn, is a confirmation for manager and interventionists that 
this is ‘a difficult team with resistance’, which reinforces their unilateral control. This 
way, their beliefs turn out to be self-fulfilling prophecies. Later, in a subsequent 
session, team leaders say that they believe that management do not listen to their 
opinion. This unchecked belief influenced their behaviour during the first session. 
Figure 8.3 illustrates the circular and self-fulfilling character of this pattern. 
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Figure 8.3 Unchecked beliefs become self-fulfilling prophecies 
 
As long as this pattern is not the subject of inquiry, it will go on and the situation will 
grow worse. 
 
Different views perceived as resistance 
The sessions with this team strongly illustrate that different views are being perceived 
as resistance (from a management perspective), which subsequently leads to 
activation of a unilateral control model. The espoused theory is that we would like 
valid information, especially about a fundamental thing like commitment. A leading 
question in mutual learning is ‘are we missing some information?’ However, if this 
valid information is unpleasant and even threatening, this valid information tends to 
activate a unilateral control model, with another leading question: ‘how do we keep 
things under control?’ This case is clear: team leaders are quite explicit about their 
lack of commitment (to the process). This is valid information. However, manager and 
interventionist label this information (different view) as resistance and activate a 
unilateral control model, which further stifles team leaders’ commitment. The difficulty 
in action is to deal with valid information if we perceive this information as 
threatening. It is easier to manage people who say ‘yes’ and think ‘no’, even if a ‘yes’ 
is not valid information.  
 
How to break through the negative circular pattern? 
The atmosphere in the first and last session with this team is very different. The 
manager has contributed directly with some behavioural changes that fit in a mutual 
learning model. 
• Self-disclosure and reflection upon his own role: ‘I have learned that I tend to take 
distance in difficult situations.  
• Making circularity visible: ‘As a consequence, I lose contact, which stimulates you 
to be offended. I really want to keep in touch.’ 
• Inquiry into underlying pattern: ‘What do you feel needs to be taken seriously?’  
• Sharing valid information: ‘I don’t want yes-men. Let’s be honest, it would be easy 
if you just followed. However, I appreciate you being honest about your thoughts 
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and feelings. Still, it is not always easy to deal with. I expect you to take 
responsibility as well. Can you imagine?’ 
 
The consequence of the manager’s approach is that team leaders follow his example 
(e.g. ‘The effect is that we create a distance between our employees and us. They 
might feel that we don’t take them seriously’). This leads to an open dialogue and 
learning. As a consequence, the team leaders take initiatives to prepare sessions 
with their employees autonomously and show (internal) commitment. 
 
From ‘partner-in-business’ to ‘independent professional’ 
Together with the manager, the interventionist has developed his approach from 
unilateral control to mutual learning. In first instance, the interventionist’s reasoning is 
that he should help management to make the process successful. Regardless of his 
knowledge about the risks of unilateral control, in action the interventionist translates 
‘help’ into ‘assisting management to realize an episodic change within a certain time 
frame with as few problems as possible’. Or, in other words, assisting management 
to keep things under control. 
 
The preparation of sessions together with the manager easily activates this ‘partner-
in-business’ model: helping the manager under difficult circumstances easily 
becomes helping to keep things (read ‘individuals’) under control. The greater the 
desire to help the manager, the less help (bypass, persuasion, growing control under 
stress, directing instead of asking). As a consequence, in this case team leaders 
perceive the interventionist as a partner of management and make no difference in 
their response. This, in turn, reinforces the interventionist’s unilateral control. This 
circular pattern is highly identical to the one between manager and team leaders.  
 
An alternative approach, in line with a mutual learning model, would have been to 
inquire into the manager’s beliefs from scratch: 
- why do you expect resistance? 
- what exactly do you mean by resistance? 
- what examples do you have in the past? 
- what exactly happened and how did you act? 
- what is the effect of your belief (they will have resistance’) on your behaviour? 
- what is the effect of that behaviour and are you satisfied with that effect? 
- might they have information that you’re missing? 
- could you explain why they act as they do? 
- how do you contribute to their behaviour? 
- how could you create an open dialogue instead of unilateral control? 
 
The problem is, the interventionist was not able to ‘produce’ these questions in action 
and under pressure. During the process, the interventionist becomes aware of his 
‘partner-in-business’ role and becomes increasingly independent: ‘I will help you. 
However, this will not always mean that I confirm you. We saw what happened last 
time’. The more (emotionally) independent he feels, the more he succeeds to 
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contribute to mutual learning. 
 
Interventions that contribute to (de-blocking) changing, organizing and learning  
The interventionist has contributed to the development from unilateral control model 
towards a mutual learning model. 
• Publicly reflecting on his own contribution/sharing valid information: ‘To be honest, 
in the first session I tended to perceive you as a ‘difficult team’. I really appreciate 
if one is open, however one can easily label real openness as ‘resistance’. I did. 
In turn, I started helping J (manager) to persuade you and took distance. This 
way, I stimulated you precisely in your behaviour, didn’t I?’ 
• Helping the manager to reflect upon his own role: ‘How did you feel during the 
session? What kept you from saying these things? What was the effect of these 
strong feelings?’ 
• Suggesting what to do and what to say in order to change the process: ‘Try to be 
open then about what you really felt as an effect of their behaviour: you felt you 
were let down. Share valid information. Why do you think they acted the way they 
did?’ 
• Helping team leaders to reflect upon their own role: ‘At some moments I feel a 
firmness that makes it difficult to have an open conversation. This discouraged 
me to say what I think and stimulated me to be cautious. And it encourages me to 
stand beside the manager and against you. I am not sure if that is what you want.’ 
• Making circularity visible: ‘You might be in a vicious circle: you get angry, which 
leads to more negative labels, which make you even angrier, etcetera..’ 
• Inquiry into underlying pattern: ‘What is the effect of being labelled this way?’ 
 
 
Period 4: monitoring sessions 
 
In a next stage all teams have monitoring sessions. The main goal of these sessions 
is to discuss progress and to schedule new actions.  
 
Meeting with manager and team leaders 
Illustrative is the meeting with the manager with his team leaders who have been 
described before. This session demonstrates the interventionist’s attempts to make 
defensiveness debatable. Some parts are described below.  
 
 
[…]  
 
Mgr: Today, I would like to explore with you how 
we can keep the energy in the process. Besides, I 
would like to inspire you. 
 
[…] 
 
Mgr shows an instruction movie (Fish!) about 
leading change, followed by a question: What 
struck you while watching this movie? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The belief that the manager is responsible for 
inspiring team leaders, leads to the opposite. 
Team leaders respond dependently and 
reactively (we will wait and see’). 
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TL1: They focus on coaching, which attracts me 
more than steering. 
 
TL2: One really has to believe; it has to be 
genuine. That is not always the case here. Here 
we tend to be politically correct. 
 
[…] 
 
Mgr: Let’s apply the insights to our own situation. 
What is needed to keep the improvement process 
alive? 
 
TL6: We have to repeat our vision time after time. 
 
[…] 
 
TL8 (just a team leader for a week; has been one 
of the employees before): People do not really find 
this process important. 
 
TL1: There is no clear sense-of-urgency. 
 
[…] 
 
Int: It strikes me that you don’t explore two 
remarks that have been made: political 
correctness and ‘people don’t really find the 
improvement process important’. I have heard this 
‘political correctness’ several times. What do you 
mean by it? 
 
Silence … 
 
TL2: Well, it means people just follow and are not 
open about what they really think: here, 
employees, top managers…. 
 
TL4: I don’t like the word. And actually it bothers 
me that this is brought in time after time. 
 
TL5: Let us focus on what we can do ourselves, 
what is within our own circle of influence. 
 
Int: This ‘political correctness’ word seems to hang 
over the process like a dark cloud. Let us inquire 
how we could help the process forward. 
 
TL2: The best way is to ignore it. 
 
Int: But if you say that we don’t say how we really 
think about this improvement process we cannot 
ignore it, can we? 
 
TL2: But the problem is not in this group. It is 
somewhere else …. 
 
Tense silence  
 
TL4: We should neither accept nor ignore, 
however we should be aware of the risk and go on 
 
 
 
 
B valid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Openness about defensiveness. However 
nobody responds. This is in line with Senge 
(1990): “To retain their power, defensive 
routines must remain undiscussable. Teams 
stay stuck in their defensive routines only when 
they pretend that they don’t have any defensive 
routines, that everything is all right, and that 
they can say ‘anything’” (Senge, p. 255). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TL8 shares a threatening message. Nobody 
responds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist tries to make defensiveness 
debatable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Valid information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist tries to stimulate inquiry into 
defensiveness. 
 
 
Several defensive strategies are being 
activated: ignorance/denial strategy. 
 
 
 
 
Distance strategy: it is not here but somewhere 
else. 
 
 
 
This seems to be an ignorance/denial strategy 
in different words. 
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with this process. 
 
Int: This is difficult, isn’t it. Saying that this is not 
really a problem could be a confirmation of the 
problem.  
 
Several managers: We think we just have to go on. 
 
Mgr: This is difficult to grasp. I think we should all 
focus on our own role. And I appreciate if we can 
be open about what we really think. We have 
learned that before. Let’s go back to where we 
were (looks at TL1). 
 
TL1: Well, after all I don’t want them to do it for 
me. I want them to do it because they want it 
themselves. 
 
Many confirm.  
 
Mgr: That is important indeed. We have to make 
them do it by themselves. 
 
Int: Sounds like a difficult assignment: ‘I want you 
to do it because you want it yourself.’ 
 
[…] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What could interventionist do differently, without 
being in a control model of persuading and 
pressing? 
 
 
 
Mgr makes this issue undiscussable …. 
The interventionist feels he is pushing too hard 
and stops trying to make this discussable. Two 
team leaders watch him in a way he translates 
as ‘please don’t go on, as we just don’t want 
her negative remarks about political 
correctness’. He does not check this. The 
question is, how far should the interventionist 
go to make the undiscussable discussable?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feedback of double bind assignment. 
 
 
 
 
Reflection 4 
(narratives 2.14 – 2.15) 
 
A Subject-Object perspective leads to the inconsistency 
The last meeting illustrates how a Subject-Object perspective leads to inconsistency. 
Two examples: 
- ‘I want to inspire you’ 
- ‘We have to make them do it by themselves’ 
 
These examples show how these managers try not to be directive, however still push 
subordinates into a dependent and reactive position because they act from an S-O 
perspective. The belief that the manager is responsible for inspiring team leaders 
easily leads to the opposite. After all, team leaders will wait and see how their 
manager tries to inspire them. This, again, illustrates how an S-O perspective leads 
to a circular pattern of active subjects and passive objects and how the intention to 
inspire and to motivate can stifle inspiration and motivation (see Swieringa & Jansen, 
2005). The second example illustrates the belief that things don’t work if employees 
do not want it and that management is able to ‘make them want it’. The more 
management suggest they can, the more employees will wait and see.  
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Making defensiveness debatable 
The last session illustrates the difficulty to make defensiveness debatable. Or, in 
other words, to make the undiscussable discussable (Noonan, 2007). The process: 
- One team leader addresses defensiveness (‘Here we are politically correct’) at an 
abstract level: where is ‘here’? 
- Others just ignore (ignorance strategy). 
- Interventionist confronts ignorance and repeats team leader’s remark. 
- Others activate several defensive strategies: ignorance (‘The best way is to ignore 
it’), distance (‘But the problem is not in this group. It is somewhere else …’), 
ignorance (‘We should neither accept nor ignore, however we should be aware of the 
risk and go on with this process’) and ignorance again (‘This is difficult to grasp. Let’s 
go back to where we were’). 
 
The question for the interventionist is where to stop. He stops confronting the 
defensiveness as he beliefs he is pushing too hard which reflects a unilateral control 
model (‘You have to discuss the undiscussable’). Besides, he takes some team 
leaders’ body language as an appeal to stop. At that moment, the interventionist 
wonders what it would do if he shared this dilemma. In the end he doesn’t, as he 
assumes this would be experienced as pressure and would have unintended effects. 
 
 
Period 5: later developments 
 
Some months later some evaluation sessions are planned. Generally, people are 
satisfied about the improvement initiatives that are being taken. All teams have had a 
number of sessions in order to select improvement issues and initiate concrete 
actions. In a customer satisfaction survey, customers evaluate service higher than 
one year before. 
 
Generally, managers say that management on all levels should steer the process to 
keep things going: ask for concrete results that customers really take advantage of. 
Keep showing commitment and keep discussing results. Accept no freedom of 
obligations. However, several managers and team leaders bring in that they have to 
work very hard to keep the process going on. Illustrative are minutes of meetings of 
some management reflection sessions, aiming at sharing experiences in the 
development process, reflecting and learning. The reported leading question in these 
sessions is: ‘how can we get our employees in the right mode and how can we 
explain why this process is so laborious?’  
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8.4 Analysis of moving moments 2 
 
In this section the findings of case 2 are summarized and interpreted. Preceding the 
analyses, which follows the structure of the research questions, the point of departure 
and results of this case are summarized. 
 
 
Point of departure and results 
 
The case starts with management’s desire to develop from ‘a product seller to a 
service supplier’, which requires the development of an entrepreneurial and 
customer-oriented culture and working methods.  
 
In this case, the ‘assignment’ is to support a process that aims at concrete initiatives 
in order to improve customer processes and the development of an entrepreneurial 
and pro-active culture. This is a combination of a relatively linear and a dynamically 
complex aim. The linear part has been successfully managed with a unilateral control 
model in the upper cycle of Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure. The dynamically 
complex part (entrepreneurship, pro-activity), however, cannot be managed this way. 
 
As to the results, this case has two faces. The main focus of the managers and 
interventionist has been on the quality of the processes and service. This aim seems 
to be realized, illustrated by the higher customer satisfaction ratings. Regarding the 
long-term aim to create more pro-activity and entrepreneurship, the results are not 
that evident. If managers realize their goals with unilateral control there seems to be 
little reason or urgency to develop alternatives. As a consequence, most attention 
regarding learning and changing has been paid to managers who faced problems in 
interaction with their teams and did not realize their goals. As a result, these 
managers have learned most of all. They have illustrated that they are able and 
prepared to develop towards mutual learning in situations they cannot manage with 
unilateral control. And they have contributed most of all to the development of 
entrepreneurship and pro-activity.  
 
Research question 1:  
To what extent are the expressions of unilateral control visible in interactions?  
 
In this case numerous observations have been made regarding Perceiving 
(reductionism, distancing, blaming, linear perception and S-O relations), Behaving 
(controlling circumstances, repeated behaviour, stronger control in case of threat and 
reactive behaviour) and Intervening (focus on symptoms, cover-up of underlying 
patterns, quick wins and focus on impersonal instruments)14. The ‘diagnostic model’ 
helps to recognize situations that are influenced by unilateral control. 
 
                                                
14 For numbers of observations, see appendix 4 ‘Cross-case analysis’. 
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In the encoding of transcripts, there are only few illustrations of Design of 
organization (positional organization, variety reduction, S-O relations and 
organization/change as separated entities). Regarding Change of organization (goal-
oriented and planned process, step-by-step, episodic and top-down, rational), this 
case illustrates a change process that rests heavily upon an episodic and top-down 
perspective. Illustrative is the program manager, who shows his enthusiasm about 
the change approach by saying that he likes this way of ‘boosting the new culture into 
the organization’. The more management communicates this way, the less pro-active 
employees will be. This will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section 
(research question 2). 
 
Research question 2 
How does unilateral control relate to (de-)blocking of changing, organizing and 
learning? 
 
This research question aims at gaining insight into the ‘black box’ between unilateral 
control and changing, organizing and learning. Research question 2 has been 
specified into four questions. The findings are summarized under these specific 
questions. 
 
How do expressions of unilateral control contribute to recurrent problems? 
The improvement of customer processes in this case has led to some successes: in 
about one year all teams have developed improvement issues and have put several 
actions into practice. Customer ratings have been improved and customers give 
positive feedback about the developments. All in all this process is generally 
perceived as successful.  
 
A closer look uncovers different successes regarding short-term aims on the one 
hand and long-term aims on the other hand. The improvement of customer 
processes typically has a single-loop character and fits the upper circle in Senge’s 
‘shifting the burden’ structure: quicker responses to customers, better telephone 
management, more personal contact with customers, better complaint management. 
These issues have a linear character: the problems can be reduced with obvious 
solutions. These improvements are important for customers and, thus, important for 
the company. This case illustrates that unilateral control is effective for linear 
problems and contributes to visible improvements. 
 
However, the aim of the process was not only to realize quick wins, but also to 
stimulate entrepreneurship and ownership in the longer run. Unlike the linear 
problems as described before, this aim cannot be realized by managers’ and 
interventionists’ unilateral control perception, behaviour and interventions. This case 
offers several illustrations of blocked changing, organizing and learning regarding this 
aim. 
From the ‘start’, this case reflects a strong Subject-Object perspective, considering 
the leader and interventionists as active agents that impose an episodic change upon 
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passive and reactive employees. This tends to work out as a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
At the end of the case description managers discuss the question ‘how do we get our 
employees in the right mode and how can we explain why this process is so 
laborious?’ This question still strongly reflects a Subject-Object perspective and 
uncovers some assumptions: 
- ‘Management are able to get employees in the right mode.’ 
- ‘If management do not succeed in interaction with their employees they should not 
discuss this openly with employees, though they should think up new strategies 
alone or with peers.’ 
Both assumptions do not stimulate employees to be active and to take co-
responsibility for the recurrent problems. On the contrary, they keep managers and 
employees from (mutual) learning. This way, a Subject-Object perspective preserves 
the current reality: management initiate and employees follow. This is exactly the 
opposite of what one aims to realize.  
 
Taking Senge’s ‘shifting the burden system’ as a starting point, unilateral control 
consistently activates actions and initiatives in the upper circle: quick problem 
solving, persuasion and instrumental solutions. This appears to be helpful to short 
term and linear solutions, e.g. quicker responses to customers and better telephone 
management. Unlike these relatively simple situations, the long-term aims like 
improvement of entrepreneurship and pro-activity cannot be realized in the upper 
circle. Here, the limits of unilateral control become visible: activation of defensive 
strategies that block the lower circle in Senge’s ‘shift the burden’ structure and 
activation of circular patterns. Figure 8.4 summarizes these findings. 
Figure 8.4 Unilateral control stimulates symptomatic solutions and blocks fundamental 
  solutions 
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What circular patterns are visible? 
This case illustrates that many circular patterns start with the way one thinks and 
perceives. If leaders hold a Subject-Object perspective of relations, they tend to 
impose changes upon employees. This is problematic, if the very aim of the change 
is to stimulate pro-activity and entrepreneurship. After all, a Subject-Object 
perspective is only effective if employees accept the changes as imposed and follow 
the leader (be reactive and dependent).   
If team members do not automatically follow and hold different views, leaders (and 
their consultants) tend to label this as resistance. In turn, they tend to enlarge control 
in order to ‘save the situation’. This, in turn, stimulates employees to develop 
negative feelings that management perceive as resistance again. As long as one 
holds a unilateral control model and does not reflect upon one’s own contribution to 
the problems, these patterns keep repeating themselves.   
 
Typical circular patterns that are illustrated in this case are described below.  
 
Manager initiates change process, employees (act as if they) follow 
The more managers consider themselves as being capable of and responsible for 
imposing changes upon employees, the more they push employees into a following 
(dependent, reactive) position, the more managers are confirmed in their belief they 
should impose changes, etcetera. 
 
Manager expects resistance and braces himself, employees respond negatively and oppose 
The more managers expect employees will show resistance, the more they tend to 
brace themselves and persuade, the more employees respond negatively and 
develop resistance, the more managers brace themselves, etcetera. 
 
Manager talks; employees listen 
The more managers talk (about ‘the change approach’, their opinion, the need for 
change), the more employees (act as if they) listen, the more managers direct, 
etcetera.  
 
Manager active; employees reactive 
The more initiative managers take (executing change actions, organizing meetings, 
chairing meetings, stressing the need for change), the more reactively and 
dependently employees behave (‘apparently he feels responsible …’, ‘let’s wait and 
see …’), etcetera.  
 
Manager tries to motivate and inspire employees; employees feel lack of motivation and 
inspiration 
The more managers try to motivate and inspire their employees, the less employees 
feel responsible for their own motivation and the more they feel dependent on the 
manager’s ability to motivate and inspire, the more managers need to motivate and 
inspire, etcetera.  
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Manager pushes to speed up progress; employees are passive and wait for their turn 
The more managers increase pressure to speed up progress, the less employees 
feel responsible and the more they become reactive, the more managers increase 
pressure to speed up, etcetera. 
 
Manager instructs; employees wait for next instruction 
The more managers instruct, the more employees wait for the next instruction, the 
more managers instruct, etcetera.  
 
Manager feels uncomfortable and takes distance; employees feel uncomfortable and take 
distance 
The more uncomfortable managers feel, the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable employees feel and the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable managers feel, etcetera. 
 
What defensive routines are visible? 
Defensive strategies are considered to be behaviour and actions that block the lower 
circle of Senge’s ‘shift the burden’ and thus block fundamental solutions. Defensive 
strategies aim at making sensitive issues undiscussable. Or, in Argyris’ terms, 
defensive strategies cover sensitive issues up and undermine changing, organizing 
and learning. 
 
This case illustrates how defensive strategies make it possible to invest much energy 
in a change process, realize short-term improvements but stifle long-term 
fundamental changing, while making this undiscussable and avoiding painful 
situations: ‘as long we don’t discuss that we are not effective, we don’t have a 
problem’. How does this work? Managers (and their consultants) start with a Subject-
Object perspective and initiate a process that has to contribute to employees being 
more entrepreneurial and pro-active. Many employees say they comply with this 
change process and bring in ideas. Later, managers complain that although 
employees bring in ideas, they don’t show real commitment to put them into practice. 
This might uncover a compliance strategy: employees have said ‘yes’ even if they 
were not really internally committed. A couple of times this strategy was referred to 
with the word ‘political correctness’ (‘one just doesn’t say what one really thinks’). A 
unilateral control model does not instruct managers to make this discussable. On the 
contrary, it instructs managers to ‘withdraw’ and think up a new strategy ‘how to get 
employees in the right mode’ alone or together with peers (in their management team 
or supervision lunches). This way, managers and employees block learning.  
 
This situation resembles a case described by Argyris (1990), who argues that the 
most important question that the (top) manager should ask, though seldom is asked: 
“what is it that I do or the company does that makes it necessary for me to take the 
initiative to identify their barriers, and to design a workshop to reduce them, when 
you knew the barriers, and you knew how to reduce them?” (p. 126-127). One could 
conclude that something – read: defensive strategies – prevents them from doing this 
by themselves. And it is exactly these defensive strategies that are not openly 
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discussed. This way, things can be improved in the short run, though in the longer 
run the same problems will probably recur. When the interventionist asked some 
managers in the case ‘why was it necessary to design this improvement process 
while you already knew the improvement issues?’, their reaction was: ‘well, when we 
ask this question, we don’t come any further, do we? We have realized quite some 
improvements, haven’t we?’ At that moment, the interventionist accepted that this 
was difficult to discuss, made a trade-off, and did not bring it up again. By reflection, 
he could have shared this trade-off openly and helped the manager to make a free 
but conscious choice. 
 
This case illustrates several defensive strategies: 
• Compliance strategy: in case of threat, say that you comply (regardless of 
whether you really do); in this case, one refers to this strategy as being ‘politically 
correct’. 
• Ignorance strategy: ignore information that is difficult to deal with.  
• Distance strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, change the subject to 
other parties or general observations (employees, middle management, ‘the 
organization’). 
• Blame strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, blame others. 
• Assume strategy: keep sensitive assumptions about others privately. 
• Shirk strategy: shift the responsibility to an ‘outsider’ and avoid sharing your own 
opinion about the process or colleagues. 
• Withdraw strategy: in case of difficulties in the communication between manager 
and employee, withdraw and think up new strategies unilaterally. 
 
All strategies help to make sensitive issues that could lead to embarrassment or 
threat undiscussable. 
 
How do leaders de-block changing, organizing and learning? 
Although unilateral control leads to much defensiveness and circularity in this case, 
there are several situations that illustrate changing and learning. In reference to the 
diagnostic model, some typical examples of leadership perception and behaviour are 
visible in this case: perception and sharing of circularity, mutual influences, dynamical 
patterns and the way one contributes to the problems. Regarding leadership 
behaviour, the case illustrates moments of inquiry into and public reflection upon the 
circular situation including one’s own role.  
 
One manager in particular illustrates the effects of a strong behavioural change from 
unilateral control to mutual learning:   
• Reflection and experimentation: the director responds to feedback of circularity 
and says ‘Yes, I see I may contribute to their behaviour.’ In the next session he 
shows different behaviour and tries not to stimulate the circular pattern anymore. 
• Self-disclosure and public reflection upon the way he contributes to lack of 
learning: ‘I have learned that I tend to take distance in difficult situations.’ 
• Making circularity visible: ‘As a consequence, I lose contact, which stimulates you 
to be offended. I really want to keep in touch.’ 
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• Being proactive: ‘I wonder, for example, if you think I take you seriously and if I 
take enough time to involve you. I really want to hear your personal and 
constructive feedback in a next session.’ 
• Inquiry into underlying pattern: ‘What do you need to feel taken seriously?’  
• Sharing valid information: ‘I don’t want yes-men. Let’s be honest, it would be easy 
if you just followed. However, I appreciate you being honest about your thoughts 
and feelings. Still, it is not always easy to deal with. I expect you to take 
responsibility as well. Can you imagine?’ 
 
The consequence of the manager’s approach is that team leaders follow his 
example, which leads to the development from opposing to an open dialogue and 
from stagnation to learning. As a consequence, the team leaders show (internal) 
commitment and take responsibility for the improvement process.  
 
 
Research question 3 
How do interventions contribute to (de-)blocking changing, organizing and learning? 
 
The aim of this research question is to develop an intervention perspective that 
contributes to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning. 
 
By organizing sessions, offering methods and supporting managers, the 
interventionists in this case contribute directly to the development and execution of 
improvement initiatives, which lead to higher customer satisfaction rates. This relates 
to the (dynamically) simple part of this change process. This study, however, focuses 
on the dynamically complex part: developing employees’ entrepreneurship and pro-
activity in the longer run and contributing to (continuous) changing and learning. The 
dynamically complex part cannot be managed by unilateral control and requires 
attention to circular patterns, defensiveness and interactions that contribute to 
(mutual) learning.  
 
This case illustrates how the interventionist develops from a management serving 
(partner-in-business) role, with much unilateral control, to a professional independent 
consulting role (Drukker and Verhaaren, 2002), with a stronger contribution to 
(mutual) learning.  
During the first part of this case the interventionist’s perception, behaviour and 
interventions are strongly governed by a unilateral control model. How can this be 
explained, while he knows the limits? There are several elements (in the 
interventionist’s perception) that create pressure, which in turn activates a unilateral 
control model: 
• It is a major opportunity that has to succeed. 
Reasoning: this is a new client and the business unit of a large company. This 
project has to be successful in the eyes of the client, as this might lead to new 
opportunities.  
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• The relationship with the client is not easy. 
Reasoning: it is difficult to get contact with the client. This does not feel 
comfortable and we should try to get in touch with him in order to work together. 
• The client is critical.  
Reasoning: the client seems to perceive us as ‘suppliers’. He takes distance and 
stresses regularly that he wants ‘professionalism’. We have to please the client 
and deliver ‘professionalism’, which means we have to organize things very well, 
we should contribute to quick visible results and should keep things under control.   
 
Partner-in-business 
Under these circumstances of pressure and possible embarrassment, the 
interventionist activates a unilateral control model that, in turn, has some 
consequences for his role. The interventionist reasons that he should help 
management to make the process successful. Regardless of his knowledge about 
the risks of unilateral control, in action the interventionist translates ‘help’ into 
‘assisting management to realize an episodic change within a certain time frame with 
as few problems as possible’. Or, in other words, assisting management to keep 
things under control. Preparing sessions together with the manager easily activates 
this ‘partner-in-business’ model.15 
The interventionist’s unilateral control is expressed in different ways in this case. 
• Confirming the director who says that he desires professionalism, without 
inquiring into what he exactly means by that and what makes him say that. 
• Confirming the manager who expects resistance and helping him to think up 
strategies to break through this resistance. Thus he labels employees with 
different views as ‘difficult people’ who have resistance. This preconception leads 
to pressure and discomfort, which in turn activates a unilateral control model 
(distance, blaming, linear thinking). In effect, resistance grows and the unchecked 
assumption turns out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
• Supporting the manager in taking his view (on the change approach, the sense-
of-urgency and the difficult team) as true and stifling inquiry into this view and 
exploring different views. As a consequence, reducing listening and increasing 
directing and persuading. 
• Proving one’s added value through (immediate) answers, analysis and solutions.  
 
While activating a unilateral control model, the interventionist’s sensitivity to 
ineffective patterns diminishes. As he is so strongly involved in the ‘control game’, he 
recognizes unproductive patterns only afterwards, in reflection. This way, a typical 
dilemma becomes visible again between being involved or being neutral and at a 
distance. Here, a relation with the client seems to help the interventionist to get 
comfortable and take a neutral position towards the patterns and contents.  
 
 
 
                                                
15 Compare Argyris’ description of Help and Support from a Model I perspective: “[…] if possible, agree with 
them that the others acted improperly” (2004, p. 398). 
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From management serving to independent advising 
After some weeks, the interventionist finds his way back by self-disclosure: he is 
open about the effect of the director’s behaviour on him. The director appreciates this 
feedback, which, in turn, makes the relationship stronger. This is the start for the 
interventionist to develop from management serving to independent consulting 
(Drukker and Verhaaren, 2002). From this moment his added value to learning and 
changing grows.  
 
This case illustrates some elements of an intervention perspective that seems to 
support changing, organizing and learning. 
 
Openly share what one fears to share regarding the effect of the leader’s actions  
This case illustrates that the director’s behavioural shift was greatly influenced by the 
interventionist’s self-disclosure: ‘Let me present this from my personal perspective. In 
my experience you can be very unpredictable: from one moment to another you can 
be very dissatisfied about things, which you communicate verbally or nonverbally 
(interventionist gives some examples). […] It becomes important if your behaviour 
has the same effect on your managers. Might they be cautious because they cannot 
predict your reaction? 
This intervention, including the effect of the director’s behaviour on the interventionist 
and inquiry into the circular relation of managers’ behaviour, appears to contribute 
strongly to the director’s learning process. He shows different behaviour in the next 
management team sessions.  
 
Share valid information about one’s own role and the role of other people  
The interventionist creates a learning atmosphere by public reflection on his own 
contribution to difficulties. For example, in one of the sessions: ‘To be honest, in the 
first session I tended to perceive you as a ‘difficult team’. I really appreciate if one is 
open, however one can easily label real openness as ‘resistance’. I did. In turn, I 
started helping J (manager) to persuade you and took distance. This stimulated you 
precisely in your behaviour, didn’t it?’ 
In this team, the interventionist also shares the effect of the team leaders’ behaviour, 
in order to support learning: ‘At some moments I feel a firmness that makes it difficult 
to have an open conversation. This discouraged me to say what I think and 
stimulated me to be cautious. And it encouraged me to stand beside the manager 
and against you. I am not sure if that is what you want.’ 
 
Invite to share valid information 
In order to stimulate learning, the interventionist stimulates individuals to share valid 
information. For example, when one manager says he complies with the group norm 
(unlike what he seems to think), the interventionist inquires into what happens. The 
manager responds. 
Manager: ‘It does not feel pleasant; I feel I have to defend myself.’  
Interventionist: ‘But it works, right? After all, you say that you comply. Does it feel this 
way?’ 
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Manager: ‘Well, actually I believe my way also works. But I see I need to change my 
belief.’ 
Interventionist (to all): ‘Is that what you want?’ 
Another manager: ‘ No, I think you are right. We should not try to convince him, but I 
think we have to take time to find out how we wish to contribute to the change 
process.’ 
The interventionist invites the manager to share valid information and leaves room for 
free choice to the other managers. In the end, other managers agree that persuasion 
is not effective in this change process.  
 
Confront inconsistency neutrally 
By confronting inconsistency between espoused theory and theory-in-use neutrally, 
the interventionist leaves room for free choice and commitment to this choice. For 
example, in relation to the director: ‘What you wish (proactive behaviour, 
entrepreneurship) is not consistent with what you do (stimulating reactive behaviour). 
You could either leave your actions as they are and accept your managers’ 
behaviour or change your actions and contribute to their proactive attitude (valid 
information). Both options are consistent; it is up to you (free choice).’  
 
Stimulate inquiry into unchecked beliefs 
Instead of accepting a manager’s beliefs, the interventionist stimulates inquiry into 
these beliefs and their influence on the manager’s actions. For example, the 
manager in this case expected his team to show resistance. The interventionist might 
ask him questions like  
- why do you expect resistance? 
- what exactly do you mean by resistance? 
- what examples do you have in the past? 
- what exactly happened and how did you act? 
- what is the effect of your belief (‘they will have resistance’) on your behaviour? 
- what is the effect of that behaviour and are you satisfied with that effect? 
- might they have information that you are missing? 
- could you explain why they act as they do? 
- how do you contribute to their behaviour? 
- how could you create an open dialogue instead of unilateral control? 
With these questions the interventionist helps the manager to get insight into the 
effect of his beliefs, circularity and his own contribution to the problem. Subsequently, 
he has a free choice as to what extent he is satisfied with these effects. This way, he 
makes a picture that includes himself. 
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Share circularity and help managers/employees to reflect upon their contribution to the 
problem 
By sharing observations regarding circularity and asking questions about the way 
one perceives one’s own role in the circular patterns, the interventionist supports 
learning and changing. An illustration: 
Team leaders: ‘To be honest, we don’t like to be labelled as ‘the difficult team’ time 
after time.‘ 
Interventionist: ‘What is the effect of being labelled this way?’ 
Another team leader: ‘We feel unhappy with it. Actually I get angry. It de-motivates 
me when the organization talks this way, just because we are not yes-men.’ 
Interventionist: ‘If you are labelled this way time after time, you should think together 
why people would do that. You might be in a vicious circle: you get angry, which 
leads to more negative labels, which make you even angrier, etcetera. Try to find out 
together how you could stop this recurrent pattern.’ 
 
Make defensive strategies debatable (make the undiscussable discussable) 
Two times in this case someone addresses defensiveness (‘Here we are politically 
correct and do not really say what we think’). The first time, the interventionist does 
not address it. The second time he does, however, he is strongly confronted with 
other defensive strategies that make it impossible to inquire into the defensiveness. 
After some attempts, the interventionist stops trying as he feels he is starting to push 
which reflects a unilateral control model (‘You have to discuss the undiscussable’).  
 
The question for the interventionist is where to stop. In the end, he decides that he 
has shared valid information and has left room for free choice and he hopes that, just 
as in case 1, the effect will be visible in the longer run. While the episodic change 
project is finished and customer satisfaction rates are improved, changing and 
learning seem still be blocked. Knowing that continuous changing and learning is 
never finished, the interventionist decides to share these insights with his client at a 
later evaluation moment. 
 
Reduce (time) pressure  
In this case, the interventionist discusses with the manager how he could create 
circumstances that reduce pressure for him, in order to make it less difficult to 
develop alternatives for unilateral control. 
 
 176 
 P = Perception  B = Behaviour  I = Intervention O = Design of organization  C = Change of organization 
177 
9. Moving moments 3 
 
 
 
9.1 Type of organization 
 
This organization is one of the divisions of a large educational institute. Each division, 
including this one, offers education in a certain field of attention. Staff consists of 
approximately 75 well-educated professionals.  
 
 
9.2 Context of the change process 
 
Recently, the Board of this institute gave a consultancy the assignment to assess all 
divisions on quality of education, work processes and atmosphere. Some divisions 
did not pass the exam. Subsequently, the directors of these divisions got the 
assignment to improve things in order to meet the norms. If they did not succeed, the 
Board would intervene. 
 
The director of one of the divisions, who had been one of the teachers, was given a 
specific assignment, as stated by the Board: ‘try to make the institute more 
businesslike, entrepreneurial and result-oriented and introduce more innovative 
teaching methods. In addition, create a more positive culture, as there are rumours 
about a negative atmosphere within the institute.’ 
 
As management experience difficulties with changing, they invite a management 
consultant (interventionist) in order to support them in this process. The consultant 
has no relations with the firm that conducted the organization assessment. 
 
 
9.3 Moving moments 
 
Period 1: start-up 
 
Intake with director 
The director of the division invites the interventionist for a first session. This session 
is used to become acquainted and to explore the current reality as well as his 
expectations of the interventionist. Below, some characteristic phrases are quoted.  
 
 
Dir: Recently, the Board gave me an assignment: 
‘try to make the institute more businesslike and 
result-oriented’. Well, in the meantime I know the 
consequences of that. 
 
Int: What do you mean by that? 
 
Employees complain, the organization consists of 
many islands, the grapevine is active, employees 
have a ‘we-they’ attitude towards management. 
 
 
P subject-object 
C top-down 
C rational 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
 
 
 
The assignment, as formulated here, reflects 
the assumption that the director can ‘make’ or 
‘produce’ another organization and act upon a 
passive and reactive system of persons. 
 
 
 
Director focuses on the role employees play 
and seems to overlook the fact that their 
behaviour might be a consequence of a S-O 
relationship. 
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[…] 
 
We have taken a lot of initiatives […]. We have 
formulated a clear mission for the organization. 
 
Int: So what is missing? 
 
Dir: Well, this organization behaves like a family. 
Although there are differences, many employees 
act dependent on and –at the same time - aversive 
to management. They say: ‘you give too little 
room’. Well, we are quite willing to take some 
distance, as long as they take their responsibility. 
 
Int: Sounds to me that you are waiting for each 
other. Might it be possible that you stifle their 
personal sense of responsibility just by giving little 
room? 
 
Dir: This might be possible. Still, we also tried the 
opposite just by letting go. However, they did not 
take their responsibility either. They seem to have 
an anti-management attitude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intervention: feedback of circular pattern.  
 
Reflection: it is not clear how they have tried 
the opposite. Assumption: one cannot break 
through a circular pattern by one action, as ‘the 
other party’ is used to the pattern they don’t 
like. One should be open about the new 
strategy and take into account some delay. 
Otherwise one still acts from an S-O 
perspective. 
 
 
First session with the division management team 
Director and interventionist agree upon a session with the management team of the 
division (MT), in order to explore visions of the current reality. The MT consists of the 
director and three department managers. During this session they share their 
opinions about the current situation. Some quotes are presented below. 
 
 
W: They are quite committed to the content of their 
jobs. However, it is quite difficult to talk about the 
way we communicate and work together. People 
are afraid of change.  
 
I have tried to solve some concrete problems. 
However, this seems to be not satisfying for them. 
Management seems to be always distrusted in this 
division, regardless of what they do.   
 
Dir: Yes, we really have tried to respond to their 
needs. They ask for clear procedures, we give 
them. And in the end they reject them. 
 
Typical quotes of employees are ‘we are not being 
heard’ and ‘management do almost nothing with 
our ideas’.  
 
Int: It seems they feel quite dependent on 
management. What do you think? 
 
All: Yes, they do. 
 
Int: Could there possibly be a circular pattern: the 
more active managers are, the more reactive and 
dependent employees become and vice versa? 
 
All (while making notes): Yes. 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P reduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The difficulty to talk about the way we 
communicate seems to reflect on this manager 
as well. And on the interventionist, who does 
not test this belief publicly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reduction to procedures and neglect of the 
underlying pattern; why do they ask for 
procedures? 
 
Just like management seems to hold an S-O 
perspective on relations, employees hold an  
O-S perspective: they behave like objects who 
are acted upon by management. Consequently, 
they might judge the way management acts 
critically. 
 
 
 
The reasoning behind this intervention is that 
feedback of circularity facilitates learning about 
the way one contributes to the problems one 
faces. 
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Dir: we have to break through this paradox. There 
is a large distance between employees and 
management. Many things have happened and 
many things have to be done. 
 
Interventionist summarizes and shares a first 
analysis: 
• Many people in this organization feel insecure 
about the future. As a consequence, all look for 
something to hold on to. 
• Managers do this by enlarging control and taking 
initiative. This, in turn, stimulates employees to 
act dependently and reactively. In this way, you 
paralyse each other and yourselves.  
• Typical expressions are quotes such as ‘we are 
not being heard’ and ‘management should prove 
their added value’. What is a logical response 
from management? 
 
Mgrs (after a short silence): Working harder. But 
that isn’t smart, is it? 
 
Int: Why not? 
 
Mgrs: It would be more of the same. 
 
Int: You indeed would probably confirm the circular 
pattern. As the situation is quite threatening, 
employees and managers take distance. These 
behaviours relate circularly: the more distance you 
take, the more threatening the situation for 
employees and the more distance they take, the 
more threatening the situation for you, the more .. 
etcetera. 
 
P circular (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist assumes that sharing his 
analysis contributes to learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These sessions lead to a first reflection. 
 
Reflection 1 
 
Circular patterns maintain the current reality 
The recurrent problems, despite several initiatives, seem to disclose a dynamically 
complex situation. People in this organization, managers as well as employees, 
seem to feel insecure about the future. As a consequence, all might look for 
something to hold on to (these assumptions have to be tested). 
Response of MT: enlarge control and take initiative. By acting this way, they stimulate 
employees to act dependently and reactively. In turn, managers become even more 
active. This way, a circular pattern is created. 
Figure 9.1 Circular relation between active manager and reactive employee 
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• In their analysis of the situation, managers tend to distance themselves, point to 
employees and reason from a linear perspective. For example, the director says 
that ‘employees have a ‘we-they’ attitude towards management’ and tends to 
overlook his own Subject-Object definition of the relation between management 
and employees: ‘we have taken quite some initiatives, but employees are 
aversive to management’. Apparently, a Subject-Object definition by management 
has a circular relation with an Object-Subject definition by employees. 
• In this situation, employees say that they are not being heard and managers 
should prove their added value. However, working harder and being more active 
in order to meet this expectation would probably activate the circular pattern.  
• This situation is probably threatening for management as well as employees, and 
people take distance. Distance will grow as an effect of circularity (the more 
distance from managers, the more distance from employees, etcetera). 
• Employees ask for procedures and instruments, probably in their desire for 
something to hold on to (this assumption has to be tested). Managers tend to 
respond by developing these procedures and are confronted with employees who 
are ‘still not satisfied’. A possible explanation is that employees translate their real 
needs into instrumental solutions. By responding directly, managers do not 
inquire into underlying needs. This way, instrumental solutions become a bypass.  
• Although managers tend to focus on the employees’ role, they respond open to 
feedback about circularity and act receptively if confronted with their own role (‘we 
have to break through this paradox’). 
 
 
This reflection as described above is more elaborative than the analysis that is 
shared with the management team. Some distance from the situation helps to 
recognize the patterns. The challenge is to recognize these patterns ‘in action’. 
 
Feedback of circularity 
In this stage, the interventionist’s actions focus on feedback of circularity. The 
underlying reasoning is that this feedback helps managers to see how they contribute 
to the problems they face. The interventionist assumes that insight into one’s own 
role is a first step in order to facilitate learning. This is in line with Argyris (1990, p. 
95).  
 
 
Period 2: further inquiry into situation 
 
Session with the division management team 
This session aims at elaborating on management’s role in confirming the current and 
undesired situation. The director and three managers attend this meeting.  
 
 
[…] 
 
A: Teachers have quite some problems in this 
division. I think it is my duty to solve problems for 
them.  
 
Int: There is nothing wrong with that. On the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int confronts effects of his behaviour neutrally. 
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contrary … However, if I understand you correctly, 
this leads to reinforcement of a reactive attitude 
that you do not like…. 
 
A: Yes. 
 
Int: What would happen if you were open about 
your assumptions? For example: ‘Dear employee, 
I would love to solve the problem for you. 
However, I am afraid that will stifle your pro-activity 
and you will become dependent on me. That, I do 
not want. I think it is more effective if you try to 
solve this problem yourself. What do you think?’ 
 
Dir: This sounds good and would lead to learning. 
However, this requires a certain level of reflection 
that not all employees possess.  
 
Int: By assuming this, you confirm the situation as 
it is, don’t you? Would you be prepared to take a 
risk by trying? 
 
Dir: Yes, but I still believe they find this very 
difficult to deal with.  
 
Int: I understand. I suppose this is difficult for all of 
us. 
 
 
 
 
[….]  
 
Int: Shall I share some ideas about a possible 
approach? 
 
All confirm. 
 
Int: I would not suggest designing a formal plan 
including phases and steps. Nor would I suggest 
organizing special meetings. Rather, I prefer an 
open approach that is characterized by learning. I 
suggest I join several meetings in the organization, 
management team meetings as well as education 
teams with their team leads. In these meetings I 
will help to make patterns regarding leadership, 
cooperation and changing debatable. Besides, I 
give feedback to managers afterwards. After all, 
you seem to be caught in strong mutual beliefs 
and circular patterns that are not open to 
discussion yet. 
 
All respond positively and agree to work this out 
later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P s-o 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int illustrates how to be open about one’s 
dilemma. This way, he tries to make an 
alternative (mutual learning) model actionable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compare Isaacs (1999), who describes how 
one tends to attribute to others that they would 
not be interested, able or open to tackling the 
‘real’ difficulties and so do not raise them. 
 
 
 
Int tries to put it into a broader perspective. 
Actually, he wants to persuade the director and 
is not aware of this; he holds a unilateral control 
theory-in-use. He is not open about his own 
assumption that the director’s beliefs seem to 
be persistent and that he should be open about 
these beliefs. Thus, he acts exactly the same 
as the director. 
 
 
 
 
 
Giving feedback to managers afterwards 
reflects the assumption that personal feedback 
is threatening and should be shared privately. 
This way, the interventionist confirms a culture 
that does not allow being open about one’s 
effectiveness and blocks learning (unilateral 
control). 
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Reflection 2 
 
Blocking strategies and beliefs 
The last meeting with the management team uncovers some blocking strategies and 
beliefs. 
• Some strategies stimulate a reactive and dependent attitude and lead to 
circularity: 
- taking care of employees and, thus, solving problems for them 
- in case of threat, taking decisions for employees 
• Changing is complicated by some strong beliefs that managers have about 
employees 
- ‘dialogue presumes the ability to reflect, which some lack’ 
- ‘employees find management a priori not okay’ 
- ‘giving room to work autonomously presumes trust, while it is betrayed by some’  
• These beliefs block changing and learning as long as they are not tested openly.  
 
Confrontation and self-censoring by the interventionist 
• The interventions focus on confronting managers’ beliefs and how they contribute 
to circular processes and self-fulfilling prophecies. This might have a delayed 
effect that should be checked later in the process.  
• Furthermore, the interventionist tries to make an alternative (mutual learning) 
model actionable (compare Argyris, 1990, p. 87) by literally phrasing the words 
one could use. For example, ‘What if you shared your considerations with the 
employee? Such as: ‘I am hesitating. I would like to give you the opportunity to 
run the project autonomously. However, I need some security. How shall we 
organize this situation?’’ 
Compare Argyris (1990), who states, “the advice should contain the action 
strategies (e.g. advocate your position in a way that encourages inquiry). Second, 
it should be accompanied with actual statements that illustrate what you would 
have to say and do” (p. 87). 
• The interventionist is cautious with personal feedback to the director about his 
beliefs. The main reason, in reflection, is the wish to save the director’s face 
(Argyris calls this ‘designed self-censoring’, which is an illustration of a unilateral 
control model). This way, he shows the same behaviour as the managers and 
does not help them to share their beliefs and attributions openly. 
 
 
Contact between director and interventionist 
A week after the last management team meeting a document is distributed in the 
organization by management. The document describes all steps to be taken in the 
near future (C planned, C step-by-step, C top-down, C rational). One of these 
initiatives concerns workshops on ‘giving and receiving feedback’ and ‘customer-
oriented behaviour’ for all managers, team leaders and teachers. This description has 
a number of pitfalls. Such a workshop, focusing on teaching how to perceive and 
behave, leaves defensiveness and recurrent patterns unaddressed (I symptom, I 
cover-up, I short-term, I instrumental). After all, they will possibly participate as they 
have to and they know it will not help them to refuse (compliance strategy). This way, 
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the workshops would be a bypass and cover-up of the underlying problems (compare 
Argyris, 1990, p.127). Besides, organizing a workshop and expecting employees to 
participate would reinforce the circular pattern of active management/interventionist 
versus reactive and dependent employees. 
 
The interventionist gets in touch with the director and shares his concerns about this 
description. The director agrees and reports some first signals from employees like 
‘this is another initiative by management; well, let us wait and see again’. The director 
intends to join some team meetings within the organization to discuss some 
misunderstandings. 
 
Interviews with teachers 
In order to get insight into team leaders’ and teachers’ visions of the situation, the 
interventionist conducts some interviews. The approach is unstructured and open, in 
order to give interviewees room for sharing their story. After a brief introduction, the 
interventionist invites them to describe how they experience the current reality within 
the organization. Below, some illustrative quotes are summarized. 
 
 
Management should create a better climate and 
inspiring atmosphere. They have to take initiative. 
 
…. 
 
I think the MT should show some more 
vulnerability. The employees just look at the MT 
but don’t take action themselves. There is a lot of 
negativity and little pro-activity. 
…. 
 
Support for management decreases because 
people do not get the guidance they need or wish. 
Recently somebody said: We need a real leader, 
someone who inspires us, solves our problems 
and is a content specialist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…. 
We do not implement our plans. And, 
subsequently, we do not evaluate our changes. 
[…] For example, we agreed upon organizing 
customer focus sessions. However, management 
does not organize them. I really miss those 
sessions. 
  
Int: What keeps you from organizing these 
sessions yourself? 
 
We have tried, but we lost interest when we saw 
that people did not show up. 
 
Int: What would happen if management organized 
these sessions and forced everyone to attend?  
 
P distance 
P blame 
P s-o 
B reactive 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P s-o 
B reactive 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P s-o 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P s-o 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This reflects the belief that management is an 
active subject that should act upon this 
reactive/dependent object. Changing is 
perceived as fully dependent on management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This example strongly illustrates a dependent 
attitude and defines the relation between 
management and employees as a S-O relation: 
‘management has to inspire me’. Or, in other 
words, ‘I do not feel inspired and management 
is accountable for that’. The problem in this S-O 
definition is that if management take the 
responsibility to inspire employees, they stifle 
employees’ responsibility and stimulate a 
dependent attitude. In other words, taking 
responsibility to inspire employees works out 
counterproductively. 
 
This sounds like we say we wish to change and 
make plans (but actually do not want to change 
really), do not put these plans into practice and 
do not discuss that we do not put these into 
practice. Or, in Argyris’ words: ‘we cover up that 
we do not want to change and cover up the 
cover-up’. The defensive strategy is a ‘plan-
strategy’: we make a plan and act as if we 
comply. 
 
Interventionist asks questions to raise 
awareness of reactive and dependent attitude. 
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Probably this would not work either.  
 
…. 
Sometimes I surprise myself. I can behave quite 
dependent and ask for things I do not really want. I 
call for procedures and forms, but regularly think: 
why do I need all these procedures? I would rather 
work without them. We are looking for grip, but all 
the forms and formats only cause annoyance. 
 
…. 
People were trained many times in this division, for 
example by someone who taught how to 
communicate and we had a team building session 
with our team of teachers. And we had all kinds of 
workshops on cooperation, but they don’t really 
work. The next day people just continue working in 
the old manner. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
P own (D) 
P dynamic (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I symptoms 
I cover-up 
I short-term 
I instrumental 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Person shows awareness of dynamical process 
and his own role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These workshops are probably bypasses for 
the real problems, as one does not change 
really. Compare Argyris (1990): if a workshop 
does not include the ‘how come’ question (e.g. 
‘how comes that we are so good at keeping 
things as they are and are confronted with the 
same problems time after time?’), it is a bypass 
and cover-up in itself. This defensive strategy 
can be labelled as an ‘undergo’ strategy: 
undergoing an intervention without making 
underlying patterns debatable.  
 
 
 
Reflection 3 
 
How one unintendedly preserves the current situation (and blocks changing and 
learning) 
The interviews lead to a number of observations on the way changing is being 
blocked. Apparently one is stronger in maintaining and preserving the current 
situation than changing it. How does one preserve the current situation?  
• Management hold a Subject-Object definition of the relationship with employees. 
Many (how many?) employees, in turn, hold an Object-Subject definition. By 
perceiving this way, management and employees maintain a recurrent circular 
pattern: active management and acted-upon, dependent employees. Illustrative 
examples: 
- ‘I need a manager who inspires me.’ 
- ‘Sometimes I surprise myself. I behave quite dependent and ask for things I do 
not really want.’ 
In this circular pattern, employees tend to distance themselves and put a strong 
responsibility on management’s shoulders. Some employees hold strongly fixed 
beliefs and find it hard to reflect on their own role. 
• Most activities by management seem to be problem-solving (single loop learning): 
if employees, from a dependent perspective, expect management to offer 
instruments or instructions, management tend to respond by delivering those 
instruments or instructions (and keep the circularity active). This response fits the 
upper circle in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure and bypasses the patterns 
that produce the problems (see figure 9.2). If this appears to lead to 
dissatisfaction, management sometimes stop offering solutions. It seems to be 
either ‘the upper circle’ (hands on), or ‘not the upper circle’ (hands off). There 
seems to be little dialogue about the lower circle, which means inquiring into ‘how 
we create the same problems time after time’. 
 P = Perception  B = Behaviour  I = Intervention O = Design of organization  C = Change of organization 
185 
• Most interventions in the past fit a unilateral control model. They activate the 
upper circle in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure by instruments, procedures 
and workshops. And they bypass the way one maintains the current reality: why 
do employees ask for instruments time after time and how could one avoid 
workshops becoming bypasses and cover-ups? 
 
The focus of perception, behaviour and interventions is on the upper circle in Senge’s 
‘shifting the burden’ structure (figure 9.2). This leads to recurrent patterns. What 
keeps management and employees from inquiring into the lower circle? 
• Management as well as employees seem to hold strong beliefs about the other 
‘party’. Many employees hold persistent beliefs about management’s 
responsibility to change the situation. Management, in turn, seem to be blocked 
by their perception that employees lack the ability to reflect.  
• The strong and anti-management beliefs of some employees put management 
(and interventionist) in a difficult double bind (compare Argyris, 1990): if defensive 
routines are not confronted, they will keep blocking any changing. If they are 
confronted in order to reduce them, there is a risk of “opening up a can of worms 
because the players do not know how to do it effectively” (p. 45). This risk might 
be threatening and not attractive from a unilateral control perspective.  
• In the current reality, some defensive strategies block inquiry into the patterns that 
managers and employees keep alive together. The interviews uncover some of 
them: 
- plan strategy: we agree to make a plan and act as if we comply to the plan 
- we strategy: in case of threat, we talk about ‘our responsibility’ and say ‘we 
should pay attention to the problems’ (as a consequence, nobody has to feel 
personally responsible) 
- undergo strategy: in case of threat, just undergo the intervention (passively) and 
do not make the producing patterns debatable 
- assume strategy: hold strong assumptions about others and situations without 
testing them. 
• Much communication, including this reflection, is highly vulnerable to reification 
and underestimates individual differences. By and large, management talk about 
‘the employees’, employees talk about ‘the management team’ and ‘the 
organization’.  
 
Figure 9.2, which is based on Senge’s ‘shifting the burden system’, summarizes 
these observations. 
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Figure 9.2  Unilateral control in relation to the ‘shifting the burden’ structure 
 
 
Session with the division management team 
In a session the outcomes of the interviews are discussed with the management 
team. Managers become defensive when confronted with the outcomes of the 
interviews. Management have heard these signals so often that they seem to be not 
open to them anymore. For example: ‘This is about the old story of ‘we are only 
making plans but nothing is implemented’, right?’ As an effect (and cause), the 
interventionist activates a unilateral control model as well. He persuades managers 
that their approach is not effective, tries to prove he did a proper job in the interviews, 
and presents the information as objective facts/analyses. From a mutual learning 
model, he could have confronted the observation that people do not seem to be open 
to feedback from employees (anymore) and that he tends to persuade them (which is 
not effective either). The interventionist’s and managers’ behaviours relate circularly: 
persuasion leads to defensiveness, leads to persuasion. 
 
In a conversation by phone, director and interventionist agree this was not a 
satisfying meeting. The director felt there was a distance between interventionist and 
management team. The interventionist felt he had been directing too much. Both 
agree upon a meeting between interventionist and director and a full day 
management team meeting. 
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Reflection 4 
 
How the way the interventionist helps does not really help 
The methodology of the interventionist in this part of the process is characterized by 
• conducting interviews with employees, in order to get insight into their perceptions 
and beliefs regarding the current reality, 
• analysing this information and developing temporary conclusions 
• sharing these outcomes with the management team.  
 
What happens? Managers and employees seem to be stuck in little learning by 
reflection, strong beliefs about ‘the other party’ and little public testing of their beliefs. 
Managers, as well as employees, impose their beliefs and reasoning upon each 
other, which blocks changing and learning. The interventionist, with this 
methodology, does exactly the same. He makes interpretations of the situation, 
based on the interviews and presents these as ‘the analysis’. In other words, he 
‘imposes’ these outcomes as a truth on the managers. The underlying reasoning is 
that these interpretations are ‘more valid’, since he is an expert. The effect is 
managers’ defensive behaviour: ‘Did they say this again? We are fed up with giving 
more and more.’ Besides, this methodology leaves room for managers to distance 
themselves: the analysis is or is not interesting or valid. The interventionist becomes 
a bypass of the communication problems between management and employees. 
This way, this methodology does not support learning and changing. 
 
What, in reflection, would have supported learning and changing? 
Instead of new interpretations and meaning, the interventionist could have shared 
‘raw material’ with the managers: what exactly did employees say? Subsequently, he 
could have invited managers to find out what these kinds of quotes could mean. 
What could these quotes say about the employees’ beliefs and reasoning? How do 
they apparently perceive management? And how do managers contribute to these 
beliefs? 
If managers become defensive, what does this mean? What makes them defensive? 
Do managers have the same response to employees when the latter confront them 
with their beliefs? Could there be any circular patterns? By slowing down and 
opening inquiry, there would probably be much more learning than by presenting the 
interventionist’s interpretations of the interviews.  
 
A typical problem would be ‘how to guarantee employees’ anonymity?’ This problem, 
in essence, uncovers the doubtful value of interviewing as a methodology in 
situations with interpersonal, behavioural and communication problems. After all, 
what is the added value of information that employees would not share with their 
manager and the interventionist cannot share with their manager? For this reason, 
direct communication between managers and employees is to be preferred in such 
situations. The interventionist can help them to create an atmosphere that supports 
mutual learning. 
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A circular pattern between managers and interventionist  
The last management team meeting illustrates a circular pattern. The interventionist 
presents his interpretations of the interviews as ‘the outcomes’. Managers interpret 
this information as ‘we must give even more attention’. As a consequence, managers 
become defensive (‘did they say this again?’). In turn, the interventionist interprets 
this defensiveness as ‘the managers doubt the validity of the outcomes’ and feels he  
has to prove that he did a good job. Thus, he tends to persuade managers of the 
need to take these signals seriously. Figure 9.3 summarizes this situation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3  Circular pattern between interventionist and managers 
 
This circular pattern can keep repeating as long as interventionist and managers hold 
a unilateral control model, characterized by having strong beliefs about the situation 
and the other party without checking them (Argyris would call this ‘designed self-
censoring’), and keeping things ‘under control’. 
 
Meeting between director and interventionist 
Director and interventionist evaluate the last MT session and prepare the next 
meeting. 
 
 
[….] 
 
Dir: I would like to share how I experienced the last 
meeting. I would like you to understand the feeling 
behind what we say. […] 
We experience continuous negativism that we 
have to cope with. Whatever we do, management 
is not okay. Actually we have a double bind 
assignment: ‘give more attention to people who 
push you away’.  
 
The basis of our subjective experience is in all the 
things we have already tried. I would like to share 
some of them.  
 
[…] 
 
You know, when you shared your analysis last 
time, we felt this all had been in vain. It is very 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P linear 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir formulates the essence of the 
perceived problems very skilfully. 
 
Dir is open about his feelings of 
disappointment and disbelief. Managers 
have tried a lot. His analysis is open and 
clear. He focuses on the difficult situation 
from a management perspective and 
reflects an S-O definition of relations: 
‘whatever management do, employees 
show an ‘anti-management attitude’.   
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persistent. This is the subjective experience, which 
we have to take into account in our next steps: 
what do we want to commit to?  
 
Int: I understand. We cannot neglect these 
feelings. In the last session we actually did. The 
situation is rather fixed, isn’t it? Employees seem 
to have strong perceptions about management. 
You, in turn, have strong perceptions about them. 
For example, you said that a dialogue requires the 
ability to reflect, which some employees would 
lack. This assumption blocks change. How strong 
is this assumption; do you still believe in and feel 
the energy for improving the situation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir: Sometimes this assumption is very strong. 
However, I still want to learn and find alternatives 
to deal with this situation. 
 
Int: What exactly is the effect of these beliefs on 
your actions? 
 
Dir: Sometimes I find it hard to invest again, 
especially regarding some employees. 
 
[…..]  
 
Now what will we do in the MT session of next 
week? 
 
Director and interventionist agree upon an open 
session, aiming at  
- understanding better what they already have 
done and why things are as they are; 
- agreeing upon the next steps in the process; 
- finding alternative interactions to break through 
the fixed patterns. 
 
Int: regarding these fixed patterns, I have derived 
some first suggestions from our earlier meetings: 
- share cyclical patterns: e.g. ‘active management 
leads to reactive employees and vice versa’, check 
for different views and explore together with 
employees how to break through these patterns. 
- open dialogue and sharing of dilemmas: e.g., if 
you would like to give room to manage a project 
autonomously and feel insecure, share this 
dilemma and try to find a solution together. 
- share assumptions that block change: make a 
start in being open about your beliefs regarding the 
how the problems recur time after time. 
Do you recognize these suggestions as being 
valuable? 
 
Dir: Yes, let’s bring them in during our session. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist shows understanding for his 
feelings and confronts linearity; the 
interventionist wishes to re-establish the 
relation and confidence after the 
dissatisfying meeting. Showing 
understanding, in reflection, is equal to not 
upsetting the other (unilateral control 
model). The interventionist would have 
stimulated learning, if he had asked for 
valid information: how do you know that 
‘whatever management do, employees 
show an ‘anti-management attitude’? 
Could you share an example? How did you 
act in that example? How did your 
behaviour contribute to the situation? 
 
Dir tells int that he still wants to learn. To 
what extent is he willing to reflect on his 
own contribution to the recurrent patterns? 
 
Int stimulates reflection on effect of 
director’s beliefs on his effectiveness. 
 
Director is open about his considerations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist holds some underlying 
assumptions: 
- an open session refers to an atmosphere 
without time pressure that allows 
participants to say what they think (and, 
thus, share valid information); the more 
pressure, the more unilateral control and 
the less learning; 
- management should start to find out how 
they contribute to recurrent problems and 
how they could contribute to mutual 
learning; 
- the interventionist helps by sharing his 
opinion on how to de-block changing and 
learning; by sharing these ideas with the 
director, the latter can already think about 
these suggestions.  
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Meeting with the division management team 
The next session of the division management team aims at reflecting upon people’s 
contribution to recurrent problems and sharing feelings regarding the current reality. 
 
 
[….] 
  
W: We are grid locked in the active manager - 
passive employee problem. How do we get 
ourselves out of that situation? The MT is the 
leading group, but how do we make the others 
follow us? I don’t feel like building even more 
bridges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I invested more in personal contact with 
employees and I feel there is a healthy 
professional part in that contact, but some people 
want more personal attention. That doesn’t fit. 
However, a more open culture is still what I want to 
achieve in this organization. 
 
[…] 
 
Dir: My approach is positive and I want to go and 
deal with these problems, but we have to consider 
that ‘whatever we do, management of this division 
is not okay’.  
 
Int: What are you aiming at? 
 
Dir: A fresh look at the situation. If we succeed we 
can add something to the world. I have the feeling 
we have to be much more strict. The hard part is 
how do we combine a strict policy and possibly 
even firing people with building contacts with 
employees? 
 
Int: You can also be strict in an open way. The 
process dialogue can be open with a strict 
message: ‘To be honest. I feel tired investing in 
our relationship. And I don’t like that. Actually, I 
don’t know how to reach you and still expect you to 
contribute to our goals. How could we improve this 
situation?’ In that way you have a conversation 
that is based upon equality. 
 
Dir: I see. 
 
Int: In the last meeting we reflected on some 
responses we got from the teachers. That gave 
you negative energy. Employees ask things you 
don’t want to give anymore. The question is: have 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
 
P linear 
P subject-object 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
P distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P blame 
P reduction 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W describes the situation circularly in 
words (espoused theory). However, he 
reasons from a linear and Subject-Object 
perspective. 
 
Interventionist is not aware of this 
inconsistency while it happens. He wants 
to re-establish the relationship and 
confidence, as he feels responsible for the 
last dissatisfying MT-meeting. This 
activates a unilateral control model, 
including the social virtue that confronting 
difficult issues harms the relationship. 
Besides, by working on a closer 
relationship, the interventionist’s capability 
to recognize defensiveness and circularity 
decreases. 
 
There seems to be inconsistency between 
espoused theory (an open culture) and 
theory-in-use, as his behaviour seems not 
to contribute to an open culture. His belief 
seems to be that he can ‘create an open 
culture as if he is not an active part of it’. 
 
 
 
Director shows positive energy. Still, he is 
inconsistent by sharing his message that 
employees do not talk positively about 
management, while talking negative about 
employees himself. Besides, from a 
Subject-Object perspective he makes 
success dependent on employees’ 
competence and willingness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int illustrates an approach that is based on 
mutual learning. He makes his advice 
actionable by literally phrasing what one 
could say. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managers repeat the message that they 
cannot pay more personal attention and 
give more energy. Giving more and more, 
while not realising the desired effect, 
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you given what they want? […] When you give 
more and more of something that doesn’t help, you 
are probably stuck in a circular pattern. Now you 
face a dilemma: they ask for something you don’t 
wish to give anymore. Try to be open about that: ‘I 
feel that I cannot satisfy you. Regardless of the 
amount of procedures and attention I give, you ask 
for even more. If this does not satisfy you, then 
what is it really you need?’ What about such an 
approach? 
 
All (all make notes): Yes, yes, we need to ask that 
question. 
 
[ …]  
 
 
 
 
 
Int: I have noticed that you and the employees 
have strong assumptions about each other. 
Examples of your assumptions:  
- ‘dialogue presumes the ability to reflect, which 
some lack’ 
- ‘teachers find management a priori not okay’  
I appreciate you have built these assumptions 
upon your experiences and don’t say they are 
‘wrong’. However, by holding these assumptions 
without inquiring into them, they tend to turn into 
self-fulfilling prophecies as they filter what you 
perceive. You can start to break through the 
circular patterns by inquiring into these beliefs. […] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
uncovers a circular pattern, kept alive by a 
unilateral control model.  
The interventionist wishes to make clear 
that ‘more of the same’ is probably not 
effective; an approach based on valid 
information advocacy and inquiry into one’s 
own assumptions would probably be more 
effective. 
Int assumes managers will probably not 
succeed using these kinds of words while 
not being aware of their governing beliefs. 
However, he does not share this 
assumption, as he thinks that will stifle their 
motivation (and thus, they will not be able 
to deal with that information). By not being 
open about this assumption, the 
interventionist strongly holds a unilateral 
control model and contributes to blocked 
learning and changing. 
 
Int confronts managers’ beliefs that govern 
their perception and behaviour and 
describes consequences.  
 
In reflection: the interventionist confronts 
managers’ beliefs, however does not invite 
managers to make a (free) choice. 
Alternatively, he might ask them whether 
they accept the effects of these beliefs. If 
yes, they can stop worrying. If not, the 
interventionist could ask whether they are 
willing and able to inquire into these 
beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection 5 
 
A dynamically complex situation 
Several managers emphasize that they are fed up with giving more and more (of the 
same), without getting any further. The recurrent problems in the longer run, despite 
several initiatives, seem to disclose a dynamically complex situation. “When obvious 
interventions produce nonobvious consequences, there is dynamic complexity” 
(Senge, 1990, p. 71). 
 
This situation will remain as long as unilateral control keeps managers and 
employees from learning. Managers maintain the current situation by 
- holding the same beliefs without publicly testing and using the same strategies 
without reflection (‘Whatever we do management is not okay’, ‘how do we get rid of 
the current attitude of the teachers?’),  
- holding others responsible for the recurrent problems (‘I know perfectly well who’s 
the crazy one’) and/or 
- taking distance (‘I reduce my contacts. Actually, I take distance’). 
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How the way we discuss blocks change and preserves the current reality 
Instead of sharing problems and dilemmas openly with employees, managers 
discuss the problems they face in the management team: the only team without 
employees. Here, they develop new strategies how to deal with difficulties in 
interaction with employees. This common use is an expression of a Subject-Object 
perspective: we, managers (and interventionists), design strategies that we can 
impose upon employees. This way, managers are not open to employees about their 
beliefs, nor their reasoning and experimenting (we are going to try something new to 
improve the way we work in interaction with you). Just by acting this way they confirm 
the situation as it is (we are not open about our beliefs and impose our actions upon 
employees), push employees into a dependent and reactive position and stifle their 
sense of responsibility for the current reality. This, in turn, will probably help to fulfil 
management’s prophecies about unwilling and difficult employees.  
 
The interventionist recommends an approach that gives the opportunity to see the 
managers in action with their employees, in order to support mutual learning in 
interaction. During the management team meeting, the interventionist illustrates to 
managers how they can be open in interaction with their employees about their 
dilemmas. For example: ‘Now you face a dilemma: they ask for something you don’t 
wish to give anymore. Try to be open about that: ‘I feel that I cannot satisfy you. 
Regardless of the amount of procedures and attention I give, you ask for even more. 
If this does not satisfy you, then what is it really you need?’’ 
 
Interventions that contribute to de-blocking of changing  
In some sessions the interventionist tries to contribute to changing and learning by a 
number of interventions. 
• Share that ‘more of the same’ is probably not effective. By asking questions about 
the effects of one’s actions the interventionist stimulates reflection on one’s own 
contribution to blocked changing (‘Are you satisfied with the effects of your 
actions? If not, how can you continue saying that you are doing the right things?’). 
• Confront strong beliefs and self-fulfilling prophecies: ‘By holding these 
assumptions without inquiring into them, they tend to turn into self-fulfilling 
prophecies as they filter what you perceive’. Compare Isaacs (1999): “These 
beliefs then reinforce what we select out to see. We can easily become locked 
into a way of thinking that is hard to change” (p 97). 
• Confront circular patterns and one’s contribution to the problems that one faces: 
‘Could there possibly be a circular pattern: the more active managers are, the 
more reactive and dependent employees are and vice versa?’ The underlying 
assumption is that by stimulating awareness of how one contributes to the 
recurrent patterns, it will be difficult to repeat these actions on purpose. 
• Confront inconsistency neutrally (‘what you say and what you do are 
inconsistent’), present possible consistent choices equally (‘you might decide you 
are satisfied with the results until now and accept some people do not feel safe; if 
you do not accept this, you will need to inquire into defensive strategies; each 
option is fine’) and invite to make conscious and free choices so that one can feel 
responsible. This way, managers are helped to be consistent and reduce 
defensiveness.  
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• Relieve (time) pressure that might activate managers’ and interventionists’ 
defensiveness. 
• Illustrate what one literally could say to stimulate mutual learning. ‘Getting rid of 
an attitude is probably not possible without inquiring into your own role. Be clear 
about your hesitations and dilemmas in the process and be prepared to inquire 
into the patterns that stimulate the attitude you want to get rid of: ‘I see this 
behaviour and to be honest, I would like to get rid of it. Still, I understand I cannot 
just say ‘stop it’. What do I do that stimulates your attitude?’ 
 
These interventions, until now, contribute to awareness and understanding. However, 
this is not necessarily consistent with actions. This manager’s quote is illustrative: 
‘We are grid locked in the active manager / passive employee problem. How do we 
get ourselves out of that situation? The MT is the leading group, but how do we make 
the others follow us?’ 
 
Self-censoring by interventionist  
The interventionist is part of the system as soon as he enters. Just like the managers, 
the interventionist holds beliefs and assumptions that he does not openly test. For 
example, the interventionist is not open about his hesitations about the managers: 
- are they really prepared to learn? 
- are they prepared to reflect on their own role? 
 
This ‘designed self-censoring’ (Argyris) withholds valid information from the 
managers and thus blocks learning. This is a typical expression of a unilateral control 
model (compare Argyris’ social virtues of Model I: Respect for others means “Defer to 
other people and do not confront their reasoning or actions” (1990, pp. 106-107)).  
 
This self-censoring becomes stronger when the interventionist feels he has to re-
establish the relationship and his position. His reasoning is as follows: as managers 
were not satisfied with the process in one meeting (they experienced distance and 
my expectations did not do justice to their situation), they might have lost confidence 
in me. Thus, I have to re-establish the relationship and my position. This means I 
have to ease in and pay personal attention to their experience. This does not allow 
me to confront painful issues, as this will damage the relationship and confidence 
again. Mutual learning would have meant sharing this reasoning, checking how valid 
it is and checking if managers have a different view. 
 
Meeting with employees 
In a meeting with team leaders and teachers the interventionist shares the first 
findings and the suggested change approach. The interventionist has prepared an 
interactive presentation on the current reality, possible reasons why changing seems 
to be difficult and a possible approach to start a learning and development process. 
Below, some illustrative parts of this meeting are described. 
 
 
The atmosphere is a bit tense. People look at the 
interventionists expectantly.  
 
[…] 
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One interventionist starts the presentation. Core 
issue: You – including managers – are very good 
at keeping the situation as it is. (Some laugh). How 
do you do that? We perceive some patterns (int 
elaborates on these patterns): parties, circularity, 
reactivity, distancing. Summarized, successful 
changing requires all of you, including managers, 
to make a picture that includes yourself. 
 
During and after the presentation, some 
interactions take place. 
 
Employee 1: Do you really expect us to change? I 
am not sure if I want to. 
 
Int: I do not expect you to do anything. But 
whatever your choice is, try to be consistent. Either 
keep doing the same things as you do and accept 
some tension and discomfort (and do not complain 
about it), or contribute to changing by reflection on 
your own role. For me it is a free choice. 
 
Empl 2: I think he is right. We cannot change 
anything as long as we are not willing to do 
anything ourselves.  
 
Empl 3: But let us be honest. We can talk as if we 
are equal, but management has more influence. 
After all, we are dependent. So they have to start.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int: Managers have stressed they are open to 
feedback and are willing to learn. Regardless of 
that, you show some of the patterns that I have 
just described. Do I say things that give you the 
feeling you have to defend yourself? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empl 3: Well, eh, actually I do not trust them and 
don’t feel comfortable. 
 
Int: What is the effect of that?  
 
Empl 3: I don’t go to my manager anymore. 
 
Int: You take distance. What is the effect on your 
manager?  
 
Empl 3: He seems to pay less attention to me. 
 
Int: He takes distance as well; is that what you 
want?  
 
Empl 3: No, I don’t.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P s-o  
P blame 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist’s intention is to 
stimulate awareness of circular patterns 
and to help employees to see how they 
contribute to the problems that they face. 
However, in reflection, presenting an 
analysis could be a bypass of the 
problems, as employees and management 
can take distance, saying that this is 
interesting and subsequently waiting and 
seeing what happens. 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist confronts inconsistency 
in current situation (valid information), 
invites them to make a free choice (each 
option is fine, as long as it is consistent) 
and to take responsibility. By this 
intervention he stimulates employees to 
hold a mutual learning model. 
 
 
 
 
Empl 3 confirms an Subject-Object relation 
by taking a dependent position towards 
management. Management will have to 
show different behaviour consistently in 
order to break through the circular pattern. 
The effects will only be visible with a delay, 
as employees will have to get used to the 
new pattern. 
 
Int tries to improve trust in managers’ 
willingness to change, although he is not 
really convinced. The underlying reasoning 
is that he wants to stimulate employees to 
follow managers’ learning attitude. This is, 
however, not entirely valid information as 
he has not seen real management learning 
until now. Subsequently, he illustrates a 
mutual learning model by making 
defensiveness debatable without blaming. 
 
As a consequence, empl 3 responds quite 
openly and seems to share valid 
information. 
 
Int helps empl 3 to make a picture that 
includes herself and to gain insight into the 
circularity of this pattern.  
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Int: He might not feel comfortable either. If I 
understand you correctly, your manager and you 
act identically towards each other, don’t you? 
 
Empl 3: Maybe … 
 
Interventionist just wants to pay attention to 
someone else, when empl 3 makes an additional 
remark. 
 
Empl 3: But the reason why I don’t trust him, is a 
consequence of [….]; so it seems to be reasonable 
to me that he … 
 
Int: … has to start changing his behaviour? 
 
Empl 3: Yes … 
 
Int: Waiting for others is deciding to take 
responsibility for the situation as it is. If you do not 
accept the situation, you will need to reflect on 
your own role and take responsibility for change. 
Both choices are fine to me.  
 
[….] 
 
Empl 7: How will you know something has 
changed really? I think we are all quite smart and 
able to act constructively as long as you join our 
meetings for a couple of months … 
 
Int: If you show you are able to act constructively 
for a couple of months, I am quite happy. Show 
each other you can. You might bring about new 
patterns that you even like. 
 
Some, including empl 7, laugh and confirm.  
 
After all, the meeting ends rather positively. Some 
employees thank the interventionists personally. 
One of them returns after ten minutes and reports 
a positive atmosphere in the corridors, although 
some employees say words like ‘let us see what 
happens’.  
 
One employee takes time to share another 
negative story about managers. 
 
Int: I understand you had negative experiences. 
However, telling negative stories about 
management to me does not change the situation. 
On the contrary, it is the current situation. Please 
take some time to consider if you are willing to 
contribute to change this situation. It is up to you. 
 
Empl: Well, but management should … 
 
Int (impatient): … you are right, management 
should do this as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P s-o  
P blame 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empl tries again. 
 
 
 
Int loses patience … 
 
 
 
… and puts pressure on her to make a free 
choice (!). The signal, however, is ‘you 
have made your point and must stop 
droning on’. 
 
 
 
 
Empl 7 asks for valid information about the 
effectiveness of the approach. 
Subsequently, she is open about 
defensiveness. What she actually says is 
‘our (my?) defensive strategy is active 
(compliance strategy); and we are quite 
good at it’. This remark is quite unusual, as 
she uncovers defensiveness. 
 
Partly as a consequence of the critical tone 
of voice, int takes the remark as 
‘resistance’. He succeeds in not reacting 
negatively, however, activates a unilateral 
control model as he tries to ‘win by being 
smart’. The interventionist does not take 
the opportunity to inquire into the 
employee’s remark. From a mutual 
learning approach the interventionist could 
have shared his appreciation that she 
brought in this issue and stressed this 
issue is essential. Questions could have 
been: what would it bring you if you acted 
as if you are constructive? What makes 
you expecting that constructive behaviour 
would only last as long as we are joining 
you? And: how could this ‘acting’ have 
contributed to the preservation of the 
current situation and difficulties to change? 
These questions stimulate to find ‘valid 
information’. Subsequently, the 
interventionist could have asked if they are 
satisfied with these effects of their actions. 
If so, they take responsibility for these 
actions and results. If not, they could 
explore alternative thinking and acting. 
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After this session the interventionist gets in touch with the director. The director says 
‘he has heard several positive signals; some employees had found the session 
inspiring’. He concludes the interventionist has a positive influence on the 
atmosphere: ‘I have heard some employees, who are open to change, have met; 
they no longer want to accept this negative behaviour of some colleagues’.  
 
 
Meeting with director 
In a conversation with the director the interventionist shares his hesitations in being 
open about his observations and beliefs, as he perceives that the director tends to 
take distance and make pictures of the situation that do not include him. This, in turn, 
blocks learning and contributes to the fixed situation. The director responds by saying 
that he already felt that the interventionist took distance for a period and should have 
brought this issue in earlier. He emphasizes that he really wants to learn and is glad 
to know that this is not visible in action yet. 
 
 
Reflection 6 
 
How effective is it to present a diagnosis?  
The interventionist presents his diagnosis to a group of employees. What is the effect 
of this methodology? The diagnosis could be a bypass of the problems, as 
employees and management can take distance, saying that this is interesting and 
subsequently wait and see what happens. Besides, the diagnosis could make them 
defensive; this could be uncomfortable for the interventionist who, in turn, activates a 
control model (persuasion, trying to win). In turn, employees would probably show a 
compliance and undergo strategy: ‘we say yes and think no or we don’t say what we 
think at all’.  
 
Presenting a diagnosis, however, can stimulate awareness of 
• how changing is (possibly) blocked, 
• how one contributes to the recurrent problems, 
• how one could contribute to de-blocking of changing. 
This could contribute to learning, as long as this is not presented as ‘the truth’ but 
only a possible explanation (‘It is the best I could think up. Have you got something 
else in mind?’) and as long as the interventionist leaves room for free choice and 
personal commitment (‘I do not expect you to do anything. But whatever your choice 
is, try to be consistent. Either keep doing the same things as you do and accept 
some tension and discomfort (and do not complain about it), or contribute to 
changing by reflection on your own role. For me it is a free choice.’). 
 
Having a discussion with a large group can only be a start, as it does not stimulate a 
personal sense of responsibility. The larger the group, the larger the ‘diffusion of 
responsibility’ and the less individuals feel personally responsible. This social 
psychological principle explains the so-called ‘bystander effect’ (Latané and Darley, 
1970).  
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Management has to start? 
Employees often tend to refer to management: management has more influence and 
management has to start. This is a reasonable expectance. Argyris (1984, 1990) 
argues that one should start with the top. This is confirmed by Weick & Quinn (2004), 
who argue “most top managers assume that change is something that someone with 
authority does to someone who does not have authority”. However, to engage the 
logic of attraction (instead of power), leaders must first make deep changes in 
themselves. “When deep personal change occurs, leaders then behave differently 
toward their direct reports, and the new behaviours from followers” (p. 190). 
 
However, stressing the position that management has to start has some 
disadvantages. First, it is a confirmation of a Subject-Object perspective: change 
starts with management and is, thus, top-down. As long as managers do not succeed 
in making visible behavioural changes, employees will not feel responsible either. 
This situation is still unilateral and does not support mutual learning. Second, if 
managers start changing their behaviour unilaterally, their attempts can easily be 
frustrated by employees who try to push them back into the ‘old system’ (even if they 
don’t like this ‘system’).  
For this reason, managers should be open about their beliefs and considerations 
regarding their new behaviour and be open to inquiry: ‘I feel that I cannot satisfy you. 
Regardless of the amount of procedures and attention I give, you ask for even more. 
If this does not satisfy you, then what is it really you need?’ This way they involve 
employees in changing and learning from scratch.  
Besides, in this case the interventionist invites employees directly to decide whether 
they wish to contribute either to preserving the current reality or to changing and 
learning. Two examples: 
‘However, telling negative stories about management to me does not change the 
situation. On the contrary, it is the current situation. Please take some time to 
consider if you are willing to contribute to change this situation. It is up to you.’  
And: ‘Waiting for others is deciding to take responsibility for the situation as it is. If 
you do not accept the situation, you will need to reflect on your own role and take 
responsibility for change. Both choices are fine to me.’ 
 
On resistance and valid information 
By and large, defensiveness protects itself. According to Argyris, we tend to cover up 
and cover up the cover-up. For example, we say ‘yes’ and think ‘no’ and we are not 
open about this (compliance strategy). This is in line with Senge (1990): “To retain 
their power, defensive routines must remain undiscussable. Teams stay stuck in their 
defensive routines only when they pretend that they don’t have any defensive 
routines, that everything is all right, and that they can say ‘anything’” (p. 255). 
 
Sometimes, as illustrated in this case, one makes one’s own defensiveness 
debatable. For example: ‘How will you know something has changed really? I think 
we are all quite smart and able to act constructively as long as you join our meetings 
for a couple of months …’ As it is not usual to be this open about one’s own 
defensiveness (after all, a unilateral control model instructs to cover up our 
defensiveness), this can be experienced as uncomfortable or even threatening.  
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The espoused theory is that we would like valid information, especially about a thing 
as fundamental as commitment. However, it seems to be much easier to manage 
people saying ‘yes’ while thinking ‘no’ than people saying ‘no’. This probably explains 
why managers (and consultants) often tend to favour a possibly invalid ‘yes’ to a valid 
‘no’. 
 
This puts common insights regarding ‘dealing with resistance’ in a different 
perspective. Generally, ‘positive’ (and neutral) persons tend to be perceived as 
constructive, while critical persons are usually perceived as not constructive. This 
perception contributes directly to defensiveness, as it makes different views 
undebatable and stimulates a compliance and undergo-strategy: ‘we say yes and 
think no or we don’t say what we think at all’.  
On the other hand, making all individual views debatable time after time will 
undermine ‘momentum’. A mutual learning approach would stimulate sharing this 
valid information: ‘I know we do not all agree now and I know I will disappoint some of 
you and might make you defensive, but now I will have to take a decision. I will not 
ask you to agree and I understand your defensiveness, though I expect you to 
respect this decision.’ 
 
 
Period 3: team sessions deeper in organization 
 
The interventionist joins a number of team sessions deeper in the organization. By 
and large, these meetings follow a structure and agenda as usual. The interventionist 
has room to intervene during the session and share his observations at the end of 
the sessions. The approach aims at supporting a learning process. More specifically, 
the ambition is to contribute to a development from 
• blocking to inquiring into mutual expectations and interaction patterns 
• opposing to dialogue 
• ‘they must’ to ‘we go’ and ‘I go’. 
 
This approach is based on the assumption that the interventionist can support 
learning by sharing his observations on how one seems to contribute to the recurrent 
problems one faces and how one can help to de-block changing and learning. 
 
Some illustrative parts are described below. 
 
Session team 1 
In the first half of this meeting, some routine topics are discussed that seem to be 
content-driven and not stressful or threatening to anybody. This part comes across as 
effective and result-oriented. Until a delicate issue is brought in … 
 
 
Team leader (TL): We will introduce new 
procedures regarding learning methods. The aim 
is to standardize some methods in line with a 
quality system.  
 
Empl 1: What? Why don’t we know that? I am not 
going to do that. […] They are over-demanding. 
 
O variety 
reduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empl 1 is very clear about his annoyance; he 
strongly resists the new activity report. 
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They cannot expect us to do this. If they go on this 
way, we lose any professional freedom.  
 
TL: Let us share this with A (department manager). 
We will meet him next week. 
 
Empl 1: Yes, we must say that we are not going to 
do this. It has to stop. 
 
A strong tension fills the room.  
 
Int: You are angry, aren’t you? 
 
Empl 1: Yes, we are. They ask more and more. 
 
Int: I appreciate your disappointment. However, 
the way you respond to them is quite blocking: you 
say you are not going to do it, that it has to stop, 
etcetera. It is a brief ‘no’. Can I tempt you to 
inquire into this situation? 
 
Empl 1 and 2: Right.  
 
Int: What exactly makes you angry? 
 
Empl 2: Managers try to enlarge their control step-
by-step.  
 
Int: What is the effect of this assumption on your 
behaviour? 
 
Empl 1: We do not accept that and try to block it. 
 
Int: Does this normally help? 
 
Empl 1 and 2: No, actually it doesn’t. On the 
contrary. 
 
Int: If I understand you well, you say you do not 
want to do what managers ask you to do, right? 
 
Empl 1 and 2: Right.  
 
Int: So, if it is true that managers try to enlarge 
their control, this does not sound very foolish. You 
seem to encourage them to do so. 
 
Empl 1: The question is, who is the cause? That is 
not us. 
 
Int: In my opinion you are both cause and effect. 
This is an illustrative example of a circular pattern: 
the more control by managers, the more you block, 
the more control by managers, etcetera. 
 
Silence 
 
Int: Blocking does not seem to help, does it?  
 
Empl 1: No. 
 
Int: An alternative is to approach your manager 
and have an open conversation that sounds 
different to ‘we are not going to do what you ask 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P linear 
P distance 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int tries to describe the situation in neutral 
terms, in order to invite them to inquiry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int tries to help them to get insight into the 
effect of their beliefs on their actions and into 
the effects of their actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int confronts inconsistency by describing how 
they might contribute to management’s 
behaviour. 
 
The employee holds management as 
responsible for the situation and –thus- 
behaves reactively.  
 
Int describes circularity. 
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us’. Rather, try to find out what they need in order 
to play their role and what you need to work 
effectively as a professional. Try to make this 
circularity debatable.  
 
Empl 1: I understand, but that requires them to be 
really open. 
 
Int: Indeed. Well, would you be prepared to give it 
a try? 
 
Empl 1: I wish to think about that for a while. 
 
TL: I think this is very good. We should try to 
involve our own role. 
 
After two weeks the employee gets in touch with 
the interventionist. He wishes to prepare a 
conversation with the manager, together with his 
team leader. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words: would you be prepared to be 
really open yourself? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
De-blocking changing and organizing is 
characterized by delay. This observation 
resembles Senge’s (1990) insights: changing 
the ‘lower circle’ in the ‘shifting the burden’ 
structure is characterized by delay. 
 
 
Session team 2 
One day before this session, the interventionist organized a half-day workshop on 
circular and recurrent patterns and de-blocking of these patterns. The focus is on 
reflection on one’s own cases from a unilateral control and mutual learning model. 
Some of the employees in team 2 have attended this workshop and immediately 
bring the new insights into practice.  
 
 
TL: This subject logically fits team x better. They 
have thorough knowledge of the potential partners 
in this field. For that reason they will do it from 
now. 
 
Empl 1: Oh …. (looks disappointed and angry) 
 
TL: There are good reasons why team x will adopt 
it. 
 
Empl 1: Well, you should have let me know, but 
anyhow … (looks even more disappointed and 
angry). 
 
TL (a bit irritated): I understand you are 
disappointed, but I’m telling you now, am I not? 
 
Empl 1: Yes … (nonverbally ‘no’) 
 
[…] 
 
Int: This looks a bit complicated. Are you satisfied 
with your result? If so, let’s go on. If not, let’s take 
a moment to evaluate this situation. 
 
Both: Let’s take a moment … 
 
Int: What did you wish to realize?  
 
Empl 1: I feel so powerless and frustrated. It 
always goes this way within this organization. It is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This sounds as a free choice, but how free is 
the choice between ‘learning’ and ‘not 
learning’? 
 
 
 
 
 
Empl 1 is open about his feelings. But he talks 
in abstractions. Int could have facilitated 
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always the same regardless of what we say. 
Things are being arranged and no one is informed. 
 
[…] 
 
Silence … 
 
Empl 2: I want to try something that I have learned 
from A (interventionist). My belief was that if we 
ask for more information and bring in our 
frustration time after time, that we will reach our 
goal, but … 
 
Int: But? 
 
Empl 2: but I doubt if this assumption is valid. 
 
All look at the TL: No, I guess it is not. 
 
Int: What is the effect?  
 
TL: The effect is that I get frustrated myself. I take 
it as a vote of no confidence.  
 
Int: And what are your assumptions about how to 
deal with this situation? 
 
TL: When I say I don’t know more than this, in the 
end they will stop. 
 
Int: And if they don’t? 
 
TL (laughing): I tend to think it is not going to work 
with their attitude. 
 
Int to empl 1 and 2: What is the effect of the TL 
saying the same thing another time? 
 
Empl 2: Our frustration grows even stronger. 
 
Int: This seems to be a circular pattern. My 
assumption is that both of you hold a unilateral 
control model, as described in the workshop we 
had yesterday. If your strategy appears to be not 
effective, you either try the same strategy again, or 
distance yourself (let it go), or think the other party 
is the problem. Right? 
 
All laugh (slightly uncomfortable): Yes … 
 
Int: Each one maintains the situation as it is and 
blocks changing and learning. The alternative is 
what you do now: empl 2 did a great job by being 
open about her assumptions. By testing her 
assumptions openly, she facilitates mutual learning 
and takes responsibility.  
 
[…] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P dynamic (D) 
P own role (D) 
P mutual (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
learning by making things concrete (valid): ‘how 
do you know this is true?’ 
 
 
 
 
 
Empl 2 is open about her beliefs and tests them 
publicly. She reflects on her own role and is 
open about being not effective, as her actions 
do not lead to her goals. I, she contributes to 
mutual learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to facilitate learning, int asks questions 
about 
- one’s beliefs 
- how these lead to actions 
- the effect of these actions in someone else’s 
perspective. 
 
 
TL follows empl 2’s example and is open about 
his beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int illustrates circularity and how a control 
model maintains this situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int illustrates how empl 2 contributes to the 
alternative, mutual learning. 
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Period 4: learning process director and division management team 
 
Meeting with the division management team 
The interventionist is invited to join a two-hour management team meeting. The 
agenda covers several formats/instruments, such as project plans, performance 
management system and registration of hours. One of the items is the development 
process that the interventionist is involved in. He has been invited to share some 
experiences and insights during the last month. Some illustrative parts are described 
below.  
 
 
In the first part of the meeting several formats and 
systems are discussed, like project plans, 
performance management system and course 
evaluations.  
 
 
 
 
Dir: A problem is that teachers do not fill out these 
course evaluations properly. How come? 
 
Mgr 1: We have to improve the system. It has to 
be easier. 
 
Mgr 3: I agree, but I don’t think that is the problem. 
The problem is they lack knowledge and skills to 
work with such a system. For many years they 
could do what they liked. And now we expect them 
to work transparently. 
 
Dir: I guess you are right. We must think about 
how to support our teachers. 
 
Mgr 3: I think we have to train them in the field of 
performance management in education. 
 
Dir: I think we indeed have to invite a specialist in 
this field. 
 
Int: Can I interrupt for a moment? 
 
Dir: Yes, of course … 
 
Int: If I understand you well, your teachers do not 
fill out the course evaluations properly. And now 
you discuss what the problem is: the complexity of 
the evaluation method or their lack of knowledge 
and skills. Right? 
 
Some (hesitantly): Right … 
 
Int: How will you decide what the problem is? 
 
Dir: We’re trying to make an analysis of the 
problem. 
 
Int: And how will you know that you are right? 
 
Silence … 
 
 
I symptoms 
I cover-up 
I short term 
I instrumental 
O variety 
reduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I symptoms 
I instrumental 
P distancing 
 
P dynamic (D) 
P circular (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I symptoms 
I instrumental 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, the interventionist is surprised by this 
focus on systems. There are many signals in 
the organization that the distance between 
management and employees is huge. In the 
interventionist’s feeling, it has been too long 
ago that he has joined a management team 
meeting.  
 
Dir tries to explore the problem openly. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mgr 3 recognizes a system that protects itself. If 
we have ‘trained’ employees to act a certain 
way, we cannot expect them to change from 
one day to another. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist tries to facilitate learning by 
- checking what exactly they are doing, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- checking upon what  (valid) information they 
want to decide, 
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Int: Could this be a part of the difficulties? You 
discuss what the teachers’ problem is, you share 
beliefs about them but not with them and you 
develop solutions for their problems. For example, 
they need training. What would happen, if you told 
them that they need training? I think you’d push 
them into a reactive and dependent position. What 
would you think? 
 
Dir and some mgrs: Yes, you are probably right. 
 
Int: I know this is not what you want. I guess you 
need to facilitate mutual learning. By sharing the 
problem, sharing your beliefs, asking their beliefs 
and co-developing solutions. What do you think? 
 
Dir: We have discussed this subject with the team 
leaders, but indeed, we have to do that more 
intensively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- confronting inconsistency and the way they 
contribute to the problems they face, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- describing the alternative (although this is 
rather abstract and high on Argyris’ ladder of 
inference), 
 
 
 
 
 
Immediately afterwards, director and interventionist evaluate this session.  
 
 
Dir: How did you experience this meeting? 
 
Int: As I said, there was significant focus on 
‘control’. You work on instruments to control work 
processes. And if employees do not commit to 
these instruments, you discuss ways to improve 
the instruments or to get the employees ‘in 
position’. Where is the dialogue with your 
employees? How do you try to find out what the 
underlying problems are? What keeps them from 
obeying? 
 
Dir: People wait until something happens. We 
have to become a more professional organization. 
 
Int: How does this belief affect your actions? 
 
Dir: Someone has to steer very powerfully. And 
that is me. 
 
Int: I suppose you are right. Be clear about your 
expectations. However, I think you need (output) 
steering and process dialogue. If you don’t explore 
why employees don’t follow your instructions and 
how you could contribute to commitment, you will 
have to control more and more.  
 
Dir: You are right. 
 
Int: It is quite a job, isn’t it? How do you manage 
your energy? 
 
Dir: It is very busy for me. 
 
Int: How come? 
 
Dir: Everything is on my shoulders. 
 
Int: How come? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int tries to stimulate learning by 
- inquiring into the effect of dir’s beliefs on his 
actions, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- sharing circularity (including his role), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- inquiring into circularity (including his role), 
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Dir: I am afraid I find it difficult to share 
responsibility with my managers. 
 
Int: Have you got an example? 
 
Dir: I had asked mgr 2 to manage this registration 
problem. However, she does not pick it up. 
 
Int: Why not? 
 
Dir: I don’t know. 
 
Int: What did you do?  
 
Dir: I took it back. I will do it myself. 
 
Int: What is the effect on her? 
 
Dir: I guess she feels less secure now.  
 
Int: Is that what you want? 
 
Dir: No. 
 
Int: Have you shared this with her? 
 
Dir: No. 
 
Int: Why not? 
 
Dir: Actually I don’t know. 
 
Int: I guess you do. 
 
Dir: I don’t know if it will help. We have to go on, 
right? 
 
Int: I am afraid you produce your own problems: 
you have beliefs about her, you assume it does not 
help to share these beliefs, you take her 
responsibility away, you think this will make her 
less secure and you are busier and busier … 
 
Dir: Yes, yes … I am afraid you are right. 
 
Int: What would be an alternative? 
 
Dir: Keeping her responsible. 
 
Int: How long are you able to keep her responsible 
if she does not speed things up? 
 
Dir: I don’t know. Let’s find it out. And what if I am 
not able to anymore? 
 
Int: What if you shared your dilemma openly with 
her? Such as: ‘I am hesitating. I would like to give 
you the opportunity to take this responsibility. 
However, I feel insecure because I get no signs 
that you’re working on it. How shall we organize 
this situation?’ 
 
Dir: Yes, I could do that. I will try this. 
 
P own role (D)  
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D)  
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
- asking for a concrete case (valid, observable 
data), 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- inquiring into the effect of actions, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- inquiring into what beliefs produce her actions,  
 
 
- sharing how dir produces his own problems, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- inquiring into alternatives, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- sharing alternatives to make things actionable.  
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Session with management, team leaders and teachers 
Management decides to organize a half-day meeting with all team leaders and 
teachers. This meeting aims at discussing how the strategy of the organization can 
be put into practice and how to deal with difficult problems and different opinions, as 
these situations often lead to stagnation instead of learning. Director, some 
employees and interventionist prepare the meeting. This way, it is not only a program 
that management imposes upon employees. During the preparation, the director is 
very open to any suggestion and leaves room for employees to bring in their ideas. 
The director opens this session and shares the problems, including the way he 
contributes to them: ‘We are facing quite a few difficult issues. An important issue is 
how we deal with these. And let’s be honest: we don’t always do this effectively; I 
don’t always do this effectively. I know that there is too large a distance between 
employees and management.’ While most teachers respond positively to the 
director’s opening in the plenary, during the break some of them still talk negatively 
about the director, the Board, management and the organization. Nobody, including 
the interventionist, addresses these opinions in the plenary. The program is closed 
‘positively’.  
 
 
Reflection 7 
 
Quick fix and slow change 
Some positive developments are visible, but there are also some persistent patterns 
that make changing still difficult. Some positive developments: 
 
• The division management team works hard on instruments that should support a 
result-oriented organization. There is no reason to believe that this, in itself, is 
ineffective. The effectiveness is questionable, as soon as this same single-loop 
approach is used for people problems. For example, there is an attempt to solve 
the problem that ‘teachers don’t fill out the course evaluations as we instruct them’ 
through improvement of the system and/or education of the team leaders. This 
way, a more fundamental question is bypassed: ‘what makes the teachers not 
follow the instructions?’ 
If the management team designs solutions for these kinds of problems, they might 
contribute to several circular patterns:  
- active managers who impose solutions on teachers versus dependent teachers 
(and team leaders) who wait and judge management’s solutions 
- distant managers versus distant employees. 
• Several employees and some managers visit workshops on circular patterns and 
de-blocking of these patterns voluntarily and show active interest in how to learn. 
Some of them actively bring their insights into practice soon after the workshop (‘I 
want to try something that I have learned. My belief was that if we ask for more 
information and bring in our frustration time after time, that we will reach our goal, 
but I doubt if this assumption is valid.’) This, in turn contributes to reflection on 
recurrent patterns and the way one contributes to these patterns. A significant 
number of employees, however, feel discouraged to learn as they believe 
management do not learn and should be a positive role model.  
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As a consequence, some tend to resist management initiatives, which leads to 
 reduction of management influence. This, in turn, encourages management to 
 enlarge control. Here, the circular pattern is activated again. 
 
Don’t ruin the good atmosphere that we don’t have 
The session with management, team leaders and teachers strongly illustrates the 
‘current situation’: the director’s vulnerable opening of the day, the discussion about 
circular patterns and defensiveness, as well as the way employees, management 
and interventionist contribute to defensiveness. 
 
The director opens with a vulnerable presentation. He talks frankly about his 
contribution to difficulties and takes responsibility. This, with delay, is an important 
step ahead and reduces the gap between him and the employees. Many employees 
say they are impressed and there is a positive atmosphere in the room. Later, after 
the interventionist’s presentation, interventionist and management think most 
participants agree that ‘we can only get further if we are willing to reflect on our own 
contribution to recurrent patterns’. How valid is this information? 
This appears to be questionable. In a break some employees talk negatively about 
management and organization and don’t seem to be able or willing to reflect on their 
own role. This seems to uncover an ‘undergo strategy’ during the plenary session: 
‘we just act as if we commit, even if we don’t’. This undergo strategy helps to make 
this issue undiscussable. Later, in the plenary session, the interventionist only refers 
to this issue in general terms (‘not all employees seem to feel intrinsically motivated 
to join’) and stimulates employees to share their concerns frankly in a conversation 
with a manager (however, why would they if they haven’t done that until now?). The 
director confirms this invitation and all participants cover up the painful issues 
effectively and cover up the cover-up.  
 
Afterwards, the interventionist asks the director how representative the critical voices 
during the break are. The director: ‘They are not, this was a selection of critical 
persons.’ The interventionist does not inquire into how he knows that he is right. Both 
contribute to cover up this issue and prevent learning. Later, the director shares with 
the interventionist that he wants to invite employees who seem to be unhappy to 
have a conversation with either him or the HR manager. 
 
Main interventions that support learning 
In several sessions with management and production teams the interventionist tries 
to stimulate learning. The main interventions: 
• Sharing observations and interpretations regarding 
- beliefs that people seem to hold 
- circular patterns, including the contribution of several parties  
- how one preserves the current reality and contributes to recurrent patterns 
- defensiveness 
• Teaching how a unilateral control model can stifle learning and block changing 
and how a mutual learning model can contribute to learning and changing. One 
gets acquainted with the conceptual models and how these help to gain insight 
into the way one preserves the current reality and blocks changing and learning. 
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• Trying to be consistent in one’s own behaviour and support learning in action. 
Typical ingredients that contribute to learning: 
- instead of talking about abstract interpretations, ask for valid, observable data: 
‘Have you got an example?’ 
- inquire into the effect of one’s beliefs on his/her actions 
- inquire into the effects of his/her actions: ‘What are the effects?’ 
- explore to what extent one is satisfied with these effects: ‘Is that what you want?’ 
- share how a person produces his own problems: ‘I am afraid you produce your 
own problems: you have beliefs about him, you assume it does not help to share 
these beliefs, you take his responsibility away, you think this will make him less 
secure and you are busier and busier.’ 
- share circularity (including one’s role): ‘If you don’t explore why employees don’t 
follow your instructions and how you could contribute to their commitment, you 
will have to control more and more.’ 
- inquire into alternatives: ‘What would be an alternative?’ 
- share alternatives and make them actionable: ‘What if you shared your dilemma 
openly with him? Such as: ‘I am hesitating. I would like to give you the opportunity 
to take this responsibility. However, I feel insecure because I get no signs that 
you’re working on it. How shall we organize this situation?’  
Compare Argyris (1990), who states, “the advice should contain the action 
strategies (e.g. advocate your position in a way that encourages inquiry). Second, 
it should be accompanied with actual statements that illustrate what you would 
have to say and do” (p. 87). 
 
 
 
9.4 Analysis of moving moments 3 
 
In this section, the findings of case 3 are summarized and interpreted. Preceding the 
analyses, which follow the structure of the research questions, the point of departure 
and results of this case are summarized. 
 
Point of departure and results 
 
The case starts with communication and interaction problems between management 
and employees, leading to blocked changing. The problems already exist for a longer 
period and the situation does not improve despite several management initiatives. 
The recurrence of the problems in the longer run, while obvious actions do not lead 
to obvious results, seems to reveal a dynamically complex situation. This situation 
relates directly to the subject of this study. 
 
Although the process in this case is laborious, in the end managers and employees 
start a learning process and after half a year they report improvements regarding 
open communication, learning and changing. After all, it remains the question how 
lasting these changes are.  
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Research question 1:  
To what extent are the expressions of unilateral control visible in interactions?  
 
In this case numerous observations have been made regarding Perceiving 
(reductionism, distancing, blaming, linear perception and S-O relations), Behaving 
(controlling circumstances, repeated behaviour, stronger control in case of threat and 
reactive behaviour) and Intervening (focus on symptoms, cover-up of underlying 
patterns, quick wins and focus on impersonal instruments) 16. The ‘diagnostic model’ 
helps to recognize situations that are influenced by unilateral control. 
There are only few observations regarding Design of organization (positional 
organization, variety reduction, S-O relations and organization/change as separated 
entities). These observations relate to the discussion about organization structure at 
the start (O positional), the wish to implement a uniform culture (O subject-object) 
and the focus on instruments and formats that aim at standardisation (O variety 
reduction). Design of organization is also illustrated when one employee talks about 
lack of clear tasks, information and responsibilities as well as the structure that does 
not allow flexibility. These observations, in reflection, seem to be conflicting. It is this 
employee who also says: ‘Sometimes I surprise myself. I can behave quite 
dependent and ask for things I do not really want. I call for procedures and forms, but 
regularly think: why do I need all these procedures? I would rather work without 
them. We are looking for grip, but all the forms and formats only cause annoyance.’ 
 
As for Change of organization (goal-oriented and planned process, step-by-step, 
episodic and top-down, rational), the case delivers only a few illustrations. Especially 
at the start of the case, the director’s assignment reflects a rational, episodic and top-
down rationale: ‘Try to make the institute more businesslike and result-oriented’. 
Later, one of the managers follows the same line when he suggests reforming the 
organization (culture).  
 
Research question 2 
How does unilateral control relate to (de-)blocking of changing, organizing and 
learning? 
 
This research question aims at gaining insight into the ‘black box’ between unilateral 
control and changing and organizing. The findings are summarized under some 
specified questions. 
 
How do expressions of unilateral control contribute to recurrent problems? 
Several managers in this case emphasize that they are fed up with giving more and 
more (of the same), without coming any further. The recurrent problems in the longer 
run, despite several initiatives, seem to disclose a dynamically complex situation. 
“When obvious interventions produce nonobvious consequences, there is dynamic 
complexity” (Senge, 1990, p. 71).  
 
The case illustrates a difficult change process and a highly fixed situation. Although 
most actors, managers, team leaders as well as employees, say the current situation 
                                                
16 For numbers of observations, see appendix 4 ‘Cross-case analysis’. 
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is undesirable (espoused theory), together they appear to be very skilful in preserving 
that situation with the way they perceive, behave and intervene (theory-in-use). This 
way, they block changing, organizing and learning. How?  
 
Management hold a strong Subject-Object definition of relations while in several 
instances employees reflect an Object-Subject definition. Some typical quotes by 
managers: 
- ‘How do we get rid of the current attitude of the employees?’ 
- ‘We have to change the culture of this organization.’ 
- ‘We have taken quite a few initiatives, but employees are aversive to 
management’. 
And some typical quotes by employees: 
- ‘I need a manager who inspires me.’ 
- ‘Sometimes I surprise myself. I behave quite dependent and ask for things I do not 
really want.’ 
  
Thus this case illustrates how a Subject-Object perspective of relations is reinforced 
by both managers and employees in a circular way: managers perceive themselves 
as active subjects that (can) impose change on reactive employees, while employees 
perceive themselves as dependent on management actions and behave reactively. 
In this circular pattern, employees tend to distance themselves and put a strong 
responsibility on management’s shoulders. The circular pattern contributes to self-
fulfilling prophecies, as depicted in figure 9.4. 
 
Figure 9.4 Circular pattern between managers and employees 
 
In this circular pattern, managers and employees tend to reason in a linear way and 
repeat their behaviours. Typical illustrations: 
• If employees, from a dependent perspective, expect management to offer 
instruments or instructions, management tend to respond by delivering those 
instruments or instructions (and keep the circularity active). If this appears to lead 
to dissatisfaction, management sometimes stop offering solutions. It seems to be 
either ‘the upper circle’ (hands on), or ‘not the upper circle’ (hands off). They 
cover up the underlying problem: ‘why do they ask for more and more, regardless 
of what we deliver?’ 
• If teachers do not fill out course evaluations properly, management consider 
developing a better system or educating them. They cover up the underlying 
problem: ‘why don’t employees do what we expect them to do?’ 
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• If employees don’t like the way managers respond to their needs, they tend to 
distance themselves and discuss managers’ incompetence amongst peers.  
 
The focus of perception, behaviour and interventions is on the upper circle in Senge’s 
‘shifting the burden’ structure: single-loop learning based on a unilateral control 
model. This leads to recurrent patterns. What keeps management and employees 
from inquiring into the lower circle and asking ‘how do we create the same problems 
time after time?’ 
First, management as well as many employees seem to hold strong beliefs about the 
other ‘party’, without publicly testing them. For example, ‘dialogue presumes the 
ability to reflect, which they lack’, ‘employees find management a priori not okay’, 
‘giving room to work autonomously presumes trust’ and ‘management is responsible 
for changing the situation’. Compare Isaacs (1999): “These beliefs then reinforce 
what we select out to see. We can easily become locked into a way of thinking that is 
hard to change” (p 97). This is in line with Van Dijk (1989), who argues that fixed 
beliefs normally aim at defending and confirming themselves. 
Second, management as well as many employees hold others responsible for the 
recurrent problems (‘I know perfectly well who’s the crazy one’ and ‘The question is, 
who is the cause. That is not us.’). There is little (open) reflection on one’s own 
contribution to the problems. 
Third, both management and employees tend to take distance towards each other (‘I 
reduce my contacts. Actually, I take distance’ and ‘I don’t even try again’). There is 
little dialogue with each other about the problems. Managers talk with managers 
about what to do and employees talk with employees about what management 
should do. To avoid dialogue about sensitive issues, people activate defensive 
strategies. These are discussed in later in this section.  
 
Figure 9.5, based on Senge’s ‘shifting the burden system’, summarizes these 
observations. 
 
Figure 9.5  Unilateral control stimulates symptomatic solutions and blocks fundamental 
  solutions 
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An additional element that blocks change, though not an element of the theory in this 
study, is the element of ‘power’ and ‘parties’. In this case people often state that 
‘management’, ‘teachers’ and/or ‘staff’ say or do something, as if all individuals in that 
group act and think exactly the same. Thinking in terms of ‘parties’ seems to lead to 
ignorance of individual differences, de-personification (it is relatively easy to say ugly 
things about a party) and a struggle for power (which party is in charge?). Illustrative 
quotes are: 
• management: ‘But we know that the game for power will be played and that the 
employees will organize themselves.’ 
• employees: ‘But let us be honest. We can talk as if we are equal, but 
management has more influence. After all, we are dependent. So they have to 
start.’ 
Both managers and employees (both ‘parties’) bring in the power issue on a regular 
basis. The issue can be linked to the blocking effect of a unilateral control model: 
both ‘parties’ try to impose their reality on the other party and both parties are 
hindered in having a pro-active contribution because they think ‘the other party’ 
behaves from a power model and success is dependent on this other party. Which is 
probably right: the more they think in terms of parties, the more power thinking ‘on 
both sides’. Beside this perspective, the power issue might have another 
consequence: it may lead to parties just not willing to learn, not willing to have a 
dialogue and just wanting the other party to lose or leave.  
 
What circular patterns are visible? 
As discussed, this case illustrates repetitive behaviour by both managers and 
employees, reinforced by strong but unchecked beliefs about the other ‘party’, the 
expectance that others are responsible for problems, and little reflection on one’s 
own contribution to the problems. This repetitive behaviour leads to circular patterns. 
The patterns have in common that they are built on this strong Subject-Object 
perspective that managers as well as employees hold. 
 
Typical circular patterns that are illustrated in this case are described below.  
 
Manager initiates change process, employees (act as if they) follow 
The more managers consider themselves as being capable of and responsible for 
imposing changes upon employees, the more they push employees into a following 
(dependent, reactive) position, the more managers are confirmed in their belief they 
should impose changes, etcetera. 
 
Manager expects resistance and braces himself, employees respond negatively and oppose 
The more managers expect employees will show resistance, the more they tend to 
brace themselves and persuade, the more employees respond negatively and 
develop resistance, the more managers brace themselves, etcetera. 
 
Manager active; employees reactive 
The more initiative managers take (executing change actions, organizing meetings, 
taking, chairing meetings, stressing the need for change), the more reactive and 
dependent employees behave, etcetera.  
 
 P = Perception  B = Behaviour  I = Intervention O = Design of organization  C = Change of organization 
212 
Manager tries to motivate and inspire employees; employees feel lack of motivation and 
inspiration 
The more managers try to motivate and inspire their employees, the less they feel 
responsible for their own motivation and the more they feel dependent on the 
manager’s capability to motivate and inspire, the more managers need to motivate 
and inspire, etcetera.  
 
Manager solves employees’ problems; employees bring in their problems 
The more managers deliver the instruments that employees ask for, the more 
employees keep asking for instruments (instead of bringing in their underlying 
needs), the more managers deliver instruments (instead of inquiring into underlying 
needs), etcetera. 
 
Manager feels uncomfortable and takes distance; employees feel uncomfortable and take 
distance 
The more uncomfortable managers feel, the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable employees feel the more distance they take, the more uncomfortable 
managers feel, etcetera. 
 
Manager implements control instruments; employees resist management initiatives  
The more managers enlarge control, the more employees believe managers are not 
a positive role model and resist management initiatives, the less management 
influence, the more managers enlarge control, etcetera.  
 
These circular patterns go on as long as no one makes them debatable. In order to 
avoid inquiry, one uses defensive strategies. 
 
What defensive strategies are visible? 
Defensive strategies are considered to be specific behaviours and actions that block 
the lower circle of Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ and thus block fundamental solutions. 
Defensive strategies aim at making sensitive issues undiscussable. Or, in Argyris’ 
terms, defensive strategies cover sensitive issues up and undermine learning and 
changing. This way, defensive strategies support preservation of the current reality 
without making this debatable or even visible. 
 
The last session with management, team leaders and teachers delivers the most 
striking example of defensiveness in this case. While all attendees agree that ‘we can 
only get any further if we are willing to reflect on our own contribution to recurrent 
patterns’, in a break employees talk negatively about management and don’t seem to 
be able or willing to reflect on their own role. This seems to uncover an ‘undergo 
strategy’ during the plenary session: ‘we just act as if we commit, even if we don’t’. 
Later, while all parties know about the discussions in this subgroup, neither 
employees nor managers nor interventionist make this openly debatable. All try to 
maintain ‘the good atmosphere that we do not really have’. This is an example of the 
‘ignorance strategy’: just ignore the information that is difficult to deal with. Compare 
Senge (1990): “To retain their power, defensive routines must remain undiscussable. 
Teams stay stuck in their defensive routines only when they pretend that they don’t 
have any defensive routines, that everything is all right, and that they can say 
‘anything’” (p. 255).  
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This case illustrates nine defensive strategies: 
• Compliance strategy: in case of threat, say that you comply (regardless of 
whether you really do). 
• Ignorance strategy: act as if it is interesting, though ignore the information that is 
difficult to deal with. 
• Blame strategy: in case of embarrassment or threat, blame others. 
• Assume strategy: keep strong assumptions about others and situations private. 
• ‘We’ strategy: in case of threat, talk about ‘our responsibility’ and ‘we should pay 
attention to the problems’ (as a consequence, nobody has to feel personally 
responsible). 
• Undergo strategy: in case of threat, just undergo the intervention (passively) and 
do not make the producing patterns debatable.  
• Plan strategy: agree to make a plan and act as if you comply with the plan. 
• Withdraw strategy: in case of difficulties in the communication between manager 
and employee, withdraw and discuss the difficulties with peers. 
• Shirk strategy: shift the responsibility to an ‘outsider’ and avoid sharing your own 
opinion about the process or colleagues. 
 
How do leaders de-block changing, organizing and learning? 
As described, changing and learning are quite problematic in this case. Leaders as 
well as many employees tend to stick to their beliefs about the other party and find it 
hard to reflect on their own contribution to the recurrent problems. The managers, 
especially the director, have no problems with understanding the circular patterns 
that the interventionist shares with them. The difficulty seems to be to accept that 
they have to start changing their behaviour before anything can change. Illustrative 
quotes are:  
- ‘Actually we are fed up with giving more and more’. 
- ‘Actually we have a double bind assignment: ‘give more attention to people who 
push you away’. 
- ‘Giving room to work autonomously presumes trust, which is betrayed by some’  
With negative emotions, feeling that one is let down or treated unpleasantly, it is 
difficult to take distance, reflect on one’s own role and change one’s approach.  
 
The interventionist tries to support learning by showing that giving more and more is 
probably not the solution, as the current strategy does not seem to improve the 
situation. He tries to help them to show different behaviour by giving concrete 
illustrations of what they could say and do time after time. After repetitive feedback of 
circular patterns and his contribution to these patterns, and many illustrations of an 
alternative approach, the director really makes a behavioural shift. Typical 
expressions of his different approach: 
 
• Reflection and experimentation: ‘I don’t know how I will succeed in this new 
strategy, but I am going to find out.’ 
• Making sensitive issues debatable by addressing them: ‘I know that there is too 
large a distance between employees and management.’ 
• Self-disclosure and public reflection upon the way one contributes to lack of 
learning: ‘We do not communicate enough and effectively. I personally don’t.’ 
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• Making circularity visible: ‘There are all kinds of circular patterns that create 
recurrent problems and we seem to be stuck in it together: the more we, 
management, have the feeling that employees don’t pick things up, the greater 
our inclination to enlarge control, the more defensiveness of employees, the more 
control… And I take responsibility for my part.’ 
• Being proactive: ‘I want to organize sessions with employees in order to share 
mutual feedback. We have to find out together how we can communicate and 
work better.’ 
The consequence of the director’s approach is that employees respond positively. 
They appreciate the director’s vulnerability, which contributes to the common 
statement that ‘we can only come any further if we are willing to reflect on our own 
contribution to recurrent patterns’. Later, this appears to be not consistent with the 
behaviour of at least some employees. 
 
Six months after the last session that the interventionist attended, an evaluation 
meeting takes place. In this meeting some employees, a manager and the director 
discuss the current reality with the interventionist. During the meeting there is a 
different atmosphere, that is confirmed by findings that they share: there is better 
communication, all parties tend to find solutions together instead of working against 
each other, in case of problems people tend to talk to each other instead of about 
each other and people tend to consider more often how they can contribute to 
improvement themselves. Employees also agree that managers are more open in 
their communication, though this is still vulnerable. According to the director, there 
seems to be a delayed effect.  
 
Research question 3 
How do interventions contribute to (de-)blocking changing, organizing and learning? 
 
The aim of this research question is to develop an intervention perspective that 
contributes to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning. 
 
This case delivers interesting illustrations of how commonly used interventions can 
contribute to blocked changing and organizing as well as how interventions can 
support changing and organizing. In addition, the role of the interventionist develops 
during the case. 
 
From the beginning, the situation is strongly characterized by recurrent problems, 
circular patterns and defensive strategies. The assignment is to help the organization 
in their attempts to change successfully. In other words, the assignment focuses on 
exactly the contents of this study. During this tough process, the interventionist 
develops beliefs about management and employees and becomes defensive at 
several moments. Besides, he learns that some intervention methods do not and 
others do contribute to changing, organizing and learning. The insights are presented 
below. 
 
Interviews as a bypass 
The interventionist conducts a number of interviews with employees in order to gain 
insight into their perceptions and beliefs regarding the current reality, analyses this 
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information, develops temporary conclusions and presents these outcomes to the 
management team. As a consequence, managers become defensive as they have 
heard employees’ visions too often and do not agree with them. In effect, the 
interventionist becomes defensive, as he does not like the managers offending his 
outcomes. It becomes clear that this methodology does not support learning and 
changing, because 
- the interventionist, just like managers and employees, ‘imposes’ his beliefs 
(outcomes) as a truth upon the managers, and 
- the analysis leads to abstractions that lack valid information. 
 
As described before, the interventionist could better have shared ‘raw material’ with 
the managers and inquired into the meaning of this together with the managers. 
Possible defensiveness from management could have been a source of inquiry as 
well. An important notion refers to employees’ anonymity. This issue uncovers the 
doubtful value of interviewing as a methodology in situations with interpersonal, 
behavioural and communication problems. The question is, what is the added value 
of information that employees would not share with their manager and the 
interventionist cannot share with their manager? For this reason, direct 
communication between managers and employees is to be preferred in such 
situations. The emphasis of the interventionist’s activities in this case concerns 
attending sessions, collecting directly observable data and sharing interpretations in 
the ‘here and now’.  
 
The limited value of this intervention is not only methodological, but also relates to 
the interventionist’s defensiveness when he is confronted with managers’ 
defensiveness. Here it becomes visible how the interventionist activates a unilateral 
control model when he is confronted with managers who are opposed to the 
outcomes of the interviews. Their behaviours relate circularly, as depicted in figure 
9.3. 
 
Self-censoring by interventionist  
The case illustrates moments of self-censoring by the interventionist, meaning that he 
withholds valid information from the managers and blocks learning (compare Argyris’ 
social virtues of Model I: Respect for others means “Defer to other people and do not 
confront their reasoning or actions” (1990, pp. 106-107). 
Typical beliefs that the interventionist does not openly share with the managers, are 
- Are they really prepared to learn? 
- Are they prepared to reflect on their own role? 
- We are acting as if there is a good atmosphere, but I know that individuals are not 
saying what they think. 
- Each time employees show ‘difficult’ behaviour, the director says that this is 
typically part of the system. This reaction is also typically part of the system. 
- I am not sure if we can manage the effects of making the undiscussable 
discussable. 
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The underlying reasoning and beliefs are that the interventionist does not want to 
give the director feedback when the other managers are there, as this would harm his 
reputation. Besides, the director is his client and should not be pushed into a difficult 
position. This way, he saves the director’s face. Moreover, the interventionist does 
not really believe that the director wants to reflect on his own role. This belief highly 
resembles the director’s belief about the employees’ limited ability to reflect. In the 
end, all parties, including the interventionist, doubt the ability of others to reflect and 
learn, and therefore keep their beliefs private and block learning. Compare Isaacs 
(1999): “These beliefs then reinforce what we select out to see. We can easily 
become locked into a way of thinking that is hard to change” (p 97). 
Another belief that stimulates self-censoring is that the interventionist has to re-
establish the relationship and his position after a session that led to managers’ 
defensiveness. His reasoning: ‘as managers were not satisfied with the process in 
one meeting, they might have lost confidence in me. Thus, I have to re-establish the 
relationship and my position. This does not allow me to confront painful issues.’ 
Mutual learning would have meant sharing this reasoning, checking how valid it is 
and checking if managers have a different view. 
 
Interventions that contribute to de-blocking of changing, organizing and learning 
While attending sessions in the organization, the interventionist tries to support 
changing and learning. The basics of his interventions are directly observable data in 
the sessions. This case illustrates several elements of an intervention perspective 
that seems to support changing, organizing and learning. 
 
Openly share what one fears to share regarding the effect of the leader’s actions  
In one conversation with the director the interventionist shares his hesitations about 
being open about his observations and beliefs, as he does not see that the director 
tends to learn. This conversation contributes to an open relationship between director 
and interventionist and lays a foundation for later meetings. 
 
Invite to share valid data  
Instead of talking about abstract interpretations (‘Regardless of what we do, 
employees are anti-management’), ask for valid and directly observable data: ‘How 
do you know that you are right?’ ‘Have you got an example?’ ‘What exactly 
happened?’  
 
Stimulate inquiry into beliefs and actions 
Share that ‘more of the same’ is probably not effective. By asking questions about 
the effects of one’s beliefs and actions, the interventionist stimulates reflection on 
one’s own contribution to blocked changing. 
- Confront unchecked beliefs: ‘By holding these assumptions without inquiring into 
them, they tend to turn into self-fulfilling prophecies as they filter what you 
perceive’.  
- Inquire into the effect of one’s beliefs on one’s actions: ‘What is the effect of this 
belief on your actions?’  
- Inquire into the effect of his actions: ‘How does he respond to your behaviour?’  
- Explore the extent to which one is satisfied with these effects: ‘Are you satisfied 
with the effects of your actions? Do you succeed in changing the situation this 
way? If not, how can you continue saying that you are doing the right things?’ 
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- Share how one contributes to one’s own problems: ‘I am afraid you produce your 
own problems: you have beliefs about him, you assume it does not help to share 
these beliefs, you take his responsibility away, you think this will make him less 
secure and you are busier and busier.’ 
 
Share circularity and help managers/employees to reflect upon their contribution to the 
problem 
Confront circular patterns and one’s contribution to the problems that one faces: 
‘Could there possibly be a circular pattern: the more active the managers, the more 
reactive and dependent the employees and vice versa?’ The underlying assumption 
is that by stimulating awareness of how one contributes to the recurrent patterns, it 
will be difficult to repeat these actions on purpose. 
Confront inconsistency neutrally 
Confront inconsistency neutrally (‘what you say and what you do are inconsistent’), 
present possible consistent choices equally and invite to make conscious and free 
choices so that people can feel responsible: ‘I do not expect you to do anything. But 
whatever your choice is, try to be consistent. Either keep doing the same things as 
you do and accept some tension and discomfort (and do not complain about it), or 
contribute to changing by reflection on your own role. To me it is a free choice.’ 
This way, managers are helped to be consistent and reduce defensiveness.  
 
Share alternatives and make them actionable 
In many situations the interventionist shares alternative strategies and illustrates 
literally what one could say to stimulate mutual learning. Some examples:  
• ‘Getting rid of an attitude is probably not possible without inquiring into your own 
role. Be clear about your hesitations and dilemmas in the process and be 
prepared to inquire into the patterns that stimulate the attitude you want to get rid 
of: ‘I see this behaviour and to be honest, I would like to get rid of it. Still, I 
understand I cannot just say ‘stop it’. What do I do that stimulates your attitude?’’ 
• ‘What if you shared your dilemma openly with him? Such as: ‘I am hesitating. I 
would like to give you the opportunity to take this responsibility. However, I feel 
insecure because I get no signs that you’re working on it. How shall we organize 
this situation?’’ 
• ‘Now you face a dilemma: they ask for something you don’t wish to give anymore. 
Try to be open about that: ‘I feel that I cannot satisfy you. Regardless of the 
amount of procedures and attention I give, you ask for even more. As if we are 
stuck in a circular pattern. If this does not satisfy you, then what is it really you 
need?’’ 
Compare Argyris (1990), who states, “the advice should contain the action strategies 
(e.g. advocate your position in a way that encourages inquiry). Second, it should be 
accompanied by actual statements that illustrate what you would have to say and do” 
(p. 87). 
 
Teach the concepts 
In this case the interventionist conducted workshops on blocked changing and 
learning, circular patterns, defensiveness, and unilateral control versus mutual 
learning. In these workshops people become acquainted with the concepts and how 
the current reality is maintained. There were concrete examples of experimenting 
with these new insights. An example of an employee, one day after he has joined the 
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workshop: ‘I want to try something that I have learned from A (interventionist). My 
belief was that if we ask for more information and bring in our frustration time after 
time, that we will reach our goal, but I doubt if this assumption is valid.’ 
 
Reduce (time) pressure  
As pressure tends to activate a unilateral control model, it appears to be effective to 
reduce pressure by slowing down. The more pressure there is, the more automatic 
behaviour and less freedom to choose behaviour. This case illustrates that taking 
time helps all participants, including the interventionist, to inquire into the patterns 
and the way one contributes to them.  
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10. Cross-case analysis: moving moments compared 
 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the outcomes of the cases are mutually compared. Just like the within-
case analysis at the end of each case, the structure in this chapter follows the 
research questions. In each section the outcomes of the cases are summarized and 
similarities and differences are addressed. Subsequently, differences are interpreted 
and, if possible, explained. In principle, discussion of the results is limited to 
similarities and differences. In chapter 11, Conclusions and discussion, the outcomes 
will be discussed more elaboratively. This chapter starts with a summary of the point 
of departure and the results of the cases. 
 
 
10.2 Point of departure and results 
 
Before the three cases are submitted to a cross-case analysis, in this section the 
character of the three cases, as well as the results, are mutually compared. 
 
A first subject is the point of departure of the cases. As argued by Eden & Huxham 
(1996), action research demands an integral involvement by the researcher and 
intent to change the organization. All cases are combined consultancy and research 
projects. The problem in the organization that leads to the invitation of an 
interventionist (consultant) plays a pivotal role. The point of departure of the cases is 
summarized below.  
 
Case 1:  Communication problems between management and employees, 
leading to employees’ fear and a negative working climate. 
Case 2:  Desire to develop from ‘a product seller to a service supplier’, which 
requires the development of an entrepreneurial and customer-oriented 
culture and working methods. 
Case 3:  Communication and interaction problems between management and 
employees, leading to blocked changing. 
 
Unlike case 2, cases 1 and 3 focus on problems that relate to communication and 
interaction leading to blocked changing. In the past, interventions had been 
conducted that did not lead to improvement of the situation. These situations are 
dynamically complex from scratch: “When obvious interventions produce nonobvious 
consequences, there is dynamic complexity” (Senge, 1990, p. 71). The character of 
these cases is directly related to the subject of this study. Although the consultant is 
involved during a specific period, the cases do not have the character of episodic 
change as the problem relates to the daily interactions that do or do not support 
changing and organizing. 
The starting point of the second case is different. The change process does not stem 
from a negative current reality, but is rather a consequence of the strategic shift of 
this company that should contribute to a new position in the market. This process can 
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be characterized as strategy implementation. This assignment focuses on a 
combination of ‘hard’ improvement of customer processes and ‘soft’ development of 
an entrepreneurial, customer-oriented and proactive culture. While the improvement 
of working processes can be characterized as an episodic change project, the 
development of a different culture relates strongly to the daily interactions between 
managers and employees. In the light of this study, the focus will be on these 
interactions.  
 
As to the results of the cases, all show some improvement regarding the diagnosed 
problem. In case 1 (some) managers illustrate that they can put some insights into 
practice, e.g. by confronting circularity and defensiveness and developing 
approaches that break through circularity. Furthermore, the employee satisfaction 
survey demonstrates higher scores on the quality of communication after the period 
that is described. Case 2 has two faces. The customer satisfaction survey shows 
higher scores on the quality of the processes and service. The main focus of the 
managers and interventionist has been on this subject. However, regarding the long-
term aim to create more pro-activity and entrepreneurship, results are less 
convincing. During the course of the case, some managers show the ability to deal 
with non-routine and dynamically complex situations in action. Cynically, they are all 
persons who have had difficulties during the process and, as a consequence, got 
intensive personal support on how to deal with difficult situations. What the case 
teaches, is the difficulty to work on a single-loop and linear improvement process and 
at the same time organize enough reflection for double-loop and circular problems. 
Although the process in case 3 is laborious, in the end managers and employees 
start a learning process and after half a year they report improvement regarding open 
communication, learning and changing.  
 
 
10.3 Cross-case analysis research question 1: 
To what extent are the expressions of unilateral control visible in interactions?  
 
The aim of this research question is to develop and validate a diagnostic model that 
helps to perceive and understand expressions of a control model in practice. 
 
The transcripts of all cases have been encoded, based on the diagnostic model that 
is introduced in section 2.9 (figure 2.20). Appendix 4 ‘Cross-case analysis’ 
summarizes how often each expression of unilateral control is noticed in the cases. 
As can be derived from this overview, all cases deliver illustrations of three 
expressions of unilateral control: Perception (reductionism, distancing, blaming, linear 
perception and S-O relations), Behaviour (controlling circumstances, repeated 
behaviour, stronger control in case of threat and reactive behaviour) and 
Interventions (focus on symptoms, cover-up of underlying patterns, quick wins and 
focus on impersonal instruments).  
 
Without exception, the cases deliver only few observations regarding Design of 
organization (positional organization, variety reduction, S-O relations and 
organization/change as separated entities) and Change of organization (goal-
oriented and planned process, step-by-step, episodic and top-down, rational).  
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Illustrations of Change of organization are especially visible at the start of the three 
cases, when leaders, managers and interventionists discuss the change approach. 
Here it becomes visible how people tend to think and talk about change. Later, during 
the process, the change approach is no longer the subject of discussion. As a 
consequence, there are few relevant observations during the process. Afterwards, in 
reflection, it is questionable if this is effective. An ‘open consultancy approach’ would 
suppose continuous reflection upon one’s role, behaviour and (change) approach 
(Ardon, 2002, p. 175).  
Case 2 and 3 deliver observations regarding Design of organization. These 
observations relate to the discussion about organization structure at the start (O 
positional), the wish to implement a uniform culture (O subject-object) and the focus 
on instruments and formats that aim at standardisation (O variety reduction). 
Generally, these cases do not focus on design issues. As a consequence, they do 
not strongly illustrate expressions of unilateral control in this area. 
 
Design and Change of organization (as defined here) seem to be of a different order 
than the other expressions, as the former are vulnerable to espoused theory. In 
talking and on paper one can easily describe a certain way of design and change of 
organization, however, in action one actually blocks or de-blocks changing and 
organizing through the way one perceives, behaves and intervenes. This finding will 
be involved in the diagnostic model. 
 
The analytical process of encoding the transcripts led to a number of insights 
regarding the diagnostic model (figure 2.20). Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish 
between two expressions because they can both be used to encode the situation. 
This is especially the case with the combination of ‘repeated behaviour regardless of 
ineffectiveness’ and ‘stronger control in case of threat’. One could argue that these 
expressions should be combined into one. Still, the specific meaning of both 
expressions is not identical. The analysis does not lead to decisive reasons to 
change the expressions in the diagnostic model. 
 
 
10.4 Cross-case analysis research question 2: 
How does unilateral control relate to (de)blocking of changing, organizing and 
learning? 
 
This research question aims at gaining insight into the relation between unilateral 
control and (blocked) changing and organizing. The findings are summarized under 
some specified questions. 
 
How do expressions of unilateral control contribute to recurrent problems? 
A comparison of the outcomes of the three cases regarding this question leads to an 
overview as depicted in table 10.1. 
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How do expressions of unilateral control 
contribute to recurrent problems? 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
Unilateral control activates activities in the upper 
circle: quick symptomatic solutions, pressure, linear 
thinking. 
X X X 
Unilateral control activates defensive strategies that 
block the lower circle: no inquiry into the underlying 
problems and maintenance of the current situation. 
X X X 
Symptomatic solutions (upper circle) and lack of 
learning (lower cycle) lead to repetitive patterns and 
recurrent problems. 
X X X 
Director and managers hold a Subject-Object 
definition of relations, leading to circular patterns. 
X X X 
Director and managers, as well as employees, hold 
strong beliefs about the situation and others though 
do not check them. 
X X X 
If director/manager tries to change his approach 
unilaterally, employees push him back into his 
routine behaviour and – thus – defend the system. 
X  X 
Thinking in parties and power: ‘who is going to 
win?’ 
  X 
Table 10.1 Contribution of unilateral control to recurrent problems 
 
Taking Senge’s (1990) ‘shifting the burden’ system as a framework, the cases lead to 
a number of mutually related outcomes: a unilateral model activates the upper circle, 
which can be characterized as actions with a short-term, linear and single-loop 
character. In dynamically complex situations these actions do not lead to lasting 
improvements, as they do not cover the underlying problem that produces the 
symptoms. This distinction is clearly illustrated in case 2: activities in the upper circle 
induce short-term and linear solutions, e.g. quicker responses to customers and 
better telephone management. Unlike these relatively simple situations, the long-term 
aims like improvement of entrepreneurship and pro-activity are not realized by 
activities in the upper circle. All cases show that the activities in the upper circle are 
strongly governed by a Subject-Object definition of relations: director and managers 
consider themselves as the ones who inquire, develop knowledge and design and 
implement necessary changes based on this knowledge (Hosking, 2004). Especially 
in case 3 it becomes clear that this definition of relations is not only held by 
managers, but also by employees who consider themselves as dependent on 
managers’ actions. All cases show that, in the process of changing, managers as well 
as employees tend to hold strong beliefs about others that influence their behaviour.  
 
Besides, all cases illustrate that unilateral control leads to activation of defensive 
strategies that block the lower circle in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ (solving the 
underlying or fundamental problem). As these cases show, as long as one repeats 
the same activities, contributes to circular patterns and does not reflect upon one’s 
own contribution to the problems, one produces repetitive patterns and recurrent 
problems.   
 
Cases 1 and 3 provide illustrations of the ‘system that protects itself’: when managers 
try to break through circular patterns, initially they tend to be pushed back by the 
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environment they have created by their unilateral control. For example, when a 
manager changes his behaviour (e.g., instead of unilateral instruction, stimulation of 
employees to bring in their own ideas), employees push him back into the behaviour 
they are used to though do not like (‘but what is your opinion?’). As a consequence, it 
is difficult to induce immediate effects and a delay has to be taken into account. Case 
2 does not deliver clear examples of this inclination to push the manager back. This 
could well be explained by the different character of this case. It is not problematic 
interaction or communication that is the direct cause of this change process. 
Although the interactions during the process appear to have a high resemblance to 
case 1 and 3, the patterns are probably less ingrained and self-protective. These 
findings are related to Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ systemic pattern in figure 10.1. 
 
 
Figure 10.1  Unilateral control stimulates symptomatic solutions and blocks fundamental 
  solutions 
 
Case 3 is distinguished from the other cases by an additional element that blocks 
change: the thinking in terms of ‘parties’ and power. Management as well as 
employees bring in the power issue on a regular basis. In this organization the 
problems have already a relatively long history and people tend to think in parties 
(management, staff, employees) who try to maintain or even strengthen their 
position. This is an important reason why the situation is this strongly fixed. 
 
What circular patterns are visible? 
All cases illustrate circular patterns that lead to recurrent problems. The circular 
patterns that are manifest in the cases are summarized in table 10.2. 
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What circular patterns are visible? 
 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 2 
 
Case 3 
Manager active; employees reactive X X X 
Manager initiates change process, employees (act 
as if they) follow 
X X X 
Manager feels uncomfortable and takes distance; 
employees feel uncomfortable and take distance 
X X X 
Manager talks; employees (act as if they) listen X X  
Manager instructs, employees wait for next 
instruction 
X X  
Manager expects resistance and braces himself, 
employees respond negatively and oppose 
 X X 
Manager tries to motivate and inspire employees; 
employees feel lack of motivation and inspiration 
 X X 
Manager solves problems; employees bring 
problems in 
X  X 
Manager acts as if he knows answers; employees 
act as if they don’t 
X   
Manager pushes to speed up progress; employees 
are passive and wait for their turn 
 X  
Manager implements control instruments; 
employees resist management initiatives 
  X 
Table 10.2 Circular patterns 
 
All circular patterns are different manifestations of the same Subject-Object 
perspective. Three circular patterns have been observed in all cases. The different 
characters of the cases partly explain the differences regarding the other 
manifestations. In case 3, just as in cases 1 and 2, employees tend to respond to 
management’s initiative reactively and dependently. However, unlike cases 1 and 2, 
they do not listen passively or wait for a next instruction. Instead, they respond 
negatively and resist management initiatives. In this light, the difference between the 
last two circular patterns is interesting. In both instances the manager keeps 
enlarging his control, though as a response to (and cause of) opposite employees’ 
reactions. The manager’s reasoning in these cases must be different. In case 2 the 
manager probably thinks: ‘they take no initiative, so I have to act firmly to make 
things happen’. The manager in case 3 might well think: ‘they tend to resist my 
initiatives, so I have to act firmly to keep things under control’. Unlike the reasoning, 
the manifestations of these managers’ strategies are identical. 
 
All these circular patterns have a repetitive character and lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecies as long as one does not reflect on one’s own contribution to the recurrent 
problems. With defensive strategies people succeed in keeping these patterns 
undiscussable. That way, learning is blocked and the current reality is preserved.  
 
What defensive strategies are visible? 
All cases illustrate defensiveness, in this study indicated as so-called ‘defensive 
strategies’. Defensive strategies are considered to be specific behaviours and actions 
that block the lower circle of Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ system and thus block 
fundamental solutions. Defensive strategies aim at making sensitive issues 
undiscussable. Or, in Argyris’ terms, defensive strategies cover sensitive issues up 
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and undermine learning and changing. This way, defensive strategies support 
preservation of the current reality without making debatable the way they do this. 
Table 10.3 summarizes the defensive strategies that have been observed in the 
cases. 
 
 
What defensive 
strategies are visible? 
 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 2 
 
Case 3 
Compliance X X X 
Ignorance X X X 
Distance X X X 
Blame X X X 
Shirk X X X 
Withdraw X X X 
Assume X X X 
Undergo X X X 
‘We’ X  X 
Joke  X   
Reduction X   
Denial X   
Non-intervention X   
Plan   X 
Table 10.3 Defensive strategies 
 
This overview illustrates that eight defensive strategies are visible in all cases. Some 
strategies have been observed in only one or two cases. These will be discussed 
now. The ‘we’ strategy is typically visible in situations amongst peers, e.g. in a 
management team. Unlike cases 1 and 3, the management team discussions in case 
2 tend to focus on the ‘linear part’ of this change process (working processes 
improvement), which is less threatening than discussions about ‘our interactions and 
communication’. Therefore, there is less reason to act ‘as if we are going to change, 
however in reality we won’t’. 
Just like the ‘we’ strategy, the joke, reduction, denial and non-intervention strategies 
are typical for a relation between peers, for example in a management team. Case 1 
has a relatively strong focus on the management team and the way managers 
maintain the current reality. It is these circumstances where these defensive 
strategies seem to flourish.  
As to the plan strategy, it is difficult to find a tenable explanation why this strategy is 
only visible in the last case. It probably could have been observed in the other cases 
as well, though it was not.   
 
In this analysis it should be noticed that the undergo strategy resembles the 
compliance strategy greatly, though it is more passive. While the latter is visible in 
situations in a management team (a direct report says he complies but does not 
really), the undergo strategy typically relates to less direct relationships (a group of 
employees towards management just hear the message and undergo management 
interventions passively and without a sense of responsibility). Or, more concretely, 
with a compliance strategy one says ‘yes’ (as one is not permitted to say nothing) 
and thinks ‘no’, and with an undergo strategy one says nothing and thinks ‘no’. In 
both instances unilateral control leads to invalid information. 
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A further analysis leads to the insight that the defensive strategies do not seem to be 
applicable to all situations. Some strategies are typically displayed by subordinates 
towards superiors, others by superiors towards subordinates, peers towards peers, or 
actors towards interventionist (outsider). Table 10.4 depicts an overview of the 
observed defensive strategies and the social relations in which they are activated in 
the case studies. 
 
 
What defensive 
strategies are 
visible? 
 
 
Subordinates 
towards superiors 
 
Superiors towards 
subordinates 
 
 
Peers towards 
peers 
 
Actors towards 
interventionist 
(outsider) 
Compliance X    
Undergo X    
Plan X  X  
Blame X  X  
Assume X X X  
Withdraw X X X  
Ignorance  X X X 
Reduction  X X X 
Denial  X X X 
Distance   X X 
‘We’   X  
Non-intervention   X  
Joke    X X 
Shirk    X 
Table 10.4 Defensive strategies related to specific relationships 
 
In section 11.3 these outcomes are discussed more elaboratively. All these defensive 
strategies help to block learning, changing and organizing as they block public inquiry 
and reflection.  
 
How do leaders contribute to de-blocking changing and learning? 
Analysis of the cases leads to the outcome that it is far from easy to help leaders to 
change their ingrained routines that are governed by a unilateral control model. This 
is not surprising; the next section shows that it is difficult for the interventionist as 
well. Although not easy, the directors in all cases have succeeded to make 
behavioural shifts after repetitive feedback of circular patterns and their own 
contribution to the problems, as well as many illustrations of an alternative approach. 
The role of the interventionist is discussed in the next section. 
 
The transcripts of all cases have been encoded, based on the operational 
translations in table 5.1. Appendix 4 ‘Cross-case analysis’ summarizes how often 
each expression of (mutual) learning is noticed in the cases. The empirical study 
shows that some alternatives, particularly regarding ‘Interventions’, are strongly 
interrelated and difficult to separate. In the Interventions category, the blocking 
actions all relate to the upper cycle in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure. The de-
blocking alternatives are different ways to refer to inquiry into underlying patterns that 
produce the problem symptoms and defensive routines. Table 10. 5 summarizes the 
 227 
most transparent and convincing expressions of de-blocking perceptions, behaviours 
and interventions that have been observed in the cases.  
 
 
How do leaders contribute to de-blocking 
changing, organizing and learning? 
 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 2 
 
Case 3 
Perceiving circular patterns, including one’s own 
contribution 
X X X 
Reflection and experimentation X X X 
Making circularity visible X X X 
Self-disclosure and public reflection upon the way 
one contributes to lack of learning 
X X X 
Being proactive X X X 
Making sensitive issues debatable  X  X 
Sharing valid information that one fears to share X X  
Confronting defensive strategies X   
Inquiring into underlying patterns  X  
Table 10.5  How leaders de-block changing, organizing and learning 
 
All cases illustrate how leaders adopt the concept of circularity. The concept appears 
to be relatively accessible, as it shows how the leader contributes to the problem he 
faces in a way that is not very threatening: his behaviour is both cause and effect. 
This way, the concept reduces blaming of individuals and/or groups. Feedback of 
circular patterns by the interventionist, in all cases, leads to leaders’ reflection and 
experimentation: what could they do to break through the vicious circle? Initially, 
leaders tend to think up new strategies privately, with the interventionist or with 
peers. However, this would block mutual learning, as they are not open about the 
new strategy towards the other actors. Cases 1 and 3 in particular provide some 
illustrations on what happens if a person changes behaviour unilaterally without 
being open about the underlying reasoning. In these situations the employees try to 
push the managers back into their usual behaviour. Or, in other words, the system 
protects itself. In the second instance and after feedback from the interventionist, the 
leaders in all cases discuss circular patterns with the relevant parties openly. As they 
are part of the circular pattern themselves, it appears to be only a small step to self-
disclosure and public reflection upon the way they contribute to blocked changing, 
organizing and learning. This way one is proactive, as one does not expect the other 
to start changing. 
 
Unlike these relatively ‘safe’ strategies, the cases do not all illustrate some other 
ways to de-block changing, organizing and learning. In case 1 leader and managers 
show the most convincing change, as illustrated by the way they start confronting 
defensive strategies and sensitive issues. Typical illustrations are 
‘Let’s not focus on other parties. Let’s start with our own role’ (distance strategy). 
‘Gentlemen, we are changing the subject by making jokes’ (joke strategy). 
 ‘Communication and safety is a sensitive subject, as we have just announced that X 
will have to leave.’ 
In this case the interventionist has been most explicit of all the cases in his feedback 
of defensive strategies. This probably explains why they have learned to confront 
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these strategies themselves. Furthermore, in some instances people try to share 
valid data that they had feared to share before. Two examples: 
‘Well, I see that changing the atmosphere in this organization really requires us to 
change. The question is, do we really want to change and are we able to change? 
We should take more time for our people. Do we want that?’ 
And: ‘I thought it was all logical and clear. Now I see your opinions differ from mine. 
Apparently, it was my logic and clearness.’ 
 
In case 2 it is especially the change of one manager and his team who succeed in 
taking a large step forward, after a difficult session that illustrated painfully that he did 
not come any further with unilateral control. The manager convincingly illustrates how 
to share valid information: ‘I don’t want yes-men. Let’s be honest, it would be easy if 
you just followed. However, I appreciate you being honest about your thoughts and 
feelings. Still, it is not always easy to deal with. I expect you to take responsibility as 
well. Can you imagine?’ 
 
The leader in case 3 has a great deal of difficulty in changing and being pro-active. 
Finally, he succeeds in discussing circular patterns and his own contribution and 
dares to address the sensitive subject in this organization: ‘I know that there is too 
large a distance between employees and management. […] We do not communicate 
enough and effectively. I personally don’t.’ 
 
All cases illustrate positive effects: 
• Subordinates (managers, team leaders or employees) open themselves up and 
make their contribution to blocked changing discussable (case 1, 2, 3). 
• Subordinates confront circularity and/or defensiveness in the team (case 1, 2, 3). 
• Employees talk positively about director/managers who are more open to them 
(case 1, 2, 3). 
• Managers copy the behaviour towards their own employees (case 1, 3). 
 
 
10.5 Cross-case analysis research question 3: 
How do interventions contribute to (de-)blocking changing, organizing and 
learning? 
 
The aim of this research question is to develop an intervention perspective that 
contributes to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning.  
 
The outcomes of each case illustrate that the interventionist contributes to blocking 
as well as de-blocking of changing, organizing and learning. The cases illustrate how 
the interventionist, just like managers, activates the upper circle of Senge’s ‘shifting 
the burden’ system, activates circular patterns and defensiveness. Beside these 
blocking contributions, the cases illustrate how interventions support changing, 
organizing and learning. The findings are elaborated below. 
 
Circumstances that stimulate the interventionist to activate a unilateral control model 
The interventionists tend to activate a unilateral control theory-in-use in situations 
they perceive as threatening or embarrassing. The cases describe a number of 
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specific circumstances, as summarized below. The circumstances are accompanied 
with the reasoning that leads to activation of a unilateral control model and the case 
that illustrate them. 
• The interventionist’s role, approach, findings and/or added value are at stake 
(cases 1, 2 and 3). 
Reasoning: there are signals that might relate to reducing confidence in my role, 
approach, findings and/or added value, so I have to (re-)establish my position. 
• It is a major opportunity that has to succeed (case 2). 
Reasoning: this is a new client and the business unit of a large company. This 
project has to be successful in the eyes of the client, as it might lead to new 
opportunities.  
• The relationship with the client is difficult (case 2). 
Reasoning: it is difficult to get contact with the client. This does not feel 
comfortable and I should try to get in touch with him in order to work together. 
• The client is critical (case 2). 
Reasoning: the client seems to perceive us as ‘suppliers’. He takes distance, 
seems not to accept a personal relationship and tends to be rather critical. I have 
to please the client and deliver quality, which means I have to organize things 
very well, should contribute to quick visible results and should keep things under 
control.   
• The relationship must be (re-)established (case 3). 
Reasoning: the relationship with some managers seems not to be optimal, so I 
have to work on the relationship. This means I have to support these persons and 
I cannot confront painful issues (anymore). 
 
Expressions of unilateral control by the interventionist 
The cases provide illustrations of the interventionist who activates a unilateral control 
model. The perceptions, behaviours and interventions that are governed by this 
unilateral control model typically fit the upper circle of Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ 
system. The cases that explicitly illustrate a specific expression are put in brackets.   
• Proving one has everything under control (cases 1, 2 and 3). 
• Proving one’s added value through (immediate) answers, analysis and solutions 
(cases 1, 2 and 3). 
• Persuading others how they could act more effectively (cases 1, 2 and 3). 
• Taking distance and not involving one’s own role (cases 1, 2 and 3). 
• Confirming the manager who expects resistance and helping him to think up 
strategies to break through this resistance (case 2). 
 
These expressions have in common that they are based upon beliefs and reasoning 
that are not being publicly tested, which blocks learning and lead to circular patterns. 
 
Circular patterns between interventionist and client 
The cases illustrate some examples of circular patterns between the interventionist 
and the client system, which are summarized below. 
• Interventionist is active (takes initiative), participants are passive/dependent 
(cases 1, 2 and 3). 
• Interventionist feeds back, participants wait, see and keep their feedback private 
(‘that is an interesting analysis!’) (cases 1, 2 and 3). 
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• Interventionist participates, manager directs difficult issues to interventionist (case 
1). 
• Interventionist talks with employees about their role, manager feels less 
responsible (case 1). 
• Interventionist acts as a ‘partner-in-business’ with manager and helps to break 
through supposed resistance, employees perceive interventionist as a partner of 
management and respond negatively to both (case 2). 
• Interventionist persuades managers to accept outcomes, managers resist them 
(case 3). 
• The most fundamental one: Interventionist is present, participants feel less 
responsible (take distance) (case 1). 
 
The first and second pattern can be observed in all cases and seem to be most 
dominant. These patterns disclose a strong bias by the interventionist towards giving 
feedback. In the course of the cases, the interventionist moves in the direction of 
feedback in combination with inquiry. In the first case, most feedback takes place at 
the end of meetings. This leaves relatively little time for public testing and inquiry. As 
a consequence, the emphasis is on feedback of the interventionist’s subjective 
reflections. In the relationship the interventionist is the active Subject who is able to 
understand what happens, and the actors in the client system are dependent 
Objects. Similar to managers and employees, this illustrates that the interventionist 
and actors in a client system can easily hold a Subject-Object perspective. In case 2 
the interventionist often shares his feedback during the meeting, which leaves room 
for reactions. Still, in reflection, the interventionist seldom asks if he is missing 
something. Thus, he does not advocate his beliefs in a way that invites public testing 
(Argyris, 1992; Noonan, 2007, Schwarz, 2002). In the third case there is much more 
interactive reflection between interventionist, managers and employees during the 
sessions. This is partly because the interventionist is learning and partly because 
participants are more explicit in their defensiveness.  
 
The similarity in the relation between management and employees on the one hand 
and interventionist and management on the other hand is striking. Just as employees 
tend to respond dependently to active management, management respond 
dependently to an active interventionist in case 1. And while employees tend to 
respond resistantly to active management in case 3, management respond similarly 
to an active interventionist. Based on these observations, the circular patterns 
between management and employees in an organization seem to be identical to 
circular patterns between the interventionist and management and/or employees. 
 
Some circular patterns have not been illustrated in all cases. Case 1 illustrates some 
patterns that relate to the very presence of the interventionist that makes the others 
feel less responsible. The more active the interventionist is, the more dependent and 
passive the other participants are. This dependency is probably less visible in the 
other cases because the interventionist has been more explicit in his role towards 
participants: not to take over the responsibility, but to support learning. This makes 
participants less expectant and stimulates them to take their own responsibility.  
In case 2, the interventionist initially tends to take a role as a ‘partner-in-business’ 
and to help management to ‘implement their strategic ambitions’. In this role, it is not 
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surprising that this case demonstrates the circular consequences of being associated 
with (the unilateral control of) management. 
Case 3 illustrates how interventionist and managers become stuck in a circular way, 
as the interventionist thinks he has to persuade management to reflect upon their 
own role. As he presents employees’ views as conclusions (that managers have 
already heard several times), he stimulates the defensiveness that he wishes to 
reduce. 
 
These circular patterns recur as long as interventionist and actors in the client system 
do not reflect on these patterns including their own contribution to them, do not 
openly share their beliefs and reasoning and make sensitive but crucial issues 
undiscussable. 
 
Interventionist’s defensive strategies 
Just like managers and employees, the interventionist in these cases blocks inquiry 
and learning by defensive strategies from time to time. Although there are no 
illustrations of active attempts to make issues undiscussable, such as the joke or 
reduction strategy, the interventionist does not openly share his beliefs and 
reasoning several times. In these cases the interventionist demonstrates three 
defensive strategies. 
• Ignorance strategy: although the interventionist perceives an inconsistency he 
does not openly address this observation, as he is not sure if he and/or others 
can manage the consequence (cases 1, 2 and 3). 
• Distance strategy: while the interventionist does not effectively contribute to 
changing himself, he distances himself from the situation and focuses on the role 
of other parties, e.g. employees, middle management, or ‘the organization’ (cases 
1, 2 and 3). 
• Self-censoring strategy: the interventionist keeps his beliefs and thoughts that 
could contribute to his own or other’s learning private, in order to save faces 
(cases 1 and 3). 
 
All strategies aim at keeping things calm and not creating painful situations for the 
interventionist or others. By doing so, the interventionist blocks his and others’ 
learning and contributes to the preservation of the current situation.  
 
Interventions that contribute to de-blocking of changing, organizing and learning 
The emphasis of the interventions is not on methods or instruments, but on 
interactions with director, managers and employees, or the process of intervening 
(see section 4.4). The aim of the interventions is to support reflection on how one 
contributes to recurrent problems and how one could facilitate changing, organizing 
and learning. Table 10.6 summarizes the interventions that are demonstrated in the 
cases.  
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Interventions that contribute to de-blocking of 
changing  
 
 
Case 1 
 
Case 2 
 
Case 3 
Share circularity and help managers/ employees to 
reflect upon their contribution to the problem 
X X X 
Confront inconsistency neutrally X X X 
Invite to share valid information X X X 
Reduce (time) pressure  X X X 
Openly share what one fears to share regarding the 
effect of the leader’s actions  
X X X 
Make defensive strategies debatable (make the 
undiscussable discussable)  
X X  
Stimulate inquiry into beliefs and actions  X X 
Share alternatives and make them actionable    X 
Teach the concepts   X 
Share valid information about how one contributes 
to the problems 
 X  
Table 10.6  Interventions that de-block changing, organizing and learning 
 
The overview shows that six interventions were demonstrated in all cases. The 
interventions regarding the feedback of circularity and inconsistency, as well as the 
invitation to share valid information and the reduction of pressure, are relatively easy. 
These interventions are not very threatening for either the interventionist or the actors 
in the client system. Interventions regarding self-disclosure are more difficult, 
because the personal effect of the other party on the interventionist is at stake. In all 
cases, this intervention appears to have a strong effect on the leader’s behavioural 
shift. Especially in case 1, and fewer times in case 2, defensive strategies have been 
addressed.  
 
Interestingly, in all cases the director shares circularity, shows self-disclosure and 
confronts defensiveness towards subordinates only after the interventionist did so. 
And direct reports of the director did so only after the director did. These observations 
seem to justify the conclusion that the client system learns by copying the 
interventionist’s interventions.  
 
During the course of the cases, the interventionist develops his knowledge about how 
to support learning, changing and organizing. This is illustrated by his growing ability 
to share alternatives and make them actionable and to teach the concepts. It is only 
case 3 that demonstrates these interventions.  
 
Finally, the sharing of valid information about how the interventionist contributes to 
the current reality is the most difficult one. The blocking assumption is that the 
interventionist should add value and – thus- should not contribute to recurrent 
problems. In case 2 and (less) in case 3 the interventionist has openly reflected on 
his own role. For example: ‘To be honest, in the first session I tended to perceive you 
as a ‘difficult team’. I really appreciate if one is open, however one can easily label 
real openness as ‘resistance’. I did.’ 
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11. Conclusions and discussion 
 
 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the outcomes of this study are described. Subsequent to an overview 
of the theoretical exploration, the conclusions regarding the research questions are 
summarized. The next section describes additional results of this study that cannot 
directly be linked to the research questions. Subsequently, the problem statement 
and research objectives are addressed. The subsequent section summarizes the 
methodological conclusions of this study. At the end of this chapter the limitations of 
this study are described, followed by recommendations for future research.   
 
 
11.2 Overview of the theoretical exploration 
 
In change projects, most attention is paid to the approach and method: what steps 
and interventions lead from the current to the desired situation (see Werkman, 2005). 
In practice, blocked change processes often have their roots in daily interactions that 
evolve regardless of the selected change approach (Argyris, 1990, 1994, 2000, 2004; 
Weick and Quin, 1999). The focus of this study is on daily interactions between 
leaders/managers, employees and consultants and how these interactions relate to 
the (de)blocking of change processes. The study aims at gaining knowledge about if 
and how interactions contribute to recurrent problems.  
 
Senge (1990) introduces the concept of dynamic complexity. “When obvious 
interventions produce nonobvious consequences, there is dynamic complexity” 
(Senge, 1990, p. 71). Typical examples are laborious attempts to develop 
entrepreneurship and ownership, recurrent patterns of resistance, and problematic 
relations between management and employees. 
 
The problem statement of this study is: 
How do leaders and their consultants contribute to (de)blocking of dynamically 
complex change processes? 
 
This study builds on the scientific tradition of organizational learning and systems 
thinking and particularly on Argyris’ contributions about the effects of unilateral 
control on changing, organizing and learning. Several authors confirm a dominance 
of this unilateral control model, especially in case of threat or embarrassment (e.g. 
Senge, 1990; Boonstra, 2004; Campbell et al., 1994; McCaughan & Palmer, 1994; 
Putnam, 1999; Georgesen & Harris, 1998; Drukker & Verhaaren, 2004; Robinson, 
2001; Noonan, 2007).  
 
In the theoretical exploration it becomes clear that the expressions of managers’ 
unilateral control go much further than only keeping the reins short and forcing 
obedience. Unilateral control by managers becomes manifest in their 
1. perception of (organization) problems; 
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2. interactions with people in the environment; 
3. interventions in change processes 
4. design of organization 
5. change of organization. 
 
In all these areas managers contribute to blocked changing by subtle and 
sophisticated interactive patterns that mostly are recognized only with a delay (if 
recognized at all), as these patterns seem so obvious in the first place. The 
theoretical exploration leads to a diagnostic model that summarizes the expressions 
of unilateral control and the consequences for changing, organizing and learning 
(figure 2.20).  
A unilateral control model stimulates us to think in terms of episodic change, which is 
a period of (planned) instability between the current stable organization and the 
desired stable organization (Weick & Quinn, 1999). The theoretical exploration leads 
to the insight that, regardless of the selected change approach, our daily perception, 
behaviours and interventions tend to be governed by a unilateral control model and 
can lead to blocked changing, recurrent patterns and defensiveness (Argyris, 1990, 
2004).  
 
According to Argyris (1983), three-quarters of all problems that emerge in 
organizations can be solved with a unilateral control model. These situations can be 
described as routine and single-loop issues that do not threaten individuals, groups, 
inter-group relations, or organizations. In other situations the expressions lead to 
blocked changing, recurrent patterns and defensiveness (Argyris, 1990, 2004). In 
order to de-block changing, organizing and learning, Argyris introduces a ‘mutual 
learning model’, which other authors have recently elaborated on (Argyris, 1990, 
2004; Schwartz, 2002; Noonan, 2007). The governing values of a mutual learning 
theory-in-use are valid information, informed and free choice, and (personal) 
commitment to effective implementation. Schwartz (2002) adds a fourth governing 
value: compassion. 
 
There is quite some evidence that a majority of consultants tend to hold the same 
unilateral control model as their clients and have a strong bias to a Management 
Serving or ‘partner-in-business’ model that stimulates them to support their clients in 
creating processes that reinforce circular processes and stifle learning (Argyris, 2000; 
Noonan, 2007; Drukker & Verhaaren, 2002; Rubinstein & Verhaaren, 2002; 
Strikwerda, 2004). The theoretical exploration illustrates that by far the greater part of 
mainstream literature on the role of consultants (or interventionists) focuses on 
methods and techniques. Here, there is a similarity with leaders who either contribute 
to or block changing with their daily interactions, regardless of the selected change 
method. Regardless of their selected intervention methods and techniques, 
interventionists contribute to (de)blocked changing, organizing and learning in (daily) 
interaction. After all, they are as vulnerable to a unilateral control model as their 
client, are a part of the system from the moment they enter the door and might show 
behaviour that bypasses defensive routines or even activates defensiveness. As a 
consequence, they might contribute to the problems that the client experiences. This 
can only be observed in action. Action leads to observable data from which the 
theories-in-use can be inferred (see Argyris, 1983, 1990, 2004). 
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The empirical study is a combination of longitudinal case studies (Yin, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Van der Zwaan, 1990) and action research (Eden & Huxham, 
1996). The study aims at developing evidence-based knowledge on the effects of 
unilateral control on changing, organizing and learning, and on which interventions 
(interactions) help to de-block changing in the longer run. This study thus tries to 
respond to Argyris’ call for direct observable data during entire change projects and 
valid information (Argyris, 1973, 1990, 2004) and Rousseau’s call for evidence-based 
management (2006). 
By collecting directly observable data (daily interactions) in three longitudinal case 
studies, one can observe what managers, employees and their consultants say and 
do, whether and how these interactions are governed by unilateral control, how they 
contribute to (de)blocking of changing, organizing and learning, and how 
interventions affect interactions in the longer run. These data contribute to concrete 
and actionable recommendations (see Argyris, 1990). The process of ongoing 
interactions is ‘slowed down’ in order to understand patterns, recognize important 
moments, and their meaning for effective changing: moving moments. 
 
 
11.3 Conclusions  
 
In this section the conclusions regarding the research questions are summarized. 
These conclusions are based on the cross-case analysis that was described in 
chapter 10. 
 
Research question 1:  
To what extent are the expressions of unilateral control visible in interactions?  
 
The aim of this research question is to develop and validate a diagnostic model that 
helps to recognize and understand expressions of a unilateral control model in day-
to-day practice. 
 
The theoretical exploration has led to a diagnostic model that summarizes the 
expressions of unilateral control and illustrates the circular relation with blocked 
change and threat/embarrassment (see figure 2.20). The empirical study provides 
numerous illustrations of the expressions Perception (reductionism, distancing, 
blaming, linear perception and S-O relations), Behaviour (controlling circumstances, 
repeated behaviour, stronger control in case of threat and reactive behaviour) and 
Interventions (focus on symptoms, cover-up of underlying patterns, quick wins and 
focus on impersonal instruments). However, there are only few illustrations of Design 
of organization (positional organization, variety reduction, S-O relations and 
organization/change as separated entities) and Change of organization (goal-
oriented and planned process, step-by-step, episodic and top-down, rational) (see 
appendix 4 ‘Cross-case analysis). 
 
Design and Change of organization are of a different order than the other 
expressions. Expressions regarding Perception, Behaviour and Interventions are 
visible in daily interactions. Expressions related to Design of organization and 
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Change of organization are particularly visible at the start of an (episodic) change 
process17. This conclusion corresponds to Argyris’ distinction between espoused 
theory and theory-in-use. In the Board Room one might discuss alternative 
approaches for planned change and positional organization, inspired by a book, a 
course or a person (consultant). However, this is espoused theory. As this study 
demonstrates, if perception, behaviour and interventions are still governed by a 
unilateral control model, managers tend to show inconsistent behaviour as soon as 
they are confronted with other views, unexpected behaviour or anything else that 
puts them in an uncomfortable position. This way they sift out unintended effects and 
will be captured in circular processes that block change. In short, even if one selects 
alternative change methods and organization approaches one is still vulnerable to 
the same risks of a unilateral control model that appears to be very persistent. This 
puts contingency models in a different light: one could choose any change approach 
one desires (espoused theory); after all, the effect will depend greatly on daily 
interactions that are highly vulnerable to a unilateral control model (theory-in-use). 
This is a strong argument for involving daily interactions explicitly in reflections on 
processes of changing, organizing and learning. 
 
These findings have consequences for the diagnostic model. There are still five 
expressions of unilateral control. Observations regarding Design of organization, 
Change of organization and sometimes Interventions refer to the macro level (Weick 
and Quinn, 1999). At this level, there is a strong inclination to consider organization 
as something that one can produce and change from a central position (Hosking, 
2004; Homan, 2005). It is particularly these expressions that are visible at the 
beginning of (episodic) change processes. The diagnostic model facilitates reflection 
on the beliefs that decisions are based upon. At a micro level (Weick and Quinn, 
1999) one can recognize expressions regarding Perception, Behaviour and 
sometimes Interventions that relate to daily interactions (Argyris, 1990, 2000, 2004). 
It is particularly these expressions that relate circularly with blocked change and 
threat/embarrassment, as depicted in the diagnostic model (figure 2.20). 
Observations regarding Interventions can relate to both micro level and macro level. 
Some interventions are well-discussed (and espoused) decisions at policy level, 
others can be characterized as daily decisions that are based upon interactions. As a 
consequence of these findings, the diagnostic model needs to be adjusted. The five 
expressions can be maintained, however the circular relation with recurrent patterns, 
blocked changing and threat/embarrassment does not seem to fit all expressions.  
 
Figure 11.1 depicts a diagnostic model of the expressions of unilateral control that 
excludes the circular pattern. This pattern is still applicable to the expressions 
Perception, Behaviour and Interventions and is described as an outcome of research 
question 2.  
                                                
17 The distinction between two types of expressions seems to relate to the different schools that describe the 
dominance of unilateral control (see 1.2 Theoretical positioning). The (organizational) culture school argues that 
a dominant unilateral control model is region and time-related; besides, this school focuses strongly on what is 
culturally accepted (Kamsteeg & Koot, 2002). This implies the possibility that these assumptions will change 
over time. Argyris (1990, 2000, 2004)) focuses particularly on the theories-in use and argues that these are 
neither region nor time-related. Equally, spoken preferences for methods of changing and organising can change 
over time. However, the way one perceives, behaves and intervenes when things become threatening seems to be 
much deeper ingrained and less sensitive to (cultural) change. 
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Figure 11.1 Expressions of unilateral control 
 
 
Research question 2 
How does unilateral control relate to (de-)blocking of changing, organizing and 
learning? 
 
The aim of this research question is to obtain evidence-based insight into 
consequences of a unilateral control model on changing, organizing and learning. 
 
The research question is translated into four specific questions: 
• How do expressions of unilateral control contribute to recurrent problems? 
• What defensive routines are visible? 
• What circular patterns are visible? 
• How do leaders de-block changing, organizing and learning? 
 
The conclusions regarding these questions are summarized in headers, followed by 
a further explanation. 
 
 
Unilateral control is especially problematic in dynamically complex situations 
As the empirical study illustrates, unilateral control is effective in a diversity of 
situations. All cases demonstrate meetings that are effective, until the subject turns to 
 240 
a sensitive issue. In line with Senge (1990), two types of situations can be 
distinguished: (dynamically) simple and complex situations. In this study, these 
situations are described as summarized in table 11.1. 
 
 Dynamically simple situations Dynamically complex situations 
 
Focus 
 
 
Type of problems 
 
Goals and interests 
 
Neutral versus sensitive 
 
 
 
Stability, Contents, Facts 
 
 
Relatively routine and linear  
 
Shared  
 
Neutral  
 
 
 
Change, (inter)personal issues, 
interpretations 
 
Non-routine and circular  
 
Conflicting  
 
Threatening, embarrassing and/or 
sensitive 
 
Table 11.1 Characteristics of dynamically simple and complex situations 
 
Typical examples of dynamically simple situations in the cases are the procurement 
of a new photocopier, the design of a planning system, and the financial analysis of 
budgets (though these situations can have a high detail complexity (Senge, 1990)). 
Typical examples of dynamically complex situations in the cases are discussions on 
change, personal contribution to change, tense relationships between management 
and employees, personal and team effectiveness. 
 
Unilateral control is effective for dealing with (dynamically) simple situations. This 
conclusion is in line with Argyris’ remark that three-quarters of all problems that 
emerge in organizations can be solved with a unilateral control model (1983). 
However, in dynamically complex situations a unilateral control model leads to 
stagnation of changing, as will be explored in this section. 
 
Unilateral control stimulates symptomatic solutions and blocks fundamental solutions 
In this study, the effects of unilateral control have been related to Senge’s (1990) 
‘shifting the burden’ archetype. Senge describes this systemic archetype as follows: 
“An underlying problem generates symptoms that demand attention. But the 
underlying problem is difficult for people to address, either because it is obscure or 
costly to confront. So people ‘shift the burden’ of their problem to other solutions – 
well-intentioned, easy fixes which seem extremely efficient. Unfortunately, the easier 
‘solutions’ only ameliorate the symptoms; they leave the underlying problem 
unaltered. The underlying problem grows worse, unnoticed because the symptoms 
apparently clear up, and the system loses whatever abilities it had to solve the 
underlying problem” (p. 104). Figure 11.2 illustrates the ‘shifting the burden’ structure. 
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Figure 11.2 Shifting the burden (Senge, 1990, p. 380) 
 
In this study, the ‘shifting the burden’ structure has proven its value to understanding 
the relation between unilateral control and blocked changing, organizing and 
learning. In line with this structure, this study leads to some outcomes.  
1. Unilateral control activates symptomatic solutions. 
Unilateral control leads to activities in the upper circle. Typical examples are quick 
(instrumental) solutions, linear thinking and in case of difficulties, increasing 
pressure and persuasion. These activities are supposed to keep things under 
control. In the short run, this leads to reduction of the symptoms. In this study, 
activities in the upper cycle have been related to single-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön, 1974; Argyris, 1990, 2000). 
2. Unilateral control activates defensive strategies that block fundamental solutions. 
Unilateral control activates defensive strategies that aim at making sensitive or 
delicate issues undiscussable. This way, unilateral control blocks inquiry into the 
underlying problems and –thus- blocks learning. In the longer run, the underlying 
problems produce the same symptoms. In this study, activities in the lower cycle 
have been related to double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1974; Argyris, 
1990, 2000). 
3. Confrontation of the underlying fundamental problems is characterized by delayed 
effects. 
This study demonstrates that interventions that aim at inquiry into and change of 
the underlying problem are characterized by delay. Defensive strategies defend 
the current situation. Besides, inquiry into the underlying problem requires insight 
into complex (systemic) patterns and one’s own contribution to the problems. As 
the empirical study illustrates, this takes more time than relatively pragmatic 
solutions in the upper cycle. 
4. Symptomatic solutions and lack of learning lead to repetitive patterns and 
recurrent problems. 
If leaders focus on symptomatic solutions and do not inquire into the way they 
contribute to underlying fundamental problems, they reinforce circular patterns 
and recurrent problems.  
 
Figure 11.3 summarizes these conclusions. The circular patterns, as well as 
defensive strategies, are further explored in the next sections. 
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Figure 11.3  Unilateral control activates symptomatic solutions and blocks fundamental  
  solutions 
 
Unilateral control leads to circular patterns and self-fulfilling prophecies 
This study illustrates that leaders tend to hold a dominant Subject-Object perspective 
of relations. In this view, organizational leaders and their consultants are assumed to 
be the ones who inquire, develop knowledge and design and, based on this 
knowledge, implement necessary changes upon employees (Hosking, 2004). This 
perspective presupposes the employees as being dependent and reactive. The 
cases in this study illustrate the self-fulfilling character of a Subject-Object 
perspective, since it leads to actions that push employees into a dependent role, 
which in turn confirms the leader’s belief that he should initiate change. This study 
delivers clear evidence that employees contribute to this circular pattern as well by 
perceiving themselves as dependent on management actions and behaving 
reactively. The circular pattern, including the meaning that managers and employees 
attribute to each other’s actions, is depicted in figure 11.4. 
 
Figure 11.4 Subject-Object perspective in action 
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As the research findings show, a dominant Subject-Object perspective of relations 
directly influences the decisions that are being made regarding the change approach, 
as well as daily interactions. From a Subject-Object view, management take initiative 
to (episodic) change. With or without the help of consultants, they set goals and 
define the steps to be followed. Subsequently, they communicate these decisions to 
the rest of the organization. This way, middle management and employees are 
pushed into a reactive mode from scratch. This reactive and dependent attitude, in 
turn, reinforces management to take more initiative in daily interactions.  
 
The consequences of a Subject-Object perspective become problematic if the very 
aim of the change process is to stimulate ownership, entrepreneurship and pro-
activity and if the process needs ownership, commitment and pro-activity to be 
effective. The paradox is that if management perceives lack of ownership, 
entrepreneurship and pro-activity, their first inclination is to act in such a way that 
they reinforce the problems they perceive. This leads to inconsistency between their 
intention and their actual behaviour. 
 
This study illustrates 11 circular, or systemic, patterns between (active) management 
and (dependent) employees that are all different manifestations of a Subject-Object 
definition of the relationship between them. Box 11.1 summarizes these patterns 
(appendix 5 ‘Circular patterns’ visualizes these circular patterns, including the 
meaning that actors attribute to the actions of the other ‘party’). Although these 
patterns are described as if they start with the manager, by and large it is not clear 
where the cycle starts. However, it is clear that the cycles are self-propelling 
(behaviours stimulate each other) and self-protective (if managers try to change their 
behaviour unilaterally, they tend to be pushed back by employees).  
 
 
Circular patterns 
 
• Manager active, employees reactive: the more initiative managers take (executing change actions, 
organizing meetings, chairing meetings, stressing the need for change), the more reactive and 
dependent employees behave, the more initiative managers take, etcetera. 
• Manager initiates change process, employees (act as if they) follow: the more managers consider 
themselves as subjects who can impose changes upon employees, the more employees (act as if 
they) follow, the more managers are confirmed in their belief they should impose changes, 
etcetera. 
• Manager talks, employees (act as if they) listen: the more managers talk(about ‘the change 
approach’, their opinion, the need for change) the more employees (act as if they) listen, the more 
managers direct, etcetera.  
• Manager solves problems, employees bring problems in: the more managers solve problems that 
employees bring in, the more employees bring in their problems (instead of solving them 
themselves), the more managers solve their problems, etcetera.  
• Manager instructs, employees wait for next instruction: the more managers instruct, the more 
employees wait for the next instruction, the more managers instruct, etcetera.  
• Manager acts as if he knows answers, employees act as if they don’t: the more managers act as if 
they know the answers (even if they do not), the more employees act as if they don’t, the more 
managers act as if they know the answers, etcetera. 
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• Manager feels uncomfortable and takes distance, employees feel uncomfortable and take 
distance: the more uncomfortable managers feel, the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable employees feel, the more distance they take, the more uncomfortable managers 
feel, etcetera. 
• Manager expects resistance and braces himself, employees respond negatively and oppose: the 
more managers expect employees will show resistance, the more they tend to brace themselves 
and persuade, the more employees respond negatively and develop resistance, the more 
managers brace themselves, etcetera. 
• Manager pushes to speed up progress, employees are passive and wait for their turn: the more 
managers increase pressure to speed up progress, the more employees become reactive, the 
more managers increase pressure to speed up, etcetera. 
• Manager implements control instruments, employees resist management initiatives: the more 
managers enlarge control, the more employees believe managers are not a positive role model 
and resist management initiatives, the less management influence, the more managers enlarge 
control, etcetera.  
• Manager tries to motivate and inspire employees, employees feel lack of motivation and 
inspiration: the more managers try to motivate and inspire their employees, the less employees 
feel responsible for their own motivation and the more they feel dependent on the manager’s 
capability to motivate and inspire, the more managers need to motivate and inspire, etcetera.  
 
Box 11.1 Circular patterns as manifestations of a Subject-Object perspective 
 
These circular patterns have a repetitive character and lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecies. These findings are in line with authors on systemic patterns 
(Senge,1990, McCaughan and Palmer, 1994, Campbell et al., 1994). Argyris (1990) 
argues that unilateral control leads to unintended effects like self-fulfilling prophecies 
and escalating errors. As long as one holds the other party responsible for the 
recurrent problems, attributes negative intentions to the other party and keeps one’s 
beliefs private, one protects oneself from information that could be of value to test 
one’s beliefs and line of reasoning. This way, there is little reflection upon one’s own 
contribution to the recurrent problems and little learning. In other words, one defends 
the current reality and blocks changing and learning. 
 
Unilateral control activates defensive strategies 
According to Argyris (1990, 1999, 2004) unilateral control leads to defensiveness: 
“[…] whenever human beings are faced with any issue that contains significant 
embarrassment or threat, they act in ways that bypass, as best they can, the 
embarrassment or threat. In order for the bypass to work, it must be covered up.” 
(1990, p. 25). 
 
This study illustrates specific examples of defensiveness that are visible in different 
situations. Here, these are called defensive strategies. Defensive strategies aim at 
making sensitive issues undebatable and, as a consequence, block learning and 
changing. Typical illustrations of sensitive issues in this study are: 
- subordinates do not really commit to the change goals of their superior, 
- the team atmosphere is unsafe, 
- a manager has difficulties to communicate with this team, 
- employees do not trust their manager and vice versa, 
- the director has difficulties to listen to his managers, 
- managers and employees say that they want to change but do not make any step 
forward. 
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This study illustrates how defensive strategies block inquiry into the lower circle in 
Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure (see figure 11.3). Or, in Argyris’ terms, 
defensive strategies cover sensitive issues up. For example, the director in one case 
firmly introduces his approach and asks for commitment. Everyone says ‘yes’. 
However, since ‘no’ seems not to be an option, this ‘yes’ might be invalid information. 
If one says ‘yes’ and thinks ‘no’, one has to cover this up in order to save face. A first 
defensive strategy is activated: the compliance strategy. 
 
The 14 defensive strategies that are illustrated in the empirical study are described in 
box 11.2. All strategies are activated in case of threat or embarrassment. The titles of 
these strategies have not been based upon existing literature; they have been 
developed and introduced in this study. 
 
 
Defensive strategies 
 
• Compliance strategy: if your superior persuades you to commit, say that you comply regardless of 
whether you really do (‘O.k., I’ll commit’).  
• Undergo strategy: if your superior initiates a change process, just undergo the interventions 
passively and do not make debatable that you don’t think this is going to work (‘Let’s see what 
happens’).  
• Plan strategy: agree to make a plan and act as if you comply with the plan; this way you contribute 
to change and stay in your comfort zone (‘Let’s make a plan and put it on the agenda next 
month’). 
• Blame strategy: if changing does not succeed, blame others and attribute negative intentions to 
them (‘Employees just don’t want to change’; ‘Our managers just doesn’t want to listen to us’). 
• Assume strategy: keep your negative assumptions about other individuals’ intentions and 
situations private. 
• Withdraw strategy: in case of difficulties in the communication, do not make this debatable with the 
persons who are involved; rather, withdraw and think up a new initiative or discuss the difficulties 
with peers (‘What am I going to do to break through their resistance?’). 
• Ignorance strategy: if you observe patterns that are difficult to deal with, e.g. that your employees 
are not really committed, do not inquire; rather, increase pressure (‘You have to keep your 
appointments’). 
• Reduction strategy: if things become threatening or embarrassing, reduce the problem until it is 
controllable again (‘we should not overstate the problem’). 
• Denial strategy: if things become threatening or embarrassing, deny the problem (‘In my 
department there are no problems’). 
• Distance strategy: if the discussion comes too close, change the subject to other parties or 
general observations, such as employees, middle management, or ‘the organization’ (‘The 
organization needs clear core values’). 
• ‘We’ strategy: talk in terms of ‘our responsibility’ and what ‘we should do’; as a consequence, 
nobody has to feel personally responsible (‘We should pay attention to the problems’). 
• Non-intervention strategy: do not confront others’ dysfunctional behaviour (e.g. not keeping an 
appointment), so that others will not confront yours (‘I know he is very busy, so I can hardly blame 
him for not keeping his appointment’). 
• Joke strategy: if things become threatening or embarrassing, make a joke and change the subject 
(‘Don’t worry, you are just much too old to be able to change’). 
• Shirk strategy: shift the responsibility to an ‘outsider’ and avoid sharing your own opinion about the 
process or colleagues (‘I would have expected that you had made a remark about my passive 
colleagues’). 
Box 11.2 Defensive strategies  
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These defensive strategies are powerful as long as one does not make them 
debatable. They aim at covering sensitive issues up and are effective as long as they 
are covered up themselves. Or, as Senge (1990) puts it, “to retain their power, 
defensive routines must remain undiscussable” (Senge, p. 255). 
 
A further analysis leads to the insight that the defensive strategies are not manifest in 
all situations. Some strategies are typically shown by subordinates towards superiors, 
others by superiors towards subordinates, peers towards peers, or actors towards 
interventionist (outsider). Table 11.2 depicts an overview of the observed defensive 
strategies and the relationships in which they are typically activated. 
 
 
What defensive 
strategies are 
visible? 
 
 
Subordinates 
towards superiors 
 
Superiors towards 
subordinates 
 
 
Peers towards 
peers 
 
Actors towards 
interventionist 
(outsider) 
Compliance X    
Undergo X    
Plan X  X  
Blame X X X  
Assume X X X  
Withdraw X X X  
Ignorance  X X X 
Reduction  X X X 
Denial  X X X 
Distance   X X 
‘We’   X  
Non-intervention   X  
Joke    X X 
Shirk    X 
Table 11.2 Defensive strategies related to specific relationships 
 
These defensive strategies lead to ‘games’ (compare Scott-Morgan, 1994) that do 
not sound unfamiliar. If a superior introduces a change, he can ignore that 
subordinates seem not to commit really (ignorance), as an open discussion could 
lead to an embarrassing and difficult situation. Employees can act as if they comply 
(regardless of whether they really do), work on plans and just undergo the process 
without feeling responsible (compliance, plan, undergo). If the superior notices lack of 
active involvement, he is in a difficult position: he could inquire into why the 
subordinates do not contribute, though it is safer to ignore the real reason 
(ignorance), say it is not that bad (reduction) or even deny (denial) the underlying 
problem and just increase pressure. In the meantime, the superior blames 
subordinates for the problems (blame). The subordinates might blame others and/or 
circumstances (blame). If they don’t come any further, both subordinates and 
superiors might hold strong beliefs about why the other is responsible (assume). 
However, they do not openly share and check these beliefs, but withdraw (withdraw) 
and share them with peers: subordinates find someone to talk to about superiors who 
would not listen and superiors discuss subordinates’ low commitment and loyalty with 
other superiors.  
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In (management) teams in this study people show defensive strategies that seem to 
be less related to hierarchy. These strategies partly aim at avoiding concrete actions 
that would be obliging, by making plans (plan), discussing general and abstract 
subjects (distance) and talking in terms of ‘our responsibility’ and ‘problems we 
should pay attention to’ and as a consequence nobody has to feel personally 
responsible (we)18. If, in practice, it becomes visible that one or more individuals do 
not keep their appointments or do not contribute to change, one can just ignore 
(ignorance), agree not to intervene without saying (non-intervention), reduce the 
seriousness of the problem by putting things into perspective (reduction) or even 
deny the problem (denial). If this doesn’t help and things seem to get really 
embarrassing, one can save face by the use of humour: everybody laughs and the 
issue has gone (joke).  
 
This study provides some illustrations of defensive strategies towards the 
interventionist. In some instances the interventionist is asked to bring in his findings, 
followed by the statement that the analysis is interesting. Still, this analysis is free of 
obligations and could be a defensive strategy (shirk). At several moments, when the 
interventionist gives specific feedback, the listener tends to ignore, reduce or even 
deny the problem and/or blame circumstances and others (ignorance, reduction, 
denial, blame). 
 
The effect of defensive strategies cannot be separated from the context in which they 
are expressed. For example, one could not claim that it is ineffective to use humour. 
On the contrary, humour could help to release tension. Jokes become a defensive 
strategy if they are being used to make difficult issues undebatable. Defensive 
strategies lead to blocked changing and learning, as they cover up lack of personal 
commitment, lack of contribution to changing, and ineffective contribution to learning. 
As a consequence, circular patterns and recurrent problems remain undiscussed and 
lead to inconsistency: although managers say they want to change, they block 
changing and learning effectively and maintain the current situation. This study 
demonstrates that managers and employees are very good at putting defensive 
strategies into practice, though are often not aware of doing this. Argyris (1990) calls 
this ‘skilled incompetence’.  
In figure 11.5 the preceding findings are summarized. Here, the ‘black box’ of 
research question 2 is filled in.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 The ‘we’ strategy helps to reduce pressure for individuals, as there is diffusion of responsibility (Latané and 
Darley, 1970). This strategy corresponds to another social psychological phenomenon as well, the so-called 
‘group think’ phenomenon. Janis and Mann (1977) describe eight main symptoms of group think, including self-
censorship (members withhold their dissenting views and counter-arguments) and illusion of unanimity 
(members perceive falsely that everyone agrees with the group’s decision). Or, in other words, we have a 
dissenting view, do not bring this in (as our reasoning is that this will bring us in a difficult position) and act as if 
we are committed. This way, group think can be considered as an expression of defensiveness.  
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Figure 11.5 Relation between unilateral control and blocked changing, organizing and  
learning 
 
Leaders can de-block changing, organizing and learning 
This study illustrates that managers can contribute to de-block changing, organizing 
and learning, particularly if they recognize that this will help them to better realize 
their long-term goals. This condition is in line with the psychological insight that 
decisions regarding behavioural change depend on favourable expectations 
regarding future outcomes (Rothman, 2000). 
Appendix 4 ‘Cross-case analysis’ summarizes how often each expression of (mutual) 
learning is observed in the cases. Box 11.3 summarizes leaders’ de-blocking 
perceptions, behaviours and interventions that can be divided into ‘reflection upon 
the way one contributes to recurrent problems’ (upper cycle) and ‘active inquiry into 
underlying problems’ (lower cycle). Subsequently, these perceptions, behaviours and 
interventions are described. 
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Leaders’ de-blocking perceptions, behaviours and interventions 
 
Reflection upon the way one contributes to recurrent symptomatic problems 
• Perceiving circular patterns, including one’s own contribution 
• Reflection and experimentation 
• Making circularity visible 
• Self-disclosure and public reflection upon the way one contributes to lack of learning 
• Being proactive 
 
Active inquiry into underlying problems 
• Confronting sensitive issues  
• Confronting defensive strategies  
• Inquiry into underlying patterns 
• Sharing valid information that one fears to share 
Box 11.3  Leaders’ de-blocking perceptions, behaviours and interventions 
 
Perceiving circular patterns, including one’s own contribution 
There are numerous illustrations in this study of how leaders adopt the concept of 
circularity. The concept appears to be relatively easy to adopt, as it shows how the 
leader contributes to the problems in a way that is not threatening: his behaviour is 
both cause and effect. This way, insight into circular patterns reduces blaming of 
individuals and/or groups.  
 
Reflection and experimentation 
As soon as leaders recognize circularity, it is a relatively small step to reflection and 
experimentation: what could I do to break through this vicious circle? Typical 
illustrations:  
- ‘I see I contribute to their behaviour.’ 
- ‘I am learning by experimentation. Last week someone approached me to talk about 
some problems in project Y. Normally I would have tried to persuade him, but this 
time I only listened to his concerns.’ 
- ‘I don’t know how I will succeed in this new (behavioural) strategy, but I am going to 
learn and find out.’ 
Initially, when leaders have insights into their own contribution to the problems, they 
tend to think up new strategies privately, with the interventionist or with peers. This 
study demonstrates that in these situations the employees try to push their leader 
back into the behaviour they are used to though do not like. Actually, this way of 
private learning has still a unilateral character, as one is not open about the new 
strategy towards the other actors. 
 
Making circularity visible 
In the second instance and after feedback from the interventionist, all leaders in the 
cases discuss the circular patterns with relevant parties openly. This way, they create 
the opportunity for mutual learning. Just like their directors, middle managers and 
employees easily adopt the circular concept. They recognize circular patterns 
relatively easily and see that blaming the other party and saying the other party has 
to start changing will keep things as they are.  
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One leader shares circularity in his quarterly presentation to all employees:  
‘We keep a tight grip on each other, e.g. management talkand employees listen 
(‘watch this meeting’), management instruct and employees keep their ideas to 
themselves, first line management prepare this session and have foreknowledge 
while second line management and employees wait and see. That is what we 
stimulate and wish to change.’ 
 
Still, this study illustrate that employees expect management to start changing their 
behaviour, as ‘they have more influence.’ This is a reasonable expectance. Argyris 
(1984, 1990) argues that one should start with the top. In the next section this subject 
is further explored. 
 
Self-disclosure and public reflection upon the way one contributes to lack of learning 
When leaders discuss the circular patterns openly, it is only a small step to self-
disclosure and public reflection upon the way they contribute to blocked changing, 
organizing and learning. Typical illustrations: 
-‘I have learned that I tend to take distance in difficult situations. As a consequence, I 
lose contact, which stimulates you to be offended. I really want to keep in touch 
better. Please help me to do that.’ 
-‘We do not communicate enough and effectively. I personally don’t.’ 
- ‘The more we, management, have the feeling that employees don’t pick up things, 
the greater our inclination to enlarge control, the more defensiveness from 
employees, the more control… And I take responsibility for my part.’ 
 
Being proactive 
As soon as leaders have publicly shared how they contribute to blocked changing 
and learning, they cannot hold employees fully responsible any longer. As a 
consequence, they naturally will take initiative to start changing. This study 
demonstrates how leaders pro-actively initiate further steps. Some examples: 
- ‘When management prepare the sessions, we push employees into a dependent 
role. I don’t think that is effective. What would you think about preparing the next 
session together?’  
- ‘I want to organize sessions with employees in order to share mutual feedback. We 
have to find out together how we can communicate and work better.’ 
-‘I wonder, for example, if you think I take you seriously and if I take enough time to 
involve you. I really want to hear your personal and constructive feedback.’ 
 
Confronting sensitive issues  
An important aim of defensive strategies is to make sensitive issues undiscussable. 
Unlike circular patterns, it seems to be fairly difficult for leaders to make sensitive 
issues debatable, as they do not know if they can manage the effect. An illustration: 
Interventionist: ‘My assumption is that you experience the whole process as a top-
down initiative and that the safest way to behave is acting as if you find it valuable 
and keeping the discussion on the surface.’ 
Employee: ‘To be honest, your assumption is right. I felt a strong top-down pressure 
that forced me to comply.’ 
Manager: ‘I am glad you are so candid. I had the same feeling as the interventionist. 
However I did not know how to deal with the situation.’ 
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However, after (repetitive) feedback from the interventionist, there are some 
illustrations of leaders who make difficult issues about relationships and personal 
effectiveness debatable. 
- ‘I know that there is too large a distance between employees and management. […] 
We do not communicate enough and effectively. I personally don’t.’ 
- ‘Communication and safety is a sensitive subject, as we have just announced that 
manager X will have to leave. Lately another manager left this team as well. Do you 
think this is the right moment to discuss this subject now?’ 
 
Confronting defensive strategies  
Circular patterns are easier to confront than defensiveness. Circular patterns have a 
relatively neutral character: nobody is specifically to blame. The problem of defensive 
strategies is that they are designed to defend and are difficult to confront without 
activating them. If interventionists confront defensive strategies repetitively, leaders 
are capable of recognising and confronting these strategies as well. Some 
illustrations:  
‘Let’s not focus on other parties. Let’s start with our own role’ (distance strategy). 
‘Gentlemen, we’re changing the subject by making jokes’ (joke strategy). 
 
Inquiry into underlying patterns 
Instead of symptomatic solutions in the upper cycle in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ 
system, mutual learning requires inquiry into fundamental solutions in the lower cycle: 
what underlying problems keep producing the symptoms? Argyris (1990) describes 
numerous questions that lead to inquiry, when he suggests a CEO could say to the 
people who successfully developed some improvement actions: “I would like to 
reflect on what has happened to see if there is more that we can learn. What is it that 
I do or the company does that makes it necessary for me to take the initiative to 
identify the barriers, and to design a workshop to reduce them, when you knew the 
barriers and you knew how to reduce them?” (p. 126-127). 
 
This kind of inquiry appears to be difficult to put into practice. Still, this study shows 
that some managers succeed in inquiring into the underlying patterns that block 
changing and learning. The way one manager confronts the process between him 
and his employees is illustrative: ‘P, I see you want to ask a question. That is what I 
expected, because that is the pattern we always follow: I tell you my vision and you 
ask a critical question. Often you have an opinion about the subject yourself. In turn, I 
pretend that I know the answer and share another story with you. Then, after the 
session, you will evaluate my answer. You may disagree, but won’t share your 
disagreement with me. I may not know the answer, but I won’t share that with you. 
That is a strange game, isn’t it?’ 
 
Sharing valid information that one fears to share 
What this typically means is sharing valid information that one normally tends to 
cover up and that leads to mutual learning. Defensive strategies stifle sharing valid 
information and thus block learning and changing: people think ‘no’ and say ‘yes’, 
people think ‘no’ and say nothing, people say they find changing important and know 
they will not really change their behaviour. This study demonstrates how managers 
and employees learn to share valid information and contribute to changing. Some 
illustrations: 
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- A manager to his peers in the management team: ‘Well, I see that changing the 
atmosphere in this organization really requires us to change. The question is, do 
we really want to change and are we able to change. We should take more time 
for our people. Do we want that?’ 
- A manager to the director: ‘The opinions of my second line managers appeared to 
differ from yours. I considered stopping them, but I didn’t. After all, we try to share 
valid information.’ The director agrees. 
- The director to his managers: ‘I thought it was all logical and clear. Now I see your 
opinions differ from mine. Apparently, it was my logic and clearness.’ 
- A manager to his team leaders who have responded critically to his change 
initiative: ‘I don’t want yes-men. Let’s be honest, it would be easy if you just 
followed. However, I appreciate you being honest about your thoughts and 
feelings. Still, it is not always easy to deal with.’ 
These examples are visible in the cases only after some months of feedback, 
illustrations of circularity and defensiveness and inquiry by the interventionist. 
Besides, in this study managers share this kind of valid information when they realize 
that they cannot attain their goals by persuasion and cover-up of sensitive issues. 
 
The findings in this study justify the conclusion that leaders are able to bring several 
expressions of a mutual learning model into practice. Summarized, the concept of 
circularity appears to be a concept that is relatively simple to adopt, as it is neutral 
about (who is) cause and effect. Subsequently, it is a logical process to move to 
private reflection upon one’s own contribution to the recurrent problems, followed by 
public discussion of circular patterns (with employees) and the way one contributes to 
lack of learning. In turn, this is a good starting point to discuss how one could change 
these patterns together.  
This study shows that managers find it more difficult to make sensitive issues 
debatable and share valid information that would not be shared normally. 
Nevertheless, as soon as they see they cannot realize their goals through ‘upper 
cycle’ actions, this study delivers examples how managers adopt these behavioural 
changes. 
 
Another conclusion is that the learning process of managers seems to develop from 
unilateral control via private learning to mutual learning. First, managers tend to hold 
a unilateral control model that instructs them to persuade and implement short-term 
linear solutions. Second, if they do not realize their goals (e.g. they get critical 
response in a meeting), they tend to withdraw and try to think up alternative 
strategies on their own, with peers or with an outsider (e.g. a coach). Subsequently, 
they try a different strategy towards their subordinates, though keeping their 
considerations private. This is private learning and is still unilateral control. After all, 
they still try to impose a new strategy upon employees from a Subject-Object 
perspective and do not share openly what they have observed and why they adopt a 
different strategy. As a consequence, employees tend to push their manager back 
into the behaviour they are used to though do not like. Or, in other words, the system 
protects itself. This way of unilateral change of behaviour seems to play an important 
role in most, if not all, systemic patterns that are described by Moeskops (2004) and 
Werkman (2006).  
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A third step in the learning process is to stimulate mutual learning that requires 
sharing one’s observations, one’s reasoning and what one might change in one’s 
approach (‘I see that I tend to persuade more and more and that you tend to be more 
and more critical. What do you see? How could we make these sessions more 
productive?’). Subsequently, employees can respond, add missing information and 
feel responsible for mutual learning. Figure 11.6 summarizes this learning process. 
 
Figure 11.6 From repetition, via private learning to mutual learning 
 
This study illustrates that the leader’s development from persuasion to mutual 
learning influences the development of his environment. All cases illustrate positive 
effects that contribute directly to de-blocking of changing, organizing and learning. 
• Subordinates (managers, team leaders or employees) open themselves up and 
make their contribution to blocked changing discussable. 
• Subordinates confront circularity and/or defensiveness in the team. 
• Managers copy the director’s behavioural shift towards their own employees. 
• Employees talk positively about director/managers who are more open to them. 
As a consequence, the learning process that starts at the top has clear 
consequences for the process of changing, organizing and learning at organizational 
level. 
 
As the empirical study illustrates, the learning process of managers and employees 
involves much copying of the interventionist’s interventions. The interventionist, 
however, has his own defensive patterns and learning process. 
 
 
Research question 3 
How do interventions contribute to (de-)blocking changing, organizing and learning? 
 
The aim of this research question is to develop an intervention perspective that 
contributes to de-blocking changing, organizing and learning. 
 
The conclusions regarding research question 1 and 2 illustrate how leaders can 
contribute to (de-)blocked changing, organizing and learning in their daily interactions 
(micro-level), regardless of their selected change approach (macro-level). These 
findings call strongly for a micro level intervention perspective that contributes to de-
blocking changing, organizing and learning. As discussed in section 4.3, continuous 
changing (Weick and Quinn, 1999) is characterized by a micro level of analysis and a 
long-term perspective. A long-term perspective, in this study, would contribute to a 
shift in attention from the upper circle to the lower circle in Senge’s ‘shifting the 
burden’ structure (Senge, 1990). As opposed to episodic change, an intervention 
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perspective that contributes to continuous changing follows the order ‘freeze-
rebalance-unfreeze’. Freezing would suggest making visible how one contributes to 
blocked changing. Rebalancing would mean to stimulate learning and reflection on 
the way one contributes to recurrent patterns and to stimulate free and informed 
choices. Unfreezing would mean helping to put committed choices into practice and 
resume (mutual) learning. 
 
As described in section 4.4, this study distinguishes ‘interventions’ from ‘the process 
of intervening’. The outcomes of this study demonstrate how interventions by a third 
party can de-block changing, organizing and learning. These interventions are 
described below. The subsequent conclusions describe how unilateral control by the 
interventionist can lead to circular patterns, defensive strategies and blocked 
changing. These findings illustrate that the process of intervening can undermine the 
effectiveness of the interventions. This argues for an intervention perspective that 
incorporates the interventionist’s defensiveness. 
 
Specific interventions contribute to de-blocking of changing, organizing and learning 
Unlike the mainstream literature on episodic change that focuses on blocking factors 
and conditions for effective change (Weick and Quinn, 1999; Werkman, 2006), the 
intervention perspective in this study focuses on ‘understanding how we preserve the 
current situation, unlike our spoken desire to change’. This is in line with Weick and 
Quinn (1999), who argue that to understand organizational change one must first 
understand organizational inertia. 
Figure 11.7 integrates the interventions in this study into the intervention order 
‘freeze-rebalance-unfreeze’. This order is depicted as a circular process, as opposed 
to a linear process. This visualisation emphasizes three essential characteristics of 
the intervention perspective. First, the order ‘freeze-rebalance-unfreeze’ is related to 
continuous changing, organizing and learning. A linear intervention process would 
suggest an episodic interruption and would – thus – be inconsistent.  
Second, an intervention does not interrupt changing, organizing and learning, but is 
an expression of changing, organizing and learning in itself. As a consequence, and 
in contrast with traditional (episodic change) views, intervening can be considered as 
a continuous process. This intervention perspective could be expressed in the words 
‘continuous changing, organizing, learning and intervening’.  
Third, in this view interventions cannot be related exclusively to (third party) 
interventionists, for a practical as well as a fundamental reason. For a practical 
reason, since the (third party) interventionist cannot always be there. For a 
fundamental reason, since such a situation would confirm a Subject-Object 
perspective that stimulates active-dependent relationships. The interventions that are 
described in this section, however, are related to the interventionist. 
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Figure 11.7 Intervention wheel: continuous freezing, rebalancing and unfreezing 
 
The interventions that are demonstrated in this study are described in box 11.4 and 
subsequently elaborated. In the elaboration the interventions are illustrated with 
literal quotes from the empirical study, in order to serve Argyris’ call for actionable 
advice: “the advice should contain the action strategies (e.g. advocate your position 
in a way that encourages inquiry). Second, it should be accompanied with actual 
statements that illustrate what you would have to say and do” (p. 87).  
The interventions are related to the order ‘freeze-rebalance-unfreeze’. The emphasis 
of the interventions is not on methods or instruments, but on interactions with 
director, managers and employees. The aim of the interventions is to support 
reflection on how one contributes to recurrent problems and how one could facilitate 
changing, organizing and learning.  
 
De-blocking interventions that stimulate changing, organizing and learning 
 
Freezing 
• Sharing circularity and helping managers/ employees to reflect upon their contribution to the 
problem  
• Confronting inconsistency neutrally 
• Making defensive strategies debatable   
 
Rebalancing 
• Stimulating inquiry into one’s beliefs and actions  
• Inviting to share valid information that one fears to share  
• Sharing the concepts 
• Sharing what one fears to share regarding the effect of someone’s actions  
• Sharing valid information about how oneself contributes to the problems  
• Reducing (time) pressure 
 
Unfreezing 
• Sharing alternatives and making them actionable  
Box 11.4 Interventionists’ de-blocking interventions 
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Sharing circularity and help managers/ employees to reflect upon their contribution to the 
problem 
By sharing observations regarding circularity and asking questions about the way 
people perceive their own role in the circular patterns, the interventionist supports 
learning and changing. The underlying assumption is that by stimulating awareness 
of how people contribute to the recurrent patterns, it will be difficult to repeat these 
actions on purpose. This finding is in line with Edmondson and Smith (2006): “By 
mapping the dynamic, with help, management dyads or teams can see how it works, 
why they are not making progress in resolving their conflicts, and how they might 
interrupt the vicious cycle” (p. 23). As discussed before, managers understand the 
circular concept relatively easily, as it is a relatively neutral way to understand the 
situation. 
 
An illustration: 
Team leaders: ‘To be honest, we don’t like to be labelled as ‘the difficult team’ time 
after time.’ 
Interventionist: ‘What is the effect of being labelled this way?’ 
Another team leader: ‘We feel unhappy with it. Actually I get angry. It de-motivates 
me when the organization talks this way, just because we are not yes-men.’ 
Interventionist: ‘If you are labelled this way time after time, you should think together 
why people would do that. You might be in a vicious circle: you get angry, which 
leads to more negative labels, which make you even angrier, etcetera. Try to find out 
together how you could stop this recurrent pattern.’ 
 
Confronting inconsistency neutrally 
Confront inconsistency between espoused theory and theory-in-use neutrally, 
present possible consistent choices equally and invite to make conscious and free 
choices so that one can feel responsible. This way, managers are helped to be 
consistent and reduce defensiveness.  
 
An illustration: 
Interventionist to the director: ‘What you wish (proactive behaviour, entrepreneurship) 
is not consistent with what you do (stimulating reactive behaviour). You could either 
leave your actions as they are and accept your managers’ reactive behaviour or 
change your actions and contribute to their proactive attitude. Both options are 
consistent; it is up to you.’ 
 
These findings are in line with Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (1957). By 
sharing inconsistency, the person experiences dissonance between what he says 
(and wants) and what he does in action. To relieve this dissonance, he might choose 
one of two options: either changing his assumptions or changing his attitude and/or 
behaviour. 
 
Making defensive strategies debatable  
In order to strengthen the fundamental solution (the lower cycle in Senge’s ‘shifting 
the burden’ structure) one has to deal with the defensive strategies that block this 
lower cycle. Or, in other words, de-blocking changing, organizing and learning 
requires reducing the defensive strategies that block changing, organizing and 
learning. These defensive strategies, however, are built to defend themselves and 
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can be characterized as ingrained routines. Feedback of defensiveness leads to 
activation of this defensiveness in the first instance, as illustrated below. 
 
Interventionist: We doubt how open people can be. We see some patterns that keep 
team members from being open. It appeared to us that you can say fairly hard things 
to each other. Each time this happens some one makes a joke, releases tension and 
changes the subject. Difficult or personal issues remain undebatable this way and -
contrary to the desired effect- an unsafe climate is created. Let’s call this a joking 
strategy. Another strategy with the same effect is the reduction strategy: you tend to 
make problems smaller if the situation might become difficult or embarrassing.  
HR manager (joking): Then you must not make any jokes about my roots anymore 
(both laugh). 
Interventionist: This is what we mean .... 
Director: Now you are exaggerating. It is not that bad. 
 
While confrontation leads to activation of defensive strategies in the short run, it 
leads to reduction of defensiveness in the longer run. In all instances in this study the 
client readdresses defensiveness after a period: ‘you spoke about these defensive 
strategies; could you tell me more about them?’ Apparently, there is a delayed effect. 
This is in line with Senge (1990), who argues that inquiring into the lower cycle in the 
‘shifting the burden’ structure is characterized by delay. Subsequently, the findings of 
this study demonstrate that defensive strategies in teams become weaker after 
repetitive open confrontation. After a period (with a delay), team members recognize 
and address defensive strategies in action.  
 
This seems to be an argument for confronting defensiveness openly and repetitively. 
This conclusion seems to contradict McCaughan and Palmer (1994) and Moeskops 
(2004), who emphasize caution. However, the conclusion is in line with Argyris 
(1990), who argues that if the source of the defensive feelings is to avoid learning, 
defensive feelings should not be bypassed. Senge (1990) argues that in order to 
retain its power, defensiveness must remain undiscussable. The underlying 
assumption is that after repetitive confrontation of one’s defensive actions, it will be 
difficult to repeat these actions unnoticed. 
 
Recognising the limitations of this study, the empirical evidence of this study lends 
support to the conclusion that confrontation of defensiveness is easier as the number 
of persons decreases. Individual confrontation has had the strongest effects in this 
study. This finding supports the strategy of starting with the manager, and 
subsequently addressing defensiveness in the team. 
 
Two additional types of interventions contribute to weaken defensiveness in this 
study: 
• Using humour 
Using humour can help to make defensive strategies debatable, e.g. ‘You are 
very good at keeping the situation as it is.’ Compare Argyris’ concept of ‘skilled 
incompetence’: ‘You are very skilled in being incompetent …’ 
• Confronting defensive strategies just before they will be activated 
Confronting defensive strategies before they are activated supports individuals to 
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inquire into their defensiveness ‘in action’: ‘I will mention some defensive 
strategies that keep you from effective change processes; you will probably feel 
them being activated while I talk about them. That is how they work; so don’t 
worry. Try to listen and understand what I say and what you feel.’ 
 
Stimulating inquiry into one’s beliefs and actions 
Unchecked beliefs play a major role in blocked changing and learning. In fixed 
situations, managers and employees tend to hold negative beliefs about the other 
party that, in turn, lead to circular patterns and recurrent problems. In a partner-in-
business or management-serving model, interventionists tend to take the manager’s 
beliefs for granted and help him to control the situation and block changing and 
learning.  
By asking questions about the effects of one’s beliefs and actions, the interventionist 
stimulates reflection on one’s own contribution to blocked changing and learning.  
 
This study delivers many illustrations of questions that stimulate inquiry into one’s 
beliefs and actions: 
• Confront unchecked beliefs: ‘How do you know that you are right? What did you 
exactly perceive that makes you stick to these beliefs?’ 
• Share the effect of one’s beliefs: ‘By holding these assumptions without inquiring 
into them, they tend to turn into self-fulfilling prophecies as they filter what you 
perceive’.  
• Inquire into the effect of one’s beliefs on one’s actions: ‘What is the effect of this 
belief on your actions?’  
• Inquire into the effect of one’s actions: ‘What exactly is the effect of your 
behaviour?’  
• Explore to what extent one is satisfied with these effects: ‘Are you satisfied with 
the effects of your actions? Do you succeed in changing the situation this way? If 
not, how can you continue saying that you are doing the right things?’ 
• Share how one contributes to one’s own problems: ‘I am afraid you produce your 
own problems: you have beliefs about him, you assume it does not help to share 
these beliefs, you take his responsibility away, you think this will make him less 
secure and you are busier and busier.’ 
 
This inquiry leads to self-reflection and learning. Subsequently, as this study 
illustrates, this learning might lead to public reflection upon one’s contribution to 
blocked learning and changing. 
 
Inviting to share valid information that one fears to share 
What this typically means is sharing valid information that one normally tends to 
cover up and that leads to mutual learning. By inviting to share valid information 
(‘What do you really think about this change approach?’) and creating room for free 
choice, the interventionist contributes to learning. In one case the interventionist asks 
the director whether one is allowed to say ‘no’ to his proposal, as a ‘yes’ might only 
be valid information if a ‘no’ is allowed as well. Another illustration: 
When a manager says he complies with the group norm (unlike what he seems to 
think), the interventionist inquires into what is happening. The manager responds. 
Manager: ‘It does not feel pleasant; I feel I have to defend myself.’  
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Interventionist: ‘But it works, right? After all, you say that you comply. Does it feel this 
way?’ 
Manager: ‘Well, actually I believe my way also works. But I see I need to change my 
belief.’ 
Interventionist (to all): ‘Is that what you want?’ 
Another manager: ‘No, I think you are right. We should not try to convince him, but I 
think we have to take time to find out how we wish to contribute to the change 
process.’ 
 
Sharing valid information also refers to the ladder of inference (Argyris, 1990, 2000; 
Noonan, 2007; Schwarz, 2002). Instead of talking about abstract interpretations 
(‘Regardless of what we do, employees are anti-management’), the interventionist 
asks for valid and directly observable data: ‘How do you know that you are right?’ 
‘Have you got an example?’ ‘What exactly happened?’ ‘What did you do?’ ‘How could 
your actions relate to employees’ reactions?’  
 
Sharing the concepts 
In just one case in the empirical study the interventionist conducted workshops on 
the concepts regarding unilateral control and mutual learning. These workshops 
actually contributed to experimentation with the mutual learning model in daily 
interactions, as illustrated by an employee, one day after he joined the workshop: ‘I 
want to try something that I have learned from A (interventionist). My belief was that if 
we asked for more information and bring in our frustration time after time, we would 
reach our goal. But I doubt if this assumption is valid.’ 
 
Although based upon only one case study, these observations lead to the tentative 
conclusion that sharing the relevant concepts supports learning and changing.  
 
Sharing what one fears to share regarding the effect of someone’s actions  
Unlike the preceding interventions this intervention, as well as the next one, involves 
the role of the interventionist. As a consequence, the interventionist cannot be a 
distant observer any longer. This study illustrates that being open about the effect of 
the leader’s behaviour on the interventionist contributes importantly to the leader’s 
learning process. The difficulty is that sharing sensitive information presupposes a 
certain level of comfort, while discomfort might be exactly the effect of the leader’s 
behaviour. As a consequence, intervening in these kinds of situations is not 
comfortable by definition. This finding strongly corresponds to Argyris’ (2004) 
description of ‘honesty’ in a mutual learning model: “Encourage yourself and other 
people to say what they know, yet fear to say. Minimize what would otherwise be 
subject to distortion and a cover-up of the distortion” (p. 398).  
 
An illustration: 
Interventionist: ‘Let me present this from my personal perspective. In my experience 
you can be very unpredictable: from one moment to another you can be very 
dissatisfied about things, which you communicate verbally or nonverbally 
(interventionist gives some examples). Sometimes I think we have built a 
relationship, but the next moment it seems to be not there at all. As a consequence, I 
am on the alert and act very cautiously. I don’t think I give you what you deserve, 
then. Do you recognize what I say?’ 
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Director (positively aroused): Yes, I can follow you. Go on. 
Interventionist: After all it is my own responsibility to deal with you and my feelings. 
However, it becomes important if your behaviour has the same effect on your 
managers. Might they be cautious because they cannot predict your reaction? 
 
Sharing valid information about how oneself contributes to the problems 
As illustrated by the circular patterns between interventionist and client system the 
interventionist is part of the situation and –thus- can be part of the problem. This is a 
difficult issue to address for several reasons. First, client and interventionist tend to 
perceive the latter as an outsider. Being a neutral outsider is often one of the reasons 
why he is hired. Second, the interventionist is vulnerable to distance from the 
situation as if he is not a part of it. Third, the idea that the interventionist might well 
contribute to the stagnation of processes is difficult to accept for all parties. After all, 
he is hired to solve problems, not to contribute to them. For these reasons, it is 
difficult for the interventionist to see, accept and share his own role in blocked 
changing. This study illustrates only a few instances of the interventionist sharing 
valid information about his own contribution. Afterwards, however, all cases were 
thoroughly discussed with the client, including the reflection on the interventionist’s 
role. An important finding is that in none of these situations did the client accuse the 
interventionist of not being effective. Instead, involving the interventionist’s role in 
understanding how changing, organizing and learning is being (de-)blocked 
contributed directly to learning.  
An illustration of the interventionist confronting his own role publicly: ‘To be honest, in 
the first session I tended to perceive you as a ‘difficult team’. I really appreciate if one 
is open, however one can easily label real openness as ‘resistance’. I did. In turn, I 
started helping J (manager) to persuade you and took distance. This way I stimulated 
you precisely in your behaviour, didn’t I?’ 
 
Reducing (time) pressure 
This study demonstrates that as pressure tends to activate a unilateral control model, 
it is effective to reduce pressure by slowing down. The more pressure, the more 
automatic behaviour and the less freedom to choose behaviour. Taking time helps all 
participants, including the interventionist, to inquire into the patterns and the way one 
contributes to them. This way the interventionist supports individuals to inquire into 
their own ‘moving moments’. 
 
Sharing alternatives and making them actionable 
This strategy corresponds strongly with Argyris (1990), who argues that proper 
advice “should contain the action strategies (e.g. advocate your position in a way that 
encourages inquiry). Second, it should be accompanied with actual statements that 
illustrate what you would have to say and do” (p. 87). 
 
An illustration: 
‘What if you shared your dilemma openly with him? Such as: I am hesitating. I would 
like to give you the opportunity to take this responsibility. However, I feel insecure 
because I get no signs that you’re working on it. How shall we organize this 
situation?’ 
Interventionists’ unilateral control contributes to blocked changing and learning  
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The interventions as described are espoused theory. The way interventionists put 
them into action, the process of intervening, is governed by their theory-in-use. A 
sole description of interventions regarding blocked learning and defensiveness would 
neglect the interventionist and presuppose the latter as not being defensive. Noonan 
(2007) involves his own defensiveness as an interventionist, while Argyris (1996) 
describes his own defensive reasoning as a scholar. This study demonstrates that 
the interventionist can be defensive, can activate a unilateral control model and – 
thus – can contribute to circular patterns, defensive strategies and blocked changing 
and learning.  
 
Certain circumstances in particular stimulate the interventionist to activate a unilateral 
control model. Table 11.5 summarizes these circumstances (as perceived by the 
interventionist), the interventionist’s reasoning, his actions and effects. 
 
(Perceived) 
circumstance 
Reasoning Actions Effect 
The interventionist’s 
role, approach, findings 
and/or added value are 
at stake. 
There are signals that 
might relate to reducing 
confidence in my role, 
approach, findings 
and/or added value, so I 
have to (re-)establish 
my position. 
 
 
• Emphasising I have 
everything under 
control. 
• Proving my added 
value through 
(immediate) 
answers, analyses 
and solutions. 
 
• Little contribution to 
long-term solutions 
and learning by 
client. 
• Little learning by 
interventionist. 
• Reduced ability to 
recognize defensive 
patterns. 
• Distance between 
interventionist and 
client. 
The relationship with 
the client is weak or 
uneasy. 
The relationship with 
some managers does 
not seem to be optimal, 
so I have to work on the 
relationship. This 
means I have to support 
them and I cannot 
confront painful issues 
(anymore). 
 
• Confirming and 
pleasing the client. 
• Keeping my beliefs 
and thoughts 
regarding the 
client’s 
effectiveness 
private, in order to 
save face. 
• Little learning by 
client. 
• Little added value 
from interventionist. 
• Weak (not open) 
relationship with 
client. 
• Reduced sensitivity 
to ineffective 
patterns. 
It is a major opportunity 
that has to succeed  
This project has to be 
successful in the eyes 
of the client, as this 
might lead to new and 
attractive opportunities.  
 
• Being a ‘partner-in-
business’ 
• Confirming the 
client, e.g. if he 
expects resistance, 
helping him to think 
up strategies to 
break through this 
resistance. 
• (Supporting client 
to) be in control, no 
surprises. 
• Little learning by 
client. 
• Little added value 
from interventionist, 
as he does the 
same as this client.  
• Weak (not open) 
relationship with 
client. 
• Reinforcement of 
client’s unilateral 
control and anti-
learning dynamics. 
• Reduced sensitivity 
to ineffective 
patterns. 
Table 11.5 Circumstances that activate unilateral control by interventionist 
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As table 11.5 demonstrates, unilateral control leads precisely to the effects the 
interventionist wishes to avoid. Furthermore, the study illustrates the 
counterproductive effects of a ‘partner-in-business’ model. This finding is in line with 
Drukker and Verhaaren (2002), who use the term ‘management-serving’ and argue 
that this role can be effective only if the problem is known and relatively simple and a 
proper solution is within reach. In case of dynamically complex problems, this role 
does not work out effectively.  
 
As long as the interventionist is not aware of his beliefs and reasoning in action and 
he does not publicly test them, he contributes to blocked learning and circular 
patterns. 
 
Interventionists’ unilateral control leads to circular patterns between interventionist 
and client 
This study demonstrates a striking similarity regarding the relation between 
management and employees on the one hand and the interventionist and the client 
system on the other hand. As soon as the interventionist enters, client and 
interventionist tend to create a relationship in which the interventionist is the active 
Subject who is able to understand what happens, and the actors in the client system 
are dependent Objects. Similar to managers and employees, this observation 
illustrates that the interventionist and actors in a client system have an inclination to 
develop a Subject-Object relationship.  
Just like managers and employees, this Subject-Object perspective leads to circular 
patterns. Box 11.6 summarizes the patterns that are illustrated in this study.  
 
Circular patterns between interventionist and client system 
 
• Interventionist is active (takes initiative), participants are passive/dependent: the more active the 
interventionist is, the more passive and dependent the participants become, the more active the 
interventionist is, etcetera. 
• Interventionist feeds back, participants wait and see: the more the interventionist gives feedback 
about patterns, the more participants keep their feedback private (‘that is an interesting 
analysis!!’), the more the interventionist gives feedback, etcetera. 
• Interventionist participates, manager directs difficult issues to interventionist: the more actively the 
interventionist participates, the more managers tend to direct difficult issues to the interventionist, 
the more the interventionist participates, etcetera. 
• Interventionist acts as a partner-in-business, employees behave critically: the more the 
interventionist acts as a partner-in-business with the manager, the more employees perceive 
interventionist as a partner of management and responds negatively to both, the more the 
interventionist acts as a partner-in-business with the manager, etcetera. 
• Interventionist persuades managers to accept outcomes, managers resist them: the more the 
interventionist thinks managers resist his outcomes, the more he persuades managers, the more 
they resist these outcomes, the more he persuades them, etcetera. 
 
The most fundamental one: 
• Interventionist is present, participants feel less responsible: if the interventionist is present, 
participants feel less responsible, the interventionist becomes more active (in order to help), 
participants feel even less responsible, etcetera. 
Box 11.6 Circular patterns between interventionist and client system 
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These circular patterns illustrate that the interventionist is part of the organizational 
situation. This means that he cannot distance himself from the situation, as if he is 
not part of the process. These findings are in line with McCaughan and Palmer 
(1994): “We talk about a consultant being ‘outside’ the problem situation, but there 
are no insides and outsides in this kind of systems thinking. Feedback loops are no 
respecters of conventional boundaries” (p. 75). 
 
These circular patterns recur as long as interventionist and actors in the client system 
do not reflect on these patterns including their own contribution to them, do not 
openly share their beliefs and reasoning and make sensitive but essential issues 
undiscussable. 
 
Interventionists’ unilateral control activates defensive strategies  
Just like managers and employees, interventionists can block inquiry and learning by 
defensive strategies from time to time. This study demonstrates four defensive 
strategies, as summarized in box 11.7 19 
 
Defensive strategies by interventionist 
 
• Assume strategy: keep one’s beliefs and thoughts regarding the client’s effectiveness private, in 
order to save face. 
• Withdraw strategy: in case of difficulties in the communication, do not make this debatable with the 
persons who are involved; rather, withdraw and think up new initiatives or discuss the difficulties 
with peers (‘What am I going to do to make them understand?’). 
• Ignorance strategy: if one observes patterns that are difficult to deal with, e.g. that employees are 
not really committed, do not inquire (‘Some employees seem to bear heavy negative experiences; 
please share your concerns frankly in a conversation with a manager’). 
• Distance strategy: in case of blocked changing and learning, neglect one’s own role and focus on 
other parties (‘There was a distance between you and your team’). 
Box 11.7 Defensive strategies by the interventionist 
 
Although there are no illustrations of active attempts to make issues undiscussable, 
such as the joke or reduction strategy, the interventionists in this study do not openly 
share their beliefs and reasoning several times. Most persistent is the 
interventionist’s inclination  
• not to involve his own role and perceive himself as an outsider, and  
• not to test his own beliefs, but take them for granted. 
All defensive strategies aim at keeping things calm and not creating painful situations 
for the interventionist or others. By doing so, the interventionist blocks his and others’ 
learning and contributes to preservation of the current situation.  
 
Some commonly used intervention methods work out as cover-up of underlying 
problems 
As this study illustrates, some generally accepted intervention methods appear to 
work out as a cover-up of underlying problems. Although these intervention methods 
fit dynamically simple situations, they are not appropriate for dynamically complex 
situations (also see Argyris, 1994). 
                                                
19 These defensive strategies have been displayed by the interventionist in this study. This selection cannot 
automatically be generalised to other consultants. The overview mainly illustrates how interventionists 
(consultants) can block learning through defensive strategies. 
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Interviews in order to analyse the situation bypass the underlying problem 
This study illustrates the limitations of interviews in order to gain insight into one’s 
perceptions and beliefs regarding the current reality. 
 
Individual interviews normally presuppose anonymity of the interviewees, in order to 
stimulate individuals to share information one would not share otherwise. However, 
what is the added value of information that employees would not share with their 
manager and the interventionist cannot share with their manager? The interventionist 
becomes a bypass of the communication problems between management and 
employees. In effect, this methodology does not support learning and changing. For 
this reason, direct communication between managers and employees is to be 
preferred in such situations. The interventionist can help them to create an 
atmosphere that supports mutual learning. 
 
Presentations of a diagnosis can contribute to preservation of the current reality 
In some instances the interventionist presents his diagnosis to a management team 
or a group of employees. What is the effect of this methodology? The diagnosis could 
be a bypass of the problems, as employees and management can take distance, 
saying that this is interesting and subsequently wait and see what happens. Besides, 
the diagnosis could make them defensive; this could be uncomfortable for the 
interventionist who, in turn, might respond with persuasion. Presenting a diagnosis 
however, can stimulate awareness of 
• how changing is (possibly) blocked, 
• how one contributes to the recurrent problems, 
• how one could contribute to de-blocking of changing. 
This could contribute to learning, as long as this is not presented as ‘the truth’ but 
only a possible explanation (‘It is the best I could think up. Have you got something 
else in mind?’) and as long as the interventionist leaves room for free choice and 
personal commitment (‘I do not expect you to do anything. But whatever your choice 
is, try to be consistent. Either keep acting the same and accept some tensions and 
discomfort -and do not complain about it-, or contribute to changing by reflection on 
your own role. For me it is a free choice.’). 
 
A consistent intervention perspective on changing, organizing and learning involves 
the interventionist’s defensiveness. 
Based on this study, three development phases of the interventionist can be 
distinguished. If the interventionist does not recognize expressions of unilateral 
control, defensive strategies and circularity, he cannot address them either. In effect, 
he does not contribute to the de-blocking of changing, organizing and learning.  
The overviews in this chapter regarding unilateral control (figure 11.1), circular 
patterns (box 11.1) and defensive strategies (box 11.2) are more specific than 
existing descriptions and can contribute to one’s sensitivity to recognize these 
blocking patterns. Subsequently, the interventionist can contribute to changing and 
learning by addressing these patterns and make them debatable (see box 11.4 
‘Interventionists’ de-blocking interventions’). This way, the interventionist puts the 
interventions into practice in order to stimulate mutual learning by others, though 
without involving inquiry into his own contribution to the patterns. In other words, 
these interventions are built upon a Subject-Object perspective.  
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Being consistent requires the interventionist to contribute to mutual learning in a 
mutual learning way. In order to do this, the interventionist has to recognize his own 
unilateral control, defensive strategies and contribution to circular patterns as well. 
Subsequently, he has to be prepared to involve his own role and to accept that he 
might miss relevant information or might make a mistake in his reasoning. Now, the 
interventionist not only shares his analysis in a way that can be tested publicly 
(advocacy), but he also explores what other people see and understand that may be 
in conflict with his point of view (inquiry) (Noonan, 2007). This study provides some 
illustrations of the interventionist who does involve his own role and does openly 
accept he might miss relevant information. These illustrations contributed to learning 
not only by the interventionist, but also by clients who take the interventionist’s 
behaviour as an example.  
In short, there seems to be a development process from unilateral control via 
contributing to mutual learning in a unilateral control way to mutual learning by the 
interventionist. Figure 11.8 summarizes this development process.  
 
 
 
Figure 11.8 Development of the interventionist: from repetition, via sophisticated control to  
  mutual learning 
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11.4 Additional results 
 
The empirical study leads to some outcomes that cannot be linked directly to the 
research questions. In this section these outcomes are presented and discussed. 
 
Episodic change initiatives stifle entrepreneurship, pro-activity and ownership 
In all cases in the empirical study, management call for entrepreneurship, pro-activity, 
and ownership. This seems to be illustrative of numerous companies nowadays. The 
problem is that just by presenting a change process as something that starts now, 
one introduces an episodic change that is being imposed on people because 
management think it is important now. This clearly reveals a Subject-Object 
perspective. Basically, this means that just the start of the process can stifle the 
opportunity to realize one’s goals. Employees will wait and see (‘They find it 
necessary that we develop entrepreneurship; let us wait and see’). This situation 
uncovers a management dilemma: how to take initiative without stifling employees’ 
initiative? 
Typical approaches that stimulate mutual learning from the beginning:  
- Management combine advocacy with inquiry (Argyris, 1990; Noonan, 2007; 
Schwarz, 2002): ‘As we have only worked for the same clients with the same 
services last year, we think we might lose our position in the longer run. That is 
why we think we have to develop new services and attract new clients. In short, 
we think we should develop entrepreneurship. Might we be missing relevant 
information?’ 
- Management share the dilemma: ‘We are aware that just by taking initiative we 
might stifle yours. We do not like that effect. Let us start finding out how we can 
organize a process that helps us to improve things together.’  
 
Controlling leaders lead to followers and resisters; learning leaders lead to learners 
The empirical evidence of this study lends support to the conclusion that unilateral 
control leads to dependent and/or resistant employees. This study also illustrates that 
unilateral control is effective in (dynamically) simple situations, but is not in 
dynamically complex situations. In the latter situations, unilateral controlling 
leadership leads to blocked changing, organizing and learning. Here, leaders need to 
make consistent choices: either hold their beliefs, repeat their actions and accept this 
leads to recurrent problems (conflicts, resistance, reactivity), or not accept recurrent 
problems and change their beliefs and actions. If they choose the last option, they 
have to be able and willing to invest in mutual learning.  
There is an interesting relation with Zaleznik’s famous article ‘Managers and leaders, 
are they different?’ (2004). According to Zaleznik, “managers embrace process, seek 
stability and control and instinctively try to resolve problems quickly – sometimes 
before they fully understand a problem’s significance. Leaders, in contrast, tolerate 
chaos and lack of structure and are willing to delay closure in order to understand the 
issues more fully” (p. 74). This distinction greatly resembles the distinction between 
unilateral control (aiming at short-term and instrumental solutions) and mutual 
learning (aiming at inquiry into fundamental problems and long-term solutions). 
However, whereas this study inquires into managers’ development from unilateral 
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control to mutual learning, Zaleznik considers managers and leaders to have different 
personalities and organizational positions. Apparently, he makes a sharp separation 
between managers and leaders. 
If one combines the outcomes of this study with Zaleznik’s insights, one can argue 
that management refers especially to the three-quarters of all organization problems 
that can be solved with a unilateral control model (Argyris, 1983). Leadership is 
needed for effective changing, organizing and learning, and requires individuals to 
have the ability to reflect upon their own contribution to recurrent problems, to test 
their beliefs publicly, to accept they might miss relevant information, to disclose 
themselves, and to be consistent. This perspective on leadership does not leave 
room for Zaleznik’s separation of managers and leaders, as managers sometimes 
have to deal with changing and leaders have to (be in) control as well (Van der 
Vossen, 2007). Apparently, management and leadership can be perceived as 
different concepts, while managers and leaders are difficult to separate. This 
perspective on leadership is worth studying in more detail. 
 
Leaders start learning 
The outcomes of the empirical study confirm the insight that leaders have to start 
changing their contribution to recurrent problems, before they can reasonably expect 
subordinates to do so. Although the circular patterns show that leaders and 
subordinates keep recurrent problems alive, all cases illustrate that subordinates start 
changing their behaviour only after their manager has started. Espoused theories 
that are inconsistent with theories-in-use stifle management’s credibility as 
employees focus on what managers do, not on what they say. This finding is in line 
with Argyris (1984, 1990), who argues that one should start with the top, and Weick & 
Quinn (2004), who argue, “most top managers assume that change is something that 
someone with authority does to someone who does not have authority. […] When 
deep personal change occurs, leaders then behave differently toward their direct 
reports, and the new behaviours from followers” (p.190).  
Still, one could question this line of reasoning, as it seems to be a unilateral 
perspective in itself and confirms a positional organization and Subject-Object 
perspective: subordinates will change only if their superior takes initiative (at first). If 
managers share their reasons to change their behaviour openly with employees, they 
immediately involve employees in their learning and changing. This way, they 
stimulate mutual learning that involves employees as well. 
 
‘Resistance to change’ and ‘sense-of-urgency’ are top-down beliefs that lead to self-
fulfilling prophecies 
This study illustrates the effects of managers’ beliefs that employees will show 
resistance. By labelling behaviour as ‘resistance’ and ‘difficult to manage’, one 
creates circumstances of discomfort and pressure and activates a unilateral control 
model (‘we have to keep things under control’): the manager takes distance, braces 
himself, persuades, and makes difficult issues undiscussable. This, in turn, leads 
precisely to the behaviour one is afraid of and activates circular patterns: keeping 
things under control and making other opinions undebatable leads to ‘difficult 
behaviour’, leads to unilateral control, etcetera.  
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The question is, what is it that one calls resistance? This study focuses on what 
people openly say and do when their opinion differs from their manager’s. Here is 
where the inconsistency with mutual learning starts. The espoused theory is that we 
would like valid information, especially about a thing as fundamental as commitment. 
However, if this valid information is unpleasant and even threatening, this information 
tends to activate a unilateral control model. 
The difficulty in action is to deal with valid information if one perceives this 
information as threatening. It is easier to manage people who say ‘yes’ and think ‘no’, 
even if a ‘yes’ is invalid information. Generally, ‘positive’ (and neutral) persons tend to 
be perceived as constructive, while critical persons are usually perceived as not 
constructive. Labelling critical notes as resistance, however, stimulates people to go 
underground: ‘we say yes or we say nothing and after all we just don’t do what they 
expect’ (compliance and undergo strategy). This way, management stimulates 
defensiveness. 
 
This study provides some insights that might be helpful for dealing with these difficult 
situations from a mutual learning perspective.  
First, descend the ladder of inference and make the concept of resistance more 
concrete:  
- why do you expect resistance? 
- what exactly do you mean by resistance? 
- what examples do you have in the past? 
- what exactly happened and how did you act? 
- what is the effect of your belief (they will have resistance’) on your behaviour? 
- what is the effect of that behaviour and are you satisfied with that effect? 
- might they have information that you are missing? 
- could you explain why they act as they do? 
- how do you contribute to their behaviour? 
- how could you create an open dialogue instead of unilateral control? 
Second, make a consistent choice. One can either keep acting the same as one 
does and accept some commitment problems, or contribute to changing by reflection 
on the way one contributes to the situation and discuss the situation openly.  
Third, if one wishes to contribute to mutual learning, one has to be open about one’s 
ideas in a way that is testable and accept that employees might have information that 
is valuable for effectively realizing one’s goals. Instead of persuading, one could 
better share the data that have persuaded oneself in order to give others the chance 
to persuade themselves. Afterwards, there might still be a conflict of interest or views. 
A mutual learning approach would be sharing valid information: ‘I know we do not all 
agree now and I know I will disappoint some of you and might even make you 
defensive, but now I will have to take a decision. I will not ask you to agree and I 
understand your defensiveness, though I expect you to respect this decision.’ 
 
Related to the resistance to change, mainstream literature argues that change 
requires a sense of urgency (e.g. Kotter, 2002). The underlying assumption is that 
individuals will not be willing to change if there is no clear sense of urgency. Just like 
resistance to change, this seems to be a top-down belief: individuals only change if 
top management take initiative and put pressure on them through a notion of 
urgency. Pressure stimulates managers to control their environment and to 
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implement instrumental single-loop solutions. From this perspective, a sense of 
urgency might even have an opposite effect (as well), as this study demonstrates 
how unilateral control can block changing. 
Inquiry into underlying problems that produce symptoms would be hard or even 
impossible under circumstances of urgency. The concept of urgency seems to fit with 
unilateral control and single-loop learning; managers might feel comfortable if they 
can make use of clear urgency. Mutual learning and double-loop learning require a 
notion of importance.20 An odd side effect of the concept of urgency is that changing 
and learning would only be possible if it is (nearly) too late.  
 
Episodic change initiatives lead to stability 
The empirical evidence of this study supports the paradox that episodic change 
initiatives can lead to stability (see figure 2.17). This paradox holds true in change 
initiatives that relate to behaviour, attitude and interaction (summarized as ‘culture’) 
as opposed to structure and systems. The empirical study delivers illustrations of top 
management initiating a change project (e.g. improving entrepreneurship and pro-
activity), leading to middle managers taking initiatives (e.g. developing improvement 
actions and a schedule to implement these actions together with their employees), 
leading to top management’s discomfort (e.g. they neither like the improvement 
actions nor the time schedule), leading to controlling actions by management (e.g. 
putting pressure on the time schedule), leading to stability (e.g. team leaders and 
employees do not feel committed to the actions and schedule and reduce their 
efforts). This pattern is summarized in figure 11.9. 
 
 
Figure 11.9 Change leads to stability 
 
Argyris’ organizational learning approach has some challenges 
The theoretical insights of this study heavily rest upon Chris Argyris’ work (e.g. 1990, 
2000, 2004). These insights contribute greatly to an understanding of the relation 
between unilateral control and blocked changing, organizing and learning. Section 
3.4 describes a critical reflection upon Argyris’ insights. The empirical study 
demonstrates three additional challenges. First, the mutual learning model is 
                                                
20 The distinction between importance and urgency is borrowed from literature on time management and 
personal effectiveness. See, for example, Covey, 2004. 
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challenged by ‘power’ and ‘parties’. This study illustrates that blocked changing can 
be both cause and effect of thinking in terms of ‘parties’. Management talk about ‘the 
employees’ and employees about ‘management’. Thinking in terms of parties leads 
to ignorance of individual differences, de-personification (it is relatively easy to say 
bad things about a party) and a struggle for power. Phenomena like power and 
parties do play a role in Argyris’ work: they are strongly related to unilateral control. 
However, mutual learning supposes the willingness to learn, while the struggle for 
power may lead to parties just not willing to learn, not willing to have a dialogue and 
just wanting the other party to lose or leave. The issue of power is thoroughly 
discussed by Mastenbroek (1991), who presents an integrative perspective on 
system and power thinking, and Bradshaw and Boonstra (2004), who introduce four 
perspectives on power in organizations.  
A second challenge concerns the effect of slowing down. Mutual learning 
presupposes slowing down automatic behaviour. As demonstrated several times in 
the empirical study, this leads to secondary, non-spontaneous behaviour. It would not 
be desirable to create a world that is characterized by only this behaviour. A mutual 
learning model is not only not always required; it seems to be not always desired. 
A third challenge of Argyris’ organizational learning approach is the focus on error 
and mismatch as a source of learning. As depicted in figure 2.13, Argyris describes 
single-loop and double-loop learning as corrective loops that start with a mismatch. In 
line with insights regarding appreciative inquiry (e.g. Cooperrider, 1995, 1997), one 
could argue that learning can also start with positive results. Conscious reflection on 
these positive outcomes can contribute to reproduction in other situations. From this 
perspective, learning is a feedback loop from positive effects to actions and/or 
governing values that lead to these positive effects. Figure 11.10 combines Argyris’ 
familiar model of single-loop and double-loop learning with ‘appreciative learning 
loops’. 
 
Figure 11.10 Single-loop and double-loop learning combined with ‘appreciative learning’ 
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11.5 The problem statement and research objectives addressed 
 
The problem statement of this study is formulated as follows: 
 
How do leaders and their consultants contribute to (de)blocking of dynamically 
complex change processes? 
 
Subsequently, this problem statement is translated into six specific objectives. These 
objectives are addressed below. 
 
Objective 1. Collect data and evidence of a dominant unilateral control model by 
managers (and their consultants). 
The theoretical exploration cites many authors who have illustrated a strong 
inclination of managers to activate a unilateral control model that is characterized by 
the desire to win, suppress feelings, to avoid testing one’s own assumptions, to judge 
others and to be rational (e.g. Argyris, 1973,1974,1982, 1983, 1990,1991, 1999, 
2000, 2004; Argyris, Putnam, McLain Smith, 1985; Drukker, 1999; Drukker & 
Verhaaren, 2002; Kamsteeg & Koot, 2002; Koot & Sabelis, 2000; Wierdsma, 2004; 
Werkman, 2006; Senge, 1990). 
 
The collected empirical evidence lends support to this insight. Especially in situations 
that are threatening or embarrassing, managers as well as their consultants 
(interventionists) tend to hold a unilateral control model.  
 
Objective 2. Develop insight into the expressions of a dominant unilateral control 
model. 
In the theoretical exploration the expressions of a unilateral control model are 
described thoroughly, leading to a summarising diagnostic model (see figure 2.20) 
and an operational translation of the expressions (see table 5.1). 
 
The empirical study has been used to validate the diagnostic model. The adjusted 
model is depicted in figure 11.1. 
 
Objective 3. Create insight into the relation between a dominant unilateral control 
model and blocked changing. 
The theoretical exploration describes a number of concepts that are relevant to 
understand the relation between unilateral control model and blocked changing, 
organizing and learning. These concepts are 
• systems thinking and circular patterns (Senge, 1990; Campbell, Coldicott, 
Kinsella, 1994; McCaughan, Palmer, 1994; Moeskops, 2004; Werkman, 2006). 
• lack of learning and defensiveness (e.g. Argyris, 1990, 2000, 2004). 
• self-fulfilling prophecies, self-sealing processes, escalating error (e.g. Argyris, 
1990, 2000, 2004). 
 
These concepts contribute to recurrent problems. The empirical study further 
explores the relation between unilateral control and these recurrent problems. The 
empirical evidence leads to a number of conclusions, as summarized under research 
question 2. In short, these conclusions concern 
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• a description of how management (and consultancy) focus on symptomatic and 
short-term solutions and block fundamental solutions; 
• an overview of typical circular patterns and self-fulfilling prophecies that stem from 
a dominant Subject-Object perspective of relationships; 
• an overview of so-called defensive strategies that block learning and inquiry into 
the underlying problems that produce the recurrent problems. 
 
The findings confirm the insight that unilateral control is effective in dynamically 
simple situations and leads to problems in dynamically complex situations. Under the 
latter circumstances, unilateral control leads to reduction of control. This finding 
corresponds to Senge (1990): “The illusion of being in control can appear quite real. 
In hierarchical organizations, leaders give orders and others follow. But giving orders 
is not the same as being in control. Power may be concentrated at the top but having 
the power of unilateral decision making is not the same as being able to achieve 
one’s objectives” (p. 290). 
 
Objective 4. Create insight into the practical attainability of employing alternative 
behaviour in interpersonal interactions. 
The theoretical exploration involves a reflection upon Argyris’ theory on 
organizational learning (section 3.2) that addresses the question of the extent to 
which managers are able to put mutual learning model (Model II) into practice. 
Generally, this is perceived as an important issue regarding Argyris’ work (see Ardon 
and Wassink, 2008). In this reflection it becomes clear that even Argyris is not 
consistent in his reports regarding this issue, varying from “It will take as much time 
to learn Model II as it takes to play a middling game of tennis” (1990, p. 95) to “even 
highly advantaged, graduate-educated, organizationally high-ranking adults have a 
great deal of difficulty mastering – or simply cannot master - what it is he is teaching” 
(personal remark, Kegan, 1994, p. 321). 
 
The empirical study demonstrates that managers are able and willing to develop 
mutual learning skills, if they recognize this will help them to realize their objectives. 
This is demonstrated by the outcomes regarding research question 2. Still, it is quite 
fragile, especially because these skills are not enough. In order to contribute to real 
mutual learning, one has to accept that one really might miss relevant information or 
one might make a mistake in one’s reasoning. Changing this belief requires double-
loop learning and is much more difficult than ‘only’ developing learning skills, 
especially under circumstances that are threatening or embarrassing. This way, the 
leader’s development from unilateral control to mutual learning is identical to the 
interventionist’s development, as depicted in figure 11.7. 
 
This study delivers many illustrations of managers who put the skills into practice and 
fewer illustrations of managers who openly accept that they might miss information: ‘I 
thought it was all logical and clear. Now I see your opinions differ from mine. 
Apparently, it was my logic and clearness.’ These findings demonstrate that 
managers are able to develop a mutual learning model. Still, the empirical evidence 
illustrates that it is far from easy for managers and highly dependent on the 
interventionist’s role. After all, as discussed in section 11.3, most behavioural 
changes become visible only after specific interventions by the interventionist. 
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Objective 5. Create insight into the interventionist’s role in (de-)blocking of changing. 
The empirical study describes how the interventionist contributes to blocked 
changing, organizing and learning by holding a unilateral control model. Particularly 
when the interventionist takes a partner-in-business or management-serving role 
(Drukker & Verhaaren, 2002), he is vulnerable to unilateral control. The study also 
gives insight into the specific interventions that contribute to de-blocking changing, 
organizing and learning. 
 
Objective 6. Develop an intervention perspective that supports de-blocking of 
changing. 
The study leads to an overview of interventions that contribute to de-blocking 
changing, organizing and learning, as summarized in section 11.3. The insights are 
accompanied by illustrative quotes that are derived from the empirical study. This is 
in line with Argyris (1990), who argues that advice “should contain the action 
strategies (e.g. advocate your position in a way that encourages inquiry). Second, it 
should be accompanied by actual statements that illustrate what you would have to 
say and do” (p. 87). 
 
In summary, recognising the methodological limitations that are embedded in this 
study (see section 11.7), all research objectives have been addressed in this study. 
 
 
11.6 Methodological conclusions 
 
The research methodology of this study is a combination of longitudinal case studies 
and action research. This combination leads to two main characteristics: 
- the interventionist and the interventions are part of the process and part of the 
study; 
- the cases are described during a longer period.  
 
This section addresses a number of conclusions regarding the research 
methodology.  
 
Action research is particularly suitable to develop a scientifically based intervention 
perspective 
According to Eden & Huxham (1996) “it is difficult to justify the use of action research 
when the same aims can be satisfied using approaches (such as controlled 
experimentation or surveys) that can demonstrate the link between data and 
outcomes more transparently. Thus in action research, the reflection and data 
collection process - and hence the emergent theories - are most valuably focused on 
the aspects that cannot be captured by other approaches” (p. 536).  
 
Does this study justify the use of action research? The answer seems to be positive. 
The line of reasoning is as follows. This study confirms Argyris’ insight that 
managers’ espoused theory and theory-in-use are often not consistent. Surveys 
could have worked, if managers’ espoused theories regarding their actions had been 
compared with their subordinates’ observations. However, this study aims at 
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understanding processes instead of instances. This argues for longitudinal case 
studies with observation of the processes. This research method would have been 
sufficient if the researcher was considered to be a non-participative observer. 
However, this study also aims at developing an intervention perspective, which 
means that the researcher is an interventionist at the same time. The interventionist 
can no longer act as if he is not playing a role in the process. It is precisely this 
research aim that justifies the use of action research. Although this research method 
has some challenges, it seems to be the most appropriate to this study. 
As Glaser (1992) puts it, the value of action research can be seen in developing and 
elaborating theory from practice. Or, as a variation of Lewin’s famous dictum one 
could say ‘there is nothing so theoretical as a good practice’ (Jaap Boonstra, 
personal comment, 2008).  
 
Being both interventionist and researcher requires a thorough learning process and 
objective checks of data and interpretations 
In action research the interventionist is not a distanced observer. Instead, action 
research appreciates that the researcher is visible and is expected to have an impact 
on the experiment (Eden & Huxham, 1996). Or, in other words, the interventionist 
and interventions are part of the observed process. The empirical study strongly 
confirms this conception, as illustrated by the circular processes between 
interventionist and clients. McCaughan and Palmer (1994) say about this circularity: 
“We talk about a consultant being ‘outside’ the problem situation, but there are no 
insides and outsides in this kind of systems thinking. Feedback loops are no 
respecters of conventional boundaries” (p. 75). 
 
Being both interventionist and researcher requires the ability to describe what 
happens, including the ineffectiveness of one’s interventions, one’s own contribution 
to recurrent problems and one’s own defensiveness. As described in this study, a 
unilateral control model instructs people to defend their position and their line of 
reasoning, especially under circumstances that can be embarrassing. If one follows 
this line of reasoning, it is quite plausible that the researcher tends to cover up his 
ineffective actions as an interventionist and covers up this cover-up. Knowing that 
these case studies will be published discourages openness about his own defensive 
reasoning. In order to control this inclination, which would undermine the reliability of 
the outcomes, four conditions appear to be of great importance: 
• the raw data (the narratives) are preferably based on notes by a neutral observer; 
• the raw data have to be checked by the client; 
• the interpretations have to be checked by an informed expert, who has not 
participated in the process; 
• the researcher has to take distance from the contents of the cases. 
 
In this study, most data are based on literal notes by assistants. Furthermore, clients 
have studied each case and have confirmed that these narratives correspond with 
their view. The experiences in this study illustrate that the informed expert has to be 
very critical of the researcher: ‘Are you defending your case? As a researcher, you 
have to take distance from what you did as an interventionist.’ 
 
Being part of the process limits the possibility to describe ‘objective phenomena’ 
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The director in one case raises the point that he finds it unpleasant that the research 
assistant makes notes during meetings. In his perception he becomes too aware of 
what he says and what he does, which reduces his effectiveness. This view relates 
directly to an interesting methodological issue: what is the effect of observing on the 
observed? From a modernist perspective, one can say that observing may lead to a 
change of the observed phenomena. And in action research one not only observes, 
but acts directly upon the observed. This view relates to the Hawthorne studies 
(Mayo, 1933) that led to the finding that observing worker performance leads to short-
term improvements. Observing, apparently, leads to a change of the observed21. 
From a postmodernist view (e.g. Boje, 1994) the observer problem seems to 
dissolve. The question would be whether objective phenomena do exist outside the 
observer and actor. In this view, by definition, meaning is subjective and is created in 
interaction. 
 
This study illustrates that the researcher can contribute to a reduced awareness of 
the fact one is observed. First, in longitudinal case studies the observer’s effect 
seems to become weaker, as people become less aware of the observer (it becomes 
‘normal’ that the interventionist is there). Second, no recorder is used during 
conversations and meetings, as this way people would become even more aware of 
what they are saying (see Edmondson, 1996).  
 
 
11.7 Limitations of this study  
 
This study is subject to the common limitations inherent in actions research and 
(longitudinal) case studies as well as some specific limitations. General limitations 
and conditions are discussed in section 6.4 ‘Research design’. In reflection, some 
additional remarks can be made, which are discussed in this section. 
 
Unlike the process of exploration of the data, the collection of data is not repeatable 
The collection of the data in this study is only replicable in the sense that one could 
use other unique situations to validate the theoretical concepts and explore the 
research questions. After all, the study consists of three independent cases in 
different contexts that have all contributed to the research outcomes with a similar 
research method (Eisenhardt, 1989). The specific interventions, however, cannot be 
replicated identically, as each situation is unique. This corresponds with findings of 
Eden and Huxham (1996): “By its very nature, action research does not lend itself to 
repeatable experimentation; each intervention will be different from the last” (p. 532). 
It is exactly this reason why criticism has been expressed against action research: 
lack of repeatability and, thus, lack of rigour (Eden and Huxham, 1996). Other 
                                                
21 In quantum mechanics there is a famous similar phenomenon, the so-called double slit experiment (Feynman, 
1988). This experiment illustrates that if electrons - which are considered to be matter - are sent through two slits 
in a plate, they show an interference pattern that corresponds to waves. In order to understand this result, 
scientists have tried to observe how pieces of matter can behave like waves. However, as soon as one tries to 
measure what exactly happens, the interference pattern disappears and the electrons behave like matter. The very 
act of measuring changes the pattern that is observed, as if matter knows that it is being observed. 
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scientists argue that action research contributes to rich and in-depth insight that could 
not be gained in other ways (Whyte, 1991). 
 
Unlike the collection of data, the process of exploration of the data in the 
development of theory is replicable and capable of being explained to others (Eden 
and Huxham, 1996). The process from observations to conclusions has been 
structured as clearly as possible, in order to enlarge the chain of evidence (Yin, 1994) 
and follows Argyris’ ladder of inference (1990): from raw data (transcripts) to 
interpretations (reflections, single-case analysis) and conclusions (cross-case 
analysis and conclusions). 
 
This study proves association between actions and effects, not causality  
This study focuses on the effects of unilateral control and interventions on changing, 
organizing and learning. By literally describing managers’ and interventionists’ 
actions and the responses of others in a large number of specific situations, the 
relations between action and effects have been explored. However, these relations 
are not isolated from other influences as in an experimental setting. This way, 
relations are made plausible, but causal relations are not ‘hard’. This study proves 
association, not causality. These insights correspond to the internal validity of the 
study (Yin, 1994). Although this is a serious limitation, it should be put into 
perspective. Causality is difficult to prove, as besides statistical association one has 
to meet two additional conditions: the one variable must precede the other and other 
reasonable causes for the effect should be excluded (De Groot, 1981).  
 
A researcher-interventionist combination challenges external validity and reliability  
As this study aims at exploring processes instead of instances, theories-in-use 
instead of espoused theories and interactions between interventionist and actors 
instead of a distanced observer and actors, the preferred research method is a 
combination of longitudinal case study and action research. Although this seems to 
be the most effective research method in relation to this subject, there are some 
challenges.  
External validity refers to the extent to which outcomes can be generalized to other 
situations. Although there are three cases, each case involves a large number of 
specific situations (mini-cases). Besides, although the cases are characterized by 
different contexts and histories, the cross-case analysis leads to outcomes that are in 
line with existing theory. It seems to be plausible that the outcomes can be 
generalized to other situations (Eisenhardt, 1989). Glaser & Strauss (1967) even 
argue that theory development does not require many cases. Even one case is 
sufficient to generate conceptual categories and some cases can be used to confirm 
the temporary assumptions.  
 
A specific characteristic of this study is the researcher and interventionist being one 
and the same individual. This leads to the question of the extent to which the 
outcomes of the intervention perspective can be generalized. By describing the 
interventions and the effects literally, there is an attempt to separate the individual 
characteristics of the interventionist from his interventions and their effects. Still, there 
seems to be a limitation of this study here. A specific issue in relation to the 
researcher-interventionist combination is the degree to which the data collection and 
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exploration are without bias, which refers to reliability of the study (Gill & Johnson, 
1997). As discussed before, some critical conditions have been met to control a 
possible bias in observations and interpretations as much as possible. The point of 
view is that this has been done sufficiently to ensure reliability. 
 
The scope of this study only partly includes long-term effects 
This study addresses long-term effects of behavioural change and interventions. As 
this study illustrates, the effects of actions that fit the lower cycle of Senge’s (1990) 
‘shifting the burden’ structure are characterized by delay. This argues for a research 
design that involves longitudinal case studies. All cases are studied during a period 
of about a year. This appears to be long enough to explore the degree to which one 
can develop a mutual learning model and to study the effects of adjusted behaviour 
and interventions. Still, after this period the observed phenomena and processes go 
on. It seems to be reasonable to suppose that there will be longer-term effects that 
are beyond the scope of this study. Effects may, for example, relate to sustainability 
of behavioural shifts and new interactive patterns. This argues for another period of 
study after a year or two. 
 
The process of data analysing is subjective and reflective rather than interactive  
In this study the interventionist mainly analyses the data during or after meetings. 
Sometimes he shares the analysis during the process, sometimes at the end of a 
session, and sometimes in a following session. In this study, unlike defensive 
strategies, presenting circular patterns does not lead to resistance by the actors 
(Werkman, 2006, p. 440). However, it does contribute to a dependent and reactive 
attitude of actors as the expert role of the interventionist is being emphasized. At this 
point, the empirical study does not fit the conditions of Research in dynamically 
complex situations, as summarized in table 6.1: the study can be characterized as 
unilateral and Subject-Object rather than mutual learning and Subject-Subject. In 
order to be more consistent with the concept of mutual learning, the intervention 
method could have involved more elements of interactive analysis like group model 
building (Vennix, 1998; Rouwette, 2003, Vermaak, 2006, Werkman, 2006). In this 
method interventionist and actors within the organization build the circular patterns 
together.  
 
This study starts from an organizational learning perspective and excludes other 
perspectives 
The focus of this study is on changing, organizing and learning as opposed to 
change and organization. This perspective leads to interpretations and conclusions 
that would not have been found from a different perspective. For example, the 
outcome ‘Resistance to change is a top-down belief that leads to self-fulfilling 
prophecies’ is typically related to an organizational learning perspective. From a 
power perspective, resistance to change is interpreted quite differently. In the colour 
approach of De Caluwé and Vermaak (2003) the perspective of this study 
corresponds most strongly to white change. Inevitably, as with any perspective, this 
leads to a bias in the line of reasoning. 
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Opportunities for triangulation have not been fully exploited  
In table 6.2 the fifteen characteristics of action research, as described by Eden and 
Huxham (1996) are summarized. Eden & Huxham argue that these standards are 
hard to achieve, however “what is important is having a sense of the standards that 
make for good action research and evaluating the research in relation to them” (p. 
538-539). Almost all characteristics have been met in this study and are at least 
publicly testable. The 13th condition could have been met more strongly: ‘In action 
research, the opportunities for triangulation that do not offer themselves with other 
methods should be exploited fully and reported. They should be used as a dialectical 
device which powerfully facilitates the incremental development of theory’. In addition 
to the methods that were used, interviews and/or questionnaires could have been 
used to test (temporary) conclusions. 
 
 
11.8 Recommendations for future research 
 
Partly based on the limitations of this study, in this section recommendations for 
future research are provided. 
 
First, a worthwhile avenue is to further validate the outcomes of this study by a larger 
number of interventionists. As the diagnostic model and the circular patterns and 
defensive strategies as well are based upon the observations of one interventionist 
and researcher, further study could contribute to the question whether these insights 
are recognisable and actionable in daily practice by other interventionists, and the 
degree to which they are transferable. Similarly, further research could validate the 
interventions as described in this study. This way, the outcomes of this study can be 
separated scientifically from the specific observation and intervention biases of one 
interventionist. 
 
Second, the outcomes of this study could be verified in a larger number of cases. 
Although based upon a large number of ‘mini-cases’ (specific situations within the 
cases), the external validity could be further enlarged this way. Some outcomes, e.g. 
the defensive strategies, cannot be checked in existing literature, as they have not 
been described before. This recommendation could well be combined with the first 
one. 
 
Third, in line with the mutual learning model it is highly recommendable to further 
explore possibilities to interactively diagnose the recurrent patterns within the 
organization. Instead of an active subject (interventionist) and passive object 
(organization members), a Subject-Subject approach of relationships seems to be 
preferable. An interesting question would be how to involve the guiding principles of 
mutual learning in an interventionist-client system relationship. This way, the focus 
would shift from subjective reflective to interactive diagnosing, learning, changing and 
organizing.  
 
Fourth, although causality is difficult to prove, it would be worthwhile to conduct more 
in-depth study in order to further isolate the relation between unilateral control and 
blocked changing. In order to realize this, other possible factors should be analysed 
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that influence the dependent variable and the relation between the independent and 
dependent variables (Kerlinger, 1999). Such a study would be an important 
contribution to the understanding of blocked changing.  
 
Fifth, as the effects of interventions that aim at changing fundamental problems (the 
lower cycle in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ structure) are characterized by delay, 
further longitudinal data may help understand the effects of interventions and/or 
leaders’ behavioural shifts on changing, organizing and learning in the longer run. 
Although this empirical study is characterized by longitudinal case studies, it is 
recommendable to study processes and effects for an even longer period with 
repetitive interventions.  
 
Sixth, further study is also possible into the specific ways in which leaders could be 
helped to make a shift from unilateral control to mutual learning. It is not the 
application of specific skills that appears to be the most difficult step, but the internal 
acceptance that one might miss information. What specific conditions could 
interventionists create to facilitate this mental shift? Without doubt, this would require 
incorporating insights from psychological therapy, coaching and counselling. 
 
Seventh, the new model of organization learning that combines single-loop and 
double-loop learning with appreciative learning is a basis for further study. How would 
the concept of appreciative learning be described exactly? What would be the effect 
on changing, organizing and learning? And how would this kind of learning relate to 
patterns of organizational defensiveness? 
 
Eight, concepts regarding organizational dynamics and complexity (e.g. Stacey, 
2007) could further help to understand patterns that keep organizations from effective 
changing, organizing and learning. There seem to be several relations between this 
field of research and the tradition of organizational learning that would be worth 
exploring.  
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12. Learning to be a reflective practitioner 
 
 
 
12.1 Introduction 
 
 “Action scientists assume that learning is the first and overarching objective for the 
researcher, the clients and the system in which they are embedded” (Argyris, 1983, 
p. 16). This assumption is highly applicable to this study. In this chapter I personally 
reflect on my own learning process as a researcher and interventionist during the 
course of this thesis.   
 
The empirical study is partly a report of my development as an interventionist and 
researcher. As a consequence, the outcomes are a reflection of the level that I have 
reached at the moment I finished. This makes this study a learning study for me in 
the first place. Learning to be a reflective practitioner.22 
 
In the next section I describe the main insights regarding my learning process. This 
learning process refers strongly to my ability to bring a mutual learning model into 
practice as an interventionist. The process might be illustrative of what I expect my 
clients to learn. Most insights became clear when I slowed down the process and 
became aware of my role at critical moments: my moving moments. In the last 
section I look forward to the continuation of this process. 
 
 
12.2 Reflections regarding my own role: my moving moments 
 
Learning started with the decision to conduct Ph. D. research 
The very start of my thesis was strongly influenced by my desire to learn. I took a 
relatively long period to find a research question that I really wanted to know the 
answer to. The subject of this study gave me much energy from scratch, although I 
knew that it would appeal strongly to my dedication and energy. Understanding the 
consequences of Argyris’ insights on organizational learning takes time and requires 
a thorough learning process. Learning to act consistently upon these insights is 
probably never finished. And, according to Schön (1983), our knowing is in our 
action. The focus of this reflection is on what I have learned in action. 
 
As soon as I enter, I contribute to (blocking) interactive patterns 
The decision to conduct action research contributed strongly to my learning process, 
as this research approach considers the interventionist to be as much a part of the 
process as the other parties. I have learned that I hold a deeply embedded belief that 
a client hires a consultant because he is an objective outsider, who has specific 
(process) expertise, makes a right analysis and supports a practical solution. This 
belief corresponds to a unilateral control model and fits routine and single-loop issues 
that do not threaten individuals, groups, inter-group relations, or organizations. 
                                                
22 See Schön (1983), who describes the challenge for professionals to reflect while they are acting: reflection in 
action. 
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However, in other situations unilateral control leads to blocked changing, organizing 
and learning (Argyris, 1990, 2004), regardless of whether it concerns a manager, 
employee or interventionist.  
 
More than once, my supervisors stimulated me to involve my own role. Jaap 
Boonstra reported that he initially found my case descriptions too distanced: ‘I miss 
you and your reasoning.’ Lisa van de Bunt asked me more than once: ‘Have you 
analysed your role in this situation?’ The initial comments of Ernst Drukker, the 
informed expert who evaluated my cases, were: ‘The analyses are good, but boring. 
Something is missing. […] You describe situations as an observer who is outside the 
text. It is too objective, as if you were not involved in the case.’  
 
Inquiry into my defensiveness as an interventionist starts with accepting it. 
With the internal acceptance that I am part of the process, my ability to reflect upon 
my own role in critical situations grew. This reflection gave me insight into my own 
inconsistency and defensiveness when things become embarrassing or threatening. 
Most insights came up when I looked at my role as an interventionist from the 
perspective of researcher. In other words, I needed to take distance to my role as an 
interventionist to recognize that I took distance to the critical situation. For example, 
only afterwards did I recognize that I gave feedback to a manager about his distant 
behaviour during a critical session and his inclination to neglect his own role in the 
blocked process. While doing so, I took distance as well and didn’t involve my own 
role either. This way, I literally defended my own position. 
 
Another illustrative situation was this manager who assumed he could not be open to 
his employees about his observations because his employees would lack the 
competence to reflect. I suggested inquiring into this belief, since it blocks learning 
and changing. At the same time, I thought this was not going to work, as I believed 
he would not be able to reflect on his own role. However, I did not share this belief 
because I did not think this was going to help. In reflection, I learned that I had 
exactly the same defensiveness as the manager and thus blocked learning and 
changing. Besides, I learned how complex it is to put into practice what I expect 
managers to do.  
 
Initially, I did not like the insight that I might contribute to blocked learning and 
changing. After all, the client hires me to contribute to improvement and as a 
professional I find it difficult to act ineffectively (see Argyris, 1991). Ernst Drukker has 
been of great help: ‘It is okay to be defensive. Accept defensiveness as something 
normal, also for you as an interventionist in the cases. However, try to find out what 
the effects are and how you could contribute to your and others’ learning.’ Later, I 
found out that this advice is completely in line with Argyris (1990, 2000, 2004). 
Judgements like ‘wrong’ or ‘right’ do not contribute to learning. It is better if one 
inquires into the effects of one’s actions and how they contribute to learning. These 
insights helped me to accept my own defensiveness and, subsequently, inquire into 
the effects. 
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Being vulnerable makes me defensive as a researcher 
Initially, sharing the effects of my interactions in this thesis made me feel vulnerable. 
After all, I would like to show that I am effective under all circumstances. This aspect 
of my study has been quite challenging. In my role as a researcher who has 
described the analysis and effects, I sometimes have felt a tendency to cover up my 
contribution to blocked learning by not paying too much attention to it or by explaining 
why this action was understandable under these circumstances. In other words, 
when I saw, by reflection, ineffective effects of my unilateral control I activated a 
unilateral control model again and tried to cover these effects up. This way, I 
protected myself from information that might contribute to my personal learning. 
 
Accepting that defensiveness is ‘normal’ helped me forward. As to my role as an 
action researcher, the informed expert has played a pivotal role. Ernst Drukker 
confronted me with my defensiveness during one of our sessions: ‘Are you defending 
your case? As a researcher, you have to take distance from what you did as an 
interventionist. Information becomes valid when you can make free choices. That 
means you need a distance from the cases now. As a researcher, you have to feel 
responsible only for the analyses, not for what happened in that room. That will help 
you to look critically and free to your own role as an interventionist.’ After this session 
I switched the button and succeeded to describe how I sometimes have contributed 
to blocked learning and changing by my self-censoring, my urge to support my client 
(being ineffective), and my inclination to defend my position like an (active) expert 
who is able to impose his analysis on (dependent) others. 
 
Reflection plays a pivotal role in recognition of unilateral control, defensive strategies 
and circular patterns 
During this study I have personally followed the learning process as depicted in figure 
11.8. Working intensively on the contents of this thesis, my sensitivity to others’ 
unilateral control, defensive strategies and circular patterns grew. Not only in this 
study, but also in my daily practice as a management consultant, I have experienced 
a growing ability to address these patterns in action. However, since these patterns 
often come across as obvious, I sometimes recognize them only in reflection 
afterwards. I have learned that it is possible and effective to reflect immediately after 
a specific session and make the reflections debatable in a subsequent session. This 
is what I call ‘delayed feedback’. This experience emphasizes the importance of 
regular reflection moments.  
 
A next step in the learning process is to recognize my own unilateral control, 
defensive strategies and contribution to circular patterns. The empirical study, which 
involves intensive reflection upon my own role, has supported my sensitivity to my 
own defensiveness. Still, it is far from easy to catch myself in action. Often, I 
recognize my defensiveness only afterwards. And I probably still miss information 
regarding my own role. Here, moments of reflection in between sessions are even 
more important. And, since this would be a way of private learning, the challenge is 
to inquire into the effects of my actions together with the client.  
 
In the course of this study, I have experienced the difference between developing the 
skills to help others to inquire into their unilateral control, defensive strategies and 
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circular patterns on the one hand and to bring mutual learning into practice on the 
other hand. Mutual learning requires not only the intervention skills, but also the 
internal acceptance that I might miss relevant information or might make a mistake in 
my reasoning and therefore my conclusions might be wrong. As a consequence, I 
have learned that what I expect managers to do is difficult. My own learning process 
made me less judging and more understanding towards managers who have 
difficulties in putting a mutual learning model into practice. 
 
Writing and practising contribute to my learning process 
Noonan (2007) writes that, although he is an experienced workshop leader on 
organizational defensiveness, each time someone talks about this theme he learns 
again. Just because someone else uses different words or presents the insights from 
another perspective. I recognize this immediately. Each conversation about this 
theme delivers new pieces of the jigsaw puzzle. A special learning experience was a 
master class with Chris Argyris during a Sioo-conference in 2007. Actually seeing 
and experiencing how he puts his insights into practice was impressive. This session 
inspired me to write a paper on what he really does in action (Ardon and Wassink, 
2008). Furthermore, I have used some of his literal questions in daily practice as a 
consultant. Some of them were brilliant in my eyes, for example ‘How do I know your 
conclusion is right?’, ‘How do you know my conclusion is right?’, ‘What theory do you 
use that leads you to this conclusion?’ and ‘I am trying to find data to disbelieve you; 
could you help me?’  
 
I have learned that some activities contribute greatly to my development process. 
First, each time I read and write about this theme I gain better insight into the 
concepts and how they could work out in action. Second, my daily practice as a 
consultant is a rich source of inquiry into defensiveness, and offers a great 
opportunity to find out how the concepts do work out in action. Third, I am very glad I 
joined a supervision group on Argyris’ work. Practicing with other professionals has a 
high impact on my learning process.  
 
 
12.3 Path forward 
 
This thesis is a reflection of where I am now regarding my cognitive comprehension 
of and contribution to the field of organizational learning, my development as a 
practitioner who tries to put these insights into practice and my role as a researcher. 
This thesis represents a milestone in my ongoing learning process. 
 
As a researcher, I have the ambition to contribute further to the field of organizational 
learning and particularly the role of the interventionist. I would like to contribute to 
bridging the gap between scientific knowledge and daily management practice. As a 
practitioner, my challenge is to further develop my sensitivity to others’ and my own 
defensiveness in action and my skills to craft effective interventions. This will require 
the ability to slow down in action and recognize the moments that are important to 
learning: moving moments.  
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
 
 
Moving moments23 
 
Leiderschap en interventies in dynamisch complexe veranderprocessen 
 
In veranderprocessen gaat doorgaans veel aandacht uit naar de aanpak: met 
welke stappen gaan we van de huidige naar de gewenste situatie? In de 
praktijk blijken stagnaties in veranderprocessen hun oorsprong echter vaak te 
hebben in de dagelijkse interacties die zich onafhankelijk van de 
veranderaanpak voltrekken. Zo komt bijvoorbeeld van versterkt 
ondernemerschap weinig terecht als mensen met afwijkende ideeën steevast 
van hun ongelijk worden overtuigd. De focus van dit proefschrift is op de 
dagelijkse interacties tussen managers, medewerkers en adviseurs en hoe 
deze samenhangen met het (de)blokkeren van veranderprocessen. 
 
 
Probleemstelling 
 
Dit proefschrift gaat niet over routinematige veranderingsprocessen, maar over 
situaties waarin veranderingen maar niet van de grond komen en waarbij steeds 
dezelfde moeilijkheden terugkeren ondanks goedbedoelde interventies. Senge 
(1990) spreekt hier van dynamische complexiteit. Typische voorbeelden zijn 
moeizame pogingen om ondernemerschap en persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid te 
stimuleren, terugkerende weerstandspatronen en hardnekkige problemen in de 
communicatie tussen management en medewerkers. De studie analyseert hoe deze 
problemen zich in dagelijkse interacties ontwikkelen en in stand worden gehouden. 
 
De probleemstelling van deze studie is:  
Hoe dragen leiders en hun adviseurs bij aan het (de)blokkeren van dynamisch 
complexe veranderprocessen? 
 
 
Theoretische verkenning 
 
Eenzijdige beheersing als dominant model 
Deze studie bouwt voort op de wetenschappelijke traditie van organisatieleren en 
systeemdenken. In dagelijkse interacties gaat veel invloed uit van het door Argyris 
beschreven eenzijdige beheersingsmodel en het effect daarvan op 
veranderprocessen. Argyris (1990, 1995, 2000, 2004) heeft veelvuldig geschreven 
over de inconsistentie tussen wat managers zeggen (over verandering) en wat ze 
                                                
23 Deze titel laat zich niet vertalen zonder verlies van de dubbele betekenis. Moving moments verwijst naar de 
kleinste analyse-eenheid van deze studie. Om kenmerkende patronen in de interacties te herkennen, wordt het 
proces vertraagd totdat kenmerkende momenten langzaam voorbij komen. Dit zijn vaak belangrijke en 
aangrijpende momenten voor de effectiviteit van de interacties: moving moments.  
 298 
werkelijk doen (in dagelijkse interacties). Argyris maakt onderscheid tussen 
praattheorie (espoused theory) en gebruikstheorie (theory-in-use). Eerstgenoemde 
theorieën worden manifest wanneer we praten over intenties, wanneer we plannen 
bespreken of opschrijven. Gebruikstheorieën kunnen worden beschouwd als 
programma’s die ons daadwerkelijke gedrag aansturen en manifest worden ‘in actie’. 
Volgens Argyris zijn onze praattheorieën en gebruikstheorieën vaak niet consistent. 
Volgens Argyris volgt verreweg de meerderheid van de mensen eenzelfde 
gebruikstheorie, namelijk die van het eenzijdig beheersingsdenken. Deze 
gebruikstheorie instrueert individuen eenzijdig te beheersen, te winnen en mensen 
niet overstuur te maken. Het zet aan tot overtuigen en overreden en, indien nodig, tot 
het voorkomen van gezichtsverlies.  
 
Het belangrijkste doel van het beheersingsmodel ligt voor de hand: de zaak in de 
hand houden, ofwel ‘in control’ zijn. De theoretische verkenning in dit proefschrift 
leert dat de consequenties van een dergelijk model veel verder gaan dan het eerst 
voor de hand liggende gedrag van ‘de touwtjes strak houden’ en ‘gehoorzaam 
gedrag’ afdwingen. Eenzijdig beheersingsdenken van managers uit zich in hun 
manier van 
- waarnemen van (organisatie)problemen  
- handelen in interactie met de omgeving  
- interveniëren in veranderprocessen  
- vormgeven van organisaties  
- veranderen van organisaties. 
Bij de verkenning van deze uitingen en hun invloed op veranderprocessen komen 
twee aspecten van stagnerende veranderprocessen regelmatig terug. Het eerste 
aspect is zogenaamde circulariteit (zie bijvoorbeeld Senge, 1990). Er is sprake van 
een circulair patroon indien bepaald gedrag van een persoon leidt tot bepaald gedrag 
van een ander, dat op zijn beurt weer het gedrag van de eerste versterkt. 
Bijvoorbeeld: een manager neemt veel initiatief, wat ertoe leidt dat zijn medewerkers 
zich afwachtend opstellen, wat ertoe leidt dat de manager nog meer initiatief neemt. 
Men blijft hangen in een dergelijk circulair patroon zolang men niet leert hoe men er 
zelf aan bijdraagt. Zo ontstaan terugkerende problemen. Een tweede aspect van 
stagnerende veranderprocessen, zogenaamde defensiviteit, blokkeert dat 
leerproces. Defensieve routines (Argyris, 1990, 2000, 2004) zijn acties die erop 
gericht zijn te voorkomen dat een of meer individuen in een organisatie dreiging of 
schaamte ervaren. Tegelijkertijd weerhouden ze mensen ervan om de oorzaken van 
mogelijke dreiging of schaamte aan te pakken. Bijvoorbeeld, als je ineffectief hebt 
gehandeld, probeer je dit onopgemerkt te laten en geef indien nodig omstandigheden 
of een ander de schuld. En als je ziet dat iemand zijn ineffectiviteit probeert toe te 
dekken, laat je dit onbesproken. Beide gevallen blokkeren leren; in het eerste geval 
je eigen leerproces, in het tweede geval dat van de ander. 
Figuur 1 vat deze uitingen van een eenzijdig beheersingsmodel en de consequenties 
voor de veranderprocessen samen. De uitingen van een beheersingsmodel leiden tot 
stagnerende processen, die te herkennen zijn aan terugkerende patronen en 
circulaire processen. Doordat dezelfde symptomen steeds weer terugkomen, 
ontstaat druk voor de manager. Deze druk activeert vervolgens een eenzijdig 
beheersingsmodel.  
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Figuur 1: Uitingsvormen en consequenties van eenzijdige beheersing 
 
Alternatieve leidende principes: de-blokkeren van veranderen, organiseren en leren 
Een eenzijdig beheersingsmodel stimuleert ons te denken in termen van episodische 
verandering, wat een periode van (geplande) instabiliteit is tussen de huidige stabiele 
organisatie en de gewenste stabiele organisatie. Weick & Quinn (1999) introduceren 
daarnaast het concept van continu veranderen, dat direct aanhaakt op onze 
dagelijkse interacties waarin we bijdragen aan organiseren en veranderen van onze 
omgeving. Waar verandering en organisatie gescheiden entiteiten zijn, kunnen 
(continu) veranderen en organiseren niet van elkaar gescheiden worden. Het 
dagelijkse veranderen kan bovendien niet los worden gezien van leren. In plaats van 
te spreken over verandering en organisatie (macroniveau), richt dit proefschrift zich 
op interactieve processen van veranderen, organiseren en leren (microniveau). 
Ongeacht de geselecteerde veranderbenadering, kan eenzijdige beheersing leiden 
tot geblokkeerd veranderen, organiseren en leren  
 
Volgens Argyris (1983) kan ongeveer driekwart van de organisatieproblemen worden 
opgelost met een eenzijdig beheersingsmodel. Deze problemen kunnen worden 
omschreven als relatief routinematige onderwerpen die niet bedreigend zijn voor 
individuen, groepen, inter-groep relaties of organisaties. In andere situaties leidt 
 300 
eenzijdige beheersing tot terugkerende patronen en circulaire processen. Om 
veranderen, organiseren en leren te de-blokkeren, introduceert Argyris het tweezijdig 
leren model. De sturende waarden van tweezijdig leren zijn geldige informatie, 
geïnformeerde, vrije keuze en (persoonlijke) verantwoordelijkheid voor effectieve 
implementatie. Waar eenzijdige beheersing leidt tot het onbespreekbaar maken van 
informatie, gedachten en gevoelens die niet goed uitkomen, is tweezijdig leren er 
juist op gericht deze aan de orde te stellen en te onderzoeken (geldige informatie). 
Op basis van deze informatie kan men openlijk echte keuzes maken, waarvoor men 
zich ook verantwoordelijk kan voelen. 
Rol van de interventionist 
Op basis van de literatuurstudie kan worden geconcludeerd dat ook adviseurs 
geneigd zijn een eenzijdig beheersingsmodel te hanteren, wat hen stimuleert hun 
cliënten te ondersteunen in het creëren van processen die leiden tot geblokkeerd 
veranderen, organiseren en leren. De theoretische verkenning laat zien dat de 
meerderheid van de literatuur over de rol van adviseurs (of interventionisten) focust 
op methoden en technieken. Hier lijkt een overeenkomst te bestaan met managers 
die al dan niet bijdragen aan veranderen met hun dagelijkse interacties, ongeacht de 
door hen geselecteerde verandermethode. Evenzo, ongeacht de geselecteerde 
interventiemethoden of technieken, dragen interventionisten al dan niet bij aan 
veranderen met hun dagelijkse interacties. Zodra een interventionist een ‘systeem’ 
binnenkomt, maken zijn interacties er onderdeel van uit. Als gevolg, kunnen zij 
bijdragen aan de problemen die hun cliënten ervaren.  
 
 
Het empirisch onderzoek 
 
Op basis van de theoretische verkenning zijn de onderstaande onderzoeksvragen 
geformuleerd voor het empirisch onderzoek. 
1.  In welke mate zijn de uitingen van eenzijdige beheersing zichtbaar in 
interacties? 
2.  Hoe hangt eenzijdige beheersing samen met (de-)blokkeren van veranderen, 
organiseren en leren? Deze vraag is vertaald in vier specifieke vragen. 
- Hoe dragen uitingen van eenzijdige beheersing bij aan terugkerende 
  problemen? 
- Welke circulaire patronen zijn zichtbaar? 
- Welke defensieve routines zijn zichtbaar? 
- Hoe dragen leiders bij aan het de-blokkeren van veranderen, organiseren en 
  leren? 
3.  Hoe dragen interventies bij aan het (de-)blokkeren van veranderen, 
organiseren en leren? 
 
Het empirisch onderzoek is een combinatie van longitudinale casestudies en 
actieonderzoek. Door direct observeerbare data (Arygris, 1990, 2000) te verzamelen 
in drie longitudinale case studies, kan worden geanalyseerd wat managers, 
medewerkers en consultants zeggen en doen, in hoeverre en hoe hun interacties 
worden gestuurd door een eenzijdig beheersingsmodel, hoe zij al dan niet bijdragen 
aan veranderen, organiseren en leren en hoe interventies de interacties op langere 
termijn beïnvloeden. Kenmerkend van actieonderzoek is dat de rol van alle actoren, 
 301 
dus ook de interventionist zelf, onderwerp van studie zijn. In de analyse worden de 
interacties als het ware ‘vertraagd’, om de patronen te herkennen en begrijpen, 
belangrijke momenten te herkennen en hun invloed in te zien op het veranderen. 
Deze langzaam bewegende en vaak aangrijpende momenten zijn de kleinste 
analyse-eenheid in deze studie: moving moments. 
 
 
Conclusies  
 
De conclusies van het onderzoek hebben betrekking op de onderzoeksvragen, 
enkele aanvullende bevindingen en de onderzoeksmethodologie. In onderstaande 
samenvatting ligt de nadruk op de onderzoeksvragen. 
 
1. In welke mate zijn de uitingen van eenzijdige beheersing zichtbaar in interacties? 
Deze onderzoeksvraag heeft tot doel het diagnosemodel (figuur 1) te valideren. 
 
Uit het empirisch onderzoek blijkt dat Vormgeven en Veranderen van organisatie van 
een andere orde zijn dan Waarnemen, Handelen en Interveniëren. Eerstgenoemde 
zijn vooral zichtbaar aan het begin van (episodische) veranderprocessen en 
verwijzen naar macro-niveau, waar beslissingen genomen worden over 
veranderaanpak en organisatie-inrichting. Waarnemen, Handelen en Interveniëren 
zijn zichtbaar in dagelijkse interacties (micro-niveau). Het zijn voornamelijk deze 
uitingen die circulair samenhangen met gestagneerde verandering en dreiging/druk, 
zoals in figuur 1. In een aangepast diagnostisch model van de uitingen van 
eenzijdige beheersing is dit circulaire proces verwijderd. De vijf uitingen zijn 
ongewijzigd. 
 
2. Hoe hangt eenzijdige beheersing samen met (de-)blokkeren van veranderen, 
    organiseren en leren? 
Het doel van deze onderzoeksvraag is evidence-based inzicht te verkrijgen in de 
effecten van eenzijdige beheersing op veranderen, organiseren en leren.  
 
Onderstaand worden de belangrijkste bevindingen samengevat. 
 
• Eenzijdige beheersing stimuleert symptomatische oplossingen en blokkeert 
fundamentele oplossingen 
 
Senge (1990) stelt dat als een probleem moeilijk op te lossen is ongeacht vele 
pogingen en als dezelfde patronen keer op keer optreden, het waarschijnlijk is dat 
onderliggende ‘balancerende processen’ verandering blokkeren. Senge introduceert 
de zogenaamde ‘shifting the burden’ structuur: met een symptoom-oplossing wordt 
op de korte termijn het symptoom gereduceerd (bovenste loop). Hierdoor neemt de 
noodzaak af om een oplossing te vinden voor het onderliggende probleem (onderste 
loop); dit onderliggende probleem zal op langere termijn dezelfde symptomen blijven 
produceren (zie figuur 2). 
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Figuur 2 ‘Shifting the burden’ 
 
Deze ‘shifting the burden’ structuur bewijst in deze studie zijn waarde bij het 
begrijpen van de relatie tussen eenzijdige beheersing en geblokkeerd veranderen, 
organiseren en leren. Eenzijdige beheersing stimuleert activiteiten in de bovenste 
cirkel. Typische voorbeelden zijn snelle instrumentele oplossingen en verhogen van 
druk in geval van moeilijkheden. Eenzijdige beheersing activeert ook defensieve 
strategieën die oplossingen voor het onderliggende probleem blokkeren. Figuur 3 vat 
deze bevindingen samen. 
 
 
 
Figuur 3 Eenzijdige beheersing stimuleert symptomatische oplossingen en blokkeert  
fundamentele oplossingen 
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• Eenzijdige beheersing leidt tot circulaire patronen en self-fulfilling prophecies 
Deze studie laat zien dat leiders vanuit eenzijdige beheersing geneigd zijn een 
Subject-Object perspectief van relaties te hanteren. In dit perspectief beschouwen 
leiders zichzelf als degenen die op basis van hun positie en hun veronderstelde 
kennis veranderingen kunnen opleggen aan medewerkers. Om dit effectief te laten 
zijn, dienen medewerkers zich afhankelijk en reactief op te stellen (Hosking, 2004). 
Inconsistentie ontstaat als deze houding van medewerker vervolgens als onwenselijk 
wordt beschouwd. Het empirisch onderzoek toont aan dat dit perspectief leidt tot 
circulaire processen en self-fulfilling prophecies, zoals weergegeven in figuur 4. 
 
 
 
Figuur 4 Subject-Object perspectief leidt tot circulaire processen 
 
Het empirisch onderzoek heeft 11 specifieke circulaire processen aangetoond die 
alle uitingen zijn van het Subject-Object perspectief en bijdragen aan stagnatie van 
veranderen (bijlage 5 geeft een overzicht). 
 
• Eenzijdige beheersing leidt tot defensieve strategieën 
Deze studie illustreert verschillende specifieke voorbeelden van defensiviteit die met 
enige regelmaat zichtbaar zijn. Hiervoor is de term ‘defensieve strategieën’ 
geïntroduceerd. Defensieve strategieën zijn erop gericht gevoelige onderwerpen 
onbespreekbaar te maken en te voorkomen dat een of meer individuen in een 
organisatie dreiging of schaamte ervaren. Dit betekent dat ineffectiviteit niet als bron 
wordt gebruikt om openlijk te onderzoeken en van te leren, maar veeleer 
onbespreekbaar wordt gemaakt. Als gevolg gaat men door op dezelfde weg waarvan 
men meer of minder bewust weet dat deze ineffectief is, maar voelt men zich er 
afnemend verantwoordelijk voor. Typische voorbeelden van gevoelige onderwerpen 
in deze studie zijn beperkt commitment van medewerkers aan de veranderdoelen 
van hun baas en de onveilige sfeer in het management team. Zoals uit figuur 3 blijkt, 
staan defensieve strategieën de oplossing voor onderliggende problemen in de weg. 
Het empirisch onderzoek heeft geleid tot de vaststelling van 14 specifieke defensieve 
strategieën. Enkele voorbeelden: 
- Committeer strategie: als je baas je overreedt je te committeren, zeg je dat je je 
committeert ongeacht of het echt zo is (‘O.k., ik doe mee’). 
- Beschuldig strategie: als je handelen/benadering niet effectief is, beschuldig je de 
omstandigheden en/of anderen (‘medewerkers willen gewoon niet veranderen’, of 
‘managers willen gewoon niet naar ons luisteren’). 
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- Relativeer strategie: als de situatie bedreigend of ongemakkelijk is, relativeer het 
probleem totdat het weer hanteerbaar is (‘we moeten het niet erger maken dan 
het is’). 
- Non-interventie strategie: maak andermans ineffectiviteit niet bespreekbaar, opdat 
zij dat bij jou ook niet doen (‘ik weet dat hij erg druk is, dus ik kan het hem niet 
kwalijk nemen dat hij zich niet aan de afspraak heeft gehouden’). 
- Humor strategie: als de situatie bedreigend of ongemakkelijk is, maak een grap 
en verander van onderwerp (‘je kunt het niet helpen, je bent gewoon veel te oud 
om te veranderen’). 
 
• Leiders kunnen gestagneerd veranderen, organiseren en leren weer vlot trekken 
Het empirisch onderzoek toont aan leiders in staat zijn eenmaal gestagneerde 
processen weer vlot te trekken middels specifieke (gedrags)alternatieven. Deels 
hebben deze te maken met het ontdekken hoe zij zelf bijdragen aan terugkerende 
symptomen, deels met het actief onderzoeken van oplossingen voor onderliggende 
problemen. Leiders brengen eerstgenoemde gemakkelijker in praktijk dan 
laatstgenoemde. In tabel 1 staan enkele gedragingen samengevat. 
 
Reflectie op de wijze waarop men bijdraagt aan terugkerende probleem symptomen 
• Herkennen van circulaire processen, inclusief de eigen rol. 
• Zichtbaar maken van circulariteit aan andere betrokkenen in het patroon. 
• Openlijk reflecteren op de wijze waarop men bijdraagt aan terugkerende problemen. 
• Zelf nemen van initiatief tot ander gedrag. 
 
Actief onderzoek van oplossingen voor onderliggende problemen 
• Confronteren van gevoelige onderwerpen. 
• Confronteren van defensieve strategieën. 
• Onderzoeken van onderliggende patronen. 
• Delen van valide informatie die men geneigd is voor zich te houden. 
Tabel 1 Leiders’ deblokkerende percepties, gedragingen en interventies 
 
Het empirisch onderzoek laat zien dat bovenstaande gedragingen leiden tot het 
deblokkeren van veranderen, organiseren en leren. Bijvoorbeeld, ondergeschikten 
gaan mee in het bespreken van de eigen bijdrage aan terugkerende problemen en 
maken circulariteit en defensieve strategieën in het team bespreekbaar.  
 
3. Hoe dragen interventies bij aan de-blokkeren van veranderen, organiseren en 
leren? 
Het doel van deze onderzoeksvraag is een interventie perspectief te ontwikkelen dat 
bijdraagt aan het de-blokkeren van veranderen, organiseren en leren. 
 
Bij de analyse van de effecten van de interventies is vastgesteld dat ook de 
interventionist geneigd is een eenzijdig beheersingsmodel te activeren indien de 
spanning toeneemt. Typische voorbeelden zijn het benadrukken dat ‘alles onder 
controle is’, de eigen toegevoegde waarde bewijzen met (onmiddelijke) analyses and 
(symptomatische) oplossingen en het onbespreekbaar houden van de eigen 
gedachten over de ineffectiviteit van de cliënt om diens gezicht te redden. Eenzijdige 
controle door de interventionist kan, net als bij managers, leiden tot circulaire 
patronen en defensieve strategieën. 
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De mainstream literatuur over episodische verandering focust op factoren die 
verandering blokkeren en condities voor effectieve verandering. Deze studie 
illustreert hoe managers praten over verandercondities en –methoden terwijl ze 
tegelijkertijd op zo’n manier waarnemen, handelen en interveniëren dat ze processen 
van veranderen, organiseren en leren doen blokkeren. Dit leidt tot een 
interventieperspectief dat zich niet richt op verandermethoden en –aanpakken 
(macroniveau), maar ingrijpt op het niveau van dagelijkse interacties (microniveau) 
Daarmee sluit het interventieperspectief aan op de theorie rondom ‘continu 
veranderen’. Waar episodische verandering stoelt op Lewins dictum van ‘unfreeze, 
transition, freeze’, zijn interventies inzake continu veranderen gebaseerd op de 
volgorde ‘freeze, rebalance, unfreeze’ (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Freezing betekent in 
dit verband het zichtbaar maken van hoe men bijdraagt aan stagnerende 
veranderprocessen. Rebalancing betekent het stimuleren van reflectie op de manier 
waarop men bijdraagt aan stagnatie en van vrije en geïnformeerde keuzes. 
Unfreezing verwijst naar het helpen om deze keuzes in praktijk te brengen en het 
proces van veranderen, organiseren en leren te herstellen. Daarmee ligt de focus 
van deze interventietheorie op het opsporen en wegnemen van blokkades. De  
interventietheorie is samengevat in het zogenaamde interventiewiel, zoals is 
weergegeven in figuur 5. De figuur laat zien dat interveniëren niet een tijdelijke 
onderbreking is van het proces van veranderen, organiseren en leren, maar er 
steeds onderdeel van uitmaakt. Hiermee komen interventies los te staan van de 
‘alwetende’ interventionist, die is gebaseerd op een Subject-Object perspectief. 
 
 
 Figuur 5 Interventie wiel: continue herhaling van freeze, rebalance en unfreeze 
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Onderstaand overzicht vat de interventies samen die in het empirisch onderzoek 
effectief bleken. De interventies zijn ondergebracht onder de termen freeze, 
rebalance en unfreeze.  
 
 
Freeze 
- Circulariteit delen en manager/medewerkers helpen te reflecteren op hun bijdrage. 
- Inconsistentie neutraal confrontreren. 
- Defensieve strategieën bespreekbaar maken. 
 
Rebalance 
- Stimuleren tot onderzoek van eigen veronderstellingen en acties. 
- Uitnodigen valide informatie te delen die men geneigd is voor zich te houden. 
- De concepten rondom wederzijds leren delen. 
- Delen wat men geneigd is voor zich te houden omtrent het effect van andermans acties. 
- Valide informatie delen omtrent hoe men zelf bijdraagt aan de problemen. 
- (Tijds)druk helpen reduceren. 
 
Unfreeze 
- Alternatieve aanpakken delen en deze actionable maken. 
Tabel 2 Interventies gericht op deblokkeren van veranderen, organiseren en leren  
 
 
Naast de onderzoeksvragen zijn enkele aanvullende conclusies getrokken. Deze 
hebben onder meer betrekking op de effecten van episodische verandering op 
ondernemerschap en eigenaarschap van medewerkers, op de vraag of leiders 
moeten starten met gedragsverandering, op het top-down karakter van concepten als 
‘weerstand tegen verandering’ en ‘benadrukken van verandernoodzaak’ en enkele 
beperkingen van Argyris’ benadering van organisatieleren.  
 
Ook ten aanzien van de onderzoeksmethodologie is een aantal conclusies 
getrokken. Alhoewel actieonderzoek de meest passende methode is zodra ook de 
interventionist en diens interventies zelf onderwerp van studie zijn, kent het een 
aantal uitdagingen. De combinatie van interventionist en onderzoeker in één persoon 
vraagt een intensief leerproces en objectieve checks van data en interpretaties. 
Immers, als de onderzoeker achteraf de effectiviteit van de interventionist 
onderzoekt, kan sprake zijn van een bias. Het onderzoek leert dat hierop kan worden 
gecontroleerd door data bij voorkeur door een neutrale observant te laten noteren, 
deze te laten checken door de cliënt en de interpretaties te laten checken door een 
welingelichte expert. De onderzoeker zal moeten leren afstand te nemen van zijn rol 
als interventionist en ineffectiviteit te beschouwen als valide en leerzame informatie.  
Dit proefschrift sluit af met een persoonlijke reflectie van de onderzoeker op dit 
leerproces. De reflectie gaat vooral in op de manier waarop de onderzoeker heeft 
leren omgaan met zijn eigen defensieve patronen in zijn rol als onderzoeker en 
interventionist. Voor deze reflectie was een vertraging van de geanalyseerde 
processen onontbeerlijk.  
 
Zo kreeg ik zicht op mijn eigen moving moments.  
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Appendix 1 Narratives of moving moments 1 
 
 
 Period 1: start of the study 
 
 
Reflection 1 
 
 
 
1.1 
Approach 
 
Based on the available information and his assumptions, the interventionist develops an approach that he shares 
with the management team. 
 
Raw data regarding the situation 
• Perceived shortcomings in information exchange between management and employees 
• Perceived distance between management and employees 
• Experienced fear by employees 
 
Interventionist’s assumptions regarding ‘the situation’ 
• Meaning of observations is unclear as yet: what does ‘insufficient information’ really mean? 
• Perceived problems recur time after time. Parties seem to keep the patterns alive. Typical pitfalls: 
- isolating ‘the problem’ and introduce a short term solution; it is the patterns that are important 
- covering the communication problems by instruments and further investigation 
 
Interventionist’s assumptions regarding ‘the approach’ 
• As several instrumental approaches did not lead to improvement and considering the outcomes of the 
interviews with employees, this does not seem to be an instrumental problem and thus an instrumental 
approach does not fit. In order to gain insight into how management and employees contribute to recurrent 
problems, a ‘learning’ approach is needed 
• In order to make learning and changing possible, an approach should contribute to taking personal 
responsibility (by everyone) instead of blaming  
• Personal commitments instead of freedom of obligations 
• Unlike the director’s suggestion, mingling with employees by the interventionist and communication about 
‘the problems’ is a bypass of the communication problems between management and employees. As a 
consequence, an approach should contribute to direct communication between management and employees  
• Improvement requires willingness of management and employees to reflect on their own role 
• The approach should not confirm existing patterns: instead of covering problems up, they should be made 
debatable 
• Communication (improvement) is a responsibility of the line organization. 
 
Approach as shared with management 
• Start with top management: discuss approach and consequences for their own role (compare Argyris (1984, 
1990), who argues that one should start with the top). 
• Follow the ‘cascade’: director and management team, management team members with their teams, 
etcetera. This approach enables direct communication between managers and their employees and gives the 
opportunity to organize reflection and learning about the way one contributes to the communication problems. 
• Each department gets a team coach, who should support reflection and learning. 
• Each manager develops a suitable approach for his/her department in consultation with the team coach, in 
order to feel responsible for the change process in his/her own department. 
• Before and after each session the manager has a feedback session with the team coach about the 
communication patterns and his contribution. The underlying belief is that the team coach can ask questions 
and give feedback in order to enable reflection and learning. 
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• Regular progress meetings with director, individual managers and management teams contribute to keeping 
things result-oriented. 
• Evaluation after a couple of months. 
 
 
 
 
Reflection 2 
 
 
 
Period 2: further investigation of director and management team 
 
Meeting with director and HR manager: change process as an adventure 
In a meeting, director, HR manager and interventionists elaborate on the process, partly as a preparation of a 
special two-hour meeting with the management team. The director does not want an instrumental approach. 
1.2 
 
Dir: what are we going to discuss? I see that you 
have prepared this meeting? (joking, watching HR 
manager’s notes) 
 
HR: yes, I have prepared. We’re going to talk about 
the communication project. Haven’t you prepared? 
 
Dir: what have you got there? Oh, the proposal. It is 
all in my head (then he waits to see who is going to 
start – looks at the interventionists). 
 
Int: I have prepared an agenda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[.............] 
 
Int: this process is about communication. How would 
you like to communicate about the process? 
 
Dir: I want no planned communication and no 
instruments. That is exactly what we have done in 
the past. I perceive this process as an adventure. At 
certain moments you and your colleagues will 
suddenly be there during meetings and say that you 
are only there to listen a while. People may be 
confused. That’s okay. Let us see what happens. 
 
HR: But shan’t we bring in more structure? 
 
 
Dir: Let’s watch out for another instrumental 
approach. Let’s just start an open process. 
 
[.....] 
 
Int: We will join meetings and share our observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C process (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C planned 
C step-by-step 
 
C process (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director behaves reactively. This behaviour is 
being reinforced by the interventionist in a 
circular process. 
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with managers regarding communication patterns 
and their role. 
 
Dir: We must have realistic expectations. It is not our 
aim to change managers. Our main objective is to 
enlarge understanding. For example, H. is and will 
always be relatively blunt. People would find it scary 
if he suddenly changed. Employees should get more 
understanding for management. It certainly must not 
be one-way: it is not only management, but also 
employees who are part of the communication 
problem. They could have taken initiative to improve 
the situation as well. 
 
HR/Int: This is a two-way process indeed. 
 
It is time and parties agree that HR manager and 
interventionists will take care of further preparation of 
the management team session. 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although there seems to be balance in this 
argumentation, the emphasis is being put on 
employees’ responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session with management team: is this team safe? 
In a session with the management team, each manager is expected to tell what he/she wishes to realize 
regarding communication in their department. The atmosphere seems to be relaxed with many jokes from 
director and other managers. In turn, each manager presents his/her ideas regarding their own department. 
Subsequently, the safety in the management team is discussed.  
1.3 
 
(1) I believe people have fear indeed. But how can 
we change that? Have you ever joined a session with 
all employees together; I don’t see much energy and 
sometimes they are quite cynical. Their body 
language is passive and reactive. They take little 
initiative, despite our invitation to bring in ideas. I 
have heard that some don’t feel safe, thinking that 
ineffective initiatives will be punished. I don’t know 
why they think that. I guess it has something to do 
with us. But also with them. They are the ones who 
rely on some stories about colleagues who have tried 
to bring in criticism and have been punished for that. 
It is sheer nonsense. 
  
(2) I am already working on communication 
improvement. 
 
(3) The main issue in our department is the balance 
between structure and instability. We are always very 
busy. That theme is more important than safety or 
communication. 
 
(4) People might feel insecure. More important in my 
department is that several employees find it hard to 
communicate clearly. 
 
(5) We really have to work on this issue. I know 
people are afraid in our organization. They don’t feel 
secure. Especially the second line managers need a 
lot of attention. 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
P mutual (D) 
 
 
 
 
P blame 
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(6) I have asked my employees. They think my 
behaviour and communication is consistent. In our 
department the atmosphere is open and honest. 
 
[…]  
 
V: I think employees sometimes don’t ask questions 
because they are afraid of the answer. 
 
M: Right, there is a lot of insecurity, which must be 
reduced. 
 
P: Some people are afraid to approach W (director). 
 
Dir (joking): Well, I don’t know what they are afraid 
of. ... (all laugh, subsequently the subject is 
changed). Besides, I wonder if it’s that bad. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[......] 
 
H: It is important that there is reciprocability in this 
process. 
 
M: Yes, one should be aware of being a part of the 
communication. 
 
V: For that reason it is important that we stimulate 
employees’ personal sense of responsibility.  
 
H: And we have to let them know that we are open to 
all subjects they wish to share with us. By the way, 
we have to be open to each other within the 
management team as well. 
 
M (laughing): Fortunately this is the case in this 
team.  
 
Dir: By the way, we should not give employees the 
impression that – after all – we agree with their 
complaints about us. During this process you have to 
be aware of that. Who is next? 
 
[......] 
An overview is shared that proposes which manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
I cover-up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
 
 
 
 
B control 
I cover-up 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
B control 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It appears that some of the managers argue 
that this process is important, while others 
seem to find it less important. However, no one 
really seems to reflect a high sense of urgency.  
 
 
Although director desired an open 
process/adventure, he activates a unilateral 
control model as soon he is confronted with an 
embarrassing situation (confirms assumption 
III). Director keeps situation controllable by 
making embarrassing situation undebatable. 
Two defensive routines (or strategies) are 
visible: 
- Joke strategy: in case of embarrassment, 
make a joke and change subject. 
- Reduction strategy: in case of 
embarrassment, reduce the problem until it is 
controllable again (‘it isn’t that bad). 
 
Fundamental problems are being covered up 
this way. The lower circle of the Senge ‘shifting 
the burden’ system (fundamental solution) is 
blocked by these defensive strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘One’ refers to employees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threat (no longer distancing) is blocked by 
joking strategy -> undebatable situation. 
 
Strong model I control perspective. 
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gets which team coach.  
 
Int: The last team is this management team; I 
suggest I will personally keep in touch with the 
director and will join team sessions regularly.  
 
Dir: Is that necessary? Let’s check. Who thinks this 
team is not safe? 
 
Silence ..... 
 
 
 
 
 
H: I feel quite safe here. I can say anything I want.  
(some managers confirm nonverbally) 
 
Silence .... 
 
Int: You have only five minutes left. I don’t think this 
theme can be properly discussed within five minutes, 
do you? 
 
Dir: That is exactly what I was thinking. Let’s stop 
now. 
 
[......] 
 
At the end of the meeting the interventionists are 
asked by some managers to share their 
observations. 
 
Int: [....] You have mentioned some firm themes: fear, 
security, the role of management. Still, I miss a 
sense of urgency in the way you talk about this 
subject. Let’s be clear: do you really want to start a 
process focusing on the communication between 
management and employees? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Silence .... some managers confirm nonverbally. 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir: Yes, we have agreed that this is important to 
work on. We’ll really go on with this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The director gives a mixed message (Argyris): 
precisely if one does not feel safe, one would 
probably not be open about it. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to gather valid 
information (mutual learning model) through 
this question. One might easily activate a 
defensive routine (denial strategy) and – in line 
with Argyris– will not be open about it.  
 
“To retain their power, defensive routines must 
remain undiscussable. Teams stay stuck in 
their defensive routines only when they pretend 
that they don’t have any defensive routines, 
that everything is all right, and that they can say 
‘anything’” (Senge, p. 255). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist intends making the 
undiscussable discussable. However, if the 
notes above are valid, there is little chance that 
participants would be open about not wanting 
the process. The interventionist gives a mixed 
message as well. A positive reaction by 
managers might not be valid (model II). 
 
This intervention does not lead to inquiry. 
Instead, the question puts pressure on 
managers and activates defensiveness (a 
comply strategy’). The interventionist asks a 
‘yes’ or ‘now’ ( compare ‘discussion’ versus 
‘dialogue’ by Isaacs). Thus, together 
participants cover up hesitation and cover up 
this cover-up (compare Argyris). An alternative: 
‘I feel uncomfortable, as what you say and what 
I feel are not consistent. Please help me and 
yourself to understand and let us be open about 
what we feel and think. 
 
Director shows more controlling behaviour in 
case of threat and avoids a situation that might 
be uncontrollable (what if participants said they 
did not want this process?). 
 
What would have happened if the 
interventionist had reflected on this? 
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Progress meeting with director and HR manager; director wants all managers to commit 
In a meeting, director, HR manager and two interventionists discuss progress regarding the process in the 
departments. In this stage interventionists have had intake sessions with all separate managers regarding the 
detailed approach in their department. The main experience is that most managers say they are committed and 
want to work on it with their team. One manager has said openly that he does not comply with the approach. 
1.4 
 
Dir: Is this all there is to tell? Is every single 
manager positive about the approach? 
 
Int: With V. we had a difficult meeting. We did not 
succeed to get contact with him and he does not 
seem to find the approach very attractive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir: Doesn’t he want to comply? 
 
Int: He does not like some basic elements of the 
approach. 
 
Dir: Which elements? 
 
Int: He is not interested in feedback to his team 
and his own role. 
 
Dir: Why not? 
 
Int: We are not sure yet. He says he doesn’t need 
any feedback. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir: That is not a valid reason. It is an essential 
element of the approach and I would like you to 
share your observations with him and his team. 
And if his resistance grows, I have a subject to 
discuss with him. 
 
Int: The question is, how effective this feedback 
will be if he is not interested. What about finding 
out why he acts this way? It would be strong if you 
had a conversation with him and ask questions. It 
would be very strong if you could leave some room 
for him to bring in ideas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir: Let’s see how he develops. He might change 
his attitude. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
P reduction 
Pdistance 
P blame 
P linear 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, this manager had let the interventionists 
know that in his perception the approach was 
the director’s approach which had been not 
open for any discussion. In the last MT meeting 
he (and others??) had acted as if he agreed. 
This seems to be a defensive routine as a 
consequence of the leader’s unilateral control 
model: the compliance strategy (we act as if we 
agree). The control model, thus, leads to invalid 
information. 
The interventionist does not share this (valid) 
information with the director. The underlying 
belief is that he should protect manager V and 
should not betray his confidence. However, by 
acting this way the int covers an important 
issue up and blocks learning.  
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist feels he has to account for 
his activities and defends his position strongly, 
instead of inquiry. In action, he was not aware 
of this and joined the director in a unilateral 
control model. A defensive strategy by the 
interventionist: instead of being vulnerable, 
convince the client that you are completely in 
control (convince strategy). 
 
Although director desired an open 
process/adventure, he activates a unilateral 
control model as soon as he is confronted with 
deviant opinions (confirms assumption III). 
 
 
Interventionist suggests the director to inquire. 
However, this would probably hardly be 
effective as long as the director is not aware of 
his reasoning. In this situation, director and 
interventionist discuss the manager’s 
defensiveness and are both defensive 
themselves. The conversation focuses on 
someone else. As a consequence, they hardly 
learn. Alternative: the interventionist could 
make director’s defensiveness debatable, 
preferably by starting to discuss his own 
defensiveness. This requires the interventionist 
to be aware of his defensiveness in action. 
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Progress meeting with director and HR manager; defensive strategies confronted 
In this meeting (the same as box 1.4) the interventionist confronts the director for the first time with hypotheses 
regarding defensiveness in the management team. A main challenge is to make defensiveness debatable 
without producing more defensiveness. 
1.5 
 
Int: I would like to share some observations 
regarding the management team.  
 
Dir (joking): That is the most dramatic team (all 
laugh). 
 
Int: I would like to go back to the moment you 
asked if team members feel safe in the team. After 
a silence H. said that he felt safe. Some others 
nodded. However, you could hardly expect another 
response: if someone felt unsafe, he would 
probably not say that. 
 
Silence ... 
 
Int: We doubt how open people can be. We see 
some patterns that keep team members from 
being open. It appeared to us that people can say 
fairly hard things to each other. However, each 
time this happens some one makes a joke, 
releases tension and changes the subject. Difficult 
or personal issues remain undebatable this way 
and -contrary to the desired effect- an unsafe 
climate is created. Let’s call this a joking strategy. 
Another strategy with the same effect is the 
reduction strategy: you tend to make problems 
smaller if the situation might become difficult or 
embarrassing.  
 
HR (joking): Then you must not make any jokes 
about my roots anymore (both laugh). 
 
Int: This is what we mean .... 
 
Dir: Now you are exaggerating. It is not that bad. 
 
It might be possible that managers do not feel 
safe. 
 
Int: Why? 
 
Dir: If you’re doing a bad job, you will be fired by 
me. I think humour is important to relieve tension 
and makes our complex jobs manageable 
(examples of situations in which they had fun with 
each other …). That’s part of our work, I think. And 
if someone has a different opinion, I cannot help it. 
 
Int: You asked me to share my observations in the 
management team tomorrow. How will managers 
deal with critical notes? 
 
HR: They will return feedback to you. 
 
Dir: It all depends on your tone of voice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑  
B repeat 
I cover-up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joking strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sharing observations regarding defensiveness 
activates exactly the same defensiveness: 
joking and reduction strategy. 
 
The interventionist decides to reflect on this the 
first time, however does not the second time. 
His assumption is that doing so would put too 
much pressure on the director and lead to 
stronger defensiveness. The desire to get an 
(immediate) compliance by the director would 
reflect a unilateral control model. 
 
By using these defensive strategies one makes 
awkward issues undebatable and – in the short 
run – controllable. In the longer run, however, 
the underlying producing patterns grow 
stronger. Compare Senge’s ‘shifting the burden 
pattern’: a unilateral control model seems to 
activate the upper circle and block the lower 
circle consistently. 
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Session with management team: one manager is forced to feel committed 
In a session with the management team, one of the subjects concerns ‘progress communication improvement’. 
The first subject on the agenda concerns procurement of copy machines (low dynamical complexity). This part 
of the meeting seems to be quite effective. The second subject is progress on communication improvement. 
Each manager is asked to present the situation in his/her department. Some managers present positive stories. 
Others, especially the director, ask some questions. Then it is V’s turn, the manager who had let an 
interventionist know that he does not like the approach.  
1.6 
 
V: I have had a meeting with P (one of the 
interventionists) and the approach in my 
department will differ from the other departments. I 
want my employees to be trained in 
communicative skills. 
 
Dir: How are you going to learn yourself; by 
feedback? 
 
V: No, I do not want to involve feedback in our 
approach. 
 
Dir: Why not? 
 
V: Well, next Monday I will discuss the approach 
with my employees. 
 
Dir: P (interventionist) will join the session and he 
will observe. You can’t deny observations, can 
you? If he is there, he will have some 
observations. And the agreement is that these will 
be fed back. 
 
V (quietly): Whose agreement .... 
 
Dir: Just let it happen ... 
 
V: But what if my employees are not open to it? 
 
Dir: Well, there you have a strong observation, 
don’t you? 
 
E (other manager): Why are you pushing so hard? 
 
Dir: These guys are professionals. You can only 
learn from them, can’t you? 
 
V: Okay, I am with you ... 
 
[......] 
 
Another manager’s turn. 
 
K: Tomorrow I will have a meeting with A (another 
interventionist). I don’t think these communication 
problems play a role in our department. We‘re a 
small team and the atmosphere is okay.  
 
H (another manager): Well K, I want to be open 
with you. This week two employees of yours 
visited me. They said they do not feel comfortable 
with you at all. Thus, there is more than you know. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V informs that he does not comply with ‘the 
method’ (a deviant opinion). 
 
 
 
Growing control by director 
 
 
 
 
While manager V informs that he has another 
opinion, the director’s control mode grows 
stronger and stronger. He goes on until V will 
comply.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct feedback to director (apparently she 
feels safe enough to act this way). 
 
 
 
The unilateral control model leads to a short-
term solution: the manager saying that he 
complies. However, this does not seem to be 
valid information and will probably not help in 
the longer run. 
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Silence ..... 
 
H: You seem to say things in such a way that they 
feel insecure. 
 
Silence ... 
 
Dir: Well, don’t we all sometimes say things that 
appear to be ineffective afterwards? Let’s go on....  
 
The interventionists are invited to share their 
observations. 
 
This process started with some observations: 
• Employees are afraid to criticize and feel 
insecure 
• Employees feel anxious about approaching 
managers 
• Employees behave reactively, as perceived by 
managers 
 
Is there any relation between communication 
within the management team and these 
observations deeper in the organization? Is there 
room for deviant opinions? Is it safe enough to 
bring in concerns? How pro-active are managers 
in relation to the director? 
 
There are two types of situations the management 
team deals with: relatively simple situations and 
complex situations. The communication patterns 
differ strongly between these situations. 
 
Simple situations (focus on content, relatively 
routine, low dynamic complexity) 
The communication can be characterized as 
follows: 
• Positive and relaxed atmosphere: use of humour 
• Positive feedback to each other 
• Active listening: listening and asking questions 
aiming at proper understanding 
• Polite and respectful conduct: no interruptions 
• Chairman (director) stimulates active 
involvement by inviting participants to share their 
opinion 
• Chairman leaves room for discussion and 
conflicting opinions; by active inquiry the most 
attractive option is selected 
• Chairman still gives direction by firmness, clear 
summaries and attention to time. 
 
Complex situations (threatening, conflicting 
opinions, personal issues) 
As soon the management team is confronted with 
complex situations, the communication seems to 
be less effective. 
• In the last meeting people showed that personal 
issues are being addressed. However, each 
time this happens, someone reduces tension by 
making a joke and changing the subject: the 
joking strategy. The participants are quite good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
I cover-up 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Face saving by a reduction strategy. 
Result: no opportunity to inquire into personal 
feedback, which results in an insecure situation 
for K and others. 
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at this strategy. How safe is this? Another 
strategy is the reduction strategy: by reducing 
the problem, it is made undebatable. An 
example is K.’s case: the director reduced the 
problem by saying that we all sometimes say 
things that appear to be ineffective afterwards. 
• And what happens if someone has a deviant 
opinion? This was shown during this meeting in 
V’s case: pressure is increased until V. 
complies. We wonder: will V. really feel 
committed when he leaves this room in a couple 
of minutes? We call this the comply strategy: 
tension is reduced, but the ‘problem’ is still 
there. Apparently, it is easier and safer to 
comply in the first place. 
• In complex situations one loses one’s 
competence to ask questions. On the contrary, 
one tends to make things undebatable by 
reducing problems, making jokes, complying 
and increasing pressure. In other words, just 
when inquiry is needed, one stops inquiring.  
 
Response to feedback 
• Some are writing 
• Silence, concentration 
• No manifest defensive behaviour 
• Signs of recognition (nodding, humming) 
 
After feedback: silence 
 
Director thanks interventionists for their valuable 
feedback. 
 
Some make jokes about the compliments that the 
interventionists had made regarding the director’s 
meeting skills. 
 
And another joke. And a joke about the joke. 
 
End of the meeting. Everyone leaves the room; the 
majority thank the interventionists for their 
feedback and stress this was valuable for them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How to interpret the response? 
 
This might be positive. However, no one 
inquires into the observations by asking 
questions. The response could be a 
combination of defensive routines/strategies: 
- joking strategy 
- compliance strategy 
- or: ignorance strategy (act as if it is 
interesting, however, ignore the information that 
is difficult to deal with). 
 
The interventionist assumes this intervention 
method is not working very well and more time 
is needed to inquire into responses. By not 
being open about his thoughts he establishes 
an S-O relation: the interventionist thinks he 
has to find another method to make them learn. 
As an alternative, in line with a mutual learning 
model, he might share his considerations with 
the managers, ask how they evaluate the 
interventions and think about what interventions 
would help them to learn. 
 
 
 
 
Session with director: feedback to his contribution to defensiveness 
In a meeting, the interventionist reflects on the director’s role by self-disclosure.  1.7 
 
Conversations starts with ‘small talk’: director tells 
about his roots, his family and his success in his 
last job. 
 
Int: I would like to share some observations, if you 
are interested. 
 
Dir: Yes, of course. 
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Int: It all began with the observation that 
employees experience ‘fear’, they feel insecure 
and distance from management. 
 
Dir: Yes. 
 
Int: Our question is still how management team 
and you contribute to these experiences.  
 
Dir nods. 
 
Int:  
In the observations that have been fed back to the 
management team, you play an important role. We 
distinguished relatively simple situations without 
tension and complex situations that are 
characterized by possible threat or lack of control. 
You deal effectively with the first category and less 
effectively with the second one.  
• Simple/neutral situations: 
- you keep calm, ask questions, summarize 
- you activate involvement by asking opinions 
- you use humour and keep things pleasant 
• Complex situations:  
- you make these situations undebatable  
- you stop inquiring and increase pressure 
(e.g. in situation with V.), while precisely in 
these situations inquiry is essential  
 
Dir confirms by nodding. 
 
Int: you make difficult situations undebatable by 
joking and putting things into perspective (e.g. 
situation with K.). 
 
Dir: I shouldn’t have done that. I visited H. and K. 
and have let them know I should have dealt with 
the situation either by leaving room for discussion 
or by asking questions. 
 
Int: It looked like saving K., however you created 
an unsafe situation for him. The feedback could be 
given, but could not be discussed. 
 
Dir: Yes, you are completely right. 
 
Int: Another example refers to you, asking ‘how 
anyone could be afraid of this man?’ during a 
meeting. This way you make a possible threat for 
team members undebatable by making a joke. 
 
Dir nods. 
 
Int: Everyone laughed. This can either be fun or a 
sign of discomfort. To what extent do you get 
feedback from your colleagues? 
 
Dir (hesitating): Sometimes I get feedback from M 
or E, or even from V. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist shares his perception of 
director’s behaviour candidly. He holds the 
assumption that the director has the capacity 
for self-reflection and self-examination (see 
Argyris’ social virtues of Model II). This appears 
to work out effectively as it stimulates the 
director to perceive his own role as a part of the 
process and reflect on this contribution to the 
undesired situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director reflects on own role; as opposed to last 
meeting, he shows no defensive behaviour. 
What makes him more open? 
- effect of feedback in management team? 
- effect of him being alone? 
- delayed effect of earlier feedback? 
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Silence 
 
Int: I think you can be quite threatening for people. 
Even for me, while I am an outsider, this is the first 
conversation with you I feel comfortable. So how 
safe are you for persons who report to you? 
 
Silence 
 
Dir: But why? 
 
Int: it is a combination of the way you make 
important issues undebatable and the firmness 
you show when presenting your opinion. Besides, 
you are easily bored if things take too much time. 
Still, you say that you want to improve 
communication and safety. However, this takes 
some time for inquiry. What you say and what you 
do are inconsistent. 
 
Dir (thinking): I understand. 
 
Silence. 
 
Dir: I think I can be threatening indeed. If an 
employee does not perform properly, he will be 
fired (some examples of persons who have been 
fired recently). 
 
Int: These actions will certainly not contribute to a 
safe atmosphere. But this is not what I mean. Our 
observations refer to your day-to-day behaviour 
and communication.  
 
Dir: I see. 
 
Int: We started with feelings of fear and insecurity 
deeper in the organization. You probably play a 
pivotal role. Besides, we see a repetition of the 
pattern deeper in the organization: pressure stifles 
inquiry. The focus is on: 
- instruction 
- management present their solutions 
- quick solutions  
 
Dir: That is not what I want. That is not good. 
 
It is time. 
 
Int: Don’t fight against yourself now. Rather try to 
take time and inquire by asking questions. 
 
Dir: Thank you very much. This was very valuable 
for me. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int decides to be open about the effect of dir’s 
behaviour on him. He assumes that self-
disclosure will enable dir’s learning -> this 
intervention indeed leads to inquiry (as 
opposed to the first time, when director became 
defensive). 
 
Intervention: giving insight into dissonance 
between beliefs (‘we want to change’) and 
actions (‘we keep ourselves from changing’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection afterwards: 
As a consequence of pressure, the 
interventionist is talking too much, willing to 
share the observations. He is sensitive to 
exactly the same pattern he is feeding back: 
pressure leads to instruction and directing 
instead of inquiry and asking questions. 
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Reflection 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Session with director: effects of the feedback 
The director and an interventionist prepare the next management team meeting. During this session the director 
talks about his new insights and behavioural consequences. In addition, they discuss the consequences of one 
manager’s dismissal.  
1.8 
 
Meeting starts with small talk. 
 
Int: What would you like to discuss? 
 
Silence 
 
Dir: I would like to share that manager X is going 
to leave us. We will let the management team 
know in the next meeting. Also, I have thought 
deeply about your personal feedback in our last 
session. 
 
Int: What did you do with the feedback? 
 
Dir: The feedback gave me deep insight into my 
role. Since then I have been learning by 
experimentation. Last week someone approached 
me to talk about some problems in project Y. 
Normally I would have tried to persuade him, but 
this time I said almost nothing. I have only listened 
to his concerns. I made no promises either. And 
still he left my room quite satisfied. Actually I didn’t 
do anything (laughing ….). 
Tomorrow I have a meeting with all members of 
department Z. Without doubt, they expect I will 
increase pressure. However, I won’t do that. I will 
sit down and listen to them. I will try to empathize 
with them. And ask questions like ‘how do you 
experience the situation?’, ‘what consequences do 
you perceive?’ and ‘what is the relation with our 
approach?’ 
 
Int: Apparently you have the competence to use 
these kinds of questions. However, you usually do 
not use them in the business environment. As if 
you have put on a new record that you already 
possessed.  
 
[…] 
 
Int: Let’s discuss next Thursday’s meeting. If I 
understand you properly, you will tell the managers 
that manager X’s contract will be terminated.  
 
Dir: Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D)  
P mutual (D)  
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist invites director to take initiative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director is able to ask questions (single-loop 
learning); it sounds quite natural, as if he has 
activated another program (double-loop 
learning). 
 
Still, he seems to perceive these situations as 
relatively simple and he behaves relaxed.  
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Int: We cannot act as if nothing has happened, can 
we? It all started with ‘safety’. You expect us to 
share our observations regarding the 
communication patterns in the management team. 
However, I think managers will think: ‘very 
interesting, however we will be fired as soon as we 
do not perform.’ They will probably not say such 
things, but they will think them. In short, is that the 
right moment to share our feedback? 
 
Dir: They may think so. But they will think the 
same two weeks later. I want your feedback during 
this meeting. 
 
Int: At least we must address this issue. We 
cannot act as if nothing has happened, can we? 
 
Dir: Well, maybe you should say something when 
we start discussing this subject during the meeting. 
 
Int: What about you saying something about it?  
 
Dir: Okay, what shall I say? 
 
Int: You might say: the interventionists have some 
observations to share. However, I would like to 
have an open conversation with you: is this the 
right moment for you? 
 
Dir: Okay. 
 
His secretary opens the door. End of meeting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No questions or inquiry, but a strong focus on 
pushing and persuasive behaviour (‘we cannot 
afford to slow down’). 
 
Interventionist tries to persuade as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This pattern is recognisable from other 
meetings: the highest person in charge gives 
the right answers. Others ask questions. 
Apparently the director perceives the 
interventionist as the highest in charge 
regarding this subject. 
 
In action, the interventionist tends to distance 
and is not aware that he stimulates the 
director’s dependency by a strong S-O 
definition of the relation: the interventionist 
treats the director as an object that ‘should’ and 
‘must’ behave a certain way. As a 
consequence, the director behaves reactively. 
In action, neither is aware.  
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Management team session: defensive strategies help to keep the situation under control 
The interventionists enter the room during a short break, just after the announcement that manager X will leave 
the organization. 
1.9 
 
When the interventionists enter, the climate seems 
to be very good: jokes, laughter and a lot of 
talking.  
 
Dir starts the next subject: Communication and 
safety is a sensitive subject, as we have just 
announced that X will have to leave. Lately 
another manager left this team as well. Do you 
think this is the right moment to discuss this 
subject now? 
 
V: I am flabbergasted. I have never felt unsafe in 
this team. What do you mean? 
 
Dir repeats his message. 
 
 
 
 
E: Why do you want to discuss safety? Don’t you 
feel safe? 
 
Director looks at interventionist and asks for help 
nonverbally.  
 
Int repeats the same message. 
 
 
 
H: I don’t feel unsafe at all. However, I recognize a 
feeling of fear amongst employees. For example, 
an employee who said: ‘Well, this remark may be 
not good for my career, but I would like to say ….’. 
But I have never had this feeling.  
 
 
 
During this discussion nobody looks at manager X, 
who is still attending the meeting.  
 
 
Dir makes a joke. 
 
A manager describes what makes good 
communication (in general) and another manager 
describes a meeting deeper in the organization. A 
third manager argues that second line 
management and employees should be trained to 
deal effectively with change processes.  
 
Director asks interventionists to share their 
observations regarding the last period. 
 
Interventionist shares insights as summarized in 
reflection 3 with some additional examples from 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This might be very well an utterance of the joke 
strategy. 
 
 
Director tries to activate and inquire into the 
lower circle, but is being ‘pushed back’. 
Managers are very good at these routines: 
even if the director tries to leave the unilateral 
control model, managers immediately fall back 
on their routines. This response stifles the 
director’s attempts and pushes him back in his 
‘well known’ role. As a consequence, it is hard 
for the director to change the patterns (he may 
succeed with a delay). 
 
Managers activate several defensive strategies: 
- denial strategy: we have no problems with 
safety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist goes on with the same strategy 
that apparently activates defensiveness. An 
alternative: make the process debatable.  
 
- denial strategy: “To retain their power, 
defensive routines must remain undiscussable. 
Team stay stuck in their defensive routines only 
when they pretend that they don’t have any 
defensive routines, that everything is all right, 
and that they can say ‘anything’” (Senge, p. 
255). 
 
- ignorance strategy: we act as if she and her 
problem are not there, just by ignoring her. And 
we keep saying that this team is very safe. 
 
- joke strategy 
 
- distance strategy: we talk about other parties 
and general observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist intends to avoid a painful 
situation for manager X and tries to save 
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this meeting. He does not refer to the response to 
director’s opening question (regarding safety) in 
order. 
 
 
Dir: I think I select dominant managers, who give 
instructions and solve problems themselves. How 
bad is this? 
 
Interventionist: Well, you should all be aware of 
your pitfalls and especially of the structural 
patterns that you keep alive. You stimulate 
employees’ behaviour that you don’t like: 
reactiveness and passiveness. They wait for your 
next instructions and solutions. 
 
Interventionist finishes feedback. 
 
Silence. 
 
Dir makes a joke. 
 
M: Inquiry is not my natural style, but I see it is 
important to break through the patterns. Although 
it’s difficult to realize major changes in one’s 
personality if one is older than 38, it must be 
possible to change our behaviour. We have to try. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A: Yes, I think we really need to pay attention to 
this. 
 
V (joking): Well, do you think even K could still 
learn things? 
 
K says nothing. 
 
It is time and the director finishes this subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
P circular (D) 
manager X’s face (unilateral control). In doing 
so, he complies with the defensiveness of the 
team: we do not discuss sensitive subjects and 
act as if we can say anything we wish. 
 
Director considers his own role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- joke strategy 
 
This manager seems to reflect on the 
management role. Real behavioural change 
could still be blocked by a ‘we strategy’: we 
should change, so nobody has to feel 
personally responsible. 
 
How far could one go: this may be a very 
sophisticated utterance of a ignorance strategy: 
we say that this is important and interesting, but 
we leave all things as they are. He is possibly 
very serious. However, it still might be 
espoused theory. This might become clear later 
in the process.  
 
- we-strategy/ignorance strategy? 
 
 
- joke strategy 
 
 
In the end, with all defensive strategies 
participants were able to keep things ‘under 
control’.  
 
Question: how to feed back this observation 
without activating even more defensiveness? 
This would not have been the right moment. 
The interventionists might let them choose: ‘we 
accept us not discussing safety and accept the 
consequences, or we do not accept these 
consequences and (thus) discuss safety’. 
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Session with management team; managers address defensiveness and circularity  
In the period that follows, the interventionists have several moments of hesitation: will the director and 
managers succeed to de-block the process? Their routines seem to be deeply ingrained and difficult to change. 
In a subsequent session the management team evaluate the progress of the improvement process. This 
meeting has two faces: on the one hand, the interventionists experience the atmosphere as rather dutiful. On 
the other hand, this session illustrates some initiatives to make defensive strategies and circularity debatable.  
1.10 
 
Small talk. 
 
Dir: On the agenda: communication. He looks at 
the interventionists expectantly. 
 
Int: Brief introduction. … Two questions are 
pertinent: what has the process brought you and 
what do you want to work on? 
 
Dir: I communicate in a different manner with the 
second line managers. They visit me more often 
than before and discuss certain themes.  
 
A: In my perception employees have less fear to 
bring things in. Besides, they really appreciate that 
W. (the director) behaves more vulnerably. 
Some second line managers find it a bit soft and 
would still prefer some concrete instruments to 
improve communication. That is really a problem 
for me. 
 
H makes a joke. All laugh. 
 
A: Gentlemen, we’re changing the subject by 
making jokes.  
 
H: You are right. (other managers confirm 
nonverbally) 
 
H: I perceive a change in the way we communicate 
within our management team. Deeper in the 
organization the effect is still weak. For too many 
employees it is still vague. 
 
Dir: V, what is the situation in your team?  
(V is the manager who has complied under 
pressure). 
 
V ‘wakes with a start’. 
 
V: Eeehh, well communication is not a severe 
problem in our team. We had a session with P (an 
interventionist), which was pleasant. Especially his 
feedback was appreciated. 
 
Dir (laughing): Quite valuable, those observations, 
right? 
 
V: I don’t get your point, W. 
 
Dir: I am serious. These observations are valuable, 
aren’t they? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I inquiry (D) 
I long term (D) 
I reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circularity:  
Looks like an improvement. 
Observation afterwards: it would have been 
interesting to ask what exactly this ‘different 
manner’ is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joke strategy. 
 
Joke strategy being addressed. 
 
 
 
 
 
What is this change in his opinion? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir wants acknowledgement that he has won.  
Joking strategy: a serious hint, covered by a 
joke. 
As a consequence, difficult to inquire. 
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V: Yes. 
 
AV: L visited our team. This was very positive. We 
especially focused on … [….]. 
 
[…] 
 
M: I have changed my view on this process. I 
perceive it as very positive. [……] 
 
Dir (who has already looked at his watch a couple 
of times): We are talking bullshit too long. To be 
honest, I have been bored for 20 minutes already.  
 
Silence 
 
Int: In my perception you focus on procedures: ‘I 
had a session with …’. I wonder: What do you 
really want regarding this subject? I miss the fire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dir: This process is really important to me. I realize 
that we are the problem. But it irritates me that we 
are discussing the subject by doing a round again. 
 
 
M: But this is not an easy process. It takes time. 
We have to see that we must start with ourselves.  
 
Int: The conversation sounds quite polite and 
obligatory.  
 
A: I do not agree. Last year we wouldn’t have had 
this discussion. 
 
Dir: I hate repetition. I don’t have Alzheimer’s. 
 
H: W (dir), I see that you are in a certain mode. 
 
M: W, you are just too impatient. 
 
Some jokes about how intelligent team members 
are. 
 
Dir (laughing): But, what are we going to do now? 
 
A: I think a problem is second line management. 
They must be the bridge to the rest of the 
organization and we have quite a problem there. 
 
Dir: Let’s not focus on other parties. Let’s start with 
our own role. 
 
[ …..]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P mutual (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I inquiry (D) 
I long term (D) 
I reflection (D) 
 
Compliance strategy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A confusing discussion: the director seems to 
be the person who has the highest commitment 
to the process. Still, he is the person who gets 
irritated. 
 
 
The interventionist confronts managers’ 
behaviour. He assumes that managers are not 
really internally committed, but he does not 
share this. He does inquire by sharing what he 
experiences. But he is not open about his own 
assumptions. The feedback fits a unilateral 
control model, as he pushes (and blames): ‘you 
do not show the right behaviour’. Besides, the 
feedback is too vague: what actions exactly 
make him wonder?  
 
A possible explanation: exactly because he is 
committed, he gets irritated because of the 
obligatory atmosphere: what people say does 
not seem to be consistent with what they show. 
 
Manager gives feedback to director. 
They seem to be impressed by the director’s 
behaviour and act as if they want to 
compensate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joke strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blame/distance strategy is addressed. 
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During the meeting there a discussion about the 
next staff information session. Normally, during 
these sessions the director and/or management 
team members talk about recent developments, 
while employees listen. One is aware of the 
disadvantage: ‘the more we direct, the more 
reactive they will be’. A small committee is being 
formed in order to develop ways to break through 
this cycle. 
 
End of the session: interventionists feed back their 
observations of this session: 
 
Changes are visible in the communication patterns 
within the team: 
- joking strategy is often being addressed 
immediately 
- blaming strategy (e.g. middle management is the 
problem) is being addressed 
- much more attention to management team’s role 
(however, less attention to managers’ role; the ‘we 
strategy is still active) 
- more direct feedback to director 
- awareness of circularity in behaviour during staff 
information sessions and initiative to break through 
this circularity 
- much more attention is needed for the visibility of 
these changes to employees; they still do not see 
real changes. 
 
Dir: Good to hear. I recognize these observations. 
We must not underestimate the perception of 
employees. 
 
Interventionists leave. 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
P own role (D) 
P mutual (D 
This discussion shows that participants’ 
awareness of circularity and their own roles is 
growing. 
 
In the current situation, employees show an 
‘undergo strategy’: in case of threat, just 
undergo the intervention (passively) and do not 
make the producing patterns debatable. 
 
 
 
 
 
This feedback, afterwards, is quite polite and 
focuses on things that are clear. Unclear 
issues, such as the difference between what 
interventionists sense and what managers say 
is not addressed. A factor that keeps the ints 
from going further might be their wish to add 
value (‘together we realize improvements’). 
However, in avoiding this, they bypass and 
cover up defensive routines and block changing 
and learning. 
 
 
 
Reflection 4 
 
 
 
 
Period 3: observations deeper in the organization 
 
 
Session with a second line management team: ‘employees are reactive’ 
During this session the communication, especially the relation between managers and employees, is being 
discussed.  
1.11 
 
All managers experience pressure. They are very 
busy and they are responsible for projects with 
hard deadlines. 
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They perceive negative behaviour of their 
employees: 
- ‘They are reactive and seldom bring in ideas.’ 
- ‘They often complain about lots of things. I expect 
them to suggest solutions.’ 
- ‘They are frustrated. They have the feeling they 
are overruled by the management team’ (= first 
line management team). 
 
First line manager: ‘I guess we create 
circumstances that stimulate this behaviour, don’t 
we?’ 
 
Int: How do you react to this behaviour? 
 
Some typical quotes: 
- ‘If they don’t come up with ideas themselves, I tell 
them what to do.’ 
- ‘They often come to my desk with small issues. 
Sometimes it is unbelievable. Mostly I give them a 
solution.’ 
- ‘Sometimes I ask them to bring in ideas 
themselves, but they seldom come up with ideas.’ 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
P mutual (D) 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session with second line management team and project leaders: highest in rank knows the answers 
This session is a platform for project evaluations, organizational developments and customer-related issues. 
During the session two types of subjects are being discussed: relatively (dynamically) simple and dynamically 
complex situations. In both situations communication patterns resemble those in the management team. A 
‘complex’ situation is described below. 
1.12 
 
 
Project leader H: Y told me that her department 
has contracted a third party. At least I would like to 
know how we should deal with that (a reactive and 
dependent tone of voice). 
 
Second line manager E (his boss) looks at the first 
line manager (boss of the boss): Yes, what is our 
point of view? 
 
First line manager: Our point of view is ….. 
 
 
Int: Look what happens. Project leader H brings in 
that at least he would like to know how you should 
deal with that. Apparently he feels uncomfortable 
with the situation. In a couple of seconds the 
question and responsibility are moved up to the 
person with the highest rank who, in turn, gives 
‘the right answer’. 
Alternative: H is a professional; ask him how he is 
dealing with the situation now and what 
alternatives he considers. 
 
 
 
 
 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reactive attitude; he sends the problem 
bottom-up. 
 
 
 
 
Reactive attitude; he sends the problem 
bottom-up. 
 
 
 
Participant with the highest rank takes 
responsibility and instructs ‘the right solution’. 
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Some laugh: looks like he has been in a course …. 
 
Silence 
 
First line manager: Okay H, and now the customer 
tells you they are going to leave you. What will you 
do in turn? 
 
Silence 
 
Project leader J (colleague of H) looks at first line 
manager: The question is, who says ‘stop’ at that 
moment? 
 
First line manager: We have to be clear about the 
rules. You must say they cannot ignore the rules. 
 
Project leader H: And what if they still don’t follow 
the rules? 
 
First line manager: Then we escalate and increase 
pressure. 
 
H (looks satisfied): Okay. 
 
Second line manager E: I think account managers 
should be sharper in this process. They should be 
much more active in their capacity as account 
managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int: I would like to share some observations. If I 
understand you right, you lose internal customers 
and you wonder how to deal with that situation. 
In my opinion you put a strong emphasis on 
increasing pressure and maintaining the rules: the 
customers must maintain the rules, account 
managers must maintain their duty. If you increase 
pressure, it might have the opposite effect. They 
might find you unpleasant to work with and leave 
you as soon as they have a chance. 
However, you don’t talk about your own role. 
Apparently your customers prefer working with 
another party. Why? What do they miss in working 
with you? You do not ask that question, do you? 
 
Silence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blame 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist confronts the recurrent patterns. 
Although some react with jokes, the manager 
immediately translates the feedback in his 
behaviour. 
Manager learns quickly and brings feedback 
into practice. 
 
 
 
 
Colleague ‘saves’ the situation and bounces the 
ball back. 
 
 
Manager answers the question again. 
Although the pattern starts differently, it ends 
with the control loop again. The manager has 
contributed to an environment that – in turn – 
pushes him back into ‘old and familiar 
behaviour’ and thus keeps him from effective 
change. 
 
 
 
 
 
Int perceives typical unilateral control behaviour 
that keeps them from learning. He assumes 
that project leader H is not aware of that. For 
that reason he shares his observations, wishing 
to contribute to H’s learning. 
 
 
When put in Senge’s ‘shifting the burden’ 
pattern, increasing pressure and maintaining 
rules are (linear) ‘upper circle’ interventions: if 
one does not comply voluntarily, we increase 
pressure. that covers up fundamental problems 
(lower circle): why do your customers prefer 
working with another party? 
 
Fundamental inquiry is blocked by defensive 
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H: I know why they want to leave: they have 
shares in the external party. 
 
 
 
 
Int: How do you know? 
 
H: That is what I think. So it makes no sense to 
ask for it. 
 
First line manager (very careful): H, could this 
contribute to their behaviour? They might think: 
Oh, he just doesn’t want to talk with us. 
 
H: Well ….. laughing .. 
 
Project leader K: Well, I think we have an 
important issue; it is all about the relation and 
personal attention, isn’t it? 
 
Some other participants move along and they 
agree they should pay more attention to real 
conversations with the customer.  
 
End of this meeting. 
 
After the meeting a project leader approaches the 
interventionist and lets him know that he 
appreciated this meeting. However, he is 
disappointed about the interventionist not having 
said anything about his passive colleagues. He got 
really irritated about some of his colleagues.  
 
The interventionist has a brief think and asks: why 
do you expect me to confront him? 
 
Project leader: well, that is your role, isn’t it? 
 
Int: how do you perceive your own role in this 
situation? 
 
Project leader: ehh, well, I could have said it 
myself. But that is different. 
 
Int: what makes the difference? 
 
Project leader: ehh, may be there is no real 
difference. 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
strategies: 
- blaming: putting responsibility on someone 
else’s shoulders 
- distancing: one’s own role is being ignored. 
- assuming: holding strong assumptions without 
testing them. 
 
Int tries to get directly observable data 
(compare Argyris).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K. saves this colleague’s face by generalising 
things: generalize strategy. 
 
 
Apparently the interventionist’s presence keeps 
the manager from giving feedback to his 
colleague: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist feels he is criticized and 
initially tends to defend. However, he is aware 
of this and consciously decides to inquire into 
the situation. This leads to learning. 
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A session with all members of one department: management break through circularity and routines 
In this session with employees, second line management and first line manager, some positive developments 
are visible. Subjects of this session: recent developments regarding products, services and customer relations. 
First and second line management try to break through circular patterns and routines. 
1.13 
 
Unlike this type of session in the past, second line 
management ask questions and employees 
discuss these questions in groups and present 
their answers. Normally, one works the other way 
round: employees have questions and managers 
have answers. 
 
However, managers find it difficult to be consistent. 
After each presentation they perform as a ‘jury’ 
and judge the quality of the answers. Each time 
management present their opinion as being the 
‘final answer’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the last part of the session the first line manager 
is scheduled to give his opinion. He has observed 
the process and he tries to break through the 
routines. After a brief presentation one employee 
(the one and only who always asks a question) 
wants to ask a question. The first line manager:   
 
“P, I see you want to ask a question. That is what I 
expected, because that is the pattern we always 
follow: I tell you a story and you ask a critical 
question. Often you have an opinion about the 
subject yourself. In turn, I pretend that I know the 
answer and share another story with you. Then, 
after the session, you will evaluate my answer. 
You may disagree, but won’t share your 
disagreement with me. I often don’t know the 
answer, but I won’t share that with you. That is a 
strange game, isn’t it? Let’s play a different game. 
If you have a question and I don’t know the 
answer, I will return the question and ask your 
opinion. All right?” 
 
 
P own (D) 
P mutual (D) 
P circular (D) 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P dynamic (D) 
P own (D) 
P mutual (D) 
P circular (D) 
B reflection (D) 
I inquiry (D) 
I long term (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This new working method has a visible 
contribution to employees’ ownership and 
creativity. Employees show enthusiasm when 
presenting their visions and ideas. People 
seem to break through the circular pattern. 
 
 
The consequence: the circular pattern is re-
activated and employees fall back in their 
reactive and passive attitude. In a picture: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This intervention contributes to insight into 
circularity and blocking patterns. As a 
consequence, employees are more actively 
involved. Still, it is uncertain to what extent they 
have a free choice. The manager imposes his 
analyses and does not check to what extent 
employees recognize these analyses. Even if 
he had checked, they probably wouldn’t have 
been open about their real thoughts. Besides, 
he is the person who introduces ‘another game’ 
and imposes his playing rules. In short, this is 
an effective intervention as a start; still, it is 
characterized by unilateral control. 
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The employee is confused: Can I still ask a 
question? 
 
Mgr: Of course you can.  
 
Empl: Do you really think we are going to finish 
this project within the deadline? 
 
Mgr: I normally would try to persuade you, won’t I? 
Please share your opinion. 
 
Empl: Well, I don’t think we will manage (mentions 
some arguments). 
 
Mgr: How do others think about this? 
 
Some employees (more than ever before) share 
their opinions and actively join the conversation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own (D) 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staff information meeting: ‘employees normally ask no questions’ 
During a management team meeting, the program of a quarterly staff information meeting is being discussed. 
The program is been prepared by HR and consists of seven speakers on several subjects. All speakers are 
first line managers. In the last part, employees have the opportunity to ask questions, but no time has been 
scheduled for that part. When the interventionist asks why no time for questions has been scheduled, the 
answer is that ‘normally they don’t ask any questions’.  
1.14 
 
During this session the awareness grows that this 
program will confirm existing patterns: managers 
talkand are active, while employees listen and are 
passive. A small group is formed to prepare a 
program that de-blocks existing patterns. An 
interventionist is asked to participate.  
 
In a session with this group some decisions are 
made: 
• The interventionist will support the director with 
the preparation of his presentation. 
• The director will reflect on the management 
team’s learning process, the circularity, how the 
setting of these meetings characterizes the 
circular patterns. 
• During the session employees can write down 
questions that will be collected; the director will 
answer these questions. 
• This session will be the last one that is prepared 
only by managers. A committee of employees, 
managers and HR will prepare subsequent 
sessions. 
• Employees can bring in subjects next time. 
 
During the session the director follows the line as 
prepared. 
• No slides; rather a personal story about 
concerns, why I’m working on this process, what 
it means to me, what happens in the 
management team, what have I/we already 
learned about ourselves. 
• We keep a tight grip on each other, e.g. 
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- management direct, employees listen (‘watch 
this meeting’) 
- management instruct, employees keep their 
ideas to themselves 
• This meeting is illustrative: 
- first line management prepare and have 
foreknowledge; second line management and 
employees wait and see. That is what we 
stimulate. 
• Personal expectations; what would be my ideal? 
- trying to find each other: management visits 
employees and vice versa 
- sharing ideas, which requires managers to be 
open to ideas and employees to bring in their 
ideas 
• What might you think now? 
- ‘nice words, but as soon as we are critical, we 
will be punished …’ 
- ‘communication? We have done this before, 
but nothing has changed really…’ 
• Some recent examples of positive contact 
between management and employees 
• Suggestion for the future: employees and 
managers prepare these sessions together. 
 
During the session the director succeeds to create 
a good atmosphere. He tells about his personal 
concerns, what he has learned about his 
management style, what the management team 
has already learned and why he understands the 
distance that employees perceive. Moreover, he 
compliments some employees who have brought 
in ideas and criticism recently and labels criticism 
as a form of commitment. Employees seem to be 
surprised by the personal and vulnerable story of 
the director and respond positively. Many stay for 
a drink. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P dynamic (D) 
P own role (D) 
P mutual (D) 
P circular (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
B proactive (D) 
I long term (D) 
I reflection (D).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This presentation by the director contributes to 
de-blocking the change process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reflection 5 
 
 
 
Management team meeting: presentation of overall analysis 
The interventionist is invited to present an overall analysis to the management team. Appendix 1 depicts the 
slide presentation (including some additional remarks that are shared verbally). The interventionist shares valid 
information about and invites the managers to make consistent choices: how safe do you want it to be if there 
is a continuous threat? 
1.15 
 
Interventionist finishes his presentation with the 
question ‘Do you personally really want to invest 
any further in this process?’ and sits down. 
 
Silence 
 
M: Yes, I agree with your analysis. 
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H: Yes, I hear your analysis. However, I don’t 
know what I must do with this safety in the 
management team. I don’t know what to do 
differently (looks at interventionist).  
 
Int: H, I don’t say you have to do anything. The 
question is: do you accept the situation as it is? I 
could imagine if you said yes. As a consequence, 
you might just have to accept people might not feel 
safe. But that’s quite common in a lot of 
organizations.  
 
 
H: But this safety in the management team; what 
do you expect me to do? I am one of the 
managers who tend to say that we can say 
anything here and that I feel safe. Partly because I 
don’t feel like saying that it is unsafe. Should I, 
time after time, say ‘I don’t feel safe’? Then we do 
not make any progress, do we? (exaggerates in 
order to make it funny – some laugh). 
 
Int: You respond as if you think this is not realistic. 
At the same time you expect managers and 
employees deeper in the organization to have an 
open dialogue about these subjects. That does not 
sound consistent. Based on your experience in the 
management team, you might decide to stop 
expecting others to discuss this theme.  
Please do not do this because you have to. W, you 
would really help the process if managers have 
some room to say they do not want to do this. I 
know this might be difficult for you, as you find this 
very important (director seems to be slightly 
uncomfortable with the situation). 
 
H: That is not what I want. I am really trying to find 
out what I should do differently in order to make a 
difference. Could you advise me what I should do? 
 
Int: Not immediately. If it were so simple, you 
would already have done so. You’re very smart. 
However, I am quite willing to assist you in 
discovering ways to improve. 
 
Dir: I have learned quite a lot since we started this 
process. I really try to do things different. 
 
Int: I recognize and appreciate the way you are 
developing. 
There are already interesting experiments (int. 
describes situation when H suggested his 
employees to play another game on 26/06/06). H, 
this is part of an answer to your question about 
what to do. Create more opportunities in order to 
be recognizable and consistent. 
 
V: you mean we should do behavioural 
experiments? That is what I have learned in my 
management course. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist confronts inconsistency in 
current situation (valid information), invites 
them to make a free choice (each option is fine, 
as long as it is consistent) and to take 
responsibility. He releases pressure by saying 
that accepting unsafety and fear is fine. By 
doing so, he stimulates managers to hold a 
mutual learning model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joke strategy 
 
Again, interventionist confronts inconsistency in 
current situation (valid information), invites 
them to make a free choice (each option is fine, 
as long as it is consistent) and to take 
responsibility. He releases pressure by creating 
room to say ‘no’. Through this intervention he 
stimulates managers to hold a mutual learning 
model. 
 
 
(from this moment the pressure is reduced; 
persons are more open about their hesitations) 
 
 
It seems he makes a conscious decision. 
Subsequently, he asks the interventionist for an 
instant answer. 
 
For the interventionist it is very attractive to give 
advice and show added value (in the short run). 
By doing so, he would have established an S-O 
relationship that leads to dependency. Here, 
the int aims at establishing an S-S relationship 
that supports exploring and mutual learning. 
 
 
 
 
H. looks satisfied. 
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Int: indeed. 
 
V: it is all about the consequences of our 
behaviour. We must develop more awareness of 
that. We must learn about the consequences. 
 
Int; indeed, in your management style you are 
quite control-driven. This means that changing 
your behaviour can feel uncomfortable. Not only 
for you, also for employees. They know your style 
and know this makes them feel uncomfortable. 
This situation, in the meantime, is quite 
comfortable. Changing your behaviour, as a 
consequence, can feel uncomfortable again for 
your staff. As a consequence, there will always be 
a delay in the desired effect. As you see, it is not 
easy at all. 
 
M: Well, I see that changing the atmosphere in this 
organization really requires us to change. The 
question is, do we really want to change and are 
we able to change. After all, we are a certain type 
of managers: result-driven, slightly dominant, more 
attention to contents than people. We should take 
more time for our people. Do we want that? 
 
Int: That is the question. But please do not try to 
answer that question under pressure. Pressure 
does not help you now. The benefit of this 
discussion is that we have never had a dialogue 
this way. Personally, and about the role you want 
to play.  
So now it is your turn: please think about the 
question and I will hear who wants to go on and 
invest personally in this process. I/we will be very 
pleased to assist you. And if you, deep in your 
heart, do not want to go on with this process, 
please be clear about that. Then it will be much 
easier for all persons. 
 
End 
 
Brief evaluation with director 
 
Dir: This was o.k.  
 
Int: I am sorry that I created room to say ‘no’, but I 
really had to do it. 
 
Dir: I understand, it is o.k. We had a good 
conversation. 
 
V joins. 
 
V shakes hands with interventionist: this was very 
good. You know I sometimes have some remarks, 
but this was really good. Now we talked about us 
and the consequences of our behaviour. That is 
good. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P dynamical (D)  
P own role (D)  
B valid (D) 
B proactive (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist draws heavily on 
management’s reflection. Still, one seems to 
pick up the message. 
 
 
 
 
If the leader changes behaviour (model II), the 
environment tends to push him back. Leader 
cannot develop isolated from environment? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist keeps them from answering M’s 
question immediately. His assumption is that 
pressure might activate defensiveness again 
(e.g. a ‘comply strategy’). Afterwards, the 
question would have deserved an answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist should have advocated his 
assumption why he had to do this and left room 
for inquiry. 
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Later that day a brief evaluation by phone with the 
HR manager, who had also joined: It was good. 
Yesterday evening there were some critical notes 
about you coming again. Do we really have to 
discuss our communication again? Now, after the 
sessions, many team members gave compliments 
about the contribution of this session to the 
management team. 
 
 
 
Reflection 6 
 
 
Period 4: later developments  
 
Meeting first and second line management: breaking circularity 
In a meeting on future developments in strategy and organization design, the director shares his vision with first 
and second line managers. Subsequently, all managers get the opportunity to ask questions. It was decided 
not to share this presentation with first line management beforehand. As a consequence, first line managers 
are as open-minded as second line managers. The latter are not confronted with a ‘power block’ and 
participate more actively. 
1.16 
 
Interventionist: although this is a step forward, the 
procedure stimulates ‘old behaviour’: first and 
second line managers ask questions, the director 
answers. It is clear that most questions could be 
answered by the managers who ask them. 
However, their vision is not asked for. Instead, the 
director does his utmost to give his answer. Please 
don’t act as if you are dummies. Try to share 
ideas. 
 
Participants recognize the circularity and agree on 
another procedure: working on some questions in 
their teams and share their opinions. All teams are 
asked to present the outcomes subsequently. 
 
Some observations: 
• The director asks questions, line managers 
answer. The latter grow more and more active, 
while the director really listens. 
• The director is open (self-disclosure): ‘I thought 
it was all logical and clear. Now I see your 
opinions differ from mine. Apparently, it was my 
logic and clearness.’ 
• A first line manager (to the director): ‘the 
opinions of my second line managers appeared 
to differ from yours. I considered stopping them, 
but I didn’t. After all, we’re trying to share valid 
information.’ The director agrees.  
 
The director finishes by asking how managers 
have experienced the session and if they would 
like to work this way in the future. Their reaction is 
positive and they bring in ideas for the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid (D) 
B reflection (D)  
B inquiry (D) 
B proactive (D) 
 
 
B valid (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By changing roles they break through the 
circularity.  
 
The director critically reflects on his beliefs and 
actively stimulates a mutual learning climate. 
 
 
 
 
This manager openly shares valid information, 
although this might be perceived as 
embarrassing. This is an expression of mutual 
learning. 
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Session with first line manager and his second line managers: disclosure of valid information, after all 
In a session with one of the first line managers and his management team, the effectiveness of the team and 
each team manager is discussed by giving mutual feedback. Team members are invited to select three 
elements that strongly characterize the team. One of the elements mentioned is ‘harmony’ that may lead to 
‘caution’. The interventionist describes possible consequences of this characteristic for the improvement 
process by feeding back his personal experience during a progress meeting with this team one week before. 
1.17 
 
Int: We discussed progress during that meeting. All 
said the process is valuable. Still, the dialogue 
related consistently to general themes like ‘the 
management team’, ‘the organization’ and 
information processes. It seemed to be very hard 
to discuss the effectiveness of team members, 
regardless of several attempts by me. At the end 
of this meeting the first line manager asked each 
of you to evaluate the meeting. All managers said 
that they really found the discussion valuable. The 
interventionist was thanked for his valuable 
contribution and the meeting was finished. 
However, I left the meeting with an odd feeling: 
what you had said contradicted strongly with what I 
had felt. My feeling said that you liked neither the 
process nor the discussion during that meeting. 
And my assumption was that you experienced the 
whole process as a top-down initiative and that the 
safest way to behave was acting as if you found it 
valuable and keeping the discussion on the 
surface. After my departure I was confused by the 
situation. 
 
Silence … 
 
B: To be honest, your assumption is right. I felt a 
strong top-down pressure that forced me to 
comply.  
 
Other managers agree. 
 
H (first line mgr): I am glad you are so candid. I 
had the same feeling as the interventionist. 
However I did not know how to deal with the 
situation. 
 
Int: Great you can be so open. The problem is that 
you have been inconsistent. You said you want to 
contribute to an improvement process, but you 
blocked effective changing and organizing by 
sharing invalid information. Unlike before, now you 
are sharing valid information. 
 
All seem to feel uncomfortable with the situation 
and agree that this is not the way to be effective as 
a team. They agree that they will be more open 
about feelings and thoughts in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
B valid (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
I patterns (D) 
I long term (D) 
I reflection (D) 
 
P own role (D)  
B valid (D) 
B reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This example is in line with Argyris (1990), who 
argues that one tends to cover up defensive 
routines (“the process is valuable”) and cover 
up the cover-up (“this was a valuable 
discussion about a valuable process”). 
 
The interventionist advocates his assumptions 
by sharing them openly. He confronts 
inconsistency not in terms of ‘right or wrong’. 
Instead, he brings in his assumptions and 
feelings neutrally and leaves room for inquiry. 
As a consequence, participants respond very 
open about their defensiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist confronts inconsistency and 
emphasizes the effectiveness of sharing valid 
information. 
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Presentation  
 
 
The slides in this appendix were have been presented to the management team. The 
text in italic represents verbal notes that were shared during the presentation. 
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Appendix 2 Narratives of moving moments 2  
 
 
 Period 1: preparation 
 
 
2.1 
Approach 
 
The approach reflects the interventionists’ beliefs about the situation and what is needed. 
 
Raw data regarding the situation 
• Management want to develop a culture that is characterized by employees who feel responsible 
for the customer’s problems, who take initiative and show entrepreneurship. As such, they would 
like to stimulate employees to implement improvements in the customer processes and 
interactions. 
 
Interventionist’s assumptions regarding ‘the approach’ 
• Culture cannot be implemented. Instead, this implies organizational development; a ‘learning’ 
approach is needed. 
• Line management play an important role in culture (development). For this reason, they play a 
central role in the approach. 
• ‘Organizational culture’ is a vague concept for many managers and employees. The approach has 
to support them to translate culture into their own day-to-day work: ‘what does it exactly mean for 
me to act entrepreneurially in specific customer situations?’ 
• The approach must be in line with the aims regarding employees:  
- ‘our employees are proactive and entrepreneurial’ 
- ‘autonomy and a personal sense of responsibility are our employees’ core characteristics’ 
- ‘in our company we stimulate employees to bring in ideas how to improve our service’ 
 
Approach 
• Start with top management: discuss approach and consequences for their own role (compare 
Argyris (1984, 1990), who argues that one should start with the top). 
• Follow the ‘cascade’: director and management team, management team members with their 
teams, etcetera. This way, employees can be invited to bring in ideas within their own circle of 
influence that can be implemented by themselves. This approach enables direct communication 
between managers and their employees and gives the opportunity to organize reflection and 
learning about the way people are working on improvement processes. 
• Each department gets a team coach, who should support reflection and learning. 
• Before and after each session the manager has a feedback session with the team coach about the 
communication patterns and his contribution. The underlying belief is that the team coach can ask 
question and give feedback in order to enable reflection and learning. 
• Regular progress meetings with director, individual managers and management teams contribute 
to keeps things result-oriented. 
• Evaluation after a couple of months. 
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Reflection 1 
 
 
Period 2: start-up 
 
Meeting director and team of interventionists; interventionist activate unilateral control 
In a session one of the interventionists introduces his team to the director. In addition, they discuss the 
workshop with all managers and team leaders that will take place.   
2.2 
 
Round to get acquainted. Dir starts and is open 
about his personal background. The next in row 
tends to cover compatible issues. 
 
Dir: Why do you cover the same issues? Please 
make your own choices. 
 
Int: Actually, that is what I did.  
 
Dir: O.k. 
 
When all persons have introduced themselves, the 
director says: ‘Well, all bright persons. Great’. 
 
Int (project leader): as you can hear, all persons 
have different backgrounds. This way we can 
deliver you a broad support. 
 
Dir: Why do you say that? I just called you bright 
persons. Do not over emphasize! 
 
Res: you are right. 
 
[….]  
 
Dir: the workshop of next week needs to be 
successful. You have to know that attendees will 
be very critical of what you do.  
 
Int: what makes them critical? 
 
Dir: Well, they come for a full day to this 
conference hotel. Then it has to add value, right? I 
expect real professionalism from you. 
 
 
Int: Of course you do. You can count on us.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Director gives a double bind message (Argyris).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director’s messages put pressure on the 
interventionists. As a consequence, the 
interventionists activate a unilateral control 
model: little inquiry and much problem solving 
(‘we fix this problem for you, you can count on 
us’). The question is, what is meant by ‘value’ 
and ‘professionalism’? Here, interventionists 
interpret these words as ‘giving attendees the 
feeling that this day was worth it and keeping 
things under control’. 
 
Illustration of unilateral control. 
 
 
 
Workshop with all managers and team leaders; change dilemmas and political correctness 
In a one-day workshop with 28 managers the change process is ‘kicked-off’.  
2.3 
 
Opening by director. Director has a very inspiring 
presentation. He starts with personal experiences 
as a customer and describes positive experiences. 
Subsequently, he clarifies the vision and (SMART) 
goals of this development process. Director talks 
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with ‘Begeisterung’. Many managers and team 
leaders seem to be moved, however not all of 
them.  
 
Presentation by interventionist, who shares 
dilemmas: 
- starting a change process with a kick-off session 
gives the impression that you’re not working on 
customer satisfaction now. However, without doubt 
you are. So this is not a change project with a 
beginning and an end, but rather a period of 
conscious learning.  
- by organizing a workshop for you, you are 
stimulated to be reactive (wait and see) 
- by asking to do sessions with your employees, 
others lead and you are led 
- by standing here and presenting you these 
insights, I am active and you are expected to be 
passive 
- by planning meetings in your schedule, we take 
initiative and you are expected to follow (while you 
don’t even know exactly what you are going to do 
during these meetings), 
- still, you are expected to feel responsible.  
Please, let’s help each other to find ways that help 
us feel responsible. And be open when you cannot 
feel responsible because of the way we organize 
things. 
 
After a presentation on the change approach 
(cascade model) all participants work on some 
questions, e.g. ‘what are possible blocking 
factors?’ and present the outcomes. ‘Political 
correctness’ is presented twice as a possible 
blocking factor. 
 
Nobody asks a question. 
 
Int: what do you mean by ‘political correctness’? 
 
Mgr: that we say ‘yes’ and think ‘no’. 
 
Int: you are quite open about this issue, which is 
not usual. 
 
Silence …. 
 
 
Dir: I don’t understand why people think they 
cannot be open. As if anyone has experienced 
some terrible punishment (dir laughs …as well as 
some others). You can say anything to me. Please 
come to me if there is anything to share.  
 
 
A hotel manager enters and asks if we can come 
for lunch, as we are quite late. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
B reactive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist aims at giving insight into some 
basic dilemmas related to initiating a change 
process: we say that we expect ownership and 
entrepreneurship and we act in a way that 
stifles these things just by giving the impression 
of an episodic change and by taking all kinds of 
initiatives from an subject-object perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager is open about defensive strategy: we 
tend to say ‘yes’ and think ‘no’ (compliance 
strategy). 
 
 
 
 
 
The problem is that valid information is not 
always pleasant to hear and is easily labelled 
as ‘difficult behaviour’ and ‘resistance’. Saying 
‘yes’ and thinking ‘no’ is less threatening and 
more common. 
 
 
 
Inconsistent: what dir says is ‘you can say 
anything to me’, however what he does – 
instead of inquiring- saying this perception of 
things makes no sense. The joking strategy 
helps making things undebatable. In doing so, 
he precisely confirms the pattern.  
 
Interventionist hesitates about making this 
issue debatable. Because of time pressure he 
does not. Later he regrets, as ‘the moment’ has 
gone.  
 
Interventionist could have covered this issue at 
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In the afternoon some simultaneous workshops on 
change management take place. 
 
this moment by inquiry:  
- what makes you say yes when you think no? 
- what does it bring you? 
- what is the effect on your actions/behaviour? 
- is this effect what you are aiming at? 
 
And to director (preferably in a personal 
conversation): 
- what does it mean to you that one tends to 
say ‘yes’ even if one thinks ‘no’?  
- would you like to find out how you contribute 
to this situation? 
- what could you do to find this out? 
 
 
  
Meeting management team 
In an evaluation of the kick-off meeting the director shares that the morning was good, however the workshops 
in the afternoon have not contributed to participants’ enthusiasm for this change process. He would have 
expected the interventionist to create this enthusiasm. Now he has a meeting with his managers that focuses on 
their role in the improvement process. The director leads the session, while the interventionists focus on the 
process. The latter strongly wish a positive experience for their client and wish to prove their professionalism. As 
a consequence, they are relatively tense. 
 
2.4 
 
Director takes much time (45 minutes) to evaluate 
the kick-off meeting. Conclusion: the morning was 
okay. However, the workshops in the afternoon 
had not met his expectations.  
 
Interventionists ask questions and do their utmost 
not to defend.  
 
Dir also shares his disappointment about relatively 
passive role that managers have played during the 
kick-off meeting. 
 
Managers do not respond to this. 
 
Director asks managers to share their vision on 
what they want to realize with this process within 
their own departments. 
 
Director gives turns to managers, takes time to ask 
questions and gives them room to share their 
ideas. Managers wait their turn and do not ask 
questions to each other.  
 
Until it is K’s turn. 
 
K: Am I allowed to divert a bit? 
 
Dir: Yes, but keep it brief please. 
 
K: Well, I have been working on my health more 
consciously lately. I even drink two litres of water, 
which I never did before. In short, I made a real 
behavioural change myself because I am 
intrinsically motivated. It is my ambition not to say 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P blaming 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the meantime, interventionists perceive a 
major responsibility for this management team 
as well. 
 
 
 
 
Actually, in this session the same pattern takes 
place as they are discussing. The director is 
relatively active and initiates the discussion, 
while managers are relatively reactive. These 
behaviours seem to relate circularly.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
K’s question confirms the circular pattern. 
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my team leaders and their employees must 
change. I want them to do it because they 
intrinsically want to. 
 
Silence. 
 
Dir: Well, but you have also a responsibility to 
manage the change and make things really 
happen. It is not free of obligations. 
 
K: I know, it isn’t. But in my opinion I should coach 
them to find out their own way rather than tell them 
what they should do. 
 
Dir: As we have learned in our training program, 
you have three roles: leader, coach and manager. 
You easily forget the management role.  
 
H (another manager): How would you monitor 
progress? We have to make progress, haven’t we? 
 
K: Yes, of course we have. But I don’t believe 
people will really change if I push them. 
 
M (another manager): People won’t change if you 
don’t push them, will they? 
 
 
 
K: O.k., the message is clear. I will involve the 
management role as well. 
 
 
 
 
Int: What is happening? You put quite some 
pressure on K, don’t you?  
 
All (including K): yes. 
 
Int: K, what is the effect of this? 
 
K: It does not feel pleasant; I feel I have to defend 
myself. 
 
Int: But it works, right? After all, you say that you 
comply. Does it feel this way? 
 
K: Well, actually I believe my way also works. But I 
see I need to change my belief. 
 
Int (to all): Is that what you want? 
 
H: No, I think you are right. We should not try to 
convince him, but I think we have to take time to 
find out how we wish to contribute to the change 
process. 
 
All agree. 
 
Dir: We shall cover this later; we had already put 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This sounds like a double bind message: ‘I 
want you to want it yourself.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is exactly the difference in beliefs between 
K and his colleagues. K does not want to push 
his team leaders (he knows the effect from 
experience, illustrated in this meeting). 
 
The control model (pushing) leads to a short 
term solution: the manager says he complies 
(compliance strategy). However, this seems to 
be no valid information and will probably not 
help in the longer run. 
 
Interventionist intends to make the effect of this 
behaviour debatable. After all, forcing each 
other to act and think the same as the majority 
is not consistent with the desire to stimulate 
entrepreneurship and ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
Int invites to share valid information. 
 
 
 
 
 
Int invites to make a free choice based on valid 
information and take responsibility.  
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the subject on the agenda. 
 
There appears to be not enough time. According to 
the agenda, director tries to initiate a brainstorm. 
However, the later it is, the more he pushes and 
the less response by the managers. 
 
Director seems to be very dissatisfied about the 
outcomes of this session. 
 
Dir: we do not have enough time at all. Int should 
have known this. We need much more time. 
 
HR: What about cancelling all sessions with 
employees scheduling longer sessions? 
 
Int: I would not do that. Unlike this one, these are 
three-hour sessions. It is our experience this will 
do. 
 
Dir and HR have a brief talk, followed by a 
statement by dir: next week on Thursday morning 
all have to clean their schedules and then we will 
have a next session. G (HR) and I will prepare. 
 
Int: would you like us to join? 
 
Dir: Let us think about that. 
 
Dir leaves the room with strong body language and 
without greeting.  
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P reduction 
P blaming 
 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The pressure stimulates the director to activate 
a control model. As a consequence, the circular 
process of an active director and reactive (even 
passive) managers is activated.  
 
 
 
 
Dir and HR reduce the situation to one factor: 
lack of time. Subsequently, the solution is 
scheduling longer sessions in the whole 
organization. In their opinion it is the 
interventionists who are to blame. 
 
The interventionist, who knows how difficult it is 
to schedule sessions, tries to save the situation. 
 
In the end the interventionists do not feel 
comfortable with the situation: there is still no 
relation and they are held responsible for the 
disappointment, as they ‘should have known 
more time was needed for this session’. In this 
situation they find it difficult to step into an 
independent position and give feedback about 
the process. As a consequence, they indeed 
add too little value, which leads to new 
disappointments. A circular process, that has to 
be stopped …. 
 
 
 
Session with director: feedback to his contribution to defensiveness 
Two days later director and interventionist have a conversation. In the meantime the interventionist does not feel 
comfortable in the process and has reflected upon possible explanations: 
- he experiences director’s behaviour as unpredictable, 
- he misses a relationship and feels he and his colleagues are being perceived as ‘suppliers’ and 
- the effect of this lack of comfort stimulates the need to stay in control by proving one’s professionalism and 
added value; as a consequence, he loses his independency and finds it hard to take up a position from which he 
can reflect on the process and share valid information (in other words, pressure activates a unilateral control 
model). 
 
The interventionist tries to break through this situation in the conversation by self-disclosure. 
 
2.5 
 
 
Director starts conversation enthusiastically and 
almost amicably, which is in strong contrast to the 
last session. 
 
Int: How do you look back at the management 
team session? 
 
Dir: Well, the outcomes did not fit my expectations. 
 
Int: What did you miss?  
 
Dir: It was not enough time. But even more 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
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importantly, I missed input from my managers and 
found them very slow. 
 
Int: I understand. Honestly, I was surprised that 
they had not prepared. It seemed they had not 
thought about your questions on goals and vision 
before. I don’t know how they really feel, but it 
came across as if they did not feel personally 
responsible.  
 
Dir: Yes, I see. You are right.  
 
Int: Still, I think you might contribute to this attitude 
yourself.  
 
Dir (open, curious): How? 
 
Int: What I see is that they mostly wait until you 
personally turn to them; there is almost no 
interaction between the managers during the 
meeting. You direct the meeting strongly and use 
words like ‘I’ll come back to you later’, which 
sounds like ‘wait until your next turn’. In doing so, 
you stimulate a reactive and dependent attitude. 
While you wish to stimulate entrepreneurship and 
pro-activity.  
 
Dir: I see ….but I have to take initiative, right? 
Exactly because they act this way. 
 
Int: You perceive their behaviour as the cause and 
your behaviour as effect. But your behaviour and 
theirs might be cause and effect at the same time. 
Like a vicious circle: you take initiative, they 
behave reactively, this is the reason for you to take 
more initiative and, in turn they will even be more 
reactive. 
 
Dir: I see. You are right. 
 
Int: And there is something else. Would you be 
interested in an additional point? 
 
Dir: Yes, please … 
 
Int: Let me present this from my personal 
perspective. In my experience you can be very 
unpredictable: from one moment to another you 
can be very dissatisfied about things, which you 
communicate verbally or nonverbally (int gives 
some examples). Sometimes I think we have built 
a relationship, but on the next moment it seems 
not to be there at all. As a consequence, I am on 
the alert and act very cautiously. I don’t think I give 
you what you deserve, then. 
 
Int: Do you recognize what I say? 
 
Dir (positively aroused): Yes, I can follow you. Go 
on. 
 
P blaming 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P linear 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The interventionist confirms the observations 
regarding the managers and distances as well. 
Argyris calls this ‘easing in’. doing so, he 
confirms a role as ‘partner in business’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist gives feedback about the circular 
patterns and addresses director’s role. The 
point is, the director is not satisfied about 
managers’ reactive attitude and stimulates this 
attitude with his own behaviour (self-fulfilling 
prophecy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist clarifies circularity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-disclosure by interventionist. Int describes 
the effects of director’s behaviour neutrally 
(without judging) and the way he tends to 
respond. As such, he shares valid information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int checks if he misses information.  
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Int: After all, it is my own responsibility to be able 
to deal with you and my feelings. However, it 
becomes important if this has the same effect on 
your managers. Might they be cautious because 
they cannot predict your reaction? 
 
Dir: Yes, they might be … 
 
Int: and as a consequence of their caution you 
increase pressure … 
 
Dir: Yes, I see I may contribute to their behaviour. 
 
Int: You could ask feedback from your managers 
regarding this issue. 
 
Dir: Yes, I will do that. 
 
[…] 
 
Dir: But you cannot put full responsibility on my 
shoulders. You and your colleagues should keep 
in mind to be professional, right. We need very 
good expertise. 
 
Int: Of course. I really would like to join your extra 
session next week. You cannot take this 
opportunity to prove our role.  
 
Dir: I would be pleased if you joined us. Many 
thanks for this conversation. This was very helpful.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
B inquiry (D) 
Int helps the director to reflect: might your 
behaviour have the same effects in his 
management team? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director recognizes circularity. 
 
Int invites to share this issue with his team, in 
order to stimulate mutual learning.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Actually, interventionist still does not know what 
director means by ‘professional’. He believes 
he can play a better role now, as he feels much 
more comfortable. He thinks this will help him to 
see patterns and make them debatable. 
However, he should have explored what the 
director really means. 
 
 
Second meeting management team; bypass of managers’ reactivity 
In order to speed things up, the HR manager has prepared a presentation regarding the issues that took much 
time the first management team meeting. The director has already approved the contents, the managers do not 
know about this initiative. 
2.6 
 
Director starts with very transparent structure for 
this meeting. Then he asks everybody to write 
down what – in their opinion - the vision is. No one 
asks a question, everyone starts writing. 
Subsequently, director stimulates an open 
discussion. He leaves much room to respond to 
each other. This part of the meeting is energetic 
and interactive; all ask questions. 
 
Subsequently, director announces that G (HR 
manager) has prepared a presentation about the 
themes that took much time to explore together. 
Dir has already approved the contents of the 
presentation. G starts her presentation that is well-
structured and has strong contents. All listen. After 
the presentation everyone keeps silent.  
 
Director (looks annoyed): I think he deserves a 
reaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
I cover-up 
I short term 
I symptoms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director succeeds to leave room and stimulates 
active participation by managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This intervention aims at speeding things up, as 
this process took much time in the first meeting. 
The circular pattern that underlies this is being 
covered up this way. In the short run, the 
presentation helps to make progress. 
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R: Well, how does this relate to the developments 
within department X? I think it is important that we 
stay in line. 
 
Director: We have to make our decisions. If we 
wait for others, nothing will happen. 
 
R (cautious): I don’t mean that we have to wait, but 
I think alignment is important to make things work. 
 
HR: Dir is right. Let us just start and make our 
decisions. We are not going to wait for others. 
 
R: Okay … 
 
Dir (still annoyed): other reactions? 
 
No one responds. 
 
Dir takes initiative again and addresses each 
manager personally: all say HR did a good job and 
all say they commit to the contents.  
 
 
Int (to dir): What we all can see is that you are 
annoyed.  
 
Dir: Yes, I am. But I did not want to intervene 
because I don’t want to block the process. 
 
Int: I am afraid you do by not saying what you 
think. What annoys you?  
 
Dir: I miss initiative. And I don’t understand why 
they don’t respond.  
 
Int: You could ask. 
 
Dir looks at managers. 
 
R: Well, I think it is a good piece of work. There is 
little to add. 
 
H: Yes, I agree. 
 
Int: Does W (dir)’s body language influence you? 
 
H: We see he is not satisfied.  
 
Dir: Yes, my expression is strong. I can’t hide what 
I think. 
 
Int: I would suggest sharing your thoughts openly. I 
think that would be less threatening.  
 
[…..] 
 
In the second part of this meeting the team works 
effectively. There are no difficult situations 
anymore. 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control↑ 
B repeat 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager complies (compliance strategy). 
 
 
 
 
 
To what extent do they really mean this? It 
might be a compliance strategy, however, this 
is not clear. The problem is that a control model 
stimulates people to share invalid information. 
 
Interventionist stimulates inquiry into the 
process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int thinks that director’s behaviour makes 
managers cautious and int tries to invite 
managers to speak out openly. Int should been 
open about these beliefs (advocacy) and been 
open to inquiry. 
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At the end of this session, director invites 
interventionist to share feedback with the team. 
Main observations: 
- in simple situations (no tension, no sensitive 
subjects) team operates fairly effectively: director 
leaves room, interaction between managers, active 
participation 
- in complex situations the director tends to 
enlarge control and reduce room; initiative and 
participation reduce and managers wait for their 
turn; director’s control and managers’ dependency 
are circularly linked 
- as such, entrepreneurship and pro-activity are 
being stifled 
- the presentation by HR was strong; however, one 
should be careful: the reason of her presentation 
was the team not being fast enough; this way this 
problem is by-passed and even confirmed; it is a 
short-term solution. 
 
All make notes. Silence.  
 
Int: Please take some time to think these things 
over.  
 
To what extent is (asking for) feedback a 
bypass? After all, when the interventionist gives 
feedback this seems to be free of obligations. 
People can be impressed, say the feedback is 
interesting and subsequently leave it for what it 
is. This would be a ‘shirk strategy’: shifting the 
responsibility to an ‘outsider’ and avoiding 
sharing one's own opinion about the process or 
colleagues.  
 
 
 
 
 
Session with director; discussion of bypasses that aim at speeding things up 
Later, director and interventionist evaluate the current reality and progress, inclusive the second management 
team meeting. 
2.7 
 
Int: what did you do with the feedback I shared 
with you during the last MT session? 
 
Dir: We have taken the feedback very seriously. In 
the afternoon, after you had left, we discussed 
your observations again.  
 
Int: Is there anything you can do with it? 
 
Dir: Well, it will take time. At least, now we are 
aware of the patterns you have described. 
 
Int: Can I give feedback on your personal role in 
these patterns? 
 
Dir: Yes, I am always open to feedback. 
 
Int: You got irritated about a lack of initiative and 
entrepreneurship, didn’t you? 
 
Dir: Yes, I did. 
 
Int: You tend to respond by showing your irritations 
without mentioning them and by taking more and 
more initiative, such as giving turns (??). Both 
reactions seem to stimulate exactly the behaviour 
you don’t like: people get cautious and act 
reactively and dependently.  
 
Dir: I see. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Int assumes a confirmation of a shirk strategy, 
however is not sure. Should he have checked 
this (valid information)? 
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Int: An illustrative example is the presentation by 
the HR manager. This was a great presentation. 
No doubt about that. And the contents were a 
major boost for the progress. However, a major 
reason for this presentation was you not being 
satisfied with the management team’s working 
pace and your team leaders’ initiative, right? 
 
Dir: Right.  
 
Int: Your solution helped in the short run. However, 
with this solution you stifled team leaders’ initiative 
in the longer run. Now they know that, in the end, 
you will come up with a solution. 
 
Dir: I understand what you say. But we don’t have 
plenty of time. I cannot wait all time. 
 
Int: What are your considerations that make you 
decide to speed things up? 
 
Dir: Well, the process is too slow. We started 
already two years ago, long before we invited you 
to support us. It is my role to put pressure on the 
process. 
 
Int: Is this the reason why you communicated to 
the organization that all team sessions should be 
sped up? 
 
Dir: Yes, that is my role. Employees look at us with 
disdain: will they succeed? 
 
Int: Can I go one step further? 
 
Dir: Yes. 
 
Int: It sounds like a difficult process. Your response 
is putting pressure on it. If you are still not satisfied 
about the progress, this might be not the best 
solution. Putting on pressure reduces freedom of 
obligations. That is okay. I think it would help if you 
inquired into the process as well, starting with your 
management team. Try to have a discussion on 
how you, your managers and the HR manager 
contribute to the recurrent patterns. Sometimes 
logical actions do not lead to logical effects. Then it 
is time to explore alternatives. 
 
It is time. 
 
Dir: I feel so sorry I have no more time for you. I 
promised to contribute to your study. I don’t feel 
comfortable with my tight schedule. It is too busy 
at the moment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
I symptoms 
I cover-up 
I short-term 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
I symptoms 
I cover-up 
I short-term 
Int shares the short term and long term effect of 
the HR manager’s presentation. In the short run 
it helps. However, the underlying circular 
problem remains not discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This belief (‘employees look at us with disdain’) 
apparently has a strong effect on director’s 
actions. Int could have explored what the effect 
exactly is. 
 
 
 
Afterwards, by reflection, the interventionist 
confronts a unilateral control model by using a 
unilateral control model: he increases pressure, 
repeats the message and tries to persuade the 
director. The latter mainly explains and defends 
his actions. 
Alternative (if interventionist is aware of this 
pattern in action) is inquiry into the pattern: ‘I 
feel I tend to persuade you; what is the effect of 
that?’ 
 
According to a mutual learning model, the 
interventionist could have made inconsistency 
visible and left room for the director to make his 
own choices: ‘what you wish (proactive 
behaviour, entrepreneurship) is not consistent 
with what you do (stimulating reactive 
behaviour). You could either leave your actions 
as they are and accept your managers’ 
behaviour or change your actions and 
contribute to their proactive attitude (valid 
information), Both options are consistent, it is 
up to you (free choice). 
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Reflection 2 
 
 
 
Period 3: sessions deeper in organization 
 
Start meeting with manager and team leaders: resistance as self-fulfilling prophecy 
When director and managers have established a clear vision and main goals, the managers plan sessions with 
their teams (team leaders) in order to discuss the implications for their department. The processes in one 
department are described as an illustration.  
2.8 
 
Meeting starts with strong body language. 
Atmosphere is tense. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction by manager: some slides describe 
goals of session. Atmosphere is still tense, nobody 
responds. 
 
Mgr: Who would like to respond? 
 
TL1: I miss the connection. 
 
Mgr: What do you mean? 
 
TL1: I miss the connection between what the MT 
has developed and what we are doing in our day-
to-day business. There should be 
acknowledgement of what our employees and we 
are already delivering.  
 
 
Mgr: Of course we do acknowledge your effort. But 
we are never good enough, are we. There is 
always room for improvement. 
 
TL2 (angry): Things don’t work here. Look how this 
is organized. We can say ‘yes’, if you want. But we 
are well-thinking individuals. (A long monologue 
about ICT possibilities, lack of entrepreneurship in 
the top, bad top management and the 
developments in society follows.)   
 
Mgr does not respond. 
 
Int (to TL2): you are very angry, aren’t you? It 
seems that you feel frustrated about your 
experiences in this organization, right? 
 
TL2: …..yes, right ….. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Up front, interventionists have heard some 
rumours about this team. It is said to be a 
‘difficult’ team. The first impression confirms 
this belief. In effect, the interventionist feels he 
has to support the manager to ‘deal with this 
difficult team’ and activates a unilateral control 
model.  
 
Introduction is relatively long. It seems that the 
more tense the atmosphere, the more directing 
by the manager, etcetera (circular pattern). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This message seems to be a reaction on 
episodic change, initiated by management. 
Episodic changes, combined with a Subject-
Object perspective, give the impression that 
‘change should be imposed on the organization 
because otherwise nothing will happen’.  
 
Neither manager, nor interventionist inquires 
into what TL1 means. Thus, they keep things 
under control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bypass by interventionist.  
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TL3: He says what he thinks. You should reward 
that. 
 
Int: I do. (subsequently, to TL2): I think you have a 
clear vision on how things could be organized. 
However, the angry way you present your vision 
keeps me from listening carefully. Is that what you 
want? 
 
TL2: …. Eh ..no … 
 
In the meantime many team leaders don’t 
participate in the discussion. 
 
TL4: The problem is, that we have brought in 
plenty ideas in the past. But the project team has 
done nothing with them. 
 
Mgr: You are right. We have a lot of improvement 
issues. Let us take our responsibility and put them 
into practice ourselves. 
 
Group work: manager invites team leaders to work 
out some ideas in small groups. Subsequently, 
these groups present their outcomes. The 
atmosphere is more interactive and pleasant.   
 
After these presentations, the manager presents 
some additional slides with the outcomes of the 
management team’s discussions on this subject 
(monitoring, management style). 
 
Many team leaders show strong (negative) body 
language. Manager goes on with his presentation. 
 
TL3: I understand that everything has already 
been decided. 
 
Mgr: No, it is just an outline. Just want to share this 
as input for your own thoughts.  
 
Other team leaders confirm TL3. 
 
Int: I don’t understand. You seem to have two 
faces: when you work out things yourself, you act 
constructively and positively. However, as soon as 
mgr presents some outlines and gives some 
direction, you seem to be offended by it. How 
come? 
 
TL5 (a bit offensive): what is your point? 
 
Int: I give feedback about how things come across. 
Do you accept that I do that? 
 
P: I don’t see what you mean. 
 
[….] 
 
TL4: What is the concrete direction, what are we 
aiming at? What is the thread? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist shares the effect of TL2’s 
behaviour (valid information) and gives room for 
free choice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mgr goes on, while he knows this is not 
effective. The same holds for interventionist, 
who strongly identifies with the manager. 
Inquiring into the problem might lead to 
unpredictable outcomes and put the manager in 
a difficult position. ‘Better neglect emotions and 
go on.’ 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist supports manager and takes a 
position against team leaders (partner-in-
business with manager). Although his intention 
is to give feedback and help the process, in 
effect he blames and generalizes. 
 
 
This defensive reaction is no surprise. 
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Mgr: We are aiming at a better service to our 
customers, as I presented at the start of our 
session.  
 
TL4: But what exactly are we going to do with our 
teams? What is my message to them? 
 
Mgr: Your message is that we are implementing 
our own ideas in order to create a better service to 
our customers. 
 
TL4: But I’m missing something…. 
 
Mgr: I am afraid we will run out of time; I wish to 
give some colleagues the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 
Some operational questions follow. At the end, the 
manager invites the interventionists to share some 
observations. 
 
Int: This has been a difficult session. For all of us. I 
am afraid we are not in connection with each 
other. I think you are all quite committed, but some 
of you are also disappointed. I think it is good that 
you share critical notes. This is much better than 
saying ‘yes’ and thinking ‘no’. Before, some of you 
referred to this as ‘political correctness’. However, 
at some moments I feel a firmness that makes it 
difficult to have an open conversation. This 
discouraged me to say what I think and stimulated 
me to be cautious. And it encourages me to stand 
beside the manager and against you. I am not sure 
if that is what you want. At the same time, we all 
have to reflect on the way we have contributed to 
this situation. This applies to the manager and us 
(interventionists) as well. We have to find out what 
the effect is of our approach and our behaviour.  
 
Mgr: Tomorrow we’ll see again. Let’s evaluate 
then. 
 
 
 
P blame 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
In other words, you should have listened more 
carefully …. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist intends to share valid information 
about the effect of team leaders’ behaviour and 
addresses circularity. Furthermore, he says that 
he appreciates them being open and sharing 
valid information (not saying ‘yes’ if one thinks 
‘no’). However, these words are not consistent 
with the interventionist’s perception and 
behaviour during the session, as he 
experienced valid information as ‘difficult 
behaviour’ and ‘resistance’ and activated a 
unilateral control model that – as a self-fulfilling 
prophecy – stimulated ‘difficult behaviour’ and 
‘resistance’. 
 
 
 
 
Feedback session with manager: interventionist distances himself as if he was not part of the situation 
After the meeting with team leaders, interventionist and manager have a feedback session. 
2.9 
 
[…] 
 
Int: How did you feel during the session? 
 
Mgr: I felt 
- not happy 
- more and more tense  
- disappointed about team leaders’ ownership 
- I was let down 
- I missed contact 
Actually I was angry. 
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Int: what kept you from saying these things? 
 
Mgr: I don’t know; it didn’t occur to me. 
 
Int : There was a distance between you and your 
team: the more tension, the more distance and the 
more focus on procedures. It seems there was a 
circular process: the more distance you took, the 
more critical some became, the more distance you 
took, etcetera.  
We saw a manager, but didn’t see you with your 
feelings and expectations. Do you see what I 
mean?  
 
Mgr: This is what I felt. I was stuck. 
 
Int: I have some suggestions; would you like to 
hear them?  
 
Mgr: Yes, please. 
 
Int. Tomorrow you will have another session. Try 
to be open then about what you really felt as an 
effect of their behaviour: you felt you were let 
down. Share valid information. Why do you think 
they acted as they did? 
 
Mgr: I think they did not feel they were taken 
seriously. There was no contact. 
 
Int: What about checking this and inquiring about 
what you did that stimulated their behaviour. 
Would you be prepared to take your own role into 
account? 
 
Mgr: Yes, I would. 
 
Actually, the interventionist had not been able 
to share these kind of feelings either. Both have 
been stuck in a unilateral control model that 
instructs them to keep things under control, to 
win, to suppress feelings, to avoid testing their 
own assumptions and to judge others (Argyris, 
1990). Manager and interventionist showed all 
these behaviours during the session. The 
interventionist was a good ‘partner-in-business’. 
 
By giving this feedback, the interventionist 
distances himself from the situation, as if he 
were not part of the situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist tries to help the manager to 
share valid information and explore (his role in) 
circular patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Afterwards, a good question for the 
interventionist as well. 
 
 
Communication between manager and team leaders 
The next day the manager has a regular meeting with team leaders. In this session the manager is open about 
what he had felt during the session and why he was disappointed. In addition, he clarifies what he expects from 
his team leaders and he inquires into what he did that stimulated the team leaders’ behaviour. Some say he 
was directing too much and not listening enough. Some felt they had not been taken seriously with all the 
pressure from the management team and the procedural focus during the session. Some found he had not 
taken enough time to hear their ideas and concerns. They agree a further session is needed; the manager and 
a team leader will prepare this session together and team leaders can bring in ideas. The next day the 
manager sends an e-mail message to all of them. Some parts are selected below. 
2.10 
 
Dear all,  
 
We had two special meetings this week. A start 
meeting and an evaluation meeting. I think we all 
had mixed feelings about the start meeting. During 
the evaluation I shared my feelings. I let you know 
that I have higher expectations regarding our 
leadership in this change process. Of course I will 
be very glad to involve my own role. I wonder, for 
example, if you think I take you seriously and if I 
take enough time to involve you. I look forward to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
B inquiry (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B proactive (D) 
I reflection (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager is open about his own role and his 
assumptions. He writes that he is willing to test 
his assumptions. This could be espoused 
theory. Later, this can be observed in action. 
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your personal and constructive feedback. I hope 
we can all give feedback to ourselves in order to 
develop ourselves, our team spirit and our 
organization. In our evaluation session I saw good 
leadership: taking responsibility for yourself, your 
team and the development process. My 
compliments!  
 
[….] 
 
Please share your input for our next session with P 
and me. My goal is to have a good, professional 
and inspiring meeting. Please offer your help, as 
we can do this only together! 
 
Best regards, 
 
J 
 
I long-term (D) 
I inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preparation of second session with manager and team leaders; manager reflects upon his role 
In a second session the manager wishes to create more active participation by team leaders, more connection 
and stronger commitment. After all, the improvement process aims at stronger entrepreneurship. This requires 
a feeling of ownership and responsibility. Therefore he has invited team leaders to bring in subjects for this 
session. The emphasis of their input is on ‘being concrete’, ‘how to involve employees’ and ‘action!’. In a pre-
session manager and interventionist rehearse some points of attention. 
2.11 
 
Int: just to rehearse, what are you going to be 
aware of during this session? 
 
Mgr:  
- keep contact, stay in touch 
- share valid information  
- beware of circularity: if I feel unpleasant, I have to 
beware of directing more and more. It would be 
better if I sat down and shared what I see and feel. 
Will you help me? 
 
Int: I will help you. However, this will not always 
mean that I confirm you. We saw what happened 
last time. 
 
Mgr: I understand. 
 
Int: What behaviour would you expect from your 
team leaders? 
 
Mgr: I want them to be open. 
 
Int: What will you do to stimulate this behaviour? 
 
Mgr: Just listen to what they say. I guess the better 
I listen, the less aggression, the easier for me to 
listen, the less ….etc.  
 
Int: Very good, you recognize circularity. Now, the 
challenge is to put this into practice. The more 
relaxed and comfortable you are, the greater the 
chance that you will succeed. What will help you to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
P own role (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
P own role (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager is aware of the circular relation 
between his actions and his team leaders’ 
actions. Besides, he is willing to share valid 
information. However, this all could be 
espoused theory. During the meeting, in action, 
he has to put this into practice. 
 
Int steps out of his ‘partner-in-business’ role, in 
order to feel free to act independently of the 
manager. He feels more comfortable in this 
role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, manager shows awareness of circularity. 
 
 
 
As pressure and discomfort will probably 
immediately activate a unilateral control model, 
the interventionist explores how the manager 
could create a feeling of comfort. The manager 
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feel comfortable? 
 
Mgr: Well, I prepared with a team leader and we 
have incorporated ideas of other team leaders. 
That helps me. Besides, the room is much better. I 
have reserved the café, which has a pleasant 
atmosphere.  
 
Int: Great. Is there anything you could do in the 
program that will help you?  
 
Mgr: I can do something. And I will. I’m starting 
with a special exercise. You’ll see (laughs..). And I 
have a beautiful movie that I will show during the 
break. I am sure that will move you. This meeting 
is going to be fun. 
 
[…]  
 
In the second part manager and interventionist 
prepare the procedural agenda of the meeting. 
 
already has several ideas how he could 
contribute to a good atmosphere. 
 
 
 
Second session with managers and team leaders; manager stimulates mutual learning 
During this session the manager contributes strongly to mutual learning and changing.  
2.12 
 
Mgr opens with a surprising introduction: he invites 
everyone to shake hands and say ‘welcome’ 
(something they did in a teambuilding session 
some months before, which had been a positive 
experience). 
 
The atmosphere is immediately different. 
 
Mgr (with a friendly, warm tone of voice): Welcome 
to this session. A second chance session. In our 
first session we were not in touch. We were 
opposing instead of working together. In the 
meantime several important things have 
happened. We had a good evaluation the next 
day. And many of you have given input for this 
session.  
In the meantime I have learned myself. I have had 
intensive contact with A (interventionist) about my 
style. I have learned that I tend to take distance in 
difficult situations. As a consequence, I lose 
contact, which stimulates you to be offended. I 
really want to keep in touch. 
 
TL1: It is not the change itself. I think most of us do 
want to change. It is the process and the tone of 
voice that bothered me: the management team 
has exactly formulated what we should do  …. 
 
Mgr: .. but these were only outlines … 
 
Int: I know you wish to listen carefully. …. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
P own role (D) 
B reflection (D) 
B proactive (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager is open about his own role and gives 
insight into the circular process. 
 
 
 
 
 
TL1 tells he finds it hard to feel responsible for 
things that are being imposed on him. The 
words he chooses make the manager 
defensive; he tries to control the situation (to 
win?). 
 
 
Int leaves his role of ‘partner-I- business’ and 
takes an independent role. The manager, 
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TL1: We want to be taken seriously. 
 
Mgr: What do you need to feel taken seriously? 
 
TL1: The way we talk now. In an open discussion.  
 
 
Mgr: Does anyone else wish to share any issues 
about the past? 
 
TL2: We don’t like to be ‘the difficult team’. That is 
what we hear in this organization.  
 
TL3: What is the idea? Do we want yes-men in this 
organization? That doesn’t feel good. 
 
Mgr: I don’t want yes-men. Let’s be honest, it 
would be easy if you just followed. However, I 
appreciate you being honest about your thoughts 
and feelings. Still, it is not always easy to deal 
with. I expect you to take responsibility as well. 
Can you imagine? 
 
TL3: Yes, I can. 
 
Mgr: Can we go on and explore how we can work 
on customer focus and entrepreneurship in our 
teams? 
 
All: yes 
 
In the meantime the atmosphere is much better. 
The manager is calm and takes time for his team 
leaders. 
 
[….] 
 
After a brief discussion on the focus of the 
development process and one’s own role, 
subgroups are invited to think about the way team 
leaders want to organize workshops with their 
teams. Subsequently, ideas are shared plenarily. 
 
One team leader (the one that is generally seen as 
a ‘difficult’ person): I am not happy with the way we 
act. We prepare sessions without our employees. 
But why don’t we involve them? It is strange, isn’t 
it? When we drive to this company in the morning 
we are all equal travellers. And in normal life we 
are equal citizens. However, within the walls of this 
company there is a difference between persons 
who lead and employees who are led. What is the 
exact moment this new situation starts: the 
moment we enter the building?  
 
Int: This is an interesting question. What exactly is 
the effect of you preparing the session without 
your employees? 
 
TL1: The effect is that we create a distance 
between our employees and us. They might feel 
 
 
 
B inquiry (D) 
I reflection (D) 
I long-term (D) 
I inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
B inquiry (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-subject 
(D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
subsequently, is able to put the feedback into 
practice immediately. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager shares valid information. He is open 
about not wanting yes-men and about yes-men 
being easier to deal with. He is also open about 
his expectations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This team leader uncovers the basic paradox: 
as soon as team leaders prepare their 
sessions, they initiate a process from a Subject-
Object perspective and – as a consequence – 
they initiate a circular pattern of active team 
leaders and reactive/dependent employees.  
 
Most team leaders are not enthusiast about his 
point of view. They find him abstract and 
difficult to follow. 
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that we don’t take them seriously.  
 
Int: This is an important issue. I suggest you don’t 
surprise your employees during the session with 
your ideas and questions. Rather invite them to 
prepare and come up with ideas upfront. 
Otherwise you would push them even more 
strongly into a dependent attitude (‘well, we’ll see 
what my team leader comes up with’). 
 
TL1: We are going to do that. 
 
[….] 
 
Manager finishes the session with a brief 
evaluation by asking each individual team leader 
for his/her feeling. All are positive and agree this 
was ‘much better’.  
 
Mgr: What was the difference? How did we make 
this session more productive? 
 
TL: You took time for us and there was a dialogue. 
In the first session there was much more directing 
from you.  
 
Mgr: I am positive as well and wish to give you a 
compliment. I have seen a lot of energy, 
responsibility and team spirit. Thank you very 
much and good luck with your team session. A 
(interventionist), would you be so kind as to share 
your observations? 
 
Int: I have learned from you. To be honest, in the 
first session I tended to perceive you as a ‘difficult 
team’. I really appreciate if one is open, however 
one can easily label real openness as ‘resistance’. 
I did. In turn, I started helping J (manager) to 
persuade you and took distance. This stimulated 
you precisely in your behaviour. After all, I did not 
help J this way. On the contrary. Today you have 
shown how engaged you are.  
 
TL: Could you spread this message in the 
organization? To be honest, we don’t like to be 
labelled as ‘the difficult team’ time after time.  
 
Int: What is the effect of being labelled this way? 
 
TL: We feel unhappy with it. Actually I get angry. It 
de-motivates me when the organization talks this 
way, just because we are not yes-men. 
 
Int: I will talk positively about you. However, if you 
are labelled this way time after time, you should 
think together why that happens. You might be in a 
vicious circle: you get angry, which leads to more 
negative labels, which make you even angrier, 
etcetera. Please try to find out together how you 
could stop this recurrent pattern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P distance 
P linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist gives a suggestion of how to 
resolve the circularity. This is a pragmatic but 
single-loop solution. An (double loop) 
alternative would be to explore to organize a 
process that gives better opportunities for 
employees to get involved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist reduces distance by self-
reflection and involving his own role. Besides, 
he shares valid information and addresses 
circular patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TL does not involve their own role, as if ‘the 
organization’ perceive them as difficult without 
any reason. 
 
Interventionist tries to make circularity visible 
and stimulates reflection on one’s own 
contribution to the situation. 
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Manager and team leader: mutual exchange of valid information 
In a feedback session the manager tells the interventionist that the ‘difficult’ team leader in effect is quite loyal. 
To illustrate this, he quotes a recent conversation that appears to be a strong example of a mutual learning 
conversation. 
2.13 
 
Manager: I would like you to contribute to this 
policy. 
 
Team leader: Would you like me to be intrinsically 
motivated or is this just something I have to do? 
 
Manager: It is just something you have to do. 
 
Team leader: O.k., I will do it. But don’t expect me 
to do it because I feel so. 
 
Manager: I understand and I am aware of that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid 
 
 
B valid 
 
 
B valid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Valid information. 
 
 
Valid information. 
 
Free choice and responsibility for the effects. 
 
 
 
Reflection 3 
 
 
 
Period 4: monitoring sessions 
 
Management team meeting; positive signals 
In a subsequent stage all teams have monitoring sessions. Main goal of these sessions is to discuss progress 
and to schedule new actions. The first session is in the management team. 
2.14 
 
Dir opens the meeting: Friends, it is a beautiful 
day! Great weather, great conference hotel and a 
great moment in our development process. I would 
like to start with looking back: how do you perceive 
the last two months? 
 
Silence 
 
Dir (open): Who wants to start? 
 
Silence. After a while one manager starts. 
 
Mgr1: We had a good session with our team. 
Team leaders responded positively and 
constructively. In the meantime, many 
improvement issues have been selected and 
teams have started putting their actions into 
practice. Also, in my opinion this process helps 
managers and team leaders to be a better team. 
Now we have to make clear whether customers 
really take advantage of our initiatives. 
 
Dir: Do you believe we are going to make a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director creates a positive atmosphere. 
Furthermore, he stimulates active participation 
and ownership by asking questions during the 
meeting. In doing so, his actions are consistent 
with his desire to enlarge entrepreneurship and 
ownership. 
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difference in the coming two months? 
 
Mgr1: It all depends on our monitoring. Success is 
in our hands. We cannot blame anybody but 
ourselves if we don’t succeed. 
 
Dir: How? 
 
Mgr1: We have to inform ourselves actively of 
concrete progress and discuss success and 
failure. We have to stimulate action and have to 
learn about what we are doing. 
 
Dir: Would anyone like to add something? 
 
Mgr2: The question is: how exactly are we going to 
steer this process? 
 
Mgr1: We have to develop execution power. 
 
Mgr3: My first session was very difficult. There was 
no connection and there was a distance between 
my team and me. The more distance they took, the 
more distance I took, the more distance they took. 
I saw that this was not going to work, but we were 
just stuck. 
However, we learned a lot from that session and 
were a much better team afterwards. 
 
Int: What did you learn? 
 
Mgr3: I learned that I tend to take distance in 
difficult situations. As a consequence, I lose 
contact, which stimulates my team leaders to be 
offended. Thus I create my own problems. And I 
have learned that it is hard to break through this 
cycle when it is active.  
The second session was very effective. We took 
enough time for each other and worked together 
on a good translation of the process to the teams. 
In the meantime all team leaders have had a 
session. By and large, these sessions were 
successful and led to concrete improvement 
issues that employees can influence themselves.  
 
About our role, I agree with mgr1’s point of view. 
We should openly let them know that we expect 
concrete results. Besides, we should support them 
and show our commitment.  
 
HR: I see the process is alive. I see many 
initiatives. We are still trying to find out how we can 
work things out in our department.  
 
Dir: Great. I am proud of you. But now we have to 
be sure that we are really going to harvest the 
coming period. How are we going to steer that? 
 
[…] 
 
 
 
 
P own role (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P dynamic (D) 
P own role (D) 
P mutual (D) 
P circular (D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P circular (D) 
 
 
Mgr 1 takes full responsibility and ownership. 
No blaming, however considering his own role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mgr 3 shows he has internalised his 
experiences and insights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Director gives positive feedback and calls for 
concrete results. Subsequently, he invites to 
explore how these results can be realized.  
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Meeting with manager and team leaders; defensiveness pops up again 
Some illustrative parts of the session between one manager and his team leaders are described below. This is 
the same department that has been described before. In this meeting the interventionist does his utmost to 
address defensiveness. 
2.15 
 
Mgr opens with a positive reflection of the 
preceding period and gives compliments to the 
team leaders about the first results. Subsequently, 
he looks forward. 
 
Mgr: We will have to steer this process. It is all 
people business. It is our challenge to commit 
persons and to motivate them. It is all about being 
pro-active, to make clear appointments, to show 
commitment and a strong coordination. Today, I 
would like to explore with you how we can keep 
the energy in the process. Besides, I would like to 
inspire you. 
 
Some laugh (not negatively, rather a reaction of 
‘we will wait and see’). 
 
Mgr: But, to be honest, I feel dependent. I cannot 
realize anything alone. We have to support each 
other and work together. 
 
[….] 
 
Mgr shows an instruction movie (Fish!) about 
leading change, followed by a question: What 
struck you while watching this movie? 
 
TL1: They focus on coaching, which attracts me 
more than steering. 
 
TL2: One really has to believe; it has to be 
genuine. That is not always the case here. Here 
we tend to be politically correct. 
 
TL3: If one does not believe in the vision, it is not 
going to work. 
 
TL4: One could also take another perspective: one 
has to be prepared to commit.  
 
TL5: Yes, what results does one want to realize 
oneself? 
 
Mgr: Let’s apply the insights to our own situation. 
What is needed to keep the improvement process 
alive? 
 
TL6: We have to repeat our vision time after time. 
 
TL7: What exactly do you repeat, then? 
 
TL6: The vision of this development process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B valid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The belief that the manager is responsible for 
inspiring team leaders might lead to the 
opposite. Team leaders respond dependently 
and reactively (we will wait and see’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Openness about defensiveness. However 
nobody responds. This is in line with Senge 
(1990): “To retain their power, defensive 
routines must remain undiscussable. Teams 
stay stuck in their defensive routines only when 
they pretend that they don’t have any defensive 
routines, that everything is all right, and that 
they can say ‘anything’” (Senge, p. 255). 
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TL2: We have to live the message ourselves. Not 
the organization, not our boss, not the 
interventionist, but I have a vision. 
 
TL3: That will cost time, as the movie shows. 
 
TL8 (just a team leader for a week; was previously 
one of the employees): People do not really find 
this process important. 
 
TL1: There is no clear sense-of-urgency. 
 
TL4: Don’t refer to a sense-of-urgency. It is my 
personal interest to make things work. My job 
becomes more attractive by the improvements. 
What does it bring you personally? 
 
TL5 (to TL1): Why do you need a sense of 
urgency? Because you want to put pressure on 
things? That is not the coaching way, is it? 
 
Silence … 
 
Int: It strikes me that you don’t explore two 
remarks that have been made: political 
correctness and ‘people don’t really find the 
improvement process important’. I have heard this 
‘political correctness’ several times. What do you 
mean by it? 
 
Silence … 
 
TL2: Well, it means people just follow and are not 
open about what they really think: here, 
employees, top managers…. 
 
TL4: I don’t like the word. And actually it bothers 
me that this is brought in time after time. 
 
TL5: Let us focus on what we can do ourselves, 
what is within our own circle of influence. 
 
Int: This ‘political correctness’ word seems to hang 
over the process like a dark cloud. Let us inquire 
into how we could help the process forward. 
 
TL2: The best way is to ignore it. 
 
Int: But if you say that we don’t say how we really 
think about this improvement process we cannot 
ignore, can we? 
 
TL2: But the problem is not in this group. It is 
somewhere else …. 
 
Tense silence  
 
TL4: We should neither accept nor ignore, 
however we should be aware of the risk and go on 
with this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TL8 shares a threatening message. Nobody 
responds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TL5 addresses inconsistency. However, the 
way he does (persuading) does not invite TL1 
to reflect and is inconsistent in itself. 
 
 
 
Interventionist tries to make defensiveness 
debatable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Valid information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interventionist tries to stimulate inquiry into 
defensiveness. 
 
 
Several defensive strategies are being 
activated: ignorance/denial strategy. 
 
 
 
 
Distance strategy: it is not here but somewhere 
else. 
 
 
 
This seems to be an ignorance/denial strategy 
in different words. 
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Int: This is difficult, isn’t it. Saying that this is not 
really a problem could be a confirmation of the 
problem.  
 
Several managers: We think we just have to go on. 
 
Mgr: This is difficult to grasp. I think we should all 
focus on our own role. And I appreciate if we can 
be open about what we really think. We have 
learned that before.  
Let’s go back to where we were (looks at TL1). 
 
TL1: Well, after all I don’t want them to do it for 
me. I want them to do it because they want it 
themselves. 
 
Many confirm.  
 
Mgr: That is important indeed. We have to make 
them do it by themselves. 
 
Int: Sounds like a difficult assignment: ‘I want you 
to do it because you want it yourself.’ 
 
Silence 
 
TL4: That is an impossible assignment, isn’t it? But 
I think many employees want to make 
improvements themselves.  
 
TL7: I guest you’re right. But what if they don’t? 
 
Then we just have to expect them to do it. 
 
Int: Don’t expect people to do it because they want 
to. Nor try to persuade them that they have to be 
motivated.  
 
[….]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
B control 
 
 
 
 
 
P subject-object 
B control 
What could interventionist do differently, without 
being in a control model of persuading and 
pressing? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And make this issue undiscussable …. 
The interventionist feels he is pushing too hard 
and stops trying to make this discussable as 
their free choice seems to leave it as it is. 
Besides, two team leaders watch him in a way 
he translates as ‘please don’t go on, as we just 
don’t want her negative remarks about political 
correctness’. He does not check this. The 
question is, how far should the interventionist 
go to make the undiscussable discussable?  
 
Feedback of double bind assignment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A relatively large amount of instruction (single-
loop learning): do this, do that …., which 
reflects a unilateral control character. 
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Reflection 4 
 
 
 
 
Period 5: later developments 
 
Management reflection session: how do we get our employees in the right mode? 
Some months later several evaluation sessions are planned. Generally, people are satisfied with the 
improvement initiatives that are being taken: concrete improvement actions have led to higher customer 
satisfaction rates. However, several managers and team leaders bring in that they have to work very hard to 
keep the process moving. Illustrative are minutes of meeting of a management reflection session. 
2.16 
 
[….]  
 
After the collection of problems there appeared to 
be one clear thread: employees tend to shirk their 
responsibility by referring to all kinds of 
circumstances. 
 
The leading question in our session was: ‘how do 
we get our employees in the right mode and how 
can we explain why this process is so laborious?’ 
 
Together, we draw the conclusions that the effect 
of this development process must be clear and 
that management has an important role in keeping 
the process alive. 
 
It strikes us that employees are blocked in being 
creative and bringing in ideas because they have 
to put their ideas into practice: ‘good idea, could 
you please work this out?’ And they might not feel 
like putting time into working things out.  
 
Managers have a role in making employees more 
flexible so that they can follow the development 
process.  
 
A couple of solutions have been brought in: 
- reflection sessions on all organization levels 
- workshops 
- meetings with a clear theme 
- knowledge management (focus employees’ 
attention on core competences).  
 
[….] 
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Appendix 3 Cross-case analysis  
 
 
The transcripts in all cases have been encoded, based on the operational 
translations in table 5.1. The first overview in this appendix shows how often each 
expression of unilateral control was noticed in the cases. The second overview does 
the same concerning the alternatives that de-block changing.  
 
1. Expressions of unilateral control 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
PERCEPTION (P)    
Reductionism 
Reducing complex problems to simple 
and manageable categories of incidents 
and problems – P reduction 
 
2 1 5 
Distancing 
Considering oneself as not being a part 
of ‘the problem’ and observing ‘the 
problem’ from a distance – P distancing 
 
9 3 17 
Blaming 
Selecting one or more parties as being 
the cause of ‘the problem’ – P blame 
 
8 4 20 
Linear patterns 
Considering only one-way causal 
relationships of cause and effect –  
P linear 
 
6 4 12 
Subject-object 
Considering leader as an active subject 
that imposes reality on employees, being 
passive objects – P subject-object 
 
3 9 16 
BEHAVIOUR (B)    
Controlling circumstances 
Unilateral control, the desire to win, 
suppress feelings, to avoid testing one’s 
own assumptions, to judge others, to be 
rational and to avoid situations that are 
considered difficult to control or have 
uncertain outcomes –  
B control 
 
9 12 10 
Repeated behaviour regardless of 
ineffectiveness 
Showing the same behaviour time after 
time, regardless of the perceived 
negative consequences –  
B repeat 
 
10 4 3 
Stronger control in case of threat 
Showing even more controlling behaviour 
if one experiences threat from the 
environment (e.g. feedback, time 
10 4 3 
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pressure, pressure on results, pressure 
from shareholders or clients) – B control↑ 
 
Reactive behaviour 
Solutions are expected to start outside 
oneself - B reactive 
 
3 1 9 
INTERVENTIONS (I)    
Focus on symptoms  
Focusing on the visible problems that 
should be solved – I symptoms 
 
2 4 5 
Cover-up of underlying patterns 
Avoiding inquiry into more fundamental 
problems that ‘produce’ the symptoms 
(questions like ‘how do we keep 
ourselves from successful change 
processes’ and ‘what makes these 
problems reoccur time after time?’) –  
I cover-up 
 
6 4 2 
Short-term solutions, quick wins 
Focusing on quick and practical solutions 
for symptoms (pragmatic short-term 
perspective) – I short-term 
 
2 4 2 
Focus on impersonal instruments 
Preferring instrumental ways of ‘solving 
or controlling the problem’, e.g. 
instruments, techniques, checklists, tips 
‘n tricks – I instruments 
 
2 3 5 
DESIGN OF ORGANIZATION (O)    
Positional organization 
Organizations are designed as a 
hierarchical ranking of people based on 
the degree to which they have an 
overview of and insight into the 
organization; focus on structure (and 
boundaries) –  
O positional 
 
0 0 3 
Variety reduction 
Attempts to keep control by organizing 
along the principle of positional 
organization as well as by planning and 
structuring for control – O variety 
reduction 
 
0 0 2 
Subject-Object  
Relations between an active agent 
(subject) and an acted-upon (passive) 
object that are perceived as being 
sharply separated entities –  
O subject-object 
 
0 2 1 
Organization and change separated 
Considering organization as a stable 
condition and change as an episodic 
0 0 0 
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period in between an old stability and a 
new and desired stability – O episodic 
 
CHANGE OF ORGANIZATION (C)    
Goal-oriented and planned process 
Elaborative plans describe the steps that 
lead to clear goals along a linear path -  
C planned 
 
1 1 1 
Step-by-step 
Focusing on stages and steps; the output 
of each stage is logically input for the 
next stage – C step-by-step 
 
1 1 1 
Episodic and top-down 
Considering change as a logical result of 
(top-down) initiatives, that will not evolve 
otherwise –C top-down 
 
0 1 3 
Rational 
Emphasizing rational analyses and 
considerations – C rational 
 
1 1 2 
 
 
 
2. Expressions of alternatives that de-block changing and organizing 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
PERCEPTION (P)    
Considering dynamical complexity –  
P dynamic (D) 
 
3 1 5 
Considering one’s own role in underlying 
patterns – P own (D) 
 
14 7 7 
Considering mutual influences –  
P mutual (D) 
 
6 1 3 
Dynamical/circular patterns: each party 
or element is both cause and effect –  
P circular (D) 
 
5 6 5 
Considering leader and employees as 
well-thinking and making choices based 
on valid information – P subject-subject 
(D) 
 
0 1 0 
BEHAVIOUR (B)    
- Valid information (which includes 
information that may cause 
embarrassment or may be difficult to deal 
with) 
-Informed and free choice  
- Personal responsibility and commitment 
to effective implementation –  
B valid (D) 
 
5 4 1 
Reflection on effectiveness of own 11 2 10 
 372 
behaviour and exploring alternatives –  
B reflection (D) 
 
Ability and willingness to test one’s 
assumptions; learning by advocating own 
position and encouraging inquiry into or 
confirmation of it, and minimizing face 
saving - B inquiry (D) 
 
4 4 4 
Pro-active behaviour by self-disclosure, 
dialogue and inquiry into one’s own role 
– B proactive (D) 
 
3 1 1 
INTERVENTIONS (I)    
Researching underlying patterns that 
‘produce’ symptoms –  
I patterns (D) 
 
1 0 0 
Inquiring into underlying patterns and 
defensive routines that aim at covering 
up these patterns, including one’s own 
defensive routines – I inquiry (D) 
 
4 2 0 
Making underlying patterns and 
defensive routines debatable and 
developing approaches to de-block 
change processes (fundamental long-
term perspective) – I long-term(D) 
 
5 2 0 
Focus on learning by reflection, inquiry 
and dialogue – I reflection (D) 
 
5 2 0 
DESIGN OF ORGANIZATION (O)    
Transactional organization: organizing is 
a process of ongoing transactions, 
relationships and meaning creation; 
focus on processes (and interfaces) –  
O transitional (D) 
 
0 0 0 
Variety beats variety; acceptance of 
several perspectives and meanings –  
O variety (D) 
 
0 0 0 
Subject-subject relations, based on 
equality: each party is part of the ‘system’ 
and plays his role in the patterns –  
O subject-subject (D) 
 
0 0 0 
Organizing and changing as interlocked 
processes, that cannot be sharply 
separated –  
O continuous (D) 
 
0 0 0 
CHANGE OF ORGANIZATION (C)    
Process-oriented, focusing on value and 
effects of day-to-day interactions –  
C process (D) 
 
2 0 0 
Focusing on day-to-day interactions 0 0 0 
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between leader, employees (and 
consultants) – C interactions (D) 
 
Considering human beings as being able 
to continually change and improve 
autonomously, without any force by 
others – C autonomous (D) 
 
0 0 0 
Emphasizing emergent and blocked 
changing and organizing – C emergent 
(D)  
 
0 0 0 
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Appendix 4 Findings of informed expert  
 
 
All cases have been evaluated by an informed expert. The aim is to get an objective 
judgement of  
• the quality of the case analyses; 
• the consistency and transparency of the chain of evidence, leading from raw data 
to interpretations and reflections to conclusions; 
• the quality of the application of the theory. 
 
The informed expert is E.L. Drukker. Several scientists and practitioners have 
mentioned his name as a professional who is not only familiar with Argyris’ work, but 
who is also able to bring the concepts into practice. Furthermore, he is an 
experienced action researcher. 
 
The cases were evaluated in two sessions. In between, there were some additional 
contacts. The feedback of the two sessions is summarized in this appendix. 
 
 
First session, July 14th, 2006 
 
• Your diagnosis model is a smart format, which is very helpful for your analyses.  
• The analyses are good, but boring. Something is missing. You analyse the 
different situations and that is fine. However, you describe them as an observer 
who is outside the text. It is too objective, as if you were not involved in the case. 
You have had considerations why you made several choices, but you have not 
made them explicit yet. The surplus value of your doctoral thesis is in what is 
missing. 
• Are you defending your case? As a researcher, you have to take a distance from 
what you did as an interventionist. Information becomes valid when you can 
make free choices. That means you need a certain distance. As a researcher, 
you have to feel responsible only for the analyses, not for what happened in that 
room. That would help you to look critically and free of your own role as an 
interventionist.  
• The matter of ‘defensiveness’. It is okay to be defensive. Accept defensiveness 
as something normal, also for you as an interventionist in the cases. However, try 
to find out what the effects are and how you could contribute to your own and 
others’ learning.   
• The conclusions of your cases are sound. I agree with them. I even think you 
could be firmer.  
• I think you do a great job in using Argyris’ theory. Everything is in it. The only 
thing you have not used is the ladder of inference. For further reading I suggest 
Isaacs (1999) and Kegan (1994). 
• There are some specific remarks regarding your analyses (not involved in this 
summary). 
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Second session, January 17th, 2008 
 
• There is a huge difference with the last time. Then, I found your reflection too 
much on the surface and from a distance. But not anymore. The commentaries in 
the third column are a pleasure to read and they are sound. Sometimes I think 
‘why would he think that, but that is in a very few instances (later these instances 
were discussed; not involved in this summary). 
• The description of your cases is convincing. However, the hit is your reflections. 
Unlike the first time, now you dare to evaluate your own role as an interventionist 
critically. In your reflections, you illustrate that you accept your own 
defensiveness as an interventionist. You are more open about your assumptions 
and reasoning and analyse the consequences of your defensiveness. After all, 
defensiveness is normal. Your challenge as a practitioner and researcher is to 
see defensiveness and find out how to turn it into learning for you and clients. 
(Mutual) learning supposes that you accept that you might be wrong or that you 
might miss something. This is an essential condition that distinguishes Model II 
(mutual learning) from an advanced way to apply Model I, e.g. by asking for other 
beliefs and thinking that in the end you are right. 
• The cases and analyses are well organized. You have kept your material under 
control. The structure and your line of reasoning are transparent. 
• The relation with the theory is also clear. As I said last time, the model that you 
have developed is a helpful format for your analysis. Although the subject of your 
thesis is quite complex, you succeed in keeping the theory relatively transparent. 
In my opinion, you have realized your aim to contribute to making Argyris’ work 
more accessible and actionable. What I like in your cases is that you clearly 
illustrate that managers are able and willing to take steps towards a mutual 
learning model whenever they see this will help them to realize their goals.  
• There is one issue that I would like to address. In case 3 you argue that Argyris’ 
insights do not involve power. In my opinion Model I (unilateral control) is strongly 
based on power thinking. It is a power model that leads to defensive routines and 
systemic reactions. In case 1 you demonstrate how you feel intimidated and 
unfree initially and how you succeed in finding back your autonomy. A good 
example that illustrates how power works and that you don’t need to get stuck in 
the situation. 
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Appendix 5 Circular patterns 
 
 
In this appendix the 11 circular patterns are depicted that are all different 
manifestations of a Subject-Object perspective. 
 
 
Manager active; employees reactive 
The more initiative managers take (executing change actions, organizing meetings, 
chairing meetings, stressing the need for change), the more reactive and 
dependent employees behave, the more initiative managers take, etcetera. 
 
Manager initiates change process; employees (act as if they) follow 
The more managers consider themselves as subjects who can impose changes 
upon employees, the more employees (act as if they) follow, the more managers 
are confirmed in their belief they should impose changes, etcetera. 
 
Manager talks; employees (act as if they) listen 
The more managers talk(about ‘the change approach’, their opinion, the need for 
change) the more employees (act as if they) listen, the more managers direct, 
etcetera.  
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Manager solves problems; employees bring problems in 
The more managers solve problems that employees bring in, the more employees 
bring in their problems (instead of solving them themselves), the more managers 
solve their problems, etcetera.  
 
 
Manager instructs; employees wait for next instruction 
The more managers instruct, the more employees wait for the next instruction, the 
more managers instruct, etcetera.  
 
 
Manager acts as if he knows answers; employees act as if they don’t 
The more managers act as if they know the answers (even if they don’t), the more 
employees act as if they don’t, the more managers act as if they know the answers, 
etcetera.  
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Manager feels uncomfortable and takes distance; employees feel uncomfortable and take 
distance 
The more uncomfortable managers feel, the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable employees feel and the more distance they take, the more 
uncomfortable managers feel, etcetera. 
 
 
Manager expects resistance and braces himself; employees respond negatively and oppose 
The more managers expect employees will show resistance, the more they tend to 
brace themselves and persuade, the more employees respond negatively and 
develop resistance, the more managers brace themselves, etcetera. 
 
 
Manager pushes to speed up progress; employees are passive and wait for their turn 
The more managers increase pressure to speed up progress, the more employees 
become reactive, the more managers increase pressure to speed up, etcetera. 
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Manager implements control instruments; employees resist management initiatives  
The more managers enlarge control, the more employees believe managers are 
not a positive role model and resist management initiatives, the less management 
influence, the more managers enlarge control, etcetera.  
 
 
Manager tries to motivate and inspire employees; employees feel lack of motivation and 
inspiration 
The more managers try to motivate and inspire their employees, the less 
employees feel responsible for their own motivation and the more they feel 
dependent on the manager’s capability to motivate and inspire, the more managers 
need to motivate and inspire, etcetera.  
 
 
 
